Disarmament Diplomacy
Issue No. 11, December 1996
US Department of Energy announcements:
Nuclear danger reduction programme; post-CTBT nuclear weapons
complex
The US Department of Energy (DOE) made two, interrelated and
overlapping, announcements in December, one concerning the US
nuclear weapons complex, which is being remodelled to take account
of lower nuclear stockpiles and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT), and one designed to reduce the danger posed by surplus, and
potentially insecure, weapons-grade materials and facilities. See
also News Review.
US plans for post-CTBT nuclear weapons complex
'Design Final for Weapons Complex Without Underground Nuclear
Testing: Livermore's National Ignition Facility to Proceed,'
Department of Energy Press Release, R-96-181, 19 December
1996
Full text
"The US Department of Energy (DOE) today finalized its plans for
a smaller, more efficient, and flexible nuclear weapons complex
that can maintain the nation's nuclear deterrent without
underground nuclear testing and without production of new weapons
for the foreseeable future.
When signing the Record of Decision for the Stockpile
Stewardship and Management Programmatic Environmental Impact
Statement, Secretary of Energy Hazel R. O'Leary said, 'With the end
of the Cold War, the Department of Energy's weapons laboratories
and production plants are now focused on warhead dismantlement and
assuring the safety and reliability of the remaining stockpile
without underground nuclear tests. This week's announcement -
success by DOE and Intel to build the world's fastest "ultra"
supercomputer - illustrates the enormous progress and potential for
the science-based approach. We don't need as large a weapons
complex; we don't need underground testing. The result is a safer,
more peaceful world for the 21st century.'
Stockpile stewardship focuses on providing the science base
needed to ensure the safety and reliability of the remaining
weapons stockpile under a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
Supercomputers, like the DOE and Intel's machine, that can model
weapons data will play an important role in the success of this
approach. Stockpile management focuses on maintenance,
manufacturing, surveillance and refurbishment of the remaining
stockpile, and the dismantlement of weapons no longer required.
The record of decision allows DOE to proceed with the
construction and operation of three new facilities to enhance its
science based stockpile stewardship program: the National Ignition
Facility and the Contained Firing Facility at Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory in California; and the Atlas Facility at Los
Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico. These facilities are key
elements of the science based stockpile stewardship program. The
approach has broad support in the national security community and
has received the endorsement of the JASONS, an independent
high-level scientific review group. In a recent letter, JASON
members Dr. Sidney Drell of Stanford University and Dr. Richard
Garwin of Columbia University wrote that science-based stockpile
stewardship is 'an essential component for the United States to
maintain confidence in a safe and reliable nuclear deterrent under
a Comprehensive Test Ban.'
Today's action clears the way for a streamlined DOE weapons
manufacturing complex without additional plant closures. To provide
the department with the right sized capacity for the maintenance,
surveillance, repair and dismantlement of weapons in the nation's
nuclear arsenal, existing facilities at three sites will be
downsized. The Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant in Tennessee will retain
secondary (highly enriched uranium) and weapons case component
fabrication activities; the Pantex Plant in Texas will retain
assembly/disassembly and high-explosive component fabrication work;
and the Kansas City Plant in Missouri will continue to manufacture
nonnuclear components. A small capability to make plutonium pits -
nuclear weapons cores - will be established at the Los Alamos
National Laboratory in New Mexico. Pit components have not been
fabricated since the closing of the Rocky Flats Plant in Colorado
in 1992.
Facility downsizing is scheduled to begin in 1998 and cost
approximately $170 million; this should be recouped by 2003, from
downsizing savings, and result in total savings of about $1 billion
by 2010. About 10 to 15 percent reduction in the defense programs
workforce is anticipated complex-wide, as much of the workforce has
already been significantly reduced as workload requirements have
shrunk.
Secretary O'Leary issued the final 'Programmatic Environmental
Impact Statement (PEIS) for the Stockpile Stewardship and
Management Program,' which assesses the environmental impacts of
current and proposed nuclear weapons complex activities, on 12
November, 1996."
Nuclear Danger Reduction Programme
Press Release
'Energy Secretary Unveils Strategies to Reduce Global Nuclear
Danger: Post-Cold War Plans for Plutonium Disposal, Weapons
Dismantlement and Solar Energy at Nevada Test Site Announced,' DOE
Press Release, R-96-176, 9 December 1996
Full text
"The Department of Energy (DOE) today laid out a dual-track
strategy to irreversibly dispose of the nation's surplus plutonium
and to reduce from seven to three the number of sites where nuclear
weapons materials are stored. DOE also will enhance the safety of
weapons dismantlement at its Pantex Plant in Texas and diversify
the Nevada Test Site for civilian uses, including a major solar
energy project, while maintaining its nuclear test readiness
activities.
'Today's actions will reduce global nuclear danger. For five
decades, the United States built up a huge stockpile of plutonium -
the deadly stuff of nuclear weapons. Today, we begin to destroy it.
We have a clear message to the world: we are committed to
irreversible nuclear reductions and we will ensure that surplus
plutonium is never again used for nuclear weapons,' Secretary of
Energy Hazel R. O'Leary said.
A significant challenge arising from the end of the Cold War is
the need for safe, secure and verifiable management of
weapons-usable highly enriched uranium and plutonium from the
disassembly of nuclear weapons.
Global stockpiles of these materials pose a danger to national
and international security if they are not managed and disposed of
in a manner that precludes their reuse in weapons. As described in
the Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials
Final Environmental Impact Statement announced today, DOE's
strategy for managing these materials is to reduce the number of
locations where they are stored and to pursue a dual-track
plutonium disposition strategy that allows for immobilizing
plutonium in glass or ceramic forms and burning plutonium as mixed
oxide fuel in existing reactors.
Both disposition approaches ensure that the plutonium cannot be
used for weapons and preserve the long-standing US policy of not
using civilian reactors to produce fissile materials for nuclear
weapons. Under the US approach, plutonium in nuclear reactors in
the form of MOX fuel would not be reprocessed to recover plutonium.
This contrasts with the approach used by some other nations.
Technical, institutional and cost uncertainties exist with both
the immobilization and reactor options. Accordingly, the
department, over the next two years, will complete the necessary
tests, process development, technology demonstrations,
site-specific environmental reviews and detailed cost proposals for
both approaches. Final decisions to use either or both of these
technologies depend on the results of this work as well as
nonproliferation considerations and progress in efforts and
negotiations with Russia and other nations. This approach gives the
President the flexibility to begin plutonium disposition either
multilaterally or bilaterally through negotiations or unilaterally
as an example to Russia and other nations.
Supporting actions needed to implement the approaches include:
constructing a plutonium vitrification or ceramic immobilization
facility at either the Hanford site in Washington or Savannah River
Site in South Carolina or modifying and using the already operating
Defense Waste Processing Facility at Savannah River; constructing a
pit disassembly/conversion facility at Hanford, Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory, Pantex or Savannah River Site; and
constructing a government-owned, mixed oxide fuel fabrication
facility at Hanford, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Pantex,
or Savannah River Site. Decisions regarding these actions would be
made by early 1998.
Under DOE's preferred storage strategy, Pantex and Los Alamos
National Laboratory would store strategic reserve plutonium
indefinitely, and Oak Ridge Reservation in Tennessee would store
strategic reserve highly enriched uranium (HEU), along with surplus
HEU pending disposition. Three sites - Hanford, Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory and Savannah River Site - would store
surplus plutonium until its disposition. Plutonium, in the form of
pits (nuclear weapons cores), would move from Rocky Flats to
Pantex, and Rocky Flats' separated and stabilized plutonium
materials would be relocated to the Savannah River Site. Non-pit
plutonium would be stored at the Savannah River Site in an
expansion of the planned new Actinide Packaging and Storage
Facility, pending disposition. Ultimately, immobilized plutonium or
spent reactor fuel would be disposed in a geologic repository.
The second review announced today is the Final Environmental
Impact Statement for the Continued Operations of the Pantex Plant
and Associated Storage of Nuclear Weapons Components. Pantex,
located near Amarillo, Texas, is the nation's only facility for the
disassembly of nuclear weapons. Its current mission is centered on
the dismantlement of nuclear weapons and maintenance and
surveillance of the smaller nuclear weapons stockpile.
The Pantex Final Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) proposes
to maintain the plant's current weapons dismantlement mission and
to increase the capability for on-site interim storage of plutonium
components from 12,000 to 20,000 pits. DOE would implement safety
upgrades to improve these operations, for example changing air
flight patterns over the plant and improving seals inside buildings
to minimize plutonium dispersal in the event of a high-explosive
accident. Interim storage activities would continue at Pantex until
decisions regarding long-term storage and disposition are made and
implemented.
DOE anticipates that Pantex will downsize as weapon
dismantlement work decreases over the next 10 years to the level
projected in the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programmatic
EIS released in November.
The Record of Decision on the Nevada Test Site signed today
diversifies operations at the Site. Defense activities include
science-based stockpile stewardship experiments and operations to
maintain the safety and reliability of the nuclear stockpile,
including 'subcritical' experiments involving nuclear materials.
These experiments are consistent with the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty. DOE will establish a 'transparency' approach to ensure the
experiments are understood by the public and the international
community. Non-defense uses of the site include a solar energy
project, hazardous materials spill testing and a technology
development program. The Department, in conjunction with the
Corporation for Solar Technology and Renewable Resources, expects
to construct and operate an up-to-100 megawatt solar power
production facility. Once built, this would be one of the world's
largest solar energy projects."
Fact Sheets
'Strategies to Reduce Global Nuclear Danger,' Department of
Energy, Series of Fact Sheets, 9 December 1996
Summary
The Fact Sheets were themselves summarised in the following
statement:
"[The Fact Sheets concern:]
Storage and Disposition of Surplus, Weapons Usable Fissile
Materials Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement
* Final environmental analysis for the Department's preferred
alternative to reduce the number of locations where highly enriched
uranium and plutonium are stored and pursue a disposition strategy
which allows for immobilization of the surplus plutonium in glass
or ceramic forms and burning of the surplus plutonium as mixed
oxide fuel in existing reactors.
Pantex Final Environmental Impact Statement
* Final environmental analysis for the continued operation of
the Pantex Plant and Associated Storage of Nuclear Weapon
Components near Amarillo, Texas.
Nevada( Test Site Record of Decision for the Environmental
Impact Statement
* A final decision on the environmental analysis of the impacts
from DOE programs at several sites in Nevada.
Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programmatic
Environmental Impact Statement
* Final environmental analysis for the Department's preferred
alternative for the future missions required of the three weapons
laboratories (Los Alamos, Sandia, and Lawrence Livermore), the four
industrial plants (Kansas City, Pantex, Savannah River and Oak
Ridge Y-12) and the Nevada Test Site. The preferred alternative
would continue operations at all eight sites but make changes
consistent with post-Cold War needs."
Storage and Disposition of Surplus, Weapons Usable Fissile
Materials Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement
Full text
"As described in the Final Programmatic Environmental Impact
Statement, the Department's preferred alternative is to reduce,
over time, the number of locations where these materials (highly
enriched uranium and plutonium) are stored and to pursue a
dual-track disposition strategy that allows for immobilization of
the surplus plutonium in glass or ceramic forms and burning of the
surplus plutonium as mixed oxide fuel in existing reactors.
The fundamental purpose of the surplus plutonium disposition
effort is to irreversibly ensure that plutonium produced for
nuclear weapons and now declared excess to national security needs
is never again used for nuclear weapons. Both disposition
approaches can achieve this goal and preserve the long-time US
policy of not using civilian reactors to produce fissile materials
for nuclear weapons. Burning of surplus plutonium in existing
reactors would not involve subsequent reprocessing of the spent
fuel. Each of these technologies would dispose of surplus weapons
plutonium in a manner which helps assure it would not again be used
in nuclear weapons.
Preferred Alternative for Storage
* Rocky Flats
Phasing out storage of all weapons-usable plutonium at Rocky
Flats Environmental Technology Site; moving pits to Pantex during a
two year period beginning in 1997 and moving Rocky Flats' separated
and stabilized non-pit materials to Savannah River Site by
approximately 2004, when the expansion of the planned Actinide
Packaging and Storage Facility is complete.
* Pantex
Upgrading storage facilities at Pantex (Zone 12 South to be
completed by 2004) to store strategic reserve and surplus plutonium
pits at Pantex including pits from Rocky Flats. Conversion into
plutonium oxide for disposition could begin approximately 2005.
Storage facilities at Zone 4 would continue to be used prior to
completion of the upgrade activities.
* Savannah River
Expanding the planned Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility to
be built at Savannah River Site to store surplus, non-pit plutonium
materials currently at Savannah River Site and surplus non-pit
plutonium materials from Rocky Flats pending the start of plutonium
disposition which could begin approximately 2004.
* Oak Ridge
Upgrading of storage facilities (to be completed by 2004) at the
Y-12 Plant at Oak Ridge Reservation to store highly enriched
uranium. Preparations for the disposition of surplus highly
enriched uranium have already begun and will last approximately 15
- 20 years.
* Hanford, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory and Los
Alamos National Laboratory
Continuing storage of surplus plutonium at these sites pending
disposition which could begin approximately 2004.
Preferred Alternative for Disposition
The Department's plans to pursue a dual-track strategy that
allows for immobilizing plutonium in glass or ceramic forms and
burning surplus plutonium as mixed oxide (MOX) fuels in existing
reactors. While both approaches are viable for the disposition of
surplus weapons usable plutonium, technical, institutional and cost
uncertainties associated with both the immobilization and MOX
options exist. Accordingly, the Department's plans include
completing by the end of 1998, the necessary process development
and small-scale technology tests. These include the 'can in
canister' immobilization approach, using the already operational
Defense Waste Processing Facility at Savannah River, and tests of
MOX fuel fabrication and irradiation; site specific environmental
analyses; and detailed cost proposals for each of these
approaches.
For the immobilization approach, the Department primarily needs
to quantify and resolve the technological issues associated with
the dissolution and solubility of various concentrations of
plutonium in various glass and ceramic materials; the reliability
and production rates of melting and mixing processes under various
temperatures and criticality controls; and the impact of impurities
in the surplus plutonium forms in order to have the confidence that
this approach can provide success in a timely and cost-effective
manner.
For the Mixed Oxide Fuel/burning in existing reactors approach,
the Department primarily needs to quantify and resolve cost and
institutional (licensing and regulatory) issues as well as issues
associated with the potential impacts of other materials alloyed in
plutonium pits in order to have the confidence that this approach
can provide success in a timely and cost-effective manner.
For both approaches, we need to complete design and operational
testing of the processes that would be used to convert the
plutonium from pits and other forms, into oxide as feed material
for the disposition technology.
The Department's Preferred Alternative identifies supporting
actions and subsequent site-specific NEPA analyses, starting in
early 1997, that would be required for implementation of these
disposition technologies at one or more DOE sites. These
include:
* Constructing and operating a plutonium vitrification or
ceramic immobilization facility at either Hanford or Savannah River
Site including use of the 'can in canister' approach utilizing the
already operational Defense Waste Processing Facility at Savannah
River Site. This would also include constructing and operating a
facility at these sites for conversion of non-pit plutonium
materials (metal and oxides) to oxide forms for immobilization.
* Constructing and operating a pit disassembly/conversion
facility at Hanford, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Pantex
or Savannah River Site.
* Constructing and operating a domestic, government-owned, mixed
oxide fuel fabrication facility at Hanford, Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory, Pantex or Savannah River.
The future disposition of the surplus plutonium, using either or
both of these technological approaches, would depend on the
near-term results from technology development and tests,
site-specific environmental analyses and detailed cost proposals as
well as nonproliferation considerations and progress in efforts and
negotiations with Russia and other nations. The work ahead will now
provide the President with the basis and flexibility to initiate
plutonium disposition either multilaterally or bilaterally through
negotiations or unilaterally as an example to Russia and other
nations."
Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programmatic
Environmental Impact Statement
Extracts
"Overview
The Department of Energy must conduct its nuclear weapon mission
within the national security policy framework defined by the
President and Congress. In addition to directives and
authorizations developed on a National basis, this framework
includes international treaties: the START I, START II, Nuclear
Nonproliferation, and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaties. The
resulting National security policy requires that the US maintain a
nuclear deterrence for the foreseeable future, but without nuclear
testing and without the production of new weapons. In order to
satisfy this mission within these constraints, the DOE has
developed the Stockpile Stewardship and Management program to
maintain the safety and reliability of a smaller aging US nuclear
weapons stockpile in the absence of nuclear testing.
Preferred Alternative
The Final SSM PEIS examines the future missions required of the
three weapons laboratories (Los Alamos, Sandia, and Lawrence
Livermore), the four industrial plants (Kansas City, Pantex,
Savannah River and Oak Ridge Y-12) and the Nevada Test Site. The
preferred alternative would continue operations at all eight sites
but make changes consistent with post-Cold War needs. The
adjustments would include constructing and operating three new
facilities to provide the experimental capabilities needed to
ensure the safety and reliability of the stockpile in the absence
of underground nuclear testing:
* National Ignition Facility at the Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory (California)
* Contained Firing Facility at Lawrence Livermore
(California)
* Atlas Facility at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (New
Mexico).
The preferred alternative for providing the needed capacity for
maintenance, surveillance, repair and dismantlement is to downsize
three operations:
* Secondary and case component fabrication mission at Y-12
* Weapons assembly/disassembly and high-explosive-component
fabrication missions at Pantex
* The nonnuclear component fabrication mission at Kansas
City.
Also, DOE's preferred alternative is to re-establish, on a small
scale, the capability to make pits - the plutonium core of a
nuclear weapon - at Los Alamos to support the existing
stockpile.
The downsizing effort would begin in 1998. The $170 million that
would be spent to accomplish the downsizing should be recouped by
2003 and result in total savings of about $1 billion by 2010,
according to an analysis supporting the PEIS. Much of the workforce
downsizing has already occurred due to reduced workload
requirements. Further workforce reductions anticipated by the
preferred alternative could result in an additional 10 to 15
percent reduction in the overall Defense Programs-funded,
complex-wide workforce after 1998. ..."
Pantex Final Environmental Impact Statement
Extracts
"Overview
The Final Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the Continued
Operation of the Pantex Plant and Associated Storage of Nuclear
Weapon Components analyzes the environmental impacts associated
with ongoing operations at the Pantex Plant near Amarillo, Texas,
over the next 10 years and evaluates impacts associated with an
increase in the number of nuclear weapon pits stored on an interim
basis at the plant. The EIS also evaluates alternative sites for
the interim storage of pits. While most of the work currently
taking place at the Pantex Plant relates to the disassembly of
nuclear weapons, the plant must be capable of responding to any mix
of assembly, disassembly, modification, or quality assurance
operations that may be necessary to maintain the stockpile in the
future. Other activities at Pantex Plant include research and
production of high explosives, waste management, environmental
protection, environmental restoration, and onsite transportation,
as required.
Preferred Alternative
The preferred alternative includes performing or maintaining the
capability to perform all of the historical and current operations
at Pantex Plant, interim storage of up to 20,000 pits, and
performing all required upgrades, modifications, and replacement of
facilities and equipment required to maintain operations at the
plant. New proposed projects include the Hazardous Waste Treatment
and Processing Facility, Pit Re-use Facility, Gas Analysis
Laboratory, Materials Compatibility Assurance Facility,
Nondestructive Evaluation Facility, and Metrology and Health
Physics Calibration and Acceptance Facility.
During preparation of the EIS two conditions were identified
which, under unusual circumstances, could result in the release of
plutonium. These conditions are being mitigated to further reduce
the already low probability of their occurrence. In the first
situation, small gaps between doors and frames of the
assembly/disassembly bays were identified. The gaps are being
reduced and additional work is planned to prevent the inadvertent
release of plutonium. The second situation involved an aircraft
accident on the Pantex Site. DOE is also working with the Federal
Aviation Administration to relocate navigational aids and change
navigation routes to reduce the possibility of an aircraft
accident.
Other Alternatives Considered
Two other alternatives were evaluated in the EIS. The No Action
Alternative considered all of the activities historically performed
at the plant, storage of up to 12,000 pits, and implementation only
of projects already approved and funded. Dismantlement would have
ceased once a storage level of 12,000 pits had been reached. The
EIS also considered a Relocation of Interim Pit Storage Alternative
which examined relocating the interim storage of either 8,000 or
20,000 pits to other sites but retaining all the other activities
historically performed at Pantex and implementing all required
upgrades, modifications, and replacement of facilities and
equipment required to maintain these operations at the plant.
..."
Nevada Record of Decision
Extracts
"Overview
The end of the Cold War, the indefinite extension of the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty and the signing of the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty have altered the need for and future uses of the
Department's nuclear weapons testing activities at the NTS. The
purpose of the Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Nevada
Test Site and Offsite Locations in the State of Nevada (NTS EIS)
was to analyze the impacts from existing and future DOE programs at
the following sites: the NTS, the Tonopah Test Range, portions of
the Nellis Air Force Range Complex (NAFR Complex), the Central
Nevada Test Area, and Project Shoal Area. These programs include
ongoing activities for the stewardship of the nation's nuclear
weapons stockpile, management of radioactive waste, and
environmental restoration. Also examined are the proposed Solar
Enterprise Zone facility sites at the NTS, Eldorado Valley, Dry
Lake Valley, and Coyote Spring Valley, all in the State of
Nevada.
The preferred alternatives selected by the Department will
provide for the following activities.
Program Decisions
Defense Program
Defense Programs activities at the Nevada Test Site will
emphasize experiments and operations to maintain confidence in the
safety and reliability of the stockpile without underground nuclear
testing. These stockpile stewardship activities will include
exercises, operations, experiments (including subcritical
experiments involving special nuclear material), and other
hydrodynamic tests. The subcritical experiments will provide an
improved understanding of dynamic material properties of plutonium
contained in nuclear weapons. This is essential for assessing
nuclear warhead performance, reliability, and safety in the absence
of underground testing. Data gained from these experiments will be
critical to stockpile stewardship computer codes and modeling
development efforts.
Appropriate transparency measures will be used to ensure that
activities conducted at the Nevada Test Site are clearly consistent
with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The DOE will also continue
to maintain a nuclear test readiness, consistent with presidential
direction at the Nevada Test Site but would conduct an underground
nuclear test only if so directed by the President under the
'supreme national interest' provision of the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty. ...
Environmental Restoration Program
... The priority for approaching environmental restoration work
will be to characterize and remediate the surface and shallow
subsurface at the Project Shoal and Central Nevada Test Area sites.
The deep subsurface at these sites will be characterized and
modeled. Next in priority will be to characterize and remediate the
contaminated sites on the Tonopah Test Range and the Nellis Air
Force Range Complex.
The DOE will characterize sites on the Nevada Test Site
beginning at the south end and progressing north. Areas with
minimum contamination will be the first priority for
characterization and remediation. ... Lowest in priority are those
contaminated sites which are in areas designated for potential
future weapons testing.
Nondefense Research and Development Program
The DOE will continue to support ongoing program operations and
pursue diversification of use to include nondefense and private use
of DOE's Nevada Test Site. These new initiatives will include the
construction and operation of a solar power production facility and
siting an Alternative Fuels Demonstration Project at the Nevada
Test Site. ...
The Department will cooperate with the Corporation for Solar
Technology and Renewable Resources, in the construction and
operation of a 100 megawatt or less solar power production facility
in Area 22. When operational this facility will enhance the Nevada
Test Site power infrastructure in support of the primary
science-based stockpile stewardship mission. ...
Work for Others Program
The DOE Nevada Operations Office Work for Others Program will
continue to be an important aspect of Nevada Test Site related
activities. These ongoing activities primarily involve work for the
Department of Defense, the Defense Special Weapons Agency, and
other federal agencies. The primary focus of these activities are
centered around Treaty Verification, Nonproliferation, Counter
proliferation, Demilitarization, and defense related research and
development. ..."
Site-by-Site Summary
Site Specific Fact Sheets, 9 December 1996
Hanford
Hanford Site, Richland, Washington
"Current National Security Mission
* Hanford stores surplus quantities of plutonium and highly
enriched uranium. ...
Storage and Disposition PEIS:
Preferred Alternative
Storage
* Continue current storage of surplus plutonium at Hanford,
pending disposition (or shipment to another site prepositioning for
future disposition). There are no nonsurplus weapons-usable
plutonium materials currently stored at Hanford.
Disposition
* Hanford would be a candidate site to host a pit
disassembly/conversion facility (Advanced Recovery and Integrated
Extraction System-ARIES). In subsequent tiered NEPA reviews in
1997, DOE would analyze alternative locations at Hanford, Idaho,
Pantex, and Savannah River, for constructing new or potentially
using modified existing buildings for this function.
* Hanford would be a candidate site to host a government-owned,
mixed oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility. In subsequent tiered
NEPA reviews in 1997, DOE would analyze alternative locations at
Hanford, Idaho, Pantex, and Savannah River, for constructing new or
potentially using modified existing buildings for this
function.
* Hanford would be a candidate site to host a new plutonium
vitrification or ceramic immobilization facility in conjunction
with its planned high level waste vitrification facilities. In
subsequent, tiered NEPA reviews in 1997, DOE would analyze
alternative locations at Hanford and Savannah River, for
constructing new or potentially using modified existing buildings
for this function. ...
* Hanford would be a candidate site to host a plutonium
conversion facility which would be collocated with the
vitrification or ceramic immobilization facility. In subsequent,
tiered NEPA reviews in 1997, DOE would analyze alternative
locations at Hanford and Savannah River, for constructing new or
potentially using modified existing buildings for this function.
..."
Idaho Plant
Idaho Plant, Idaho Falls, Idaho
"Current National Security Mission
* INEL stores surplus quantities of plutonium and highly
enriched uranium.
* The FY97 Defense Programs Budget at Idaho is $18 million.
...
Storage and Disposition PEIS:
Preferred Alternative
Storage
* Continue the current storage of surplus plutonium at INEL,
pending disposition (or shipment to another site prepositioning for
future disposition). There are no nonsurplus weapons-usable
plutonium materials currently stored at INEL.
Disposition
* INEL would be a candidate site to host a pit
disassembly/conversion facility (Advanced Recovery and Integrated
Extraction System-ARIES). ...
* INEL would be a candidate site to host a government-owned,
mixed oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility. ..."
Nevada
Nevada Test Site (NTS), South Central Nevada
"Current National Security Missions
* NTS conducts stockpile stewardship activities, and maintains a
readiness to conduct underground nuclear testing.
* The FY97 Defense Programs Budget at NTS is $232 million.
...
Employment
* At the end of the Cold War (1990), the DOE Defense Programs
workforce NTS was approximately 4,800.
* Currently, the Defense Programs workforce is approximately
2,000.
* On December 4, DOE announced involuntary layoff of 400
employees aimed at reducing costs and reductions in business from
non-DP customers.
* The Department will provide worker and community transition
assistance to help mitigate the impacts of these reductions.
Nevada Test Site Record of Decision
* This ROD implements most of the Department's preferred
Expanded Use Alternative, which is to continue the multi-purpose,
multi-program use of the Nevada Test Site (NTS), to pursue a
further diversification of interagency and private industry uses,
and to initiate certain public education activities.
* DP will continue stockpile stewardship activities including
subcritical experiments and other hydrodynamic tests.
* The subcritical experiments will provide an improved
understanding of dynamic material properties of plutonium, the
fissile material in most stockpile primaries. This is essential for
assessing nuclear warhead performance, reliability, and safety in
the absence of underground testing. ...
* In conjunction with the Corporation for Solar Technology and
Renewable Resources, the Department will cooperate in the
construction and operation of a 100 megawatt or less solar power
production facility in Area 22. When operational this facility will
enhance the Nevada Test Site power infrastructure in support of the
primary science-based stockpile stewardship mission. ..."
Oak Ridge
Oak Ridge Reservation, Oak Ridge, Tennessee
"Current National Security Missions
* The Y-12 facility at Oak Ridge is the Nation's facility for
the fabrication of secondaries (the highly enriched uranium
component in US nuclear warheads) and cases for nuclear weapons.
Y-12 also stores highly enriched uranium.
* The FY97 Defense Programs Budget at Y-12 is $407 million.
Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS:
Preferred Alternative
* Downsizing the Y-12 facility is the Department's preferred
alternative for the fabrication of secondaries and cases.
* DOE would begin downsizing in 1998. By about the year 2003,
the Y-12 facility would be approximately 10-20 percent the size of
the existing plant and would be appropriately sized to support the
stockpile for the foreseeable future. ...
* To support the reduced future stockpile, a facility capacity
for several hundred secondaries and cases per year will be
maintained...
Employment
* At the end of the Cold War (1990), the workforce at the Y-12
facility was approximately 7,170.
* Currently, the workforce at the Y-12 facility is approximately
5,150.
* Once downsizing is complete in approximately the year 2003,
the DOE Defense Programs and Material Disposition workforce at the
Y-12 facility is expected to be in the range of 3,120 to 3,420.
...
Storage and Disposition PEIS:
Preferred Alternative
Storage
* Continue storage of surplus and non-surplus highly enriched
uranium (HEU). Upgrade storage facilities at the Y-12 Plant (to be
completed by 2004), pending disposition. Strategic reserve HEU
would be stored at the Y-12 Plant, consistent with the Preferred
Alternative in the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS.
* The amount of HEU in storage would decrease and storage
facilities would be consolidated as surplus HEU is dispositioned
and blended-down to low-enriched uranium over the next 15-20 years
(per the HEU Disposition Record of Decision, July 1996). ..."
Pantex
Pantex Plant, Amarillo, Texas
"Current National Security Missions
* Pantex is the nation's facility for the assembly/disassembly
of nuclear weapons. Pantex also fabricates high explosives used in
nuclear weapons, and stores plutonium pits from dismantled nuclear
weapons.
* Since 1990, the Pantex mission has focused primarily on
dismantling nuclear weapons. Since that time, Pantex has dismantled
more than 8,000 nuclear weapons. In addition, Pantex performs
modifications and surveillance of nuclear weapons scheduled to
remain in the future stockpile.
* The FY97 Defense Programs Budget at Pantex is $271
million.
Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS:
Preferred Alternative
* Downsizing the Pantex Plant is the Department's preferred
alternative for the assembly /disassembly mission and the high
explosives fabrication mission.
* DOE would begin downsizing in 1998. By approximately the year
2005, the Pantex Plant would be approximately two-thirds the size
of the existing plant and would be appropriately sized to support
the stockpile for the foreseeable future.
* No new construction would take place. ...
* Future workload is expected to decrease from the current
throughput of 1,000-2,000 weapons per year to several hundred
weapons per year.
Employment
* At the end of the Cold War (1990), the workforce at Pantex was
approximately 2,200.
* Currently, the workforce at Pantex is approximately 3,440. The
increase over 1990 levels is due to the increased workload
associated with the dismantlement program, and increased emphasis
on environment, safety, and health issues.
* The week of 2 December, DOE announced a voluntary workforce
reduction of 350 employees to take advantage of improved
efficiency. ...
* Once downsizing is complete, in approximately the year 2003,
the DP workforce at Pantex is expected to be in the range of 1,270
to 1,740.
Storage and Disposition PEIS:
Preferred Alternative
Storage
* Plutonium pits would be moved from Rocky Flats to Pantex
starting as early as 1997. ...
* Upgrade storage facilities at Zone 12 South (to be completed
by 2004) to store surplus pits currently at Pantex, and pits from
Rocky Flats, pending disposition. This action would place pits at a
central location where most pits already reside and where expertise
and infrastructure exist to accommodate pit storage.
* Strategic Reserve pits would be stored at Pantex in the
facilities discussed in accordance with the preferred alternative
in the Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Stockpile
Stewardship and Management.
Disposition
* Pantex would be a candidate site to host a pit
disassembly/conversion facility (Advanced Recovery and Integrated
Extraction System #150; ARIES). In subsequent tiered NEPA reviews
in 1997, DOE would analyze alternative locations at Hanford, Idaho,
Pantex, and Savannah River, for constructing new or potentially
using modified existing buildings for this function.
* Pantex would be a candidate site to host a government-owned,
mixed oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility. In subsequent tiered
NEPA reviews in 1997, DOE would analyze alternative locations at
Hanford, Idaho, Pantex, and Savannah River, for constructing new or
potentially using modified existing buildings for this function.
...
Pantex site wide EIS:
Preferred Alternative
* Continues all historical and current missions including the
assembly/disassembly mission and the high explosive fabrication
mission at Pantex.
* Increases the interim storage level for plutonium components
(pits) at Pantex Zone 4 facilities from 12,000 to 20,000 pits.
* Recommends implementation of all required upgrades,
modifications, and replacement of facilities and equipment required
to maintain operations. ..."
Rocky Flats
Rocky Flats Plant, Golden, Colorado
"Current National Security Mission
* Rocky Flats stores surplus quantities of plutonium and highly
enriched uranium.
* The FY97 Defense Programs Budget at Rocky Flats is $48
million. ...
Storage and Disposition PEIS:
Preferred Alternative
Storage
* DOE would begin moving all weapons-usable plutonium from Rocky
Flats as soon as possible, transporting the pits to Pantex as early
as 1997, and the separated and stabilized, non-pit plutonium
materials to Savannah River by 2002. ..."
Savannah River
Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, South Carolina
"Current National Security Mission
* SRS is the DOE site for conducting stockpile management
activities associated with tritium recycling and tritium extraction
(once a new tritium source comes on line).
* The FY97 Defense Programs Budget at SRS is $129 million.
...
Employment
* At the end of the Cold War (1990), the DOE Defense Programs
workforce at SRS was approximately 23,000.
* With the transfer of the site's landlord responsibilities to
Environmental Management in 1995, the workforce associated with the
tritium mission, the only remaining Defense Programs mission, is
currently approximately 1,000.
* Approximately an additional 170 people will be associated with
the Tritium Extraction Facility.
* There are approximately 14,000 EM employees at SRS.
Storage and Disposition PEIS:
Preferred Alternative
Storage
* Expand the planned new Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility
to store the separated and stabilized non-pit plutonium materials
from Rocky Flats, pending disposition. This action would place
non-pit plutonium materials in a new storage facility, in a
location with existing expertise and plutonium handling
capabilities and where potential disposition activities could
occur. The Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility, including the
expansion to accommodate Rocky Flats material, would be completed
by 2002.
Disposition
* Savannah River would be a candidate site to host a plutonium
vitrification or ceramic immobilization facility. In subsequent,
tiered NEPA reviews in 1997, DOE would analyze alternative
locations at Hanford and Savannah River, for constructing new or
potentially using modified existing buildings for this function.
DOE would continue the research and development leading to the
near-term demonstration of the 'can-in-canister' variant for
plutonium disposition using the already operational Defense Waste
Processing Facility at Savannah River.
* Savannah River would be a candidate site to host a plutonium
conversionöfacility which would be collocated with the
vitrification or ceramic immobilization facility. ...
* Savannah River would be a candidate site to host a pit
disasembly/conversion facility (Advanced Recovery and Integrated
Extraction System-ARIES). ...
* Savannah River would be a candidate site to host a
government-owned, mixed oxide (MOX) fuel fabrication facility.
..."
© 1999 The Acronym Institute.
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