Disarmament Diplomacy
Issue No. 13, February - March 1997
Agenda But No Work at the CD
by Rebecca Johnson
Summary
The Conference on Disarmament (CD) managed on 13 February to
adopt an eight point agenda, but is still deadlocked on its work
programme. It has therefore been impossible to convene any ad hoc
committees or appoint special coordinators on anything. Proposals
have been made to negotiate on three issues: a ban on the
production of fissile materials for weapons purposes (fissban);
anti-personnel landmines (AP mines); and nuclear disarmament. These
were therefore the focus of formal and informal consultations and
discussions, with the President, in groups and in plenary. A few
delegations also called for the CD to undertake negotiations (or at
least further discussions) on negative security assurances (NSA),
prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS) and regional
conventional disarmament.
The European countries are deeply divided over the issues of
landmines and nuclear disarmament. On AP mines, France and Britain
are backing a joint initiative for a phased approach, beginning
with a ban on exports and transfers. However, Belgium, Austria and
Ireland are among the staunchest supporters of the Ottawa
fast-track, aiming for a total ban on the production, stockpiling,
transfer and use of all AP mines by the end of this year. In an
attempt to paper over the cracks, diplomats in Geneva cobbled
together a draft mandate that put a phased approach in the context
of the objective of a full ban. This has been discussed, but not
yet agreed, by the western group members. The formal position of
most western group members is that they would not oppose
negotiations in the CD providing that they complemented and
reinforced the Ottawa Process. Similarly, Russia, China and several
non-aligned and eastern European States are saying little, although
they want to retain the option to use AP mines as long as possible.
This has left Mexico carrying the burden of out-front opposition to
putting landmines negotiations into the CD, although its formal
position is that it remains to be convinced that the CD is the
appropriate forum. It now looks unlikely that the CD will have
taken a decision on this issue before the next meeting of the
Ottawa Process, in Brussels, June 24-27. It is hoped that the
prospects for success of the fast track approach will be much
clearer by then, which could simplify the options before the
CD.
The chances for achieving a fissile materials ban in the CD look
less and less promising. Despite repeated calls from many countries
for negotiations to commence immediately, and despite the view
reiterated by both western and non-aligned delegations that the
Shannon mandate is broad enough to enable the issue of stocks to be
addressed within the context of negotiations, incentive is lacking.
The reasons include linkage with a timetable for nuclear
disarmament and a growing lack of enthusiasm from some of the
nuclear-weapon States, who are no longer confident that
multilateral negotiations will deliver adherence by the threshold
States, and from some of the non-aligned, who consider that the
'value added' to the moratoria is not sufficient to warrant the
time and resources of multilateral negotiations unless the fissban
has a stronger disarmament component, especially with respect to
existing stocks of plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU).
The elimination of nuclear weapons remains the highest priority
for many States. Since the western nuclear powers, Britain, France
and the United States, continue to oppose an ad hoc committee on
nuclear disarmament, the deadlock on this conditions the overall
paralysis in the CD. With Jesse Helms sitting on ratification of
the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in the United States, it
seems unlikely that the Clinton Administration would risk any
positive moves on any other area of arms control that the hardline
Republicans might portray as 'weakness' on defence until that
important treaty is through. It is also unlikely that Britain would
show flexibility before its general election, called for 1 May.
While few now anticipate any dramatic change of policy on nuclear
matters if the Labour Party wins, a more constructive attitude
towards negotiations might well be forthcoming, which could result
in withdrawal of Britain's adamant opposition to a nuclear
disarmament committee.
Since so little is happening in the CD, Geneva's disarmament
delegations have devoted the majority of their time over the past
two months to other issues, including strengthening the
verification provisions of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC),
where progress is slow and painstaking, and getting agreement on
the CTBT Organisation.
Agenda Agreed
The CD requires both an agenda and a programme of work. The
generalised agenda, based on the 10 point decalogue adopted at the
UN Special Session on Disarmament in 1978, is a form of ritual.
Therefore, adoption of the following agenda by the 755th CD
plenary, chaired by Ambassador Joun Yung Sun of the Republic of
Korea, did not get the CD working, but only took the small step of
resolving a theological (and, some would say, diversionary)
procedural debate.
1997 Agenda
- Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament
- Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters
- Prevention of an arms race in outer space
- Effective international arrangements to assure
non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of
nuclear weapons
- New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of
such weapons; radiological weapons
- Comprehensive programme of disarmament
- Transparency in armaments
- Consideration and adoption of the annual report and any other
report, as appropriate, to the General Assembly of the United
Nations.
In an oblique reference regarding the debate over whether a ban
on landmines should be negotiated at the CD, the President read
into the record the following understanding: 'If there is a
consensus in the Conference to deal with any issues they could be
dealt with within this agenda.'
As acknowledged by the President, the 1997 agenda is the same as
the 1996 agenda minus the comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT). In
joining consensus, Germany stated a formal reservation over
repeating an annual formula. Germany would have preferred the
agenda to have explicitly included the concrete issues under
discussion, such as the fissban and landmines, rather than vague
and generalised categories.
No agreement on work
With the agenda agreed, the substantive and more difficult
question remains: what issues should the CD negotiate or prepare to
negotiate? The programme of work has to be much more specific,
bearing only a loose relationship with the agenda, as evidenced by
the President's on-the-record understanding. Proposals have been
made for ad hoc committees on three issues:
- fissile ban convention
- nuclear disarmament
- anti-personnel landmines
Attempts by Sun to focus informal discussions on these three
topics caused a furious exchange in the 754th plenary on 6
February. The Mexican Ambassador, Antonio de Icaza, said
categorically that 'Mines have no role to play here' and that his
delegation would not participate in discussions aimed at putting
landmines into the CD's programme of work. In Mexico's view,
priority should be accorded first to nuclear disarmament, then to
negative security assurances (NSA), and thirdly to regional
conventional disarmament. Ambassador Mounir Zahran said that
Egypt would not oppose any new item but had reservations
over separating the fissban item from nuclear disarmament: 'the
'fissban' or 'cut-off'...could be discussed as a sub-item of
nuclear disarmament.' He would also consider security assurances,
the prevention of nuclear war and the nuclear arms race as
sub-items of nuclear disarmament. India's Ambassador
Arundhati Ghose underlined the 'paramount importance' of the issue
of nuclear disarmament.
For the United States, Ambassador Stephen Ledogar
responded to de Icaza's objections to discussing landmines, by
pointing out that 'there is no consensus in this Conference on what
is called "nuclear disarmament"'. He said that the US was opposed
'to the concept of the Conference on Disarmament doing "nuclear
disarmament'". China did not want the discussions to be
limited to only three topics, arguing that the CD should establish
ad hoc committees on NSA as well as on outer space. France,
the Netherlands and Britain commended the President
on his initiative and put in a plea for trying to 'get this show on
the road'. Pakistan's Ambassador Munir Akram suggested
getting the agenda agreed first, followed by discussions on
negotiating mechanisms and work programme. However, he warned
against preordaining the items for consultation.
The debate which spilled into the 6 February plenary was just
the tip of an iceberg of bilateral and group consultations with
successive presidents, first Sun, and then Pavel Grecu of Romania.
Handing on his presidency to Russia, Grecu told the 760th plenary
on 13 March that the consultations had been useful. He emphasised
that the purpose of addressing the three issues separately was for
each to be approached on its own merits, without the 'destructive
linkage' that bedeviled the Conference. However, though he thanked
everyone for their cooperation, he had to admit defeat.
Notwithstanding the objections to the Presidential
identification of the three items for priority consideration, and
alternative suggestions for work put forward by China, Mexico and
others, the fissban, nuclear disarmament and landmines are in fact
the three areas under serious consideration. It therefore makes
sense to consider each of these in turn.
Fissban
In March 1995 the 38-member CD accepted a report from the
Canadian Special Coordinator, Gerald Shannon, with a mandate to
negotiate a 'non-discriminatory, multilateral and effectively
verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices'. The CD has
since been unable to convene a committee to do this. During
discussions over a mandate in 1994 and 1995, the major difficulty
was over stockpiles, the result of past production. The five
nuclear-weapon States, India and Israel (though not yet a CD
member) were prepared only to negotiate a cut-off of future
production of plutonium and HEU for nuclear weapons. Pakistan,
Egypt, Iran and Algeria were most prominent among the countries
which argued for past production also to be taken into account,
arguing that a cut-off would leave stockpiles untouched, thereby
merely reinforcing the inequalities of the nuclear status quo.
However, since 1995, the major point of contention is the
relationship between the fissban and nuclear disarmament.
When the G21 group of non-aligned States were working on their
programme of action for nuclear disarmament in August 1996, India
insisted that four measures identified for immediate negotiations
should be addressed concurrently. These were:
- a multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument to
assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use
of nuclear weapons;
- a convention prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear
weapons;
- a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons; and
- a treaty banning the production of fissile material for
nuclear weapons.
The 'concurrent' addition was unsuccessfully opposed by some
G-21 delegations. South Africa's Ambassador Selebi called it a
recipe 'to block progress on all fronts'. Although a number of G-21
delegations privately agreed, only South Africa and Chile refused
to co-sponsor the programme, which now forms the basis for G-21
discussions over a mandate for the proposed nuclear disarmament
committee. The fact that the fissban came fourth in the list was
also not lost on the rest of the CD, although the G-21 claimed the
order was unimportant since the measures were to be addressed
concurrently.
Since then, alliances have shifted slightly, but no real
progress has been made. During 1997, numerous western and European
countries called on the CD to convene the committee immediately and
get on with fissban negotiations. Many referred to the priority
accorded the fissban in the programme of action on nuclear
disarmament in the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear
Non-Proliferation and Disarmament adopted by NPT parties in May
1995. Spain's Ambassador Amador Martinez Morcillo called it
the 'next, complementary step'. New Zealand's Minister of
Foreign Affairs and Trade, Don McKinnon, said that a fissban would
'constitute a prerequisite step...towards a nuclear-weapon-free
world'. He emphasised that a fissban should cap the fissile
materials available not only to the declared nuclear weapon States
but also to those with unsafeguarded enrichment or reprocessing
plants, and would 'contribute to ensuring the conditions under
which the process of nuclear disarmament can broaden, constrain the
opportunities for vertical proliferation and help prevent any
future resumption of the nuclear arms race.'
The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Poland,
Eugeniusz Wyzner, echoed this view, saying that a fissban
represented 'a significant supplement to the NPT and CTBT'.
Sweden's Foreign Minister, Lena Hjelm-Wallen, agreed, saying
the fissban treaty was 'of the highest significance both for
continued nuclear disarmament and for nuclear non-proliferation'.
Hungary's Ambassador Peter Naray said that the fissban was
'ripe for serious negotiations' and that the mandate in the March
1995 Shannon report 'accommodates the different shades of opinion'
with respect to existing stocks. Slovakia's Ambassador Maria
Krasnohorska concurred: 'Special Coordinator Ambassador Shannon's
mandate can serve as the basis of the ad hoc committee's work [and]
is broad enough to meet all legitimate concerns.'
Switzerland also encouraged the CD to get on with it, while
Ireland's Ambassador Anne Anderson called for an immediate
start to fissban negotiations 'on the basis of the Shannon
mandate'. Austria's Ambassador Harald Kreid shared the view
of non-aligned nations that nuclear disarmament was of utmost
importance, but urged the CD to start work on a fissban, for 'if we
are not able to solve the daunting issue of nuclear disarmament in
one great stroke now, let us attend to what is feasible'. Kreid
refused to dodge the sensitive issue of stocks, voicing the
concerns of many western delegations (as well as the non-aligned)
when he commented that negotiations 'would inevitably have to touch
upon the question of stockpiles, even if they would remain outside
of the treaty, because it is hard to see how [a] cut-off could be
verified without transparency with regard to existing stockpiles.'
Clearly referring to South Asia and the Middle East, Kreid added
that improvising transparency and confidence could be important
regionally.
Notwithstanding these exhortations, there is a growing view that
(with the possible exception of the United States), the
nuclear-weapon States are less than enthusiastic, while the
non-aligned want much more. Prior to the consensus UN General
Assembly resolution 48/75L in 1993, from which the CD mandate
derived, the US and Russia, awash with plutonium and HEU from
dismantled warheads, brokered agreement among the P-5 to agree
multilateral negotiations on a basic cut-off. This was accompanied
by declared moratoria on production from Britain, France, Russia
and the United States, and a widespread (but unconfirmed) belief
that China has also now halted its fissile materials production
programme. The moratoria, while intended to encourage negotiations,
have paradoxically led to diminished commitment to make the halt
legally binding. For the smaller nuclear-weapon States, a voluntary
moratorium earns them brownie points while leaving open an escape
hatch if they should want to restart production in the future. They
have made it clear that they are only interested in a multilateral
cut-off that brings the threshold States, India, Israel and
Pakistan, on board but does not touch stockpiles. For many
non-nuclear-weapon countries, the moratoria remove the pressure for
speedy action. This makes them reconsider the cost of negotiating a
treaty in the CD, which could take considerable time and resources,
while also encouraging them to hold out for a more substantial
measure, including stockpiles.
Most non-aligned statements incorporated their remarks on a
fissban or cut-off in their positions on nuclear disarmament.
Indeed, Syria made no specific mention of a fissban in its
intervention on 6 February, although it endorsed the G-28 programme
of action. Brazil's Ambassador Celso Lafer suggested
establishing a nuclear disarmament committee 'under which separate
working groups would take up issues such as the fissile materials
convention and nuclear disarmament measures.' Furthermore, he
stated that if the Shannon mandate were to be the basis for fissban
negotiations, 'it is our expectation that the question of stocks
will be dealt with within committee discussions on the scope of the
future treaty.' He gave two reasons for this: i) adequate
verification of a ban on production would require knowledge and
accountability with regard to fissile materials already in
existence; and ii) the moratoria. He stated that 'if the future
treaty is to have real impact beyond non-proliferation, and we hope
it will, it would therefore also have to go beyond the narrow scope
that some currently envisage for it.' Reiterating one of its
concerns regarding the CTBT implementing organisation, Brazil also
required that the costs of verification for a fissban should not
'unduly burden' countries which already accept safeguards, such as
members of the NPT or regional nuclear-weapon-free zone
treaties.
For Mexico, de Icaza argued that the 'implicit mandate'
in Shannon's report 'should allow that, within the ad-hoc Committee
on Nuclear Disarmament, the cessation of the production of fissile
material for weapon purposes as well as the problem of past
production and management of existing stocks be examined, so as to
make sure that any production of nuclear weapons will cease.'
Ambassador Agus Tarmidzi said that Indonesia considered the
fissban would 'significantly contribute' to non-proliferation, but
emphasised that it should 'encompass not only the future production
but also the past production', in order to fulfil a disarmament
commitment as well. If stockpiles were brushed aside, the cut-off
would be 'a mere non-proliferation measure' with 'no added value to
date ... [and] therefore unappealing'. However, Indonesia would be
ready to 'revisit the question' of a fissban, with the
understanding that the Shannon mandate 'acknowledged that this
issue [stocks] to which many delegations attach great importance
cannot be isolated...'
Landmines
There has been considerable manoeuvring on the question of
negotiating a ban on landmines in the CD since US President Clinton
called for this on 17 January. Both the UK and France gave strong
and early backing, with Britain putting forward a draft mandate for
a phased approach, beginning with a ban on the export, import or
transfer of all AP mines. There is little public expression of
outright opposition to negotiating on landmines in the CD, but
considerable reluctance, coming from two corners: those who want a
'fast track' total ban, such as Canada, Mexico, Belgium, Austria,
Ireland and others who would prefer to back the Ottawa process,
initiated by Canada in October 1996; and those who want to hold
open the option of producing and using landmines, such as Russia,
China, Cuba, Syria, North and South Korea. These countries would
prefer negotiations to remain within the purview of the Convention
on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW).
The second meeting under the Ottawa Process took place in Vienna
from 12-14 February. Kreid reported that 111 States participated
and that proposals for revising Austria's tentative draft treaty
were now being considered. The next meeting will be held in
Brussels on 24-27 June. Mixed reports of progress are emerging from
the Vienna meeting. It is pointed out that of the 111 participants,
around 50 are strong supporters of a total ban on AP mines, the
others participating as critics, or with the hope of influencing or
slowing down the process. Nevertheless, it is clear that the Ottawa
Process intends to move ahead. Since few now expect the CD to have
come to agreement on its agenda before June, the tough decision
point is likely to come after the Brussels meeting, when the
prospects and products of the Ottawa Process have become clearer.
Pointing out that the landmines, which he called 'hidden killers'
take a toll of 25,000 victims a year, Kreid said that 'the CD
cannot simply ponder the matter in its customary slow motion
fashion'. Nor would the CD process guarantee participation by all
the relevant countries, Kreid warned that 'we are not willing to
submit to a strategy of long-term persuasion complete with
trade-offs and linkages and subject to an unpredictable stop and go
process.' In his view, establishing a universal norm by means of a
lawmaking treaty would bring adherents 'in due course'.
Canada spoke on 6 February, the week following Britain's
proposal for a CD mandate on landmines. Ambassador Mark Moher
reiterated that 'use is the problem' and said that Canada had set
itself 'a straightforward objective: a legally binding agreement in
1997 to ban the production, stockpiling, transfer and,
particularly, the use of AP mines.' To this end, the Ottawa Process
would 'proceed without interruption until a successful conclusion
later this year.' He cast doubt on the 'lengthy step by step
approach' but said that Canada would 'not object' if members of the
CD wanted to negotiate a ban on exports. However, he said that
Canada had 'major difficulty' with the concept underlying the UK
proposal. Moher 'acknowledged' those who wanted the CD to deal with
the issue, but rejected the view that the Conference was the 'only
acceptable mechanism' for this. If the CD wanted to negotiate on
landmines, Canada would 'not oppose', but he underlined that Canada
set one criterion: that any CD approach 'be complementary to and
mutually reinforcing of, the Ottawa Process'. If not, he warned
that Canada would oppose.
Ireland spoke in a similar vein two weeks later,
underlining that any negotiations on landmines in the CD 'must
reinforce and complement other efforts, such as the Ottawa Process,
which have already begun, which are working well, and which have
attracted a high level of international support'. After analysing
the benefits and drawbacks of the CD and Ottawa approaches,
Anderson argued that if the CD took on the issue it would have to
'build on what has already been achieved in terms of international
consensus on the way forward'; that negotiations must be
comprehensive from the outset and 'must cover the central question
of use'; and that the CD must move rapidly. 'If the Conference
spends months talking around a mandate, further months discussing
the modalities of the negotiations and yet more time on the scope
of the convention, then the Conference will not respond to the
humanitarian urgency implicit in the words "as soon as
possible"'.
While saying that he did not reject the CD out of hand,
Ambassador Erwin Hofer made clear that Switzerland prefers
the Ottawa process to the CD, since the 'time factor is decisive'.
Hofer emphasised that the planned rules should cover 'first, a ban
on the manufacture, stockpiling, possession, transfer and use of
anti-personnel landmines, and secondly, an obligation to destroy
existing stockpiles.'
Of the non-aligned who made plenary statements, only
Mexico expressed a strong opinion on the issue of landmines.
De Icaza made two telling arguments against the CD taking on
landmines negotiations: i) that it would divert attention from what
should be the CD's 'highest priority' - nuclear disarmament; and
ii) that the CD will have the disadvantage of slowness without
being able to guarantee universality or the participation of key
States. Commenting memorably that 'swiftness is not this
Conference's main virtue', de Icaza raised doubts that the CD was
'capable of pursuing and bringing to conclusion more than one
negotiation at a time'. In that case, he continued, 'it is
necessary not to waste our limited capabilities by undertaking
tasks which are not of the highest priority or which would
duplicate efforts undertaken in other multilateral fora.'
Indonesia seemed largely to share this perspective. Although
saying he would not stand in the way if the CD reached agreement on
landmines, Tarmidzi reiterated that 'this Conference should not be
sidetracked from negotiating the highest priority item in our
agenda, namely nuclear disarmament.'
Intending to bolster his argument that the CD was the
inappropriate forum, de Icaza argued that the principles for a
landmines ban were based on humanitarian and not disarmament
considerations. Others, arguing from the opposite side (and
advocating the CCW as the appropriate mechanism to deal with AP
mines) have made the same distinction. However, as pointed out by
Kreid, 'banning a defensive weapon carries with it a strong
disarmament dimension as well.' The Ottawa Process recognises this.
Although with the objective of outlawing the use of anti-personnel
mines, Ottawa is aiming for a treaty which will give teeth to such
an objective by banning the production, stockpiling, export and
transfer as well. Recognising the disarmament dimension does not
necessarily mean that the CD is the only forum for negotiations. As
Kreid pointed out, there are precedents in disarmament law, such as
the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, where a small number of States
signed the original treaty, opening it for accession by others. By
1974 this treaty was a sufficient international norm that the
prospect of a case taken in the ICJ by South Pacific countries over
atmospheric testing was decisive in making France halt its
atmospheric testing programme, despite having never acceded to the
PTBT itself.
Mexico's concern that the US-UK-French initiative to prioritise
landmines on the CD's negotiating agenda was in part designed to
divert attention from demands for the CD to negotiate further
nuclear disarmament measures is shared by many non-aligned
delegations. However, several, including Cuba, DPRK,
Pakistan and Syria, are less enthusiastic than Mexico
for the fast track Ottawa Process as an alternative. Syria referred
to the 'pain' it felt at the human suffering caused by AP mines 'in
some parts of the world where those mines have been misused'. Its
representative, Iyad Orfi, went on to argue that for some States,
mines 'are still a legitimate weapon to defend their security and
their borders in the face of more lethal weapons.'
While the attitude of several non-aligned States seems to be
unenthusiastic either way, Brazil stated its backing for the
CD as 'the proper forum for the attainment of a universal and
effective ban.' Lafer said that the proposed phased approach could
'yield early results', but said that Brazil would also continue to
participate in the Ottawa Process, which could play 'an important
role in building political momentum for attaining the goal of a
universal ban.'
The western and European States are deeply divided. Although
France and Britain have taken the lead in pushing for
the CD as the venue for negotiating on landmines, Austria,
Belgium, Canada and Ireland have been
determined to press ahead with the fast track Ottawa approach.
Other western countries are positioned along a continuum between
these two strongly held positions, with some leaning closer to
Ottawa and others towards the CD. New Zealand's Foreign
Minister said that it supported the Ottawa process but could also
accept a 'potential role' for the CD, providing it proceeded in
parallel with Ottawa and agreed a 'strong mandate supportive of an
early and comprehensive outcome.' Sweden's Foreign Minister
said that 'the only effective solution to the landmine crisis is a
total ban on APLs. No more, no less.' However, she went on to say
that Sweden participated in the Ottawa Process and was also ready
to do so in the CD. Swedish ratification of the amended Protocol II
of the CCW was foreseen for June.
Poland endorsed the Anglo-French proposal for a phased
approach within the context of the CD, saying only that it 'noted
with interest' the Canadian initiative to conclude a ban by the end
of 1997. However, Poland considered that the Ottawa Process and the
CD could complement each other and have a 'potentially synergistic
effect'. Hungary was a stronger supporter and participant in
the Ottawa Process, but Naray said that the 'CD's role in the
concert of efforts aimed at a total ban should be considered from
the point of view of the universality and efficiency of the future
convention.' Hungary could be flexible towards the Anglo-French
approach, but 'would have serious difficulties with a mandate not
stipulating a total ban on use and production as the ultimate goal
of the negotiating process in the CD.'
Nuclear Disarmament
Both Indonesia and Mexico identified nuclear
disarmament as the 'highest priority' for the CD, underlined by the
UN Special Session on Disarmament in 1978. They both wanted the CD
to establish a nuclear disarmament committee, but stopped short of
insisting that it be convened with a negotiating mandate from the
beginning. Within the G-21 there are attempts to get agreement on a
negotiating mandate, but those who opposed the 'concurrent' linkage
in the programme of action put forward by 28 of the 30 members of
the G-21 in August 1996 are also resisting any mandate which
commits the CD to negotiate a timetable for nuclear disarmament,
which they consider impractical at present. They are joined by
others, including Egypt and Morocco, who are
concerned that if the G-21 demands a negotiating mandate they could
frighten away the moderates in the nuclear-weapon States.
Three countries continue to oppose a nuclear disarmament
committee: Britain, France and the United
States. But the positions are not solid. There is an internal
debate in all three capitals, with a growing number of pragmatists
willing to accept such a committee, under certain conditions (which
do not include a mandate to negotiate a treaty or timetable at this
point). However, it is clear that unless and until the Clinton
Administration can get ratification of the CWC past the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee and Jesse Helms, it is not going to
risk showing flexibility on nuclear disarmament, while there is no
prospect of Britain moving until after the elections in May, if
then.
In their statements, Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia and also Sweden
referred to important new developments, such as the Canberra
Commission, the ICJ advisory opinion and the 5 December statement
by 61 retired Generals and Admirals calling for the elimination of
nuclear weapons. Indonesia deeply regretted 'the recalcitrant
attitude adopted by some of the nuclear-weapon States towards the
need to immediately negotiate a treaty banning nuclear weapons.'
Tarmidzi criticised them for narrowly interpreting their
multilateral legal commitments, particularly article VI of the NPT,
by insisting that nuclear disarmament is a 'bilateral exercise and
therefore the sole domain of the nuclear-weapon States.' He said
that article VI and the NPT required prompt action and warned the
nuclear-weapon States that their prevarication 'may lead to the
unravelling' of the NPT.
Brazil referred to the elimination of nuclear weapons as
'the paramount task' for the CD, proposing that a fissban and other
measures could be negotiated under the overall umbrella of a
nuclear disarmament committee. Lafer argued that making further
progress on nuclear disarmament 'contingent on the prior
attainment' of the fissban and even entry into force of the CTBT
was just linkage of another sort. Syria addressed the
nuclear disarmament by focusing on Israel's nuclear arsenal.
Among the western group, several delegations, including Ireland,
Sweden, Austria, Hungary, Poland and Japan made a strong plea for a
more constructive attitude towards nuclear disarmament, while
warning against linkage and the 'blueprint approach', as Anderson
called it. Ireland's ambassador went on to ask why some
delegations need reassurance about the direction of incremental
nuclear disarmament. Like Austria and Sweden, she enumerated
progress in the NPT, CTBT, START I and II (if ratified by Russia),
expansion of nuclear-weapon-free zones adherence, and so on. But
she also called on the P-5 to 'set out their perspective, and imbue
the words 'systematic and progressive' with meaning...Such a
perspective need not be time-bound, but ... a broad elaboration of
the next steps they themselves propose to take.' Sweden's
Foreign Minister also called for the concept of systematic and
progressive nuclear disarmament to be given a 'concrete content'.
She said that 'the steps must be identified and fully translated
into action.' New Zealand's Foreign Minister declared that
though the process of irreversible nuclear disarmament had begun in
a bilateral framework, 'we are also convinced that sustainable
progress is not a matter which can be left solely to the
nuclear-weapon States...'
McKinnon went further, calling for a nuclear disarmament
committee 'with an overarching mandate...[which] could begin
immediately with the cut-off negotiations, while also considering
longer term issues.' In effect, it would have 'an active
negotiating track and a preparatory track.' This would not be a
talk shop, he argued, but one 'which prepared the ground carefully
and effectively for eventual negotiations.'
Others sought ways to bridge the gap between those who wanted a
committee on nuclear disarmament and those who wanted nothing.
Ambassador Hisami Kurokochi of Japan proposed that a special
coordinator be appointed 'to identify the issue(s) in the field of
nuclear disarmament which could be negotiated in the Conference and
to report to the Conference on the result of these consultations no
later than the conclusion of the 1997 session.' This might have
proved acceptable last year, but with many members of the G-21
focusing now on a negotiating mandate, a special coordinator could
be perceived as a defeat rather than a compromise.
Conclusion
This is a dismal time for the CD. More than one delegate has
likened it to post-natal depression (after the difficult birth of
the CTBT). Some hold out hopes that a constructive NPT PrepCom in
April could help shift the logjam. Others look forward to a more
constructive government in Westminster or a less timid approach in
Washington after Senate ratification of the CWC and Russian
ratification of START II. Certainly not even the optimists expect
any decisions on the CD's programme of work before the end of June.
Pointing to the strong reservations (read objections) by
significant groups of States on each of the three major issues
under discussion, the pessimists doubt that there is sufficient
incentive for any movement on anything this year.
1997 CD Session
The CD's 1997 session runs from 20 January to 27 March; from 12
May to 27 June; and from 28 July to 10 September.
© 1998 The Acronym Institute.
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