Disarmament Diplomacy
Issue No. 15, May 1997
Geneva Update No. 35
By Rebecca Johnson
Summary
Half way through its 1997 session, the Conference on Disarmament
(CD) in Geneva was still unable to agree its programme of work or
get started on any negotiations. The main issues under
consideration are:
i) a ban on fissile materials (fissban or 'cut-off');
ii) negotiations on (a phased approach to) banning the export,
stockpiling, production and eventually use of anti-personnel (AP)
landmines; iii) nuclear disarmament (with or without a specific
negotiating mandate at this stage).
Other issues which have been on past agendas and have been
raised, although lacking widespread support for immediate CD
negotiations, are: security assurances from the nuclear-weapon
States (NWS) to non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) not to use or
threaten to use nuclear weapons against them; prevention of an arms
race in outer space; transparency in armaments and issues relating
to an arms register.
The most recent discussions focused on landmines, specifically
on attempts to find a formula for considering the issue in the CD.
It is now more likely that a Special Coordinator might be agreed
than an ad hoc Committee. Appointment of a special coordinator
would acknowledge that CD negotiations on this issue were ruled out
before the end of 1997, when the Ottawa Process expects to have an
international ban on the production, stockpiling, transfer and use
of AP mines ready for signature.
Although negotiations on a fissban are advocated by many CD
members, the issue is attracting less attention than landmines at
present. Disagreement remains over whether and how the negotiations
would address existing fissile material stocks, but the fissban is
chiefly stymied by linkage with establishment of a nuclear
disarmament committee, which the United States continues to rule
out. John Holum, Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency (ACDA) urged the CD to negotiate on both the fissban and a
landmines ban, arguing that the CD is the forum where 'arms control
negotiations, not merely discussions, are conducted.'
Several delegations expressed frustration at the lack of
progress in the CD and made suggestions for what work should be
prioritised. These included the United States, Ukraine, Egypt,
Japan, Hungary, Morocco, Canada, Chile, Italy, Australia, United
Kingdom, India, Poland, Germany and Sudan. Egypt proposed
establishment of three ad hoc Committees: on agenda item 1 (nuclear
disarmament), item 3 (prevention of an arms race in outer space),
and item 4 (security assurances). Included in Egypt's proposal was
the appointment of three special coordinators: on agenda item 6
(especially landmines), item 7 (transparency in armaments) and the
CD structure and function, including the agenda and further
expansion.
Grigori Berdennikov of the Russian Federation, the outgoing CD
President, expressed regret that no consensus on the work programme
had been forthcoming despite intensive consultations. The incoming
President, Absa Claude Diallo of Senegal pledged to work at finding
a compromise. She said that Senegal would join consensus on banning
landmines providing that the CD did not ignore the issue of nuclear
disarmament.
An increasing number of delegations doubt whether the CD will
succeed in agreeing to start work on even one issue in 1997. The
real question is whether understandings can be reached this year to
allow the CD to convene its committees and perhaps start
negotiations on something concrete in 1998.
Landmines
Despite exhortations from Holum and a few others, who want the
CD to convene a committee and immediately begin negotiations on
some form of landmines ban, there is a marked lack of enthusiasm
from two sides. Although they have not wanted to block the CD
per se, advocates of the Ottawa Process were anxious that
the CD could be used to derail their fast-track initiative to
conclude a total ban on AP mines, including use, by the end of the
year.
Mexico has been particularly blunt in its view that the
CD would not achieve the necessary measure with the urgency that it
requires. On the other hand, there are some ten or so States in the
CD which rely on landmines for border defences and do not want to
be forced into giving them up in the near future. These countries
oppose the Ottawa initiative. Some oppose the concept of a
landmines ban altogether, so oppose negotiations in the CD as
well.
Others recognise the humanitarian concerns, but are heavily
weighed down with military considerations. They view the CD as a
better forum than Ottawa as it would approach negotiations at a
slower pace, be more likely to address their concerns and give them
time to adjust to the prospect of a total ban. For example,
India's ambassador Arundhati Ghose argued that a pragmatic,
phased approach to a global ban could allow the security concerns
to be addressed of States which still use landmines 'for defensive
purposes'. There are also those who regard the CD as a useful way
to divert attention from the Ottawa Process or slow it down.
When in January the US threw its weight behind landmines
negotiations in the CD, it was quickly backed by Britain,
France and Australia. They argued that only the CD
had the negotiating credibility to involve all the major mine
producers and users (apart from sub-state actors). The US, Britain
and France were uncomfortable with the fast-track approach,
although they were under heavy pressure from domestic public
opinion and needed to be seen to be doing something.
Following the landslide election win for Britain's Labour
Party, the new Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, wasted little time
reformulating a more positive approach. On 21 May, he announced
that Britain would stop using or trading in all AP mines and would
back the Ottawa Process for a total ban. London also dropped its
support for replacing existing stockpiles with 'smart' mines
intended to neutralise or destroy themselves within a certain time
after being laid. The new policy mentioned the year 2005 as a final
deadline for the total destruction of Britain's stockpiles of AP
mines - or earlier if an international ban were to take effect
before 2005. Until then (and to enable the military to develop
alternatives) the armed forces were given some reassurance in a
provision for consideration of exceptional need and use. Requiring
any exceptional use to be reported to Parliament imposes additional
constraints.
Within the context of the CD, however, it appeared that
Britain's position had altered little. Citing statements made by
the Foreign Secretary in the British Parliament, that Britain would
impose a moratorium on the operational use of landmines "while we
participate constructively in the Ottawa Process and push in the
Conference on Disarmament in Geneva for a wider ban", Ambassador
Sir Michael Weston emphasised on May 22 that "lest there be any
room for doubt about our position with respect to work on this
issue here in the Conference on Disarmament: the United Kingdom
continues strongly to support the immediate establishment of an ad
hoc Committee on anti-personnel landmines with a negotiating
mandate." He went on to back the Australian proposal for a Special
Coordinator.
France had also been showing signs of a more positive
approach towards the Ottawa Process, with the likelihood that its
newly elected government will be even more inclined to back a
fast-track ban. The US desire to see landmines negotiations
commence in the CD in 1997 now looks unlikely to be fulfilled.
Increasingly it appears that the maximum that can be expected from
the CD this year is the appointment of a Special Coordinator to
consult the 60 delegations about what the CD might do on
this issue.
In March, Chile, Poland and Finland had
proposed appointing a special coordinator to conduct consultations
on 'the most appropriate arrangements' for dealing with the issue
of AP mines (CD/1452). The special coordinator would take into
account all related matters and could consult with delegations on
whether the CD should address this issue, and if so, how. Choices
would include: no action by the CD at all; a deliberative function,
to oversee and discuss without actually negotiating; convening a
committee with a negotiating mandate; the nature of the mandate and
its objective, specifically whether the CD would negotiate a ban
itself or dovetail with the Ottawa objective (for example, by
addressing verification). If the CD decided to negotiate, it would
have to choose whether to go for a ban on exports only, as
advocated by some CD members, a phased approach beginning with a
ban on exports, or a total ban, as advocated by participants in the
Ottawa process.
Hoping to go beyond a special coordinator and get a CD committee
established, Hungary and Japan followed up on May 15,
proposing a draft mandate for an ad hoc committee under agenda item
6, to 'negotiate an effective, legally binding international
agreement to ban the use, stockpiling, production and transfer' of
AP mines (CD/1455). However, most debate has centred on a proposal
for a special coordinator tabled by Australia on 22 May.
Australia has been a staunch backer of the US position wanting CD
negotiations on landmines (by implication entailing a less
enthusiastic approach to the Ottawa process). Wishing to avoid
dealing with the CD's programme of work as a complete package,
Australia aimed to bypass the linkage problems by proposing a
special coordinator on this one issue, thereby detaching it from
'ongoing efforts' to get agreement on an overall programme of
work.
The original Australian proposal was as follows (CD/1458, 22
May, 1997):
"Draft decision
Without prejudice to its ongoing efforts to establish the
Programme of Work for its 1997 session and in order to facilitate
them, the Conference on Disarmament decides:
1. To appoint a Special Coordinator to conduct
consultations on the most appropriate arrangement to deal with the
question of anti-personnel landmines under agenda item
6.
2. The Special Coordinator shall take into consideration
all relevant proposals, present and future.
3. The Special Coordinator shall present an early report
to the Conference on Disarmament."
During various consultations under the auspices of the CD
President, Grigori Berdennikov, the opening paragraph of the
proposed decision at one point made reference to agenda item 1
(nuclear disarmament) and then dropped it again, at US insistence.
This 'chapeau' was then amended to read: "Without prejudice to, and
within the context of its urgent ongoing efforts to establish a
Programme of Work for its 1997 session and to set up mechanisms, as
appropriate, for other agenda items of the Conference, and in order
to facilitate these efforts, the Conference on Disarmament
decides..." There is still no agreement on the wording, although no
delegation has ruled out or threatened to veto the appointment of
the special coordinator.
A special coordinator could be a helpful compromise at this
point, removing the illusion that the CD is in a position to
conduct negotiations on landmines this year, but keeping alive the
possibility of a role in the future. For the CD to appoint a
special coordinator is tacit acknowledgement that it is unable to
move on this issue at present. This could clear the way for the
Ottawa Process to conclude its negotiations as planned and may
bring in States which wavered between the CD and Ottawa options.
Deciding on a special coordinator now would not preclude the CD
from engaging in negotiations on landmines at a later date, either
to work out verification arrangements or to undertake negotiations
on a phased ban that would draw in States like China and Russia,
which are opposed to the Ottawa approach.
Fissban
On 15 May, John Holum, for the United States, put forward
a strong argument for the CD to commence fissban negotiations. He
argued that guaranteeing that fissile material stocks 'available
for use in weapons will not and cannot grow' would be a constraint
specifically on the NWS. He warned that the recent moratoria
undertaken by the NWS were 'eminently reversible', unless codified
in a global, binding and verifiable treaty. Such a treaty, he said,
could be simple and straightforward and was achievable now. Urging
the CD to begin negotiations on the basis of the Shannon mandate,
Holum presented the choice starkly: "we can continue to talk about
nuclear disarmament in the abstract - or we can get on with it in
practice."
For India, Arundhati Ghose said that the issue of
stockpiles, the inclusion of tritium and the problem of surplus
stocks were some of the 'grey areas' of the Shannon Report, which
"appeared even more grey after two years". India considered that
these could be clarified if the CD adopted a work programme that
put the fissban mandate into the context of a multilateral
disarmament process.
Nuclear Disarmament
In addition to Senegal, India and Egypt,
others also stressed the importance of addressing nuclear
disarmament in the CD. Although Canada regarded the NPT as
the primary forum for addressing nuclear disarmament issues and
strongly backed immediate negotiations on a fissban, Ambassador
Mark Moher called for establishment of 'a mechanism, perhaps an ad
hoc Committee' for substantive discussion on nuclear disarmament,
with a view to identifying if and whether further measures could be
negotiated in the CD.
The G-21 Group of Non-Aligned States has been attempting
to get agreement on a joint proposal for a mandate for a nuclear
disarmament committee. Although they are in agreement over the need
for an ad hoc committee, they disagree over what it should do. The
majority of G-21 members are pressing for a negotiating mandate.
They want negotiations on nuclear disarmament in a specified
framework of time and mention several measures for concurrent
consideration, as proposed in the August 1996 Programme of Action,
which had been backed by 28 of the 30 non-aligned members.
Several members, including Chile, Morocco and
South Africa, have argued that the G-21 should not specify a
negotiating mandate at this time. Their position echoes Canada's in
calling first for discussions on what nuclear disarmament measures
the CD could address, with a view to working out an appropriate
negotiating mandate when the objectives are clearer. However,
India seems determined to ensure that fissban negotiations
do not take place without an agreed framework on nuclear
disarmament. Pakistan is holding out for a strong mandate to
be proposed at the start, arguing that negotiations on that mandate
can begin when the NWS respond to it. There are some concerns that
any proposal for negotiations on a timetable for nuclear
disarmament would be dismissed out of hand, losing the opportunity
for dialogue with the NWS over the mandate.
The three Western nuclear powers have so far refused to consider
an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament. China and
Russia indicated in previous years that they would not
oppose, although Russia is now thought to be less than
enthusiastic. Opposition has been strongest from the United
States. Holum's 15 May statement underscored that the US had no
intention of compromising on this: "The real obstacle to nuclear
disarmament negotiations here is not the willingness of the
parties, but the capacity of the forum. It will not work. It will
set back disarmament. We cannot and should not agree to it."
The Clinton administration feels itself to be vulnerable on
disarmament questions, as evinced by the recent difficulties in
Congress over ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
and the restructuring of ACDA into the Department of State. Holum's
statement was partly intended to head off any possible shift by
Britain or France, and partly to repudiate the strategy of linkage
employed by some CD members.
With deadlock in the CD and more western countries expressing
support for a nuclear disarmament committee - or at least some form
of mechanism to address nuclear disarmament questions in the CD -
the US is coming under increased pressure to compromise. Holum's
hard-line statement was intended to convince CD members that
neither linkage nor time would wear down the US resolve against a
nuclear disarmament committee. Instead, he argued, "the way to
extend nuclear disarmament today is through the same painstaking
step-by-step process that has produced such dramatic results in
recent years." Bringing nuclear disarmament to the CD would, in
Holum's view, halt all actual progress "for the sake of a long
argument over the ultimate destination, and when we must arrive
there."
Conclusion
For different reasons, each of the proposed issues before the CD
is opposed by at least a few CD members, thwarting consensus. The
linkage asserted between the proposed fissban negotiations and
nuclear disarmament has logic and history but practical drawbacks.
Like the CTBT, this is also falling victim to South Asian and
Middle Eastern regional politics, as well as concern that the
measure should not merely reinforce the nuclear status quo.
Without understandings or mechanisms to address stocks or nuclear
disarmament either in the CD (which the Western nuclear powers
oppose) or in parallel talks, perhaps among the P-5, it is
difficult to see how fissban negotiations can get started in the
CD. The G-21 are concentrating on trying to get agreement for a
negotiating mandate for a nuclear disarmament committee, but there
is significant opposition within their own ranks. Stalemate
continues, as the United States unequivocally rejects a role for
the CD in promoting nuclear disarmament. Most energy has therefore
been devoted to the landmines issue, with no success.
It does not look as if the CD will have an effective work
programme this year. At best, it might get agreement to open
consideration on a fissban in preparation for getting negotiations
underway in 1998, but that would require a considerable political
breakthrough, which is not presently on the horizon. It might be
possible to appoint special coordinators on landmines and/or
nuclear disarmament as a way of partially addressing these issues
while putting them off for alternative or later consideration. Such
devices can only serve the CD temporarily.
Following the successful negotiations of the 1992 CWC and the
1996 CTBT, the Conference will not be greatly harmed by a fallow
year in 1997. If no breakthrough is possible and the stalemate
continues into 1998, however, the CD could lose credibility and
authority as a multilateral forum for disarmament negotiations. It
is therefore vital that CD members negotiate with sufficient
flexibility now so that they are in a position to undertake a
programme of work early next year.
© 1998 The Acronym Institute.
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