Disarmament Diplomacy
Issue No. 15, May 1997
Setting Up the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons
by Alexander Kelle
Introduction
The First Session of the Conference of States Parties to the
Chemical Weapons Convention (FSCSP) - scheduled for 6-23 May 1997 -
concluded on the evening of Saturday 24 May. 117 of the
Convention's 165 signatory States participated in the Session, of
which 80 States had deposited their instruments of ratification
before the Convention's entry-into-force on 29 April, entitling
them to participate in the decision-making during the Conference.
Decisions had to be taken in three main issue areas:
- the approval of provisional decisions taken by the Preparatory
Commission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons (OPCW);
- the solution of issues left outstanding by the Preparatory
Commission;
- the setting up of the organizational structure of the OPCW to
allow for the new organization's proper functioning.
A summary of progress
The first of these tasks, the approval of the draft decisions
and recommendations prepared by the Preparatory Commission and the
Provisional Technical Secretariat of the OPCW, did not cause much
trouble. Practically all speakers during the initial four-day
general debate welcomed the progress made by these two bodies. The
vast majority of draft decisions were approved without
modifications.
The adoption of all these decisions, however, was contingent on
the ability of the Conference to agree on its rules of procedure in
the first place. The main bone of contention in this regard was the
participation in the decision-making of the FSCSP of signatory
States which had not ratified the Convention. Apparently, China
supported the Russian Federation, Pakistan and Iran in their
unsuccessful attempt to gain access to, and have a right to speak
in all the meetings of, the Conference and thus be able to exercise
some influence over its decision-making process. Instead of
granting signatory States these rights, the Conference decided to
'switch back' from committee work to plenary sessions several
times, so that signatories could voice their opinions and
distribute position-papers to delegations.
The second task of the Conference - solving these outstanding
substantive issues necessary to enable the newly-established OPCW
to take up its duties - turned out to be much more difficult. The
most prominent such issue was the approved list of inspection
equipment. Without such a list, inspected parties would be able to
reject inspection equipment as they see fit.
Initially, the Conference made progress when China and India
withdrew their demand to have different lists of equipment for
different types of inspection. The approval of one consolidated
list nevertheless remained blocked because of India's request that
all inspection equipment had to be commercially available to States
Parties.
According to the compromise formula accepted by India on the
last day of the Conference, all Member States have the right to
familiarise themselves with inspection equipment before it is
brought to the State. Should an inspected State feel deprived of
this right, it can refuse the utilization of inspection
equipment.
Since it could be foreseen early in the Conference that only a
small fraction of the outstanding issues would be resolved by its
closure, a mechanism was adopted that allowed the unresolved issues
to be addressed during the first intersessional period. Again, the
degree of participation that signatory States should be granted
proved contentious. As in the debate over the rules of procedure,
China favoured greater participation of signatories, while the US
led the group of States Parties which obviously felt that there had
to be a visible distinction between Members and non-Member States.
In addition, the degree of the formalization of the consultation
process was contested.
The compromise that was finally reached provides for a rather
informal process in which so-called 'facilitators' will be
appointed to solve specific issues assigned to them. There will not
be a clustering of issues, and with respect to signatory States it
was decided, on the day before the Conference ended, that they
"shall be given reasonable opportunity to express their views
during the facilitator's consultation process."
These controversies complicated the third task of the Conference
- the setting up of the OPCW. First of all, it took a week before
all 41 Members of the Executive Council were nominated and
approved. Only after the constitution of this organ could the
Director General (DG) of the OPCW, the Brazilian diplomat Jose
Mauricio Bustani, be elected. India was given the chairmanship of
the Executive Council for the first year of the Organization's
operation. Once this was accomplished, debates focused on the
OPCW's top structure and the distribution of posts among the five
regional groups as well as the organization's first budget.
According to a proposal submitted by the DG, the Western
European and Others Group (WEOG) was to receive three of the nine
top positions, while the Latin American and the Eastern European
Groups in contrast were allotted only one post each. However, the
regional distribution of the OPCW's top-positions turned out not to
be all that controversial. Rather, it was overshadowed by a
struggle over the classification of the Director General's post and
the subsequent gradation of his Deputy and the Directors of the
Technical Secretariat.
Apparently, a contract had been set up and signed by the
newly-appointed DG which foresaw for him the 'rank' of
Undersecretary General in the United Nations hierarchy. This is, in
and of itself, nothing unusual - the Director General of the
International Atomic Energy Agency, for example, holds a comparable
position. However, the contract was obviously formulated and signed
without prior consultation with Member States. This unusual
procedure, and the prior assumption of some influential States that
the top-post of the OPCW would be accorded the rank of an Assistant
Secretary General, led to fierce resistance by a small group of
States, led by a WEOG delegation. It was only overcome in the
early-morning hours of the FSCSP's last day when all delegations
eventually were willing to approve the DG's contract.
This controversy was the main obstacle to a timely conclusion of
the FSCSP, as it delayed - together with the debate about a list of
approved inspection equipment - the drafting of the OPCW's first
budget. The calculation of this budget was made even more
complicated by the US insistence on externalising a great portion
of the verification costs associated with the destruction of its
chemical weapons (CW) arsenal. The initial US proposal envisaged
that most of the verification costs should initially be covered by
the Organization, which would be reimbursed only after the
completion of inspections. This, however, would have increased the
OPCW's budget and, accordingly, the contributions of all member
States. Consequently, the US proposal met with considerable
resistance from most Member States. According to the compromise
eventually reached, the US will, from the outset, cover all those
expenditures directly and unquestionably related to verifying the
destruction of its arsenal.
An Assessment
At first glance, the large number of decisions formally taken by
the Conference - more than 75 - suggests a prevailingly cooperative
attitude. However, one has to take into account the fact that the
great majority of these decisions were prepared during four years
of intense negotiations in the Preparatory Commission of the OPCW
and thus had only to be approved by the Conference.
In fact, the willingness to compromise appears to have been
quite limited during this inaugural Session. Only those issues
absolutely necessary to establish a functioning Organization were
taken up by delegations. This is not to diminish the achievements
that were made with regard to creating the organizational structure
of the OPCW's Executive Council and its Technical Secretariat led
by the Director General. Nevertheless, these successes should not
lead to overly optimistic expectations or an assumption that only
some minor issues need to be resolved by the consultation process
set up for the interesessional period. On the contrary, the still
outstanding issues are numerous and significant.
The final report of the FSCSP lists 24 unresolved issues, among
them guidelines for detailed procedures for verification of CW
production and storage facilities, old and abandoned CW sites,
challenge inspections, investigations of alleged use, as well as
model arrangements for a variety of CW-related facilities. In
addition, the report recorded "no statement" on outstanding issues
related to international cooperation for peaceful purposes in the
field of chemical activities.
With respect to all these issues, the dearly held and mutually
exclusive positions of various delegations prevented resolution. It
is therefore doubtful that the intersessional consultation process
will yield the hoped-for results. In cases where timelines set by
the Convention demand ad hoc solutions, these are likely to be
taken by the Technical Secretariat. It can be expected that the
approval of these provisional decisions will be hotly debated by
the OPCW's political organs - either in the Executive Council, or
during the next Session of the Conference of States Parties which
is scheduled for early December 1997.
Dr. Alexander Kelle is Research Associate at the
Non-Proliferation Project of the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt
(PRIF).
© 1998 The Acronym Institute.
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