Disarmament Diplomacy
Issue No. 24, March 1998
CD Adopts 'Make Work' Work Programme For 1998
By Rebecca Johnson
SUMMARY
The Conference on Disarmament, chaired by Ambassador Taher
Al-Hussami of the Syrian Arab Republic, on 26 March established an
ad hoc Committee on negative security assurances (NSA) and six
special coordinators on substantive and procedural issues. There
was not time before the first part of the 1998 session closed to
decide on the names of CD Members to fill the posts of special
coordinators and Chair of the ad hoc committee, but it is hoped
that the appointments will be agreed soon after the CD reconvenes
on 11 May.
Special coordinators were established for the CD agenda items
dealing with prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS),
landmines, and transparency in armaments (TIA). Three 'reform'
coordinators were also established, for review of the agenda, the
expansion of CD membership, and on improving the functioning of the
CD. With continued opposition from some of the nuclear-weapon
States (NWS), there was no agreement on appointing a special
coordinator for nuclear disarmament. It was therefore decided that
'intensive consultations' on this issue should be carried out by
the troika of past, present and next presidents of the CD. The
Presidency is normally rotated every four weeks alphabetically
among the ambassadors of CD member States.
Although a number of delegations showed satisfaction at finally
achieving some decisions on a work programme, they also expressed
disappointment. Brazil said the decision fell 'woefully short' of
international aspirations and agreed with South Africa that it
represented the 'lowest common denominator' of consensus; China saw
it as the 'product of compromise'; Germany and Pakistan
characterised the decision as a 'modest step'; while many
emphasised that it was, at least, a start. Japan, Britain, Germany,
the United States and others urged the President to seek agreement
on the personnel to fill the key appointments so that they could
begin consultations in the intersessional period before the CD
reconvenes on 11 May, but the non-aligned States warned against
rushing such decisions, pointing out that they would not be able to
engage in full consultations during the remaining 24 hours as they
were also covering the Human Rights Commission.
Delegations from the G-21 group of non-aligned States
particularly regretted that nuclear disarmament was not given a
special coordinator, and called on the President to begin
consultations on this as soon as possible. Others, including Japan
and Germany were concerned that the decision did not mention the
fissile material production ban (fissban) or cut-off treaty (FMCT),
to which they accorded high priority. Ambassador Robert Grey of the
United States devoted the major part of his plenary statement to
urging the CD to get negotiations on a cut-off treaty underway,
calling it "ripe for negotiation". Arguing also for the CD to
undertake substantive work on landmines, Grey said that
negotiations on these two issues would demonstrate that the CD was
a "serious negotiating forum in which meaningful disarmament
agreements can be reached." (1)
South Africa and Canada both expressed deep reservations
regarding the establishment of an ad hoc committee on security
assurances, questioning whether 'real work' could be done on NSA at
the CD. While Canada said it would not block consensus, South
Africa made clear that it did not support the decision, leaving an
impression that it might have exercised its veto if that right had
not been suspended as part of the CD enlargement agreement in June
1996.
In public statements as well as in the corridors there was
relief that a work programme had been agreed, but recognition that
it had missed the major issues. Some delegates complained that the
CD had only managed to agree on 'make work' topics to give the
appearance of relevance and industry, while in fact it was still
deadlocked on the politically-charged issues of fissban
negotiations, nuclear disarmament and whether to work on
landmines.
Major plenary statements were made during recent weeks by China,
Colombia, Pakistan (with a reply from India), Canada, Mexico and
the United States. Following the establishment of a new government
in India, headed by the Hindu nationalist party, the Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP), the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Gohar Ayub
Khan, criticised his neighbour's "great power ambitions and
aggressive proclivities", with particular reference to Jammu and
Kashmir and the "unpleasant revelation" of India's chemical weapons
programme and stockpiles. In particular, Khan raised concerns about
recent public pronouncements from the BJP President that India
would "go nuclear". He warned that "South Asia may be pushed into a
dangerous arms race" (2). Ambassador Savitri Kunadi responded on
behalf of India, but suggested that Pakistan should raise these
concerns bilaterally rather than in the CD. She said that India
remained committed to sustained and constructive dialogue at the
Foreign Secretary level, in the ongoing talks initiated in 1990
(3).
The new Chinese Ambassador, Li Changhe, gave a comprehensive
statement in which he warned that despite the end of the Cold War,
"we are still haunted by the spectre of the Cold War mentality, as
evidenced by the expansion of military blocs, the strengthening of
military alliances, the retention and even extension of the nuclear
deterrence doctrine, and research, development and proliferation of
strategic defence systems." Li called the CD "irreplaceable" and
said that, since it encompassed "all militarily significant
countries", only the treaties concluded in the CD framework could
"enjoy wide representation and universality". China expressed its
willingness to commence negotiations on a FMCT "on the basis of the
mandate contained in the Shannon Report". In his careful wording
and reiteration of the mandate based on the 1993 UNGA resolution
48/75L, Li clearly underlined China's view that existing fissile
material stocks should not be included in the proposed treaty. He
also gave general support for discussing nuclear disarmament in the
CD, and pushed for the militarisation of outer space to be
addressed. Li backed CD work on NSA and argued for unconditional
security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States and a commitment
by the NWS of no-first-use of nuclear weapons against each other
(4).
After making a strong case for addressing nuclear disarmament in
the CD, the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs of Mexico,
Ambassador Carmen Moreno, also considered the work methods of the
CD. Observing that the present division of CD Members into "groups
reminiscent of the Cold War is anachronistic and does not
facilitate decision-making", she said that "the real division with
regard to security today is between nuclear-weapon States and
non-nuclear-weapon States." Recognising the importance of consensus
in safeguarding everyone's security interests, Mexico argued that
"if carried to the extreme, as is happening now, consensus is
reduced to the lowest common denominator or...line of least
possible resistance." Backing Chile's proposal on standing
committees, Moreno called for the consensus rule to be re-examined,
so that it could not be applied in ways that prevented the
effective functioning of the CD (5).
CD WORK PROGRAMME
The President, Taher Al-Hussami, first made a declaration
regarding agenda item 1 (nuclear disarmament). This was followed by
adoption of the decision on the work programme and comments from
various delegations, including South Africa, Egypt, India, Iran,
Japan, Canada, Pakistan, Germany, China, and the United States on
behalf of itself, France and the United Kingdom. The statement and
draft decision adopted by the CD on 26 March 1998 were contained in
a 'Non-paper' by the President, revision 3. The statement will be
issued as CD/1500 and the decision as CD/1501.
Presidential Declaration
After having identified Agenda Item 1 entitled "Cessation of
the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament" as being of an
extremely high priority, and after having used all means of
consultations provided for in the Rules of Procedure of the
Conference, the President came to the conclusion that the only way
to move forward on substance at this stage would consist in
substantially increasing consultations regarding this item, under
his authority by using all possibilities, including the assistance
of the outgoing and the incoming Presidents, with a view to
reaching consensus on how to deal with this item.
The Presidency is thus willing to consider henceforth Agenda
Item 1 as its first priority, to vigorously continue its efforts in
this respect and to present early and regular reports on these
consultations throughout the session, including before the end of
the second part of the 1998 session.
Draft Decision
The Conference takes the following decisions:
1. That the Presidency, taking into account the statement
(CD/1500), made by the President at the 791st plenary meeting on 26
March 1998, shall pursue intensive consultations and seek the views
of its Members on appropriate methods and approaches for dealing
with agenda item 1 entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and
nuclear disarmament", taking into consideration all proposals and
views on this item.
2. The Conference establishes, for the duration of the 1998
session, an ad hoc committee under agenda item 4 entitled
"Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon
States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", to
negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective
international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States
against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. These
arrangements could take the form of an internationally legally
binding instrument.
The ad hoc committee shall take into consideration all
relevant views and proposals present and future and also address
questions related to its mandate.
The Ad Hoc Committee will report to the Conference on the
progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1998
session.
3. The Conference appoints a Special Coordinator under agenda
item 3 entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space" to seek
the views of its Members on the most appropriate way to deal with
the questions related to this item.
4. The Conference appoints a Special Coordinator under agenda
item 6 entitled "Comprehensive programme of disarmament" to seek
the views of its Members on the most appropriate way to deal with
the questions related to anti-personnel landmines taking into
account, inter alia, developments outside the
Conference.
5. The Conference appoints a Special Coordinator under agenda
item 7 entitled "Transparency in armaments" to seek the views of
its Members on the most appropriate way to deal with the questions
related to this item.
6. In implementing these decisions, the Presidency and the
Special Coordinators shall take into consideration all relevant
views and proposals, present and future.
7. The Conference requests the Presidency and the Special
Coordinators to present early and regular reports on the outcome of
their consultations throughout the session, including before the
end of the second part of its 1998 session.
8. The Conference also decides to appoint Special
Coordinators on the Review of its Agenda, the Expansion of its
Membership and its Improved and Effective Functioning. These
Special Coordinators, in discharging their duties and functions,
will take into account all proposals and views, as well as future
initiatives. The Conference requests these Special Coordinators to
report to it before the conclusion of the 1998 session.
9. The taking of these decisions contained in paragraphs 1,
3, 4 and 5 does not prejudge the positions of delegations on the
eventual establishment of subsidiary bodies on the issues
identified, but reflects agreement to advance the Conference's work
with a view to reaching consensus. This decision is also taken
without prejudice to the rights of Members of the Conference to
move forward with positions and proposals already made or to be put
forward in the future.
STATEMENTS TO PLENARY
Nuclear Disarmament
Non-nuclear weapon States have continued to stress the
importance of nuclear disarmament. Camilo Reyes Rodriguez, the
Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Colombia, supported
establishment of an ad hoc committee with a negotiating mandate and
called on the nuclear weapon States to display the necessary
resolution and political will to dismantle their nuclear arsenals
(6).
Ambassador Carmen Moreno, Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs of
Mexico, devoted the major part of her statement to
addressing nuclear weapons concerns. Pointing out that with the end
of the Cold War bipolar confrontation, "logic and practice dictated
putting an end to the spread of the awesome weapons it had produced
and to the nuclear deterrence doctrines that had lost their
fundamental support", Moreno raised concerns about new deterrence
doctrines, aimed "everywhere and against anyone", concluding that
"today the probability of the intentional use of these awesome
weapons is greater than ever." In view of these new doctrines, the
continued risk of accidental or mistaken use, and increasing
insecurity surrounding nuclear technology and materials, Moreno
asserted that the "strains on the nuclear non-proliferation regime
could lead us - in the continued absence of consensus on nuclear
disarmament - to considering nuclear weapons commonplace."
Though her statement also raised serious concerns about
conventional weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, Moreno
underlined that the 1996 advisory opinion of the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) made clear that nuclear disarmament was
relevant to all States and was not to be subordinated to general
and complete disarmament.
Noting statements in December 1996 by 60 Generals and Admirals
and in February 1998 by the civil leaders of 44 nations, as well as
the initiatives put forward by Mexico in the past, Moreno stated
that "the abolition of nuclear weapons is an idea whose time has
come". Mexico wanted the concept and parameters of a nuclear weapon
convention to be explored, stressing that this did not imply
artificial deadlines, but that it should be possible to agree on
"flexible and differentiated time-frames with due regard to the
quantitative and qualitative disparities in existing stockpiles..."
Noting the suggestions put forward by the G-21 and others in recent
years, Moreno suggested that the CD would only overcome its
"endless consultations" when it acknowledged the priority of
nuclear disarmament and tackled the subject "systematically and
seriously" (7).
Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Gohar Ayub Khan, argued that
the danger posed by nuclear weapons was not confined to 'loose
nukes' or nuclear terrorism, although these needed to be seriously
addressed: "The principal danger arises from the continued
possession and possible use of nuclear weapons by some of the
nuclear weapon States." Khan raised concerns about the continued
existence of large arsenals, even after START II and START III and
the "uncertainty of multipolar nuclear deterrence between 5 nuclear
powers and perhaps some additional nuclear-capable States". Like
Mexico, Pakistan was particularly concerned about "the new nuclear
doctrines contemplating the actual use of nuclear weapons - even
against non-nuclear weapon States". Khan said that the new
doctrines and related refinement of nuclear designs could destroy
the consensus against nuclear proliferation and lead to a nuclear
disaster.
Pakistan wanted the CD to "play a central role in realising the
vital objective of nuclear disarmament". Noting that there may be
more than 20 countries with the potential to build nuclear weapons,
Khan said that "it would not be wise or logical to exclude them
from negotiations which seek the progressive reduction and eventual
elimination of nuclear weapons." He reiterated Pakistan's support
for the 1997 proposal from 26 non-aligned countries for an ad hoc
committee on nuclear disarmament with three simultaneous working
groups:
i) to negotiate a binding commitment to the complete elimination
of nuclear weapons, on which Pakistan intended to circulate a
working paper;
ii) to negotiate a timetable for nuclear disarmament along the
lines of CD/1419 (proposed by 28 non-aligned delegations in 1996),
making clear that "we are seeking in this process to identify
nuclear disarmament measures, their sequence and the approximate
timing for their realisation", not for actual negotiations of
specific measures; and
iii) to negotiate a Fissile Materials Convention "with a mandate
which reflects the Shannon Report and the concerns expressed by all
countries." Khan warned that the fissban would not be equitable
(and therefore not acceptable) if it failed to address existing and
unequal stockpiles (8).
Ambassador Li Changhe reiterated China's policy of
opposing the nuclear arms race and nuclear deterrence and standing
for "the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear
weapons". He said China had exercised "extreme self restraint" in
its development of nuclear weapons. Although China hoped that "on
the basis of full exchange of views" an acceptable formula would be
found for addressing nuclear disarmament in the CD, Li argued that
the two largest NWS should "carry out further drastic reductions of
their nuclear arsenals, abandon the strategy of nuclear deterrence,
stop the research in and development of outer space weapons and
refrain from the development, deployment and proliferation of
missile defence systems, which undermine the global strategic
security and stability." China considered such progress necessary
to create the conditions for all the NWS to participate in nuclear
disarmament negotiations in the future (9).
Fissban
Grey devoted the major part of the recent US statement to
highlighting the need to move forward with negotiating a treaty on
the basis of the 1995 Shannon mandate. He said that while the
United States was "prepared to listen, to participate, to
contribute, and to discuss issues of concern" to all CD members, it
wanted the Conference to do what was "realistically achievable".
Calling a fissile materials cut-off "one of the cornerstones in
building a solid foundation for global nuclear disarmament", Grey
said that it was not "only" a non-proliferation measure, but would
have "clear benefits from a nuclear disarmament perspective":
i) it would apply a quantitative restraint, capping the amount
of fissile material available for nuclear weapons globally;
ii) it would extend verification measures to fissile material
production facilities not currently subject to international
monitoring, including all reprocessing and enrichment facilities in
the NWS;
iii) it would make legally binding and irreversible the current
voluntary moratoria on fissile material production undertaken by
some of the NWS;
iv) it would promote a positive climate for continued progress
on reducing nuclear weapons stockpiles;
v) it would meet the commitment made in the NPT Principles and
Objectives in 1995.
With regard to its nonproliferation benefits, Grey stressed that
a FMCT would "promote stability in regions where the risks of
escalating arms races are greatest". In a clear reference to South
Asia and the Middle East, Grey said: "We hear talk of dangerous
'regional imbalances' which must be addressed. Would it not make
sense to take an important step - a step we can take now - to
ensure that those imbalances do not grow larger?" (10)
China maintained that "the conclusion of a convention on
the prohibition of fissile material for nuclear weapons will be
conducive to the prevention of nuclear proliferation and promotion
of nuclear disarmament, a shared responsibility of every member of
the international community." Li Changhe said that the future
convention should be "fair, reasonable and universal" and be based
on the Shannon mandate and the 1993 UNGA resolution 48/75L (11).
Pakistan's Foreign Minister said his country was "prepared
to commence work on a Fissile Materials Convention with a mandate
which reflects the Shannon Report and the concerns expressed by all
countries. If it is to be acceptable, the Fissile Materials Treaty
must be equitable. It would not be so if it does not address the
problems created by unequal stockpiles of fissile materials,
including in our region." (12) Mexico's reference to
"efforts limited to partial and peripheral measures" was
interpreted by some delegations as a dismissal of the importance of
CD work on a FMCT (13).
Egypt reiterated the importance of the fissban, putting
it in a wider context of nuclear disarmament. Western States,
including Canada, Japan and Germany, stressed
the urgent need to negotiate the proposed FMCT, arguing that the
Shannon report provided a good basis and the necessary flexibility
to raise matters of legitimate concern. Germany and Canada also
expressed a willingness to re-examine the context of the Shannon
mandate, although Ambassador Günther Seibert underlined
Germany's view that "this should not stand in the way of
commencement of substantive work in an ad hoc committee, or, if
necessary, in a less formal setting." (14) Having tabled its own
proposal for a Presidential clarification to enable the fissban
committee to start work on the basis of the Shannon report, Canada
had wondered whether the FMCT issue was omitted from the draft
decision because it had been "precluded - dare we say vetoed - by
one or more delegations?" (15)
Security Assurances
The only ad hoc committee established in the work programme was
on NSA, due in no small measure to Pakistan's tenacity. Khan
suggested that the committee should "enable us to collectively
clarify the new doctrines for nuclear deterrence and nuclear use
propounded by certain States and Alliances systems" with the aim of
concluding a binding international agreement. He also suggested
that the committee could examine additional confidence building
measures related to nuclear targeting and possible use (16).
China's position on unconditional security assurances and no
first use has remained solid and Li predictably pledged support for
an NSA ad hoc Committee to negotiate such an international legal
instrument. Firstly, he said, the "most effective security
assurances should be the complete prohibition and thorough
destruction of nuclear weapons." Pending the realisation of this
"ultimate objective", the NWS should "undertake unconditionally not
to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against
non-nuclear-weapon States" and the NWS should commit themselves to
"no first use of nuclear weapons against each other." (17)
South Africa, as one of 23 new Members admitted to the CD
in June 1996, was denied the right to exercise a veto as part of an
agreement designed to deal with US problems over Iraq. Before the
26 March Plenary decided on the 1998 work programme, South Africa
read a statement withholding its support from the decision to
establish an NSA ad hoc Committee. Quoting Ambassador Selebi, Peter
Goosen questioned whether NSA belonged in the CD and noted that in
the past the CD had "demonstrated a singular lack of any progress"
on NSA. In South Africa's view, NSA was not a genuine disarmament
measure, but rather "confirmation of the nuclear weapon status of
those States which possess these weapons." Arguing that the NSA
issue ought rather to be addressed in the strengthened review
process of the NPT, since security assurances are "an implicit part
of the NPT bargain which was struck with non-nuclear-weapon States
when they forswore the nuclear weapons option", Goosen made clear
that the South African delegation did not support paragraph 2 of
the work programme setting up a NSA ad hoc committee (18).
Canada affirmed that it regarded nuclear disarmament and
the FMCT as national priorities and reiterated its scepticism about
setting up a committee on NSA. Canada had noted the fundamental
disparity of views over who was to give what to whom and how, and
suggested that these questions needed to be explored and clarified
before taking "the deliberate decision" to establish a committee.
Though it had not blocked agreement on the programme of work,
Canada, like South Africa, expressed scepticism that any real
progress could be made on security assurances at the CD (19).
PAROS
China expressed concern about "activities in the
development and testing of components of outer space weapons or
weapons systems in recent years" and said that such activities were
designed to use outer space for consolidating and strengthening
military superiority on the ground. As such, they could "undermine
regional and global strategic balance, jeopardise peace, security
and stability, and harbour the potential danger of turning outer
space eventually into a battlefield." Arguing that outer space
should be used solely for peaceful purposes and that the existing
international legal instruments were far from adequate, Li Changhe
endorsed the view of Ambassador Palihakkara of Sri Lanka,
that if the CD did not deal now with preventing an arms race in
outer space, it would in future years have to negotiate on space
disarmament or on the nonproliferation of outer space weapons.
China therefore supported the re-establishment of an ad hoc
committee on PAROS but would also accept a special coordinator, as
a first step.
Mexico raised concerns that technological developments
could lead to the increasing militarisation of outer space and
considered that a PAROS committee should be re-established on the
basis of the 1997 UN General Assembly resolution 52/37.
Pakistan and Colombia also backed a PAROS committee,
hoping that it would soon negotiate an agreement to preserve outer
space for peaceful purposes. Colombia emphasised the need for a
comprehensive regime with verification, transparency and confidence
building measures.
Landmines
The United States continued to argue that the issue of
anti-personnel landmines (APL) was "ripe for negotiation" in the
CD. Noting that a number of the largest producers and stockpilers
of landmines were not adherents of existing agreements, Grey argued
that "an export/transfer ban negotiated in the CD would enable many
more States to accept international obligations that restrict APL."
(20)
China said it took seriously the humanitarian concerns
and supported "appropriate, reasonable and feasible restrictions"
on landmines, as well as carrying out large scale national and
international demining activities. However, China considered that
landmines continued to be "an indispensable defensive weapon" for
many countries, so that "a balance should be struck between
humanitarian concerns and legitimate requirements of sovereign
States for self defence." Until alternative means could be found,
China could not agree to a ban on landmines, but it was prepared to
support the reappointment of a special coordinator along the lines
of CD/1495, proposed by 23 countries, including Ottawa signatories
and non-signatories.
Colombia stressed the importance of regional initiatives,
as well as humanitarian work and demining, and said that the CD
could work on landmines in "parallel" with the Ottawa process,
providing that it did not jeopardise the rules established by the
Ottawa Treaty (21). Mexico urged continuing work aimed at
the entry into force and full implementation of the Ottawa Treaty.
With regard to proposals for further negotiations beginning with a
ban on exports, Moreno argued that the 1980 Convention on Certain
Conventional Weapons (CCW) would be a more "fitting context" for
negotiating phased measures that would "take us one step further
from Protocol II... without eroding the prohibitions agreed on in
Oslo." (22)
Conventional Arms Control
Several statements supported further work on conventional arms.
Clearly concerned about the military disparities in South Asia,
Pakistan called for establishment of an ad hoc Committee on
Conventional Arms Control and Disarmament, suggesting that it
should have three working groups:
i) to constrain advanced technology and development of more
sophisticated weapons systems, since "the increasing lethality and
sophistication of conventional weapons...increase suffering
and...further intensify the concentration of destructive power in
the hands of a few militarily and technologically advanced
powers";
ii) to formulate a framework for conventional disarmament and
arms control at the regional and sub-regional level; and
iii) to consider the transfer of armaments, especially small
arms. With regard to regional arms control, Khan identified certain
key principles which Pakistan would want to instil: that "none of
the potential adversaries should be capable of prevailing in a
military attack launched by surprise"; rough parity of quantitative
and qualitative defence capabilities between potential adversaries;
and "no significant disparity in any of the areas of conventional
defence - land, air or naval forces" (23).
Colombia also regarded small arms as an issue of major
importance, raising concerns about illicit trafficking and
widespread use. Noting that small arms destabilised societies, and
sheltered terrorism, drug trafficking and mercenary activities,
thus violating human rights, Reyes Rodriguez called for an ad hoc
committee in the CD to address this issue (24). Mexico also
raised concerns about excessive conventional armaments. Holding
that conventional disarmament would have "better prospects of
success at the regional level", Moreno noted the work of the
Organisation of American States in 1997 and the Rio Group, which
met in Mexico in January 1998 to consider possible voluntary
measures to control the acquisition of offensive conventional
weapons (25).
Other Issues Raised
Reyes Rodriguez pushed for a fourth UN Special Session on
Disarmament (UNSSOD IV) to be held in the near future.
Colombia also stressed the importance of transparency in
armaments, an issue that was barely mentioned (or only in passing)
by other delegations. Several States referred to the need to
strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and work for
full implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Mexico called for a
broad approach to the issue of the non-proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, raising concern about shortcomings in the export
control regimes. Arguing that "the closed and hence discriminatory
nature of these regimes contributes to their diminished
efficiency", Moreno called for the CD to identify the elements for
"a multilateral regime for the control of the transfer of
technology and dual use materials linked to the building of weapons
of mass destruction."
Pakistan wanted the CD to consider negotiations for an
international agreement to prohibit or restrict anti-ballistic
missile (ABM) and theatre missile defence (TMD) systems, arguing
that the development of AMB and TMD defence systems could
"seriously erode nuclear stability and provoke a new nuclear and
missiles race among the nuclear powers and perhaps other States."
As a first step, Pakistan suggested that the CD could set up a
working group to clarify the legal and technical developments
pertinent to this issue.
CONCLUSION
The CD's difficulties are essentially political, with structural
components that obstruct substantial decision-making. Adoption of
this 'lowest common denominator' work programme demonstrates more
clearly than ever the need for a positive new mandate on
disarmament from the international community. Since the
groundbreaking consensus at the UN Special Session on Disarmament
in 1978, the geostrategic context has altered beyond recognition.
The CD has enlarged its membership to 60, one third of the UN
Membership, comprising the major military and industrial nations,
with a few notable exceptions. It is high time for another Special
Session of the UN General Assembly to allow the international
community to re-examine post-Cold War priorities and
practicalities. UNSSOD IV could provide a valuable opportunity to
update the substantive and procedural guidelines on which the CD
relies. In particular, it could help to set an 'Agenda 21' on
nuclear and conventional disarmament for the next century, perhaps
resulting in an updated decalogue that could be a more practical
tool for guiding the CD's work than a decalogue that arose 20 years
ago at the height of the Cold War.
UNSSOD IV could also play a useful role in helping the CD to
examine its procedures, and consider ways to be more accountable
and bring greater continuity and coherence to its work. This could
include rethinking its relationship with the United Nations (26),
the strengths and limitations of the rule of consensus, as
suggested this week by Mexico, and Chile's proposal for standing
committees. Some States (notably by the United States) seem worried
that UNSSOD IV may turn into a forum for mutual accusation. This
can be avoided if the international diplomatic community and NGOs
engage in careful planning and have creative input into the
organisation of the Special Session early on. The modest decision
on the CD's work programme does not adequately reflect the
sophisticated level of debate among many of the delegations or the
growing degree of convergence about the need to address
conventional arms control and disarmament and to ensure continued
positive progress towards nuclear disarmament.
The programme of work adopted by the CD will enable more
systematic consultations on some of the topics, but it cannot
escape notice that the really substantive issues have been avoided.
Most notable, however, is the growing recognition that the CD has a
role to play in conventional disarmament and in regulating military
activities so as to prevent outer space from becoming a future
battleground. Although there are serious questions which can be
discussed in the ad hoc committee on security assurances concerning
use, new doctrines and postures, alliances, nuclear capable States
and whether nuclear, chemical and biological weapons can be
regarded as equivalent for the purposes of security assurances and
no first use, the gulf between the perspective of the NWS and that
of the nuclear capable States (who have been pushing most strongly
for a multilateral treaty) remains too wide for the CD to have a
realistic prospect of agreeing a negotiating mandate in the near
future.
Despite having agreed a mandate to negotiate a fissban three
years ago, the CD is still unable to move forward on this. Nor will
the sleight of hand in giving the nuclear disarmament issue to the
President's troika satisfy for very long. Some States are already
claiming that the CD has broken new ground by establishing a
mechanism for addressing nuclear disarmament. Some consider that
agenda item 1 has been given priority above the issues dealt with
by special coordinators, while others see the decision as a con,
offering nothing new. Although linkage is, of course, formally
eschewed, in reality the CD will have to consider mechanisms for
addressing both the fissban and nuclear disarmament if it is to
make concrete progress on these important issues.
Whether the 26 March decision will be dismissed at the end of
the year as irrelevant will depend on how the special coordinators
and NSA committee address their tasks. If they are willing to step
beyond past thinking and ideologies, examine the new technologies
and security conditions and update their proposals for making
progress, then the CD will be shown to be acting responsibly in
creating conditions for future work. If old positions and proposals
are endlessly rehashed, the judgement of the international
community on such expensive 'make work' will be harsh.
The dates for the 1998 session are: 19 January to 27
March;
11 May to 26 June;
27 July to 9 September.
Notes and References
1. Robert T Grey, Ambassador of the United States, 26 March
1998, CD/PV.791.v 2. Gohar Ayub Khan, Foreign Minister of Pakistan,
19 March 1998, CD/PV.790.
3. Savitri Kunadi, Ambassador of India, 19 March 1998,
CD/PV.790. The statements are summarised in Documents and
Sources.
4. Li Changhe, Ambassador of the People's Republic of China for
Disarmament Affairs, 12 March 1998, CD/PV.788.
5. Carmen Moreno, Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs of Mexico,
26 March, 1998, unofficial translation (will be in CD/PV.791).
6. Camilo Reyes Rodriguez, the Deputy Minister for Foreign
Affairs of Colombia, to the CD Plenary, 12 March 1998. The actual
speech was unavailable, so the summary has been taken from United
Nations Press Release, DC/98/14.
7. Moreno, op. cit.
8. Khan, op. cit.
9. Li, op.cit.
10. Grey, op. cit.
11. Li, op. cit.
12. Khan, op. cit.
13. Moreno, op. cit.
14. Günther Seibert, Ambassador of Germany, 19 February
1998, CD/PV.785 (not available for inclusion in Disarmament
Diplomacy No. 23), and remarks on 26 March 1998.
15. Mark Moher, Ambassador of Canada, 19 March 1998,
CD/PV.790
16. Khan, op. cit.
17. Li, op. cit.
18. Peter Goosen, 26 March 1998, quoting J.J. Selebi, 20 January
1998, CD/PV.779.
19. Don Sinclair, 26 March 1998.
20. Grey op. cit.
21. Reyes Rodriguez, op. cit.
22. Moreno, op. cit.
23. Khan, op. cit.
24. Reyes Rodriguez, op. cit.
25. Moreno, op. cit.
26. See R. Johnson, 'Making the CD more accountable', Disarmament Diplomacy No. 17,
July/August 1997.
Rebecca Johnson is Director of the Acronym
Institute.
© 1998 The Acronym Institute.
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