Disarmament Diplomacy
Issue No. 27, June 1998
Geneva Update No. 41
By Rebecca Johnson
CD Dominated by Tests and Calls for Nuclear Disarmament and
Fissile Material Cut-Off
Summary
The Conference on Disarmament (CD) resumed its 1998 session for
nine weeks from 11 May to 26 June. The session was dominated by the
nuclear tests conducted by India on 11 and 13 May and by Pakistan
on 28 and 30 May. Altogether, around 100 statements were made by CD
members and observers, including one, sponsored by New Zealand,
onto which 47 States signed. As reported in Disarmament Diplomacy No. 26, the
nuclear tests were almost universally condemned, and India and
Pakistan were exhorted to stop testing and sign and ratify the
comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT) immediately and
unconditionally. Many States underlined the importance of the CTBT
and called on signatories which have not yet ratified, including
China, Russia and the United States, to do so without further
delay.
There were frequent calls for India and Pakistan to adhere to
the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), although several CD
statements, notably from Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, Brazil,
Indonesia and Iran, also raised concerns about the inadequacy of
progress towards nuclear disarmament under the non-proliferation
regime. The United States' Ambassador, Robert Grey, said he
objected to comments that had identified the lack of substantive
progress on nuclear disarmament as triggering or contributing to
the nuclear tests in South Asia. Arguing that while India and
Pakistan were moving in the "wrong direction... the nuclear weapons
States are moving in the right direction", he listed some examples
of significant recent action on nuclear arms control and recalled
that the Canberra Commission "so often cited... as a road map to a
world free of nuclear weapons" had identified a cut-off of the
production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons (FMCT) as the
next step in multilateral arms control. (1) A number of
delegations, including the United States, France, Finland, Germany
and Japan, emphasised the importance of getting FMCT negotiations
underway on the basis of the 1995 Shannon mandate.
The ad hoc committee on security assurances, chaired by
Ambassador Antonio de Icaza of Mexico, and the five special
coordinators which were agreed on 14 May, have begun work. Some of
these coordinators gave interim reports to the final plenary of
June, but at this early stage they had little to say. In his
closing statement, the outgoing President of the CD, Ambassador
Murat Sungar of Turkey, gave a brief outline of the presidential
'Troika' consultations (comprising the past, present and future
Presidents) on nuclear disarmament. He noted the importance of the
issue and the divisions of opinion over the CD's appropriate role,
especially the gulf of perception between certain nuclear-weapon
States and non-aligned delegations concerning the relation between
nuclear disarmament and a ban on the production of fissile
materials or cut-off treaty, which many delegations want the CD to
start work on as soon as possible.
The Australian special coordinator for the landmines issue,
Ambassador John Campbell, proposed a mandate for establishing
negotiations on a ban on the transfer of anti-personnel mines, but
acknowledged that it would be necessary to have an 'understanding'
on several aspects, including ensuring that such negotiations would
be consistent with and would not undermine existing instruments,
including the Ottawa Treaty and the 1980 Convention on Certain
Conventional Weapons (CCW).
The most significant new development this month was undoubtedly
the Eight Nations' Joint Ministerial Declaration calling for a
nuclear weapon free world. Subtitled 'The Need for a New Agenda',
the Declaration was launched on 9 June by the foreign ministers of
Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa
and Sweden, and presented by Sweden to the CD soon after. The
Coalition castigated the 'complacency' and 'persistent reluctance'
of the nuclear-weapon States and identified the need for a new
agenda, comprising bilateral, plurilateral (P-5) and multilateral
actions, including deeper reductions, and de-alerting and
de-activating nuclear weapons. The New Agenda Coalition underlined
the need for an unequivocal commitment to the elimination of
nuclear weapons. Side-stepping the politically paralysing debate
over time-bound frameworks, the declaration appeared flexible
regarding the best approach to achieve nuclear disarmament. It
supported both the concept of a universal, legally binding
instrument, such as some form of nuclear weapon convention, and a
framework of mutually reinforcing instruments, such as might be
developed by adding to and strengthening the measures comprising
the basic non-proliferation and nuclear arms control regimes
already in existence.
With less than seven weeks to go, the CD still lacks consensus
on starting negotiations on the only issue for which it has a
mandate - the FMCT. Pakistan has hardened its position against the
FMCT unless stocks are explicitly included, which the P-5, India
and Israel are adamant in resisting. Although there are signs that
British and French opposition to a nuclear disarmament committee is
softening, provided it is along the lines proposed by South Africa
or Belgium, the United States and Russia remain opposed. China has
already indicated its acceptance. The presidential consultations on
nuclear disarmament and the discussions convened by the various
special coordinators may clarify the range of different views and
alternatives, but are not expected to come up with concrete results
before the end of this year.
Recent Statements
The CD was addressed by the Foreign Ministers of Iran and
Kazakhstan. Iran's Foreign Minister, Dr. Kamal Kharrazi,
reported to the CD on his consultations in New Delhi and Islamabad,
following the nuclear weapon tests. His statement was made just
hours before the foreign ministers of the permanent members of the
UN Security Council (Britain, China, France, Russia and the United
States - the P-5) met in Geneva and issued a statement on the South
Asian nuclear tests. While emphasising that conducting nuclear
tests was "misconduct" and that "the ensuing responsibilities
cannot be evaded nor eroded under any pretext", Kharrazi argued
that "lack of serious attention and [the] absence of concrete
action on nuclear disarmament" had been a contributory factor. He
argued for renewed dialogue between India and Pakistan on several
issues, including: peace and security; Jammu and Kashmir;
confidence-building measures; and nuclear issues, including the
CTBT and NPT. He did not let the opportunity pass to underline the
necessity of ensuring the universality of the NPT and a zone free
from weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, citing "the
refusal by Israel to accede to the NPT and accept IAEA safeguards
[which had] gravely endangered the security of the entire region."
(2) This point was underlined by a subsequent statement by Iran,
which referred to the "urgent need to prevent the spill-over
effect" of the nuclear tests. (3)
The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of
Kazakhstan, Kassymzhomart Tokayev, reminded the CD that
"nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation issues are
intertwined" and said that Kazakhstan supported bilateral and
multilateral discussions. (4) Referring to the "qualitatively new
situation" following the South Asian tests, Brazil's
Ambassador, Celso Lafer, raised concern that the nuclear crisis
"put in question the international nuclear non-proliferation
regime, creating a situation that poses a real challenge" to the
world's "generally accepted non-proliferation paradigm". Lafer
noted that while different regional experiences were not
automatically transferable, the successful history of
confidence-building and denuclearisation undertaken by the
erstwhile nuclear adversaries in Latin America, Brazil and
Argentina, could offer a "practical precedent that can hopefully
inspire a reversal of the current tense situation [in South Asia]".
(5)
Nuclear Disarmament
Following their nuclear tests in May, India and
Pakistan were swift to proclaim their commitment to nuclear
disarmament. India revived its earlier proposal for a nuclear
weapon convention, linking it with demands from the non-aligned
countries and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) calling for
immediate commencement of negotiations on a global treaty banning
and eliminating nuclear weapons. India offered Pakistan a bilateral
no-first-use agreement, which Pakistan rejected, citing its need
for nuclear 'deterrence' based (like that of NATO and Russia) on
potential first use. Pakistan offered India a bilateral
non-aggression pact, which India rejected, because of the
utilisation of its armed forces along borders, including the Line
of Control.
Raising renewed concerns that the 'inadequate' pace and scope of
nuclear disarmament had contributed to the context of the nuclear
tests and to a weakening of the non-proliferation regime, several
delegations supported the view that nuclear disarmament was a task
pertaining both to individual responsibility (of the nuclear-weapon
States) and collective responsibility (of all States).
Indonesia argued that "changing the current policy of: 'do
as we say and not as we do' is vitally important if proliferation
is to be halted." (6)
South Africa reiterated its proposal for a nuclear
disarmament committee with a mandate to exchange information and
deliberate on the practical steps for systematic and progressive
efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons. Brazil, speaking on behalf of
the G-21 group of non-aligned States, recalled the various
proposals and suggestions put forward in recent years. Speaking
later on Brazil's own behalf, Lafer argued that "The current
international situation in which the fragility of the
non-proliferation paradigm has been exposed allows for different
responses [on] many fronts." He proposed the immediate
establishment of an ad hoc committee on agenda item 1, "where
nuclear disarmament and related issues - such as a convention
banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons
purposes - can be properly addressed and negotiated." (7)
As they had done at the Second NPT PrepCom, France and
the United States listed steps on nuclear arms reduction and
control which they had undertaken or advocated. Saying that she
agreed with those who considered that disarmament was the concern
of all, France's CD Ambassador, Joëlle Bourgois, argued that a
global approach to disarmament required that particular regional
situations be taken into account, and that progress be undertaken
in steps. She underlined the importance of the CTBT and FMCT and
pointed out that in addition to removing most of its tactical
nuclear systems, France had placed its nuclear air and submarine
forces on a reduced level of alert. (8)
In similar vein, Grey argued that the incremental approach to
reductions worked because of the complexity of asymmetries in the
structure and composition of different nuclear forces, verification
(characterised as "technically complicated and politically
sensitive"), and because "the pace and scope of nuclear arms
reductions depend largely on the security and environment and the
level of international tensions". (9) Brazil, however,
pointed out that while supporting the START process, it must be
recognised that "the process is subject to political constraints
and susceptibilities, particularly in the context of the expansion
of a nuclear capable NATO." (10)
Canada raised concerns that "new or reweighted
articulations as to nuclear deterrence are being proffered". To
mitigate and reverse the negative impact of the South Asian tests,
stalled START process and problems over strengthening the NPT,
Ambassador Mark Moher argued for a collective response, including:
opposition to any attempts to revalidate nuclear weapons in the
context of a new 'nuclear realpolitik'; reaffirmation of the NPT;
reinvigoration of the START process by the US and Russia, as well
as commitments by the three smaller NWS to join in with the next
phase. Canada proposed establishing a 'mechanism' for substantive
discussion on nuclear disarmament "with a view to identifying if
and when one or more such issues might be negotiated
multilaterally" and a separate mechanism for the immediate
commencement of FMCT negotiations. (11)
Ambassador Mounir Zahran of Egypt called for reflection
on the "lessons to be learnt" from the failure of the second NPT
PrepCom. He argued that the credibility of the nuclear
non-proliferation regime had been "seriously put into question",
blaming the nuclear-weapon States for providing a negative example.
In a clear reference to the United States, Zahran blamed 'some
States' for their "obstinate determination to block any mention of
Israel...[which continued] to block any meaningful international
discussion on how to achieve the NPT". (12)
Although the rhetoric and sense of urgency expressed by some
delegations have sharpened following the failure of the NPT PrepCom
and the South Asian nuclear crisis, it does not look likely that
the CD will be able to agree in 1998 on action related to nuclear
disarmament. It will be interesting to see over the next few months
whether the New Agenda Coalition is able to develop
effective leadership and strategies to unite a broader alliance of
non-nuclear-weapon States. Although initiated by Ireland in late
1997, coming after the tests and the stalemated Second PrepCom of
the NPT, the Declaration was timely and apt. It combined criticism
of the nuclear-weapon States and calls for a clear and unambiguous
commitment to eliminating nuclear weapons with a deliberately
moderate and pragmatic approach to ways and means of accomplishing
progress on nuclear disarmament, including support for the START
process and FMCT.
The challenge presented by the New Agenda Coalition consists of
much more than the text of the declaration, important though that
is. By bringing together a group of States which crosses
traditional political and geographic boundaries, the Coalition has
also challenged the Cold War alliances that impede decision-making
in the Conference on Disarmament and elsewhere in the UN system.
The next stage will no doubt be to test the level of support in the
United Nations First Committee and General Assembly. Then it will
become necessary to translate the multi-stranded approach into
proposals and pressure for concrete action. A first-step
deliberative committee on nuclear disarmament in the CD could have
a very constructive role to play, if the opponents from both sides
would allow it to be convened.
FMCT
The debate over commencing FMCT negotiations in the CD exposes
the sharp conflict over the efficacy of incremental steps versus
wider measures. While the majority consider that FMCT negotiations
would be a nuclear disarmament step worth taking, many acknowledge
that it needs to address stocks to be credible and verifiable in
the long term. A few delegations have made it clear that they
regard the proposed cut-off treaty as a limited non-proliferation
measure, which would have to be put into an explicit disarmament
context in order to be valid and effective.
Many of the statements which criticised the nuclear tests also
called on India and Pakistan to join negotiations for a cut-off
treaty or fissile materials ban without delay. Ambassador Markku
Reimaa of Finland spoke for many when he called the FMCT
"the indispensable next step forward in the process of nuclear
disarmament and non-proliferation". (13) Pakistan, concerned
about India's larger stocks of plutonium, has hardened its position
against this measure unless stocks are included. France
supported Austria's proposal for negotiations on the basis
of the Shannon mandate, concluding that the CD could take this
decision quite quickly. Bourgois pointed out that France had not
only halted its production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium
(HEU), but had taken the further important step of dismantling the
production facilities at Marcoule and Pierrelatte. The United
States emphasised that the FMCT would be non-discriminatory and
would not bestow any new status on any State (something which
Pakistan and others reportedly feared India would push for).
Ambassador Akira Hayashi of Japan reported on the Seminar
on the 'Technical Issues for a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty',
which the Japanese Foreign Affairs Ministry had hosted in Geneva on
11 and 12 May. Among the useful contributions, Hayashi highlighted
Australia's proposal to the NPT PrepCom for a phased
approach, starting with a cut-off of production, but committing to
further negotiations encompassing stocks once the cut-off was
concluded.
Brazil advocated FMCT negotiations as a primary task of
the nuclear disarmament committee, a suggestion which could be
considered alongside proposals from other non-aligned delegations,
including South Africa and Egypt. Egypt, however, wanted the
nuclear disarmament committee to negotiate simultaneously on a
timetable for nuclear disarmament, whereas South Africa has
proposed a deliberative function on the wider issues of nuclear
disarmament as a first step.
Although it is not thought that Egypt would block
consensus, if arrived at, its arguments against the basic FMCT are
close to those of Pakistan. Zahran reiterated Egypt's view
that a fissile materials ban (fissban) "can only be effective if it
is applied to both future as well as already-produced fissile
materials". According to Egypt's analysis, "limiting the ban to
future production would be a limited non-proliferation measure with
no real disarmament value. For such a fissile materials ban to be
effective, stockpiles of weapons-usable fissile materials which
exist in any country must be declared and become subject to
inventory and inspection under international supervision and
control, even if the ban were to be limited to future production.
Such a step would serve as the basis for any verification regime,
in order to ensure compliance with the negotiated treaty." (14)
Pakistan endorses this view and has continued to underline the
dangers of any measure that would merely reinforce the status
quo.
Following its nuclear tests, India has announced that it
would be willing to participate in FMCT negotiations in the CD and
drop its earlier position linking the cut-off with 'concurrent'
negotiations on nuclear disarmament. New Delhi's linkage of the
FMCT with timebound nuclear disarmament was imposed after India was
sidelined in the last stages of the CTBT negotiations, so it came
as no surprise that in the wake of its tests, New Delhi offered to
relax the linkage and support CD negotiations. Due to the
considerable disparity in fissile material stocks and production
capacities, the issue has long been a political football in South
Asia, so it also came as no surprise that Pakistan's opposition to
the FMCT became even more adamant.
Several of the proposals aimed at getting negotiations started
could bear fruit - if the political will can be summoned. The
blockage is not in the CD, but among the States with regional
concerns, especially in South Asia and the Middle East. Any
solution, therefore, will need to address those concerns
politically in order to lift the procedural blocks in the CD.
Landmines
Few States are really clamouring for the CD to address
landmines. The issue is largely perceived as a way to buy off
domestic criticism for staying out of the Ottawa Treaty. It might
be supported if it looks impossible to get other substantive work
moving in the CD. On the basis that those who supported the Ottawa
process and are unenthusiastic about the CD taking up an interim
ban on transfers would not actually block consensus, the special
coordinator, John Campbell, has suggested that "there is a prospect
that the Conference may be willing to establish an ad hoc committee
with the following mandate:
The Conference on Disarmament agrees to establish an Ad
Hoc Committee under agenda item 6, to negotiate a ban on the
transfer of anti-personnel landmines.
The Ad Hoc Committee will present periodic reports on its
progress to the Conference."
Noting that successful negotiations "will require the CD to take
the Ottawa Treaty as its standard when it comes to such issues as
definition and verification", Campbell concluded that some form of
Statement of Understanding may also be needed, along the following
lines:
"In taking this decision, Members of the Conference on
Disarmament agree that for such negotiations to be successful,
delegations will want addressed a range of issues including one or
more of the following:
- the need for consistency with the terms of existing
international instruments concerning anti-personnel
landmines;
- individual countries' national security concerns, the
importance of demining and the availability of alternative
technologies;
- the nature of the international trade in anti-personnel
landmines;
- the possible impact a ban on the transfer of
anti-personnel landmines might have on the indigenous production of
such mines."
Other Issues
A number of statements also referred to the issues of
transparency in armaments, outer space and security assurances, in
general repeating well-known national positions. (15) Additionally,
Egypt proposed that the CD Secretariat compile the published
material on research and development of new categories of weapons,
such as radiological weapons, and that the United Nations Institute
for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) be charged with carrying out a
detailed study on this subject.
Appointments for 1998:
- Chair of the Ad Hoc Committee on negative security assurances
(NSA) - Antonio de Icaza of Mexico;
- Special Coordinator on landmines - John Campbell of
Australia;
- Special Coordinator on preventing an arms race in outer space
(PAROS) - H.M.G.S. Palihakkara;
- Special Coordinator on transparency in armaments - Pavel Grecu
of Romania;
- Special Coordinator on improved and effective functioning of
the CD - Javier Illanes of Chile;
- Special Coordinator on review of the CD agenda - Peter Naray of
Hungary;
- Special Coordinator on expansion of the CD - Erwin Hofer of
Switzerland.
Dates for 1998 Session
19 January to 27 March
11 May to 26 June
27 July to 9 September.
Notes and References
1. Robert T Grey, US Representative to the CD, 25 June, 1998,
CD/PV.799.
2. Dr Kamal Kharrazi, Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic
of Iran, to the CD, 4 June, 1998, CD/PV.796.
3. Dr Javad Zarif, Deputy Foreign Minister of the Islamic
Republic of Iran, to the CD, 18 June, 1998, CD/PV.798.
4. Kassymzhomart Tokayev, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
Republic of Kazakhstan, to the CD, 19 May, 1998, CD/PV.793.
5. Celso Lafer, Ambassador of Brazil, to the CD, 25 June, 1998,
CD/PV.799.
6. Agus Tarmidzi, Ambassador of Indonesia, to the CD, 18 June,
1998, CD/PV.798.
7. Lafer, op. cit.
8. Joëlle Bourgois, Ambassador of France to the CD, 19 May,
1998, CD/PV.793.
9. Grey, op. cit.
10. Lafer, op. cit.
11. Mark Moher, Ambassador of Canada to the CD, 25 June, 1998,
CD/PV.799.
12. Mounir Zahran, Ambassador of Egypt, to the CD, 28 May 1998,
CD/PV.794.
13. Markku Reimaa, Ambassador of Finland, to the CD, 19 May,
1998, CD/PV.793.
14. Zahran, op. cit.
15. Since discussion of these issues is still at an early stage,
Disarmament Diplomacy will review the various arguments more
comprehensively at the end of the Session.
Rebecca Johnson is Executive Director of The Acronym
Institute.
© 1998 The Acronym Institute.
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