Disarmament Diplomacy
Issue No. 28, July 1998
The Humanitarian Dimension
By Lorna Richardson
George Robertson claims in the introduction to the SDR that the
British are "by instinct, an internationalist people", unwilling to
stand aside while humanitarian disasters and aggressive dictators
go unchecked. Bypassing, for the moment, the quite substantial
debate about whether British foreign policy is aimed at giving
Britain a status in the world quite out of keeping with her true
position, the military manifestation of this can be seen in the SDR
with the idea that Britain must be prepared to go to the crisis
rather than wait for the crisis to come to her. The force
structures themselves, from the cuts in the Reserve Forces to the
increased focus on joint operations, reflect this change in
emphasis from defending a home territory against one large enemy,
to preparing to send a number of expeditionary forces elsewhere in
the world.
As part of this declared emphasis on being a 'force for good' in
the world, Peace Support and Humanitarian Operations, defined as
ranging from logistical and medical support to disaster relief, are
included in the list of the eight defence Missions. Within this,
the enhancement of UN operations takes priority. However,
notwithstanding some recent television recruitment campaigns which
present the work of the forces as a particularly tough form of
disaster relief ('Their Country Needs You'), or, indeed, the cover
of the SDR itself, depicting a soldier feeding a baby in Rwanda,
military involvement in humanitarian aid needs to be very carefully
thought out.
The work performed by the military in protecting humanitarian
aid delivery, monitoring demobilisation, arresting war criminals
and protecting civilians has been welcomed by many development
agencies and civilians alike. Yet normalising the role of the
military in relief work brings with it inherent problems. Military
training and structures are designed primarily to support military
operations, not humanitarian work, and whatever skills that armed
forces personnel display in relief work may well be despite, not
because of, their training. Even in areas such as logistics, where
military skills and experience may seem supremely applicable to the
needs of large-scale relief work, the use of military equipment and
procedures can be entirely inappropriate to the task. In the worst
case, the unconsidered involvement of the military in humanitarian
aid may not only fail to do the job they were sent in to do, but,
by politicising the delivery of aid, actually endanger the relief
effort in the long term.
Moving from crisis response to long-term strategy, the SDR
identifies Defence Diplomacy for the first time as a separate
Mission. This covers arms control, non-proliferation and
security-building measures, but also takes into its brief military
assistance and training for overseas countries. While military
assistance abroad has long been a part of 'daily military
business', the rationale for formulating it as a discrete Mission
appears to be to give these tasks more status and a higher
profile.
The purpose of military training is set forth in the SDR as
assisting in the development of democratically accountable armed
forces. One major branch of this training is in the 'Outreach'
programme, which focuses on Central and Eastern Europe, while other
programmes assist with overseas defence forces elsewhere. One of
the ways, of course, in which the UK can promote the democratic
accountability of other armed forces is by setting a good example.
The MoD, together with the FCO, should expand on the transparency
measures outlined in the SDR by publishing the details, including
purpose, size, cost and who is paying, of every instance of British
military assistance. It would also be necessary to release details
of any human rights audit conducted on the armed forces of the
recipient country. Only then can the assistance programmes be given
the kind of informed scrutiny they need if they are to be measured
against the guidelines dictated by an ethical foreign policy.
Where ethical foreign policy guidelines are strictly adhered to
- and seen to be adhered to - timely, thoughtful, military
assistance abroad can have an effect which is beneficial
both to the host country and to Britain. These benefits can be
disproportionately large compared to the resources placed in it,
with the primary task supplemented by the establishment of
relationships of trust, with an effect on subsequent bilateral
relationships. The British Military Assistance Training Teams in
Southern Africa, for example, which assisted with the integration
of former adversaries into professional national defence forces,
have rightly been regarded by both Britain and the host States as
successful. Part of the success has to be attributable to the fact
that the training was done in support of definable foreign policy
objectives, and was flexible enough to build upon its own
strengths. The first training programme in 1980 led to the host
country, Zimbabwe, taking a 'satisfied customer' role later on in
recommending British training to Namibia, and then to Mozambique,
Angola, and South Africa.
Where the benefits to the host countries of military assistance
are lost is when assistance is used as a vehicle for promoting arms
sales abroad. This is connected more to the defence industry's
desire to achieve economies of scale than to the genuine security
needs of potential customers.
One eminently sensible point noted in the submission to the SDR
from the Secretary of State for International Development, Clare
Short, was that military assistance teams could rather use their
involvement and influence to encourage their host States to
restrict their military spending to what was absolutely necessary
for their security. (In this, too, Britain would have to follow its
own advice.) This would support the work of the Department for
International Development and the humanitarian aid agencies in
promoting development above military spending, and so on a number
of levels help to avert possible causes of conflict. By giving
advice not to buy arms, rather than merely refraining from selling
them ours, would also begin to address the usual cry of the defence
industry that "if we didn't sell them, someone else would". While
the remit of the SDR clearly does not extend to examining
interdepartmental relationships, the potential for conflicts of
interest between the different government departments does have to
be addressed. Britain, if it truly does want to be a 'force for
good' in the world, could do worse than to use the military to help
prioritise development.
Lorna Richardson has just graduated from the School of
Oriental and African Studies, London University. She is a former
Chair of the Namibia Support Committee and currently works as a
part-time administrator for the Acronym Institute.
© 1998 The Acronym Institute.
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