Disarmament Diplomacy
Issue No. 28, July 1998
New Ground, Old Assumptions: Analytical Limitations in the
SDR
By Paul Rogers
The Strategic Defence Review sets the seal on the ending of the
Cold War, finally giving up the 50-year belief that the centre of
Britain's security concerns was the risk of war in Europe. Instead,
the emphasis is now on responding to regional crises, especially in
the Persian Gulf, and developing versatile power projection
capabilities appropriate to an unstable and volatile world.
Thus, the numbers of submarines and escorts are cut, and the RAF
loses two Tornado squadrons, but aircraft carriers and
amphibious assault ships survive, along with an increase in heavy
lift aircraft. There is a persistent emphasis on logistic support
and the need increased efficiencies across the armed forces,
together with a renewed emphasis on joint operations.
In one important respect, though, the Review has been
handicapped by the substantial exclusion of two major elements in
Britain's defence capabilities, the status of the new Eurofighter
and of the Trident nuclear force. Eurofighter is
pre-eminently a Cold War project - immensely costly, constantly
modified and likely to be as great an embarrassment as the
Tornado ADV a decade ago. It should have been quietly put to
sleep immediately after the election but, regrettably, it was just
too far down the road for the new government to take it on.
Similarly, Trident was excluded from fundamental review,
even though a greater transparency and some de-alerting are welcome
developments. By co-incidence, the Review was published in the
immediate aftermath of the Indo-Pakistan nuclear tests, with
renewed concerns over nuclear proliferation. In this context, the
maintenance of Trident, albeit with limited changes, will
continue to make it difficult for Britain to speak with any
authority on issues of proliferation control.
In one important respect, the Review broke new ground, and did
it in a way that opens up the possibility of a much more vigorous
debate on Britain's security. This was because it was much more
transparent than any previous review, with seminars, advisory
groups, calls for evidence and many other instruments of discussion
opened up. This is in marked contrast to the Options for Change
exercise of the early 1990s, restricted almost entirely to a few
insiders.
But what of the overall result? In one sense, Britain's armed
forces have already experienced considerable cuts, both in budgets
and force levels, since the end of the Cold War, so this Review was
doing little more than regularise the status of the forces in the
new international context. Some further modest cuts are envisaged,
but the bottom line is that Britain will still be a major military
player on the world stage, a role which is believed to give it
international clout, but at the cost of maintaining a pretty hefty
defence budget, at least by post-Cold War standards. Perhaps the
central problem with the Review is that it barely begins to get to
grips with the likely international security problems of the next
30 years, even though it was supposedly foreign policy led. Perhaps
this is because British foreign policy itself has not yet woken up
to the problems ahead.
While there will almost certainly be particular instances of
instability and regional conflict in Eastern Europe, Africa and the
Middle East, the longer term security problems relate much more to
environmental and economic trends. There is abundant evidence that
environmental insecurity will increase, occasioned both by problems
of strategic resource supply and by the effects of climate
change.
In particular, it is now thought likely that climate change will
have a fundamental effect on rainfall patterns across the tropics,
leading to progressive droughts in regions which support most of
the world's people. The social and political implications of this,
not least as migratory pressures accelerate, are formidable.
These environmental trends will add to fundamental instabilities
created by the deepening global socio-economic divide. The
wealth-poverty gap is widening, not narrowing, and this is already
leading to formidable problems of economic and social instability,
with Indonesia and Mexico among the most recent examples.
Moreover, and thanks to globalisation, these are not remote
problems but ones that will, as they grow in intensity, readily
affect the security of apparently distant states. Even now, a
sudden economic crisis in East Asia can affect financial centres in
London, Frankfurt and New York within minutes.
It is possible to respond to these problems by seeking to
maintain the status quo, a world in which one-fifth of the
population is secure, two-fifths are just managing to hold on, and
two-fifths are deeply insecure. But such a policy is essentially
about preserving deep inequality and injustice, if need be by
military force. Keeping the lid on an insecure world, or "liddism",
is fundamentally flawed, as the eventual result will be the pot
metaphorically boiling over - an uncomfortable result in a world in
which biological and nuclear weapons are proliferating.
We have had a Strategic Defence Review which, within its
limitations, has tried to do a competent job. What we now need is a
vigorous and sustained debate on international security and
Britain's potential role in encouraging the evolution of a more
just and genuinely secure world. Such a debate will need to go well
beyond the confines of the Ministry of Defence and the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office, involving all those departments which relate
to the broader issues of security - development, trade, environment
and finance. This is an essential requirement but will not be easy
to promote - like most governments, HMG is notoriously
compartmentalised, with individual spheres of influence jealously
guarded.
Even so, the Strategic Defence Review does start this process.
Whatever its limitations, it is a considerable improvement on
previous exercises and at least encourages debate on these wider
issues. For the moment, the Review is very much of its era, and is
only just beginning to look to the new international security
context. In the long run, though, it may succeed in encouraging
that very process, and, if so, it could eventually be judged a real
success. But this will also depend on the ability of policy
analysts, academics, campaigners and others to address these wider
issues. That is a considerable challenge, but could result in
Britain developing a role in promoting international peace and
justice which could be remarkably significant in the coming
decades.
Paul Rogers is Head of the Department of Peace Studies at
the University of Bradford, UK.
© 1998 The Acronym Institute.
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