Disarmament Diplomacy
Issue No. 30, September 1998
Disarming Trident: Legality, Morality & Protest in
the UK
By Angie Zelter
Introduction
In early July, the British Labour Government published a
Strategic Defence Review (SDR), the most comprehensive review of
the UK's defence forces and requirements since the end of the Cold
War. Two key areas of policy, however, were named in advance as
exempt from questioning: Britain's status as a nuclear-weapon
State, and Britain's membership of NATO. Various implications of
these two portrayed realities were considered within the Review,
but the benefits of both possessing nuclear weapons and belonging
to a nuclear-armed alliance were apparently too self-evident to
merit examination. In particular, the moral and legal status and
legitimacy of nuclear weapons was placed beyond the 'radar-screen'
of the military planners and policy-makers. This paper argues two
things: that no State has the right, moral or legal, to become or
remain a nuclear-weapon State; and that if Governments refuse to
adopt a course of nuclear disarmament, it is the moral and legal
duty of citizens to protest against, and disrupt where possible,
nuclear-weapons business-as-usual - even if that protest and
disruption results in persecution and prosecution. The paper also
argues that such persecution and prosecution is itself not only
morally but legally wrong.
Putting Trident on Trial
A series of remarkable trials are currently taking place in
Helensburgh, a small rural town in Scotland, close to the home base
of Britain's Trident nuclear submarines. 115 people from 10
different countries were arrested during the Trident
Ploughshares 2000 disarmament actions in the middle of August.
Ten were remanded in custody for a month because they refused to
promise not to continue their attempts to disarm Trident
whilst awaiting trial. As far as the protesters were concerned,
their objective was to prevent serious breaches of international
humanitarian law. The Scottish Courts saw only damage being done to
property; the Courts either were ignorant of, or refused to accept
the applicability of, international humanitarian law to actions
directed against weapons of mass destruction. Despite the customary
portrayal of such anti-nuclear protesters as 'fanatics' who have no
respect for, or interest in, the rule of law, the trials actually
illustrate the struggle between two conflicting legal and moral
perspectives.
International humanitarian law is based upon principles and
morality common to all human beings. Everyone knows that killing
babies and children is wrong; that soldiers killing any
non-combatant is wrong; that the mass destruction of entire
populations and the inflicting of long-term environmental damage is
wrong. International humanitarian law has evolved over the
centuries to protect neutral countries, innocent bystanders, and
the environment from the worst excesses of war. All these laws
state that the deliberate killing, the targeting, of innocent
people is wrong. These are the basic legal premises used to condemn
those Nazis responsible for the Holocaust, and being applied now at
the War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague prosecuting leaders and
officials implicated in atrocities in Rwanda and the former
Yugoslavia. While the British Government is quick to condemn others
who violate these basic norms and standards of civilised behaviour,
it refuses to accept its own culpability under them and to apply
these same norms and standards to its deployment of weapons capable
of annihilating millions of people and destroying entire
ecosystems. The Trident disarmers are seeking to point out
these double-standards.
During the proceedings in Helensburgh, the protesters were told
to stop using the Court as a political platform. They were,
further, told not to use political statements such as referring to
nuclear weapons as weapons of mass destruction. The protesters
replied that they were talking law, not just politics; in
particular, they sought to draw the Court's attention to the recent
Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), made
in response to a request by the UN General Assembly for its
determination of the legality of the use or threat of use of
nuclear weapons. Part of the ICJ ruling stated: "The fact that this
question also has political aspects, as in the nature of things, is
the case with so many questions which arise in international life,
does not suffice to deprive it of its character as a 'legal'
question." The central point - both political and legal - is this:
if the UK chooses to have armed forces and to prepare for war then,
like every other country in the world, it has to do so under the
restraining influence of international law. This law is the thin
dividing line between the killing that soldiers do and the killing
of common murderers or terrorists.
The ICJ ruling - issued, coincidentally, exactly two years (8
July 1996) before the release of the UK SDR - found that "the
threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the
rule of international law applicable in armed conflict," and that
"there exists an obligation" under the 1968 Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) "to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion
negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament..." As Alyn Ware,
Executive Director of the Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy,
noted in the September 1996 issue of Disarmament Diplomacy,
the ICJ decision "is much more than a slap on the wrist for the
nuclear-weapon States, which, with the exception of China, tried to
stop the WHO [World Health Organization] and the UN from taking the
case to the Court, and then exerted pressure on the Court for it to
decline to give an answer. It is...a resounding challenge to the
continuing policies of nuclear deterrence, and to the resistance of
the nuclear States to agree to negotiations on the elimination of
nuclear weapons."
Another aspect of the Court's ruling is worth emphasising: its
treatment of the crucial issue of nuclear-use scenarios. The Court
was clearly unpersuaded by the arguments it had heard on this
matter from the nuclear-weapon States: "[N]one of the States
advocating the legality of the use of nuclear weapons under certain
circumstances, including the 'clean' use of smaller, low-yield,
tactical nuclear weapons, has indicated what, supposing such
limited use were feasible, would be the precise circumstances
justifying such use, nor whether such limited use would not tend to
escalate into all-out use of high-yield nuclear weapons."
This last point is of particular relevance to the Trident
system, which the British Government has said will function both as
a 'strategic' and 'sub-strategic' 'deterrent' - in other words, as
a system capable of firing either a high- or low-yield nuclear
warhead. The Government has refused to define the "precise
circumstances" of justifiable use of nuclear weapons, as demanded
by the Court. In a letter to the author (23 October 1997), Hazel
Finch of the Ministry of Defence stated that "the legality or
otherwise of any specific use of any nuclear weapon...can only be
determined in the light of all the circumstances applying at the
time such use is being considered. It is impossible to anticipate
in advance with any confidence the exact circumstances which might
arise, and to speculate on particular hypothetical cases would
serve no purpose." It is not only the Trident Ploughshares
2000 protesters who regard such a stance as an inadequate
evasion of the legal point at hand - the ICJ, too, was obviously of
the view that the nuclear-weapon States are obliged to state their
position less obscurely.
The Court noted that the only conceivable scenario in which the
use or threat of use of nuclear weapons might conceivably be
justifiably contemplated would be "in an extreme circumstance of
self-defence in which its very survival would be at stake," -
although a Separate Statement appended to the Advisory Opinion
added that the identification by the Court of this scenario "cannot
in any way be interpreted as a half-open door to the recognition of
the threat or use of nuclear weapons." Why does the Government
refuse to enter into discussion of this 'State-survival' scenario?
Perhaps because it clearly recognises, as it states in the SDR,
that the British State faces no such threat: "The end of the Cold
War has transformed our security environment. The world does not
live in the shadow of World War. There is no longer a direct threat
to Western Europe or the United Kingdom as we used to know it, and
we face no significant threat to any of our Overseas Territories."
As the survival of the UK is not presently under threat, the
present threat by the UK to use nuclear weapons, represented by its
deployment of Trident, is unlawful. If the Government were
to counter this by arguing that a direct threat to British survival
might re-emerge at some future date, it would be in effect
be arguing that it could never agree to eliminate its
nuclear weapons - a clear violation of its NPT undertakings.
In fact, Britain clearly wants to keep available the option to
use or threaten to use nuclear weapons in scenarios that, however
grave, do not bear on the survival of the State: for example, along
with France, the US and Russia, Britain has refused to rule out
using nuclear weapons if its forces were attacked with chemical or
biological weapons. This scenario is probably a key reason
explaining the characterisation of Trident as a
'sub-strategic' nuclear system.
Another important implication of the identification by the Court
of a threat to State-survival as the only possibly
justifiable nuclear-use scenario is that the threat or use of
nuclear weapons to defend non-nuclear-weapon States - a scenario
central to NATO's raison d'être - is unlawful.
Such references to international law, and in particular the ICJ
ruling, in the defence case of the Trident disarmers is a
deep embarrassment to the British Government, especially to the
Foreign Office, which would not want to see the nuclear-weapon
States added to its list of 'rogue nations'. And, at a time
when the forthcoming trials of the Libyans accused of the Lockerbie
bombing is putting the Scottish legal system in the limelight, and
highlighting the importance of international law to the
protection of the Scottish people, it is, to put it mildly, not
appreciated that anti-nuclear protesters are trying to 'muddy the
waters' by arguing that precisely the same set of international
legal premises and protections should be applied in their case,
too.
These factors, of embarrassment and discomfort, are among the
reasons why the protesters' cases are being heard in the lower and
not the higher courts. Their appeal (in letters sent on 9 July) to
the Scottish Lord Advocate and the UK Attorney General to either
charge the Government with breaches of international humanitarian
law or to charge the protesters with conspiracy to break the law
has remained unanswered. Their appeal to the UK Government (in a
letter to the Prime Minister sent on 18 March) to meet with them
and explain why it has not yet complied with the NPT and even
entered, yet alone concluded, negotiations to bring about a
nuclear-weapon-free world, has also not been answered.
The protesters are pursuing their present course of disarmament
action because the UK demonstrably has no intention of eliminating
Trident, and because this stance is irreconcilable with both
the spirit of the NPT and the specifics of the ICJ ruling. Yet
these weighty matters, of global import, are being heard at a
District Court in Helensburgh - a legal forum with far too narrow a
remit and too low a status to do justice to the cases at hand.
In November, the next batch of Trident disarmers will
resume the open and accountable disarmament actions currently being
prosecuted. Why persist with such actions, in the face of such
pressure? On the simplest level, such direct and public disarmament
actions add to the pressure on our political leaders to review
their position on the threat or use of nuclear weapons. Without
such continual public pressure, leaders would be more likely to act
in at best a complacent, and at worst a criminal, manner in defence
of national interests and their cherished status as nuclear-weapon
States. If citizens do not - responsibly and nonviolently -
demonstrate against and resist the inhumane, illegal or immoral
acts of their Governments, where is the bar to those Governments
becoming increasingly arrogant and corrupt?
Nuclear weapons are so horrific and frightening, and regarded as
so important by those States which possess them, that many people
turn away from confronting the issue, overcome by feelings of being
disempowered, insignificant and helpless - and yet it is in 'our'
name, to protect 'us', that the means to destroy the planet are
being maintained and funded at such huge expense. Trident
Ploughshares 2000 disarmers argue that ordinary people can and
should do something to make the world a safer and freer place. We
are encouraging 'global citizens' to come forward and form
international networks of people prepared to take safe,
accountable, practical and non-violent disarmament measures at all
nuclear-weapons sites around the world. We are starting with the
British nuclear system because it is one of the smallest and is in
a State that is not facing any serious threat, surrounded by
friendly nations and powerful allies. There are few if any risks in
Britain disarming first and setting a powerful example for others
to follow. But we are an international movement, too, and together
with citizens of other countries we intend to go on to disarm the
nuclear weapons of Russia, the United States, China, France,
Israel, India and Pakistan.
Angie Zelter is a grassroots peace and environmental
campaigner, based in Norfolk, UK. For more information about the
Trident Ploughshares 2000 project, see the project's web-site at http://www.gn.apc.org/tp2000/
© 1998 The Acronym Institute.
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