Disarmament Diplomacy
Issue No. 33, December 1998 - January 1999
Nuclear Zealotry: In Search of Justification
By Jozef Goldblat
Ever since the signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT), by which the parties committed themselves to negotiate
nuclear disarmament, the nuclear-weapon States have repeatedly
assured world public opinion that they intend to fulfil this
commitment and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons from their
arsenals. However, these assurances lack credibility because the
strategic doctrines of the great powers remain unchanged. In spite
of the disappearance of the East-West nuclear confrontation and the
general improvement in the international situation, the employment
of nuclear weapons is still envisaged by the great powers as a way
to react to any attacks on them or their allies at any point of the
globe.
The nuclear zealots, who have turned their nuclear doctrine into
an article of faith and protect it religiously against the
criticism of doubting Thomases, assert that what they have in mind
is not nuclear-fighting but nuclear deterrence. But what do they
want to deter with nuclear weapons? Certainly not aggression by
States having at their disposal only conventional means of warfare.
For the conventional forces of the nuclear powers are
quantitatively and/or qualitatively superior to the forces of any
of their potential non-nuclear-weapon adversaries. They can,
therefore, stop armed attacks by the latter without recourse to
nuclear weaponry. In any event, using nuclear arms in response to
the use of conventional arms would grossly defy the principle of
proportionality enshrined in the humanitarian law of armed
conflict. But we are told that the threat of use of nuclear weapons
is indispensable to deter attacks with biological or chemical
weapons. How plausible is this argument?
It is true that biological and chemical weapons are classified,
along with nuclear weapons, as weapons of mass destruction. They
have, nevertheless, some important distinctive features. Under
certain circumstances, the use of biological weapons might produce
very widespread fatalities and play a strategic role in war. This
strategic utility, however, is no more than a supposition; nobody
has yet used bacteria or viruses to wage a war. Only one biological
agent has so far been identified as a potential warfare agent, and
reliable means to deliver it to multiple targets have yet to be
devised. In any event, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to
recognize each and every unusual outbreak of disease as an
aggression committed with biological means of warfare - there would
be no 'signature' of the user. Attacks with biological weapons
would not, therefore, be deterred by threats of nuclear
retaliation. The likelihood of these weapons being used should
instead be reduced by strengthening the Biological Weapons
Convention. A worldwide network of epidemiological surveillance, if
properly established, could alert the world community to outbreaks
of unusual diseases. Other measures might include vaccination to
prevent contamination, as well as the development of therapy
techniques to apply after contamination. Effective civil defence
could diminish the effectiveness of biological weapons to the point
where their employment no longer appears worthwhile.
Chemical weapons are militarily useful mainly as tactical
weapons. Consequently, the level of destruction they may cause
cannot exceed a relatively limited theatre of war. Though used on
several occasions in the past, chemical weapons have never played a
decisive role in the outcome of hostilities. Paralleling the
situation with biological weapons, the likelihood of chemical
weapons being used should primarily be lessened by strengthening
the treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, designed to abolish
them. People could use warning systems with sensors capable of
detecting chemical warfare agents, and protect themselves with
masks, protective clothes and decontaminants. With the increased
precision and effectiveness of conventional weapons, the employment
of chemical weapons may no longer pay off for most countries.
Nuclear weapons are incomparable with any other means of warfare
and there is no protection against the effects of their use. As
reported by the United Nations, it is possible, using modern
technology, to release from one nuclear weapon in one microsecond
more energy than that released from all conventional weapons in all
wars throughout history. The claim that nuclear deterrence is
needed to avoid biological and chemical attacks is understood by
many as a mere pretext to retain nuclear weapons forever, for may
countries possess, and will always possess, the capability to
produce some limited quantities of biological and chemical warfare
agents. By excessively magnifying the dangers posed by biological
and chemical agents, and by affirming that these dangers can be met
only with nuclear weapons, the opponents of nuclear disarmament
encourage nuclear proliferation.
As long as the great powers cling to the belief that nuclear
weapons are needed, they will not give up these weapons. To render
their professed commitment to nuclear disarmament trustworthy, they
would have to undertake not to use nuclear weapons anywhere,
against any target and against any country, whatever the status of
that country - nuclear or non-nuclear, aligned or non-aligned,
party or not party to the NPT or a nuclear-weapon-free zone treaty.
As a corollary to such an undertaking, they would have to eliminate
tactical nuclear weapons because of the first-use characteristics
of these weapons: once deployed close to the front lines - as they
must be to have military value - they are likely to be employed
very early in armed conflict to avoid capture or destruction by the
enemy's conventional forces. In addition, to reduce the risk of a
surprise attack or of an unauthorized or accidental launch (for
example, in response to a false alarm), strategic nuclear forces
would have to be taken off alert.
Elimination of nuclear weapons would doubtlessly take many
years. As long as these weapons remain in the arsenals of States, a
ban on their use would, in fact, amount to a ban on their first
use. For, according to the doctrine of belligerent reprisals, a
second, retaliatory use of a banned weapon, to make a violator of
the ban on first use desist from further illegitimate actions,
would not be considered a breach, if it were proportionate to the
violation committed and to the injury suffered. (Under no
circumstance, however, may attacks on the civilian population and
objects protected by international law be permitted.) In other
words, nuclear weapons possessed by some States would serve to
deter their first use by others. Nevertheless, it is 'no use'
rather than 'no-first-use' that should become a norm of
international law with regard to nuclear weapons, as it already is
with regard to chemical and biological weapons under the 1925
Geneva Protocol. A legitimate retaliatory use of nuclear weapons
would thus be an exception to the general rule of no use.
The proposed non-use obligations should be included in a
multilateral treaty rather than in easily reversible unilateral
declarations. The treaty could be open for signature to all States,
not merely those recognized by the NPT as nuclear-weapon States,
but should become effective only upon its ratification by all
States which possess nuclear weapons or admit possessing the
capability to manufacture such weapons. Violation of the treaty
banning the use of nuclear weapons would have to be qualified as a
crime under international law and treated as such. The Statute of
the International Criminal Court, adopted in July 1998, would have
to be adapted accordingly.
Jozef Goldblat is Vice-President of the Geneva
International Peace Research Institute.
© 1998 The Acronym Institute.
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