Disarmament Diplomacy
Issue No. 34, February 1999
US Congressional Testimony
Statement by CIA Director
Statement by George J. Tenet, Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), to a Senate Armed Services Committee
hearing on projected national security threats, 2 February
1999
"Transnational Issues: WMD Proliferation
... As you know, 1998 saw the nuclear tests in South Asia,
continued concerns about Iraq's WMD [weapons of mass destruction]
programs, accelerated missile development in Iran, North Korea,
Pakistan and India, and broader availability of BW and CW relevant
technologies. Particularly worrisome to the Intelligence Community
is the security of Russian WMD materials, increased cooperation
among rogue States, and more effective efforts by proliferants to
conceal illicit activities. US intelligence is increasing its
emphasis and resources on many of these issues, but I must tell you
that there is a continued and growing risk of surprise.
Looking at the supply-side first: Russian and Chinese assistance to
proliferant countries has merited particular attention for several
years. This year, unfortunately, is no exception. I mentioned in my
statement last year that Russia had just announced new controls on
transfers of missile-related technology. There were some positive
signs in Russia's performance early last year but, unfortunately,
there has not been a sustained improvement. Especially during the
last six months, expertise and materiel from Russia has continued
to assist the Iranian missile effort in areas ranging from
training, to testing, to components. This assistance is continuing
as we speak, and there is no doubt that it will play a crucial role
in Iran's ability to develop more sophisticated and longer range
missiles.
Making matters worse, societal and economic stress in Russia seems
likely to grow, raising even more concerns about the security of
nuclear weapons and fissile material. Although we have not had
recent reports of weapons usable nuclear material missing in
Russia, what we have noticed are reports of strikes, lax
discipline, and poor morale, and criminal activity at nuclear
facilities. For me...these are alarm bells that warrant our closest
attention and concern.
The China story is a mixed picture... China's senior leaders are
actively studying membership in the Missile Technology Control
Regime and have pledged to prevent the export of materials or
technology that could assist missile and nuclear programs in South
Asia. Beijing has promulgated controls on dual-use nuclear
technology and tightened chemical export controls.
We cannot yet assure you, however, that the new export control
mechanisms will be effective. Both the Chinese Government and
Chinese firms have long-standing and deep relationships with
proliferant countries, and we are not convinced that China's
companies fully share the commitments undertaken by senior Chinese
leaders. While all aspects of China's proliferation behavior bear
continued watching, we see more signs of progress on nuclear
matters than on missile assistance. Moreover, the restructuring of
China's defense industrial bureaucracy - including entities charged
with export oversight - holds the potential to create confusion and
incentives that would impede the effectiveness of this system. In
short, Mr. Chairman, our guard remains up on this question.
There is little positive I can say...about North Korea, the third
major global proliferator, whose incentive to engage in such
behavior increases as its economy continues to decline. Missiles
and WMD know-how are North Korean products for which there is a
real market. North Korea's sales of such products over the years
have dramatically heightened the WMD threat in countries of key
concern, such as Iran and Pakistan.
Meanwhile, countries, such as India, Pakistan, and Iran that
traditionally have been seen as technology customers, have now
developed capabilities that they could export to others.
Looking at the demand side...let's focus first on nuclear programs.
Last spring dramatically made clear that both India and Pakistan
are well positioned to build significant nuclear arsenals.
Meanwhile, Iran, too, seems to be pushing its program forward. With
regard to North Korea, the Agreed Framework has frozen Pyongyang's
ability to produce additional plutonium at Yongbyon, but we are
deeply concerned that North Korea has a covert program. The key
target for us to watch is the underground construction project at
Kumchangni, which is large enough to house a plutonium production
facility and perhaps a reprocessing plant as well.
The missile story is no more encouraging. Indeed, we expect the
high level of launch activity in 1998 to continue in 1999. Last
year's activity included the first launches of the North Korean
Taepo Dong 1, the Pakistani Ghauri and the Iranian
Shahab-3, the latter two based on North Korea's No
Dong. With a range of 1,300 km, the No Dong,
Shahab-3, and Ghauri significantly alter the military
equations in their respective regions; each is probably capable of
delivering weapons of mass destruction.
In short, theater-range missiles with increasing range pose an
immediate and growing threat to US interests, military forces, and
allies - and the threat is increasing. This threat is here and
now.
More disturbing, is that foreign missiles of increased range and
military potential are under development. North Korea's three-stage
Taepo Dong 1, launched last August, demonstrated technology
that, with the resolution of some important technical issues, would
give North Korea the ability to deliver a very small payload to
intercontinental ranges - including parts of the United States -
although not very accurately.
Pyongyang is also working on another missile - the Taepo
Dong-2. With two stages, the Taepo Dong-2, which has not
yet been flight-tested, would be able to deliver significantly
larger payloads to mainland Alaska and the Hawaiian Islands and
smaller payloads to other parts of the United States. In other
words, the lighter the payload, the greater the range. With a third
stage like the one demonstrated last August on the Taepo Dong
1, this missile would be able to deliver large payloads to the
rest of the US. The proliferation implications of these missiles
are obviously significant.
Foreign assistance is a fundamental factor behind the growth in the
missile threat. For example, foreign assistance helped Iran save
years in its development of the Shahab-3 missile, which is
based on the North Korean No Dong and, as I noted earlier,
includes Russian assistance. Moreover, Iran will continue to seek
longer range missiles and to seek foreign assistance in their
development.
If Iran follows a development time line similar to that
demonstrated with the Shahab-3, which included significant
foreign assistance, it would take Iran many years to develop a
9,000 to 10,000 km range ICBM [Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile]
capable of reaching the United States. But Iran could significantly
shorten the acquisition time - and warning time - by purchasing key
components or entire systems from potential sellers such as North
Korea.
Iraqi capabilities to develop missiles also continues to be a
concern. Iraq was ahead of Iran before the Gulf war, and if
sanctions were lifted, we would have to assume that Iraq would seek
longer-range capabilities.
Against the backdrop of an increasing missile threat...the
proliferation of chemical and biological weapons takes on more
alarming dimensions. At least sixteen States, including those with
the missile programs mentioned earlier, currently have active CW
programs, and perhaps a dozen are pursuing offensive BW programs.
And a number of these programs are run by countries with a history
of sponsoring terrorism."
Source: Text - CIA Director Tenet's Statement at Senate Hearing
Feb. 2, United States Information Service, 2 February.
Statement by Under-Secretary of Energy
Statement by Ernest Moniz, Under-Secretary of Energy, to the
Subcommittee on Energy & Power of the Commerce Committee of the
House of Representatives, 24 February 1999
"Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Subcommittee, for the
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the FY 2000
budget request for the Department of Energy.
In FY 2000, the Department requests $17.8 billion dollars for all
of its science, energy research, energy security, and defense
activities. This is slightly less than the amount requested last
year. This request supports the Departments activities in four
business lines:
- National Security: $6.228 billion
- Energy Resources: $2.318 billion
- Environmental Quality: $6.452 billion
- Science: $2.844 billion
...
DOE's Missions
In National Security, DOE plays a critical role by ensuring the
safety, security, and reliability of our nuclear arsenal, and
through our efforts, to reduce the dangers of the spread and use of
weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The Department is maintaining
the nuclear stockpile safely and reliably without testing, thereby
supporting the Comprehensive Test Ban while sustaining the nuclear
deterrent. The Department also plays a central role in securing
nuclear material and knowhow in the Former Soviet Union, in support
of America's non-proliferation goals. The technological strength of
the Department's laboratories is being used to protect America from
the threat of weapons of mass destruction. ...
In Environmental Quality, the Department's task is clear. We will
continue to make progress in cleaning up the environmental legacy
of the cold war nuclear weapons program, and we will do so while
minimizing the risks to human health and safety. Our goal is to
finish the cleanup job at most of our sites by the year 2006, while
systematically addressing the persistent challenges at our largest
cleanup sites, in accordance with various regulatory agreements.
...
National Security
The Department's $6.228 billion request for National Security
programs is an increase of $244 million over the FY 1999
appropriation. The FY 2000 request for Weapons Activities is $4.531
billion; this includes $2.286 billion for the Stockpile Stewardship
program and $2.071 billion for the Stockpile Management program.
The Stockpile Stewardship program is a science-based program
designed to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of the
nuclear deterrent without underground nuclear testing. Critical to
the success of this effort is the Accelerated Strategic Computing
Initiative (ASCI), which is developing state-of-the-art
supercomputers and associated applications.
Another important component of this program is the National
Ignition Facility (NIF), a 192-laser beam facility under
construction at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, that will
advance not only our understanding of the physics of nuclear
weapons, but will also advance mankind's knowledge in fusion and
basic science. The Stockpile Management program request includes
$170 million for the tritium program, which will be used to develop
the irradiation services option chosen by Secretary Richardson, and
to complete design work on the accelerator option in order to
preserve it as a 'back-up' capability.
The $767 million dollar budget for Nonproliferation and National
Security is an increase from $697 in FY 1999. This does not include
separate requests for Intelligence ($36.1 million) and
Counterintelligence ($31.2 million - $18.6 in new budget
authority). We are asking for $221 million for Nonproliferation
Research and Development to develop technologies for detecting
nuclear explosions, detecting the production of different forms of
WMD, countering chemical and biological weapons that could be
released in our cities, and aiding federal, State, and local law
enforcement agencies.
Our request also includes $30 million for the Initiative for
Proliferation Prevention and $30 million for the Nuclear Cities
Initiative. These programs are designed to ensure that Russia's
most experienced scientists and technicians can be gainfully
employed at a time when they are highly sought after by rogue
nations and terrorist organizations.
The Fissile Materials Disposition program includes a request for
$200 million to provide storage for US weapons usable uranium and
plutonium, while providing a technical basis for similar actions by
the Russians. The Department recently announced that Savannah River
is the preferred site for the Pit Disassembly and Conversion
Facility (FY 2000 request of $28.8 million) and the Mixed Oxide
Fuel (MOX) Fabrication facility ($12.4 million).
The Worker and Community Transition program request is $30 million.
This will allow the Department to facilitate earlier site closures
and to promote the reindustrialization of excess facilities. The
result should be long term savings approaching $1 billion. The
program also makes it possible to move to more efficient
contracting mechanisms while utilizing the skills of the existing
work force. In the case of Oak Ridge, for example, we were able to
avoid immediate severance liabilities of up to $45 million.
..."
Source: Department of Energy web-site, http://www.doe.gov
© 1999 The Acronym Institute.
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