Disarmament Diplomacy
Issue No. 34, February 1999
Speech by Australian Foreign Minister
Speech by Australian Foreign Minister
'Asia-Pacific Approaches to Disarmament, The Peaceful Settlement
of Disputes, and International Humanitarian Law,' Keynote speech by
the Hon Alexander Downer, MP, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the
Commemoration of the Centenary of the 1899 Hague Peace Conference,
University of Melbourne, 18 February 1999
"Introduction
... This conference is a commemoration not just of a noble event -
the first Hague Peace Conference in 1899 - but a noble idea. The
notion that by sitting down together, by discussing, by debating,
by setting ourselves worthy - and realisable - objectives, we can
indeed improve the lot of the world as it enters the new
millennium.
In the lead-up to the first Conference in 1899, its chief
architect, the Russian Foreign Minister Count Mikhail Mouravieff,
thought that such a meeting could augur well for the coming
century. He hoped that 'it would unite into one mighty whole the
efforts of all States sincerely striving to make the great idea of
universal peace triumph over strife and discord'.
Two World Wars, and countless regional conflicts later, some may
say that his hopes for the 20th century at least were well and
truly dashed. But it is not a zero sum equation. This century has
seen progress toward goals set by Mouravieff and his colleagues -
disarmament, the peaceful settlement of dispute and the prevention
of conflict, and the strengthening of international humanitarian
law.
Of course much work remains to be done. Within our own Asia-Pacific
region we are constantly reminded that we live in a complex and
uncertain part of the world - made potentially more uncertain by
the region's recent economic upheaval. What I therefore would like
to do today is not just talk about what has been achieved, but what
still needs to be done, and what Australia is doing to contribute
to the ambitions of Mouravieff and his colleagues for a more stable
and more secure world.
Disarmament and Arms Control
Disarmament was, naturally enough, a priority for that first Hague
Conference. It was realized even then that eliminating violence as
a method of settling disputes would, at the very least, require
some reduction in armaments.
In today's nuclear world the stakes are that much higher, the need
for disarmament and arms control that much greater. In 1968 the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons proposed
eliminating the acquisition of nuclear weapons as a legitimate
option for assuring national security. A fanciful idea at the time
perhaps, but today it is a norm to which all five nuclear-weapon
States and 182 non-nuclear-weapon States subscribe.
The far-sighted decision in 1995 to extend the NPT indefinitely
means that it is now a permanent tenet of international law. But no
Treaty is secure simply by virtue of its legal permanence. That is
why Australia devotes a significant part of its national foreign
policy resources to the care and maintenance of international arms
control agreements. That is why Australia will be working hard for
a successful NPT Review in the year 2000 to ensure commitments to
the principles enshrined in that Treaty are reaffirmed.
Nuclear Disarmament
If we needed any reminder about the importance of the Treaty, last
year's South Asian nuclear tests certainly provided it. There is
now a real need to repair the damage done to the international
non-proliferation regime.
Australia has been criticised by some for its supposed
'overreaction' to the South Asian tests. Some have accused us of
trying to help perpetuate the great power nuclear monopoly - of not
wanting further non-western members to join the nuclear club.
Nothing could be further from the truth. The stand we have taken on
South Asian tests is a principled one. If we have perhaps seemed to
call more urgently for restraint than others it is because these
tests took place on our very doorstep. And we certainly are not
protecting any nuclear monopoly.
Let me be quite clear about the Australian Government's position on
this last issue. The Government is fully committed to the twin
goals enshrined in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of
preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and working through
progressive balanced steps towards complete nuclear
disarmament.
But calls for a multilateral nuclear disarmament process are
misguided in current circumstances. As I said at the Conference on
Disarmament last year, would it help, as some appear to be
proposing, to bring the START process into the CD and subject it to
preordained timetables and negotiation by 60 countries instead of
two? Would that accelerate the business of getting rid of actual
nuclear weapons?
Indeed nuclear disarmament has been taking place at an impressive
rate since the end of the Cold War. In addition to unilateral
nuclear reductions by France and the United Kingdom, the United
States and Russia have already more than halved their holdings of
strategic nuclear weapons this decade. START III, the guidelines
for which were agreed in March 1997, would bring those same
arsenals down to some 80 percent below Cold War peaks.
There are many steps to be taken on the road to the goal of nuclear
disarmament before the question of a single nuclear weapons
convention can be productively addressed. The Australian Government
does not favour the concept, advocated by some, of a timebound
framework for nuclear disarmament, nor does the Government share
the views of the 'New Agenda' coalition that a radical new approach
to nuclear disarmament - exactly what new approach is not all that
clear - is warranted by the current state of the nuclear
disarmament process.
Whereas a multilaterally negotiated legal instrument may well be a
focus of the final phases of the elimination of nuclear weapons, it
is more productive in present circumstances to continue to
encourage the nuclear-weapon States to maintain the momentum of
nuclear arsenal reductions, notably under the START process.
CTBT and FMCT
This does not mean however that the rest of the international
community is condemned to inaction. The Canberra Commission
identified two genuinely multilateral endeavours which will
contribute to the elimination of nuclear weapons - the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and a Fissile Material
Cut-Off Treaty.
The CTBT has been long fought for by Australia and others in our
region, the only region of the world in which all five
nuclear-weapon States have tested. During its negotiation Australia
contributed two model texts and indeed snatched it from untimely
death in the Conference on Disarmament by - if I do say so myself -
a daring and imaginative feat of Australian diplomacy.
But we still face many challenges in making the treaty truly
effective. The CTBT's normative value has been profoundly
challenged by the nuclear tests in South Asia. The conditions
required for its entry into force have not yet been met. And the
vital task of building up the Treaty's institutional fabric and
verification machinery has slipped off the world's political and
budgetary radar screens.
All of these challenges must be addressed if the disarmament and
non-proliferation achievements of the CTBT are to be consolidated
and assured. At CTBT headquarters in Vienna, Australia has made a
positive pain of itself on these issues - and I make no apologies
for saying we will continue to do so.
The next cab off the multilateral nuclear disarmament and
non-proliferation rank is the FMCT, the negotiation of which is -
we all hope - about to get underway in Geneva.
It will be a difficult negotiation and a challenging treaty to
implement effectively. But the effort will be worth it. Why?
Because an FMCT will be another nail in the coffin of the nuclear
arms race and the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. It
will require the nuclear-weapons States to make good their NPT
commitment to pursue negotiations related to the cessation of the
nuclear arms race. It will also cap the production of fissile
material by other nuclear-capable States. And a fissile material
cut-off treaty is a central and indispensable element in any
verification regime for a world free of nuclear weapons.
Chemical Weapons
While the first Hague Conference pre-dated the advent of nuclear
weapons, it did anticipate the dangers inherent in what it called
'poison or poisoned weapons.' From the 1,300,000 poison gas
casualties in World War I to Iraq's use of chemical weapons on its
own citizens this is a scourge that we have unfortunately come to
know very well this century.
With the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
in April 1997, there is now hope, however, that this scourge will
one day be eliminated. The CWC has a unique status amongst arms
control and disarmament regimes as the first verifiable
multilateral treaty that completely bans an entire class of
weapons. It is a treaty we of course understand well. Australia
played an instrumental role in bringing negotiations on the
Convention to a conclusion through the introduction of a compromise
text and have been active ever since in seeking to promote
widespread and full compliance with its provisions.
Looking towards the future, there are good grounds for optimism
that the effectiveness of the Convention will continue to increase.
But vigilance will need to be maintained if we are to ultimately
achieve a world free of chemical weapons.
Biological Weapons
There is perhaps no better reminder of the challenges to effective
disarmament and arms control created by a changing global security
balance and rapidly advancing technology than the Biological
Weapons Convention. Concluded in 1972, at the height of the Cold
War, the BWC was the first major multilateral WMD disarmament
treaty. But advances in biotechnology, making it cheaper and easier
to develop, produce and conceal biological weapons, have revealed
the treaty's fundamental flaw - the lack of a verification
mechanism.
The international community has responded to this deficiency by
negotiating a protocol to the BWC that would provide a credible and
effective verification mechanism. Australia is taking a leading
role in these negotiations, which must address complex technical
issues, accommodate future advances in biotechnology, and find a
delicate balance between effective verification and the need to
avoid hampering or interfering with the legitimate biotechnology
industry.
Australia is pursuing an initiative to accelerate the negotiations
and we convened an informal ministerial meeting last September in
New York to inject greater political impetus into the process. We
are following this up with a high level meeting later in the year.
The Government's initiative also has a domestic angle, and I am
pleased to announce today the establishment of a National
Consultative Group of biotechnology industry representatives,
academics and other interested parties to provide input to our
negotiating strategy.
Anti-Personnel Landmines
I cannot conclude this review of attempts by the descendants of the
1899 Hague pioneers to grapple with challenge of arms control and
disarmament without a mention of landmines. Australia has been
active in taking up the fight against landmines, and is determined
to achieve a comprehensive and lasting solution to the global
landmines problem. On 14 January this year Australia ratified the
Ottawa landmines ban Convention.
We are also pursuing complementary international strategies to
strengthen the global regime against landmines including: to
encourage broader adherence to revised Protocol II on landmines of
the Inhumane Weapons Convention; and to continue to lead efforts in
the Conference on Disarmament for a universal ban on landmines
transfers. In particular we are seeking the reappointment of
Australia's Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament as the
special coordinator on landmines. ..."
Source: Australian Department of Foreign Affairs & Trade
web-site, http://www.dfat.gov.au
© 1999 The Acronym Institute.
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