Disarmament Diplomacy

NATO in 1999: A Concept in Search of a Strategy
By Nicola Butler

The North Atlantic Treaty, signed on 4 April 1949 in Washington, was originally designed to provide for the common defence of the US, Canada and their Western European allies against the threat of attack by the Soviet Union. In April 1999, ten years after the end of the Cold War, NATO leaders will meet once again in Washington, against the chilling backdrop of war with Yugoslavia, to celebrate accession of three new members: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland; and to decide on the Alliance's future strategy.

As NATO prepares itself for the twenty first century, the following questions should be at the heart of its strategy review. What kind of security arrangements does Europe require in the post-Cold War era? What should be the future basis of the transatlantic relationship? What would be a desirable relationship between the North Atlantic countries and their neighbours in the Middle East, Africa and especially Russia? What priority should be given to arms control and disarmament in the new NATO?

Preparations for the Washington Summit

The centrepiece of the Washington Summit, to be held from 23 to 25 April, will be the unveiling of a new Strategic Concept, setting out NATO's "blueprint" for the future. The Strategic Concept, which was last updated in 1991 gives guidance to Alliance military authorities on force structure for NATO operations. It is the highest level declaration of the Alliance's political aims and intentions. The summit is also expected to announce new decisions and initiatives including:

• a "vision statement" for the Alliance in the 21st Century;
• a statement on the future of NATO enlargement and the "open door" policy;
• a document on developing a European security and defence identity (ESDI);
• an initiative on nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) weapons proliferation; and
• a defence capabilities initiative. (1)

In the run up to the Washington summit the US has very much set the agenda for discussions on the new Strategic Concept and NATO's other initiatives. However, a number of areas of controversy have come to the fore, both within the Alliance and between NATO members and partner countries. These include the balance between NATO's original role of providing collective defence for its members and newer "out of area" operations, the legal mandate for such missions, the debate on no first use of nuclear weapons, the future of NATO enlargement, and the gap between US and European allies in defence technology and spending.

NATO's New Missions

The North Atlantic Treaty was originally intended as a collective response to "the fear of military aggression by the forces of the USSR and its allies". (2) The key clause of the Treaty is the Article V security guarantee, under which the parties declare that any attack against an Alliance member will be considered as an "attack against them all". In the event of such an attack the parties could exercise the right of individual or collective self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter.

In recent years, NATO has become increasingly involved in peacekeeping operations beyond its own borders, first in Bosnia-Herzegovina and then in Kosovo. In its goals for the Washington summit, the US has indicated that it wants NATO to be better equipped to deal with "non-Article V" crises like these. (3) The objective is not just to defend NATO's borders against direct military invasion, but to defend against threats from beyond, including those from the spread of weapons of mass destruction, ethnic violence and regional conflict.

There is consensus within the Alliance on the need to increase the profile in the new Strategic Concept, of non-Article V operations such as that in Bosnia. However, at NATO's December Ministerial meetings, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright set out the US position that NATO should be capable not just of collective defence, but that the Alliance should also be "committed to meeting a wide range of threats to our shared interests and values". (4) The defence of unspecified "interests and values" has the potential to lead NATO significantly beyond its past role of defending Alliance territory and armed forces or even the newer role it is trying out in the Balkans. In some instances these interests and values could be seen as positive, such as the emphasis on human rights and democracy in NATO's Study on Enlargement. Other possibilities, however, such as commercial interests and access to resources, are likely to be more contentious. The concern is that NATO may be pushed towards more generalised support for US global security interests.

Whilst the Balkans are on NATO's doorstep, this more diverse range of threats raises the question of just how far out of area NATO is prepared to go. In a recent speech on the "transatlantic partnership", US Secretary of Defence William Cohen took the opportunity to address not just the issue of Kosovo, but also Iraq, the attacks on American Embassies in Africa, and North Korea's firing of a long range ballistic missile into the Pacific. (5) Similarly, Madeleine Albright describes NATO's future as a "force for peace from the Middle East to Central Africa". (6) From the US perspective there are clearly no predefined limits on where NATO can legitimately operate. Most of NATO's European allies support some form of non-Article V NATO operations within Europe, but become increasingly uncomfortable as references to potential areas of concern for the Alliance get further afield. A number of the allies have expressed concerns that pushing these new roles too far risks Alliance cohesion. They could dilute NATO's purpose and cause future divisions.

The Legal Mandate for Non-Article V Operations

The increasing emphasis on non-Article V missions and the recent NATO airstrikes against Yugoslavia also raise the question of the legal basis under which such operations may be conducted. The North Atlantic Treaty starts by reaffirming the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. Article VII goes on to emphasise that the Treaty does not affect the "primary responsibility of the [UN] Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security".

In the early 1990s, as NATO started to move into the area of peacekeeping, its Brussels summit set out its policy in this area as follows: "NATO increasingly will be called upon to undertake missions in addition to the traditional and fundamental task of collective defence of its members, which remains a core function. We reaffirm our offer to support, on a case by case basis in accordance with our own procedures, peacekeeping and other operations under the authority of the UN Security Council or the responsibility of the CSCE, including by making available Alliance resources and expertise." (7)

Although all allies reiterate that NATO will always act "in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter", the US appears no longer to accept any necessity to act under the aegis of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) or on the basis of a Security Council Resolution. The US now wants NATO to assess the legality of its future actions on a "case-by-case" basis, thereby freeing Alliance out of area operations from any potential Russian, or possibly Chinese, veto in the Security Council.

Although it emphasises the need for a proper basis in international law, and despite its usual strong support for the UN, the British government echoes the US view on Security Council mandates. In a recent debate in the House of Lords, British government spokesperson, Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean, put it as follows: "... all NATO operations must have a proper basis in international law. In answer to the specific point raised... this need not always be a United Nations Security Council resolution. The legal basis in any particular case is bound to depend on the circumstances. We have to judge each case on its merits and act accordingly." (8)

Whilst the UN Security Council can easily be blocked on political grounds by the veto of one country, it is also not desirable for any one country or group of countries to take action on the basis of a unilateral interpretation of international law. Unfortunately one country's view of what constitutes an immediate and overwhelming humanitarian disaster, requiring an immediate military response, may differ from another's.

Although US leaders may have an interest in playing down the role of the UN for domestic political reasons, not all NATO countries have shared this view. Speaking as recently as the December 1998 Ministerial meetings, French Foreign Minister, Hubert Vedrine stated: "... as regards the basis on which non-Article 5 missions involving the use of force have to be carried out, it has been agreed at Heads of State level that these missions must be 'placed under the authority of the Security Council'. This is a fundamental rule of our foreign policy." (9)

Although some NATO members insist that the airstrikes against Yugoslavia have not set a precedent for future non-Article V action, the intra-Alliance debate on legal mandates has now been overtaken by these events. Despite hesitations about the use of force from some NATO members, especially Italy and Greece, the breakdown of negotiations in Rambouillet helped NATO finally to find consensus for airstrikes to begin without explicit Security Council backing. The position of France (and also Italy) on the need for Security Council resolutions has been compromised by French and Italian support for and participation in Operation Allied Force. As a result, the US position on non-Article V operations is likely to prevail in the Strategic Concept negotiations.

Nonetheless the airstrikes against Yugoslavia have drawn severe criticism both domestically in NATO member States and internationally and will give a higher profile to this issue at the summit. Responding to the first night of airstrikes against Yugoslavia, UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, diplomatically noted that "there are times when the use of force may be legitimate in the pursuit of peace", but went on to stress that:

"... as [UN] Secretary-General I have many times pointed out, not just in relation to Kosovo, that under the Charter the Security Council has primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security - and this is explicitly acknowledged in the North Atlantic Treaty. Therefore the Council should be involved in any decision to resort to the use of force." (10)

The Kosovo crises has also highlighted the difficulty the Alliance faces in achieving and maintaining consensus for non-Article V operations, especially in the absence of a Security Council mandate. In addition, although many NATO countries supported the US and British airstrikes against Iraq in December 1998, NATO as a whole was unable to give them explicit backing. So even if the role of the UN Security Council is watered down, it may still be difficult for the allies to find consensus on individual operations. This may lead to more instances when individual NATO members take action in different groupings or coalitions, but not necessarily as an Alliance.

Nuclear Doctrine and Weapons of Mass Destruction

A third area of controversy concerning NATO's new Strategic Concept is the future role of nuclear weapons, in particular the question of no first use. NATO's current Strategic Concept makes no mention of whether NATO would use nuclear weapons first, thus keeping this option open. The question was raised initially by German Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer at a working lunch during the December 1998 NATO Foreign Ministers' meeting.

Following Fischer's intervention, Madeleine Albright told the media that the discussion had resulted in a "reaffirmation of our current NATO nuclear strategy". (11) Hubert Vedrine and British Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, also attempted to brush the issue under the carpet. (12) Nonetheless, Germany is not alone on this issue. Just as the NATO Foreign Ministers' meeting was taking place, the Canadian parliament's Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade was preparing to publish a report recommending that Canada "argue forcefully within NATO that the present re-examination and update as necessary of the Alliance Strategic Concept should include its nuclear component". (13) Canadian Foreign Minister, Lloyd Axworthy told the Foreign Ministers' meeting:

"Now more than ever, any discussion of using Alliance nuclear capabilities - even in retaliation - raises very difficult questions of means, proportionality and effectiveness that cause us significant concerns." (14)

In addition, in November 1998, twelve out of sixteen NATO countries abstained on a resolution to the UN First Committee, calling for a new agenda for nuclear disarmament. One of the most controversial paragraphs had originally called on the nuclear-weapon States (NWS) to "examine further measures, including the exploration... of an undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons". Following considerable consultation with interested parties, including NATO members, Japan and the NWS, this paragraph was revised to utilise language accepted as part of NATO's examination of its Strategic Concept, calling on the NWS to "examine further interim measures, including measures to enhance strategic stability and accordingly to review strategic doctrines". (15) However, even this language was strenuously opposed by the US, France and the UK.

The NATO NWS have made it clear that they do not want a debate on no first use in the run up to the Washington summit. In fact any public discussion of Alliance nuclear strategy is unacceptable. Speaking in Germany, Secretary Cohen underlined: "Any question about this policy undermines our deterrent capability." (16)

An early proposal in the NATO strategy review suggested describing nuclear weapons as weapons of "last resort", language used in NATO's London Declaration of 1990, but not reiterated since. However, even this language is considered a step too far for some allies and the Alliance is now considering describing the use of nuclear weapons as being "extremely remote" or some formulation to this effect. (17) In addition, NATO is expected to refer this issue, along with other questions concerning nuclear policy to a working group - possibly the High Level Group - after the summit, but it is not yet clear whether the work of this group will result in substantive changes to nuclear posture.

The summit is also expected to announce an initiative "to ensure that the Alliance has the political and military capabilities to address appropriately and effectively the challenges of the proliferation of NBC weapons and their means of delivery". (18) This initiative is expected to focus on intelligence sharing. However, US enthusiasm for counterproliferation raises the possibility that intelligence gathered may be used not just for the purpose of preventing proliferation, but also to assist US counterproliferation efforts. The view of Defense Secretary Cohen is as follows: "... it is my firm belief that the best hope for protecting ourselves against those who would unleash weapons of mass destruction - be they nuclear, biological or chemical - is to reserve the right to respond to such attacks with any means at our disposal." (19)

These views not only make the prospect of a no first use posture unlikely, but also appear to downplay existing negative security assurances, under which each of the NWS have declared that they will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This is symptomatic of the divide between what many NATO members say in disarmament related fora, such as NPT review meetings, and what they do in their military planning. Although it is NATO policy to "reinforce" progress made in arms control, it seems unlikely that any practical consideration will be given to developments such as the 1995 NPT Principles and Objectives or the 1996 International Court of Justice ruling, in drafting language for the Strategic Concept.

In the wake of the no first use debate, there may be some attempt to "tone down" some of the language in the Strategic Concept and to highlight achievements in the nuclear disarmament field, but the underlying message is likely to continue to be based on nuclear deterrence. The existing Strategic Concept specifies that NATO nuclear weapons make a "unique" contribution to Alliance security, remaining essential to preserve the peace. If, as is expected, this kind of language is reiterated in the 1999 Strategic Concept, it will send an enduring signal of the continuing utility of nuclear weapons to potential proliferators, including India and Pakistan, which will be counterproductive to NATO's wider security objectives.

The Impact of NATO Enlargement

Although the 1999 summit will feature the accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to the Alliance, and Heads of State and Government will agree a "comprehensive package that will continue the enlargement process", the summit is unlikely to announce the start of accession talks with any new countries.

Ratification of the first round of NATO enlargement in the parliaments of NATO countries has passed off reasonably smoothly; military integration, however, is progressing more slowly. Although achieving interoperability (the process of enabling the militaries of NATO's different member countries to work together with compatible communications systems and equipment) was highlighted as an objective in both the Partnership for Peace Framework Agreement and the Study on NATO Enlargement, in practice it has been hard to achieve. On a recent visit to the Czech Republic, British Secretary of State for Defence, George Robertson said that Czech armed forces had a "formidable programme to complete", replacing Soviet era equipment and increasing the proportion of professional soldiers in the Czech army. (20) Similarly, the BBC reported on the day that the three new members officially joined the Alliance that only a "small proportion" of the Polish military was ready for NATO. (21) Despite French pressure for the Alliance to name candidates for the next wave of enlargement and to set a timetable, the US has indicated that it will take longer to "absorb" the first round of new members (22), while German Chancellor Schröder speaks of the need for a period of "consolidation". (23)

In the interim, the US has proposed a "Madrid-plus" package aimed at helping aspiring partners in "practical and focussed ways, to accelerate their efforts to become the strongest possible candidates". (24) The idea is that NATO would draw on the experience of incorporating its three latest members, to help NATO-hopefuls begin preparations in key areas such as ensuring democratic accountability of their militaries and making their military forces interoperable with those of NATO. Speaking after the December Ministerials, Madeleine Albright emphasised: "... let me just say what is very important, and we all talked about this, is as the new members come in the importance of being totally prepared, the importance of having an open door and the importance of developing a package that would allow potential aspirants to really have a road map about how to acquire the various capabilities necessary for being a full fledged NATO member." (25)

With better preparation, new members could be able to join the Alliance more quickly in future, thereby reducing pressure from within NATO to name names and set timetables. Another advantage to NATO is that new countries could become more integrated with the Alliance, without necessarily becoming full members and therefore without the allies having to provide them with Article V security guarantees. The experience with the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland also indicates that aspiring NATO members are likely uncritically to support Alliance policy in other fora such as the UN First Committee and the NPT review process.

Although a "Madrid-plus" type package may provide NATO with a solution to the question of what to do about new members in future, the continuing "open door" policy can only increase tensions with Russia. The front runners for the next round of NATO enlargement at NATO's last summit meeting in Madrid were France's preferred candidate, Romania, and Italy's choice, Slovenia. In addition, Poland is now pushing for Bulgaria and Ukraine, and there is pressure from some US Senators for early inclusion of the Baltic republics, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. (26) The inclusion of these countries would take NATO into an area of great sensitivity for Russia, especially since in NATO's traditional thinking the Baltics would be indefensible without nuclear deterrence. (27) There has even been discussion within some of Europe's neutral countries, such as Austria, Finland and Sweden, of joining NATO. However, as the closure of Austria's airspace to NATO aircraft attacking Yugoslavia demonstrates, these countries are most likely to be uncomfortable with the idea of military action without a specific UN mandate. Neutral countries, including Ireland and Sweden, also tend to be more critical of NATO's ongoing policy of nuclear deterrence.

Many Central and Eastern European countries that wish to join NATO are motivated by feelings of isolation and vulnerability, as a result of their histories. Many also see NATO membership as linked with obtaining EU membership and its economic advantages. For Russia, however, NATO enlargement brings an Alliance that still deploys nuclear weapons in Europe closer to its borders.

The new Strategic Concept is likely to retain language supporting the deployment of a small number of US sub-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe. NATO views the principal role of these weapons as political, symbolic of the transatlantic commitment to the defence of Western Europe. However, the issue is equally symbolic to members of the Russian Duma.

The NATO-Russia Founding Act (28) made clear that the Alliance had "no intention, no plan and no reason" to deploy nuclear weapons or to establish nuclear weapon storage sites on the territory of new members. In addition, the US has indicated that there are currently no plans to train new members States' pilots in nuclear missions during peacetime, to transfer equipment or infrastructure to support these countries' dual-capable aircraft in a nuclear role, or to conclude bilateral programmes of cooperation with them. (29) Although it seems clear that the US genuinely has no interest in deploying nuclear weapons in NATO's new member States, the fact that the NATO-Russia Founding Act is not legally binding makes it less reassuring from a Russian perspective.

The Founding Act also sought to reassure Russia that NATO would pursue its missions through enhanced interoperability, rather than "additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces" in the territory of new members. Russia now sees adaptation of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty as a way to restrict legally any build up of forces in new NATO countries. It remains to be seen if agreement can be reached at the CFE talks in Vienna which can shore up reluctant acceptance of enlargement in Russia, whilst also proving acceptable to both new NATO members and the US Senate. (30)

NATO members stress that enlargement is not directed against anyone and highlight that today Russian and Alliance troops work side by side in the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia. However, Russia is increasingly marginalised in decision making on European affairs, as the recent airstrikes against Yugoslavia have demonstrated. Although the Founding Act established a Permanent Joint Council (PJC), since its formation the US Administration in its quest for Senate ratification of enlargement has mainly highlighted the Council's limitations, emphasising that Russia will not be allowed "to dilute, delay or block NATO decisions". (31) These conditions were reinforced in the US Senate resolution to ratify the first round of NATO Enlargement, passed in April 1998.

Differing Defence Capabilities

The questions of European defence policy and burden sharing (the NATO term for efforts to decrease the gap between US and European military spending and capabilities) have caused long running debates within the North Atlantic Alliance. They are now key issues in the attempt to redefine the transatlantic relationship for the next century. NATO's 1994 Brussels summit agreed to support development of a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) through the Western European Union (WEU), the body responsible for carrying out European Union decisions with defence implications. The idea was to develop "separable but not separate" capabilities which could respond to European requirements and contribute to Alliance security. (32) The key element of ESDI is the development of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs) for use either by NATO or by the WEU for European missions. In 1996, the Alliance went further, detailing the necessary preparations for the possibility of WEU-led operations involving all NATO's European allies (including the non-EU members) if they so wish. (33) The 1999 summit will mark the completion of the arrangements initiated in Berlin.

The change of government in the UK has also given new impetus to developing European defence cooperation at an operational level. In a speech to the North Atlantic Assembly, British Prime Minister Tony Blair called for Europe to "develop the ability to act alone in circumstances where, for whatever reason, the US is not able or does not wish to participate". This included rapid and comprehensive implementation of ESDI within NATO and development of "proper decision-making structures in the EU, headed by European Council readiness to take strategic decisions on Europe-only operation". (34)

In addition, at the annual British-French summit in St Malo, the UK and France concluded an agreement on European Defence. The 1998 St Malo agreement focuses on the need for the EU to have the "capacity for autonomous action", whilst recognising NATO as the "foundation of the collective defence of its members". The agreement highlights the "evolution" of the relationship between the EU and the WEU, but also emphasises the need for the EU to have access to capabilities and resources "pre-designated within NATO's European pillar". (35) It is likely that the WEU will become a "fourth pillar" of the EU, in the near future. However, it will take considerably longer to work out the modalities of any evolving common European defence policy.

In the past the US has blocked development of an independent European capability, whilst encouraging a build up of the "European pillar" within NATO. The CJTFs concept allows the WEU to be able to undertake missions, but using NATO assets and NATO command and control structures in the form of the CJTF headquarters. Political authorisation would therefore be necessary from NATO, thereby ensuring that there could be no question of undertaking European-only operations without US consent and without some participation of US officers. As the US retains a key role in European defence policy through ESDI and the NATO framework, the St Malo agreement has been supported by the US Administration, especially the "focus on capabilities".

The US has long wanted the European allies to enhance their capabilities and to play a greater role in burden sharing, an objective reiterated in the US Senate's advice and consent to NATO enlargement. Both the ESDI and the forthcoming initiative on Defence Capabilities provide an opportunity to promote greater burden sharing. However, Western European allies are unlikely to spend more on defence under current conditions, and even the US appears to back a more restrained approach based on achieving greater efficiency, such as that of the UK's Strategic Defence Review. In the words of US Ambassador to NATO, Alexander Vershbow:

"Our goal here is to enhance capabilities, not to get the European Allies to 'buy American' ... Most, though not all, Allied nations do not need to spend more - but they do need to spend more wisely. They must move away from overly large, standing forces and toward more emphasis on deployability and sustainability. They must ensure that the communications and weapons systems they will rely on for the next decade and beyond are modern and capable enough to operate effectively with those of the United States." (36)

Procurement of more modern equipment that is interoperable with that of the US is very much in the interests of US arms manufacturers. Although the arms companies have been enthusiastic supporters of NATO enlargement and the resulting requirement for new NATO members to procure interoperable equipment (37), the market in Central and Eastern Europe is restricted by lack of resources in potential new member countries. The industry therefore also seeks to keep up pressure on Western Europe to procure US equipment. Meanwhile on the European side, the St Malo agreement promotes the need for a strengthened European defence industry.

Agreements on ESDI in Washington this April, will be followed by further decisions by the EU at its summit meeting in Cologne in June. The development of ESDI, along with closer cooperation between EU countries in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy marks the beginning of an intensified debate about the extent to which the Europeans can really work independently of the US in the defence field.

Conclusion

Over the past ten years, NATO has survived the end of the Cold War and transformed itself with some success into an organisation that can mobilise and coordinate military forces for peacekeeping, especially within Europe. However, as the Alliance prepares to set out its vision for the future, the debate has been dominated by US efforts to downplay the role of the UN Security Council. This is problematic not least because NATO potentially has a lot of expertise to offer the UN in peacekeeping and a closer relationship between the two could give NATO-led operations greater authority.

Although interoperability is desirable for effective peacekeeping missions, there is a danger that NATO is gradually moving towards a position where interoperability is the basis of the new transatlantic relationship. It is highly debatable whether European countries really need to spend more on modernising military forces and equipment. If NATO is to enhance European security in the future, greater emphasis needs to be given to building more cooperative relationships with neighbouring States, rather than hoping to deter all threats from beyond Alliance borders.

In recent years, the US Administration in particular has prioritised NATO enlargement over progress on arms control and disarmament with Russia, contributing to the problems of START II in the Duma and the stagnation of the nuclear disarmament agenda. These problems have now been compounded by the recent NATO military action against Yugoslavia. As NATO celebrates 50 years, the highlights of those years have been the breakthroughs in arms control and the end of the Cold War. The question is whether NATO leaders now have the vision to make progress on disarmament a key component of European security for the future, and not just enlargement.

Notes and References

1. NATO Press Release M-NAC-2(98)140, "Final Communiqué", Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Foreign Ministers Session, 8 December 1998.

2. NATO Basic Text: "Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO". Approved by the North Atlantic Council , 13 December 1956.

3. US Mission to NATO, "Albright Statement to North Atlantic Council", Brussels, 8 December 1998.

4. Ibid.

5. Secretary of Defense William Cohen, "Transatlantic Partnership on the Threshold of the Next Millennium", Remarks to the Munich Conference on Security Policy, 6 February 1998.

6. Madeleine Albright quoted in Royal United Services Institute, Newsbrief, Vol. 18:4, April 1998, page 26.

7. NATO Communiqué M-1(94)3, "Declaration of the Heads of State and Government", Brussels, 11 January 1994, emphasis added.

8. House of Lords, Official Report, HMSO, 14 December 1998, column 1221.

9. Bulletin d'Information en Langue Anglaise, "Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council: Speech by M. Hubert Vedrine, Minister of Foreign Affairs", Brussels, 8 December 1998.

10. UN Press Release SG/SM/6938, "Secretary-General, in statement on NATO military action against Yugoslavia, acknowledges use of force may be sometimes legitimate in the pursuit of peace, but stresses Security Council should be involved", 24 March 1999.

11. "Press Conference by Secretary of State Albright", Brussels, 8 December 1998.

12. Michael Evans, "Nato rejects call to cut nuclear arms", The Times, London, 9 December 1998.

13. "Canada and the Nuclear Challenge: Reducing the Political Value of Nuclear Weapons for the Twenty First Century", Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, December 1998.

14. "Address by the honourable Lloyd Axworthy minister of foreign affairs to the North Atlantic Council Meeting", 8 December 1998.

15. Rebecca Johnson, "First Committee Report", Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue Number 32, November 1998.

16. William Cohen, Remarks to the Munich Conference on Security Policy, 6 February 1998.

17. Hans M. Kristensen, "Editing NATO's Strategic Concept: Nuclear Language Toned Down but 'Last Resort' Out of Reach", Non-Nuclear NATO Network, 17 February 1999.

18. NATO Press Release M-NAC-2(98)140, 8 December 1998.

19. William Cohen, "Transatlantic Partnership on the Threshold of the Next Millennium", Remarks to the Munich Conference on Security Policy, 6 February 1998.

20. "British Defence Secretary says Czech Army has a lot of work to meet NATO standards", BBC World Europe, 24 November 1998.

21. James Coomarasamy, "Poland's Greatest Prize", BBC World Europe, 12 March 1999.

22. Transcript, "Cohen says NATO relies on strength of US-Europe ties", United States Information Agency, 9 February 1999.

23. Frank T. Csongos, "NATO Expansion - How Far, How Fast?", RFE/RL, 12 February 1999, courtesy of the Berlin Information-Center for Transatlantic Security News-Press-Reports.

24. "Albright Statement to North Atlantic Council", 8 December 1998.

25. "Press Conference by Secretary of State Albright", 8 December 1998.

26. In 1998, Senate approval of the fiscal 1999 foreign operations appropriations bill included $15.3 million "to accelerate the Baltic States integration into NATO".

27. Julianne Smith and Martin Butcher (editors), "A Risk Reduction Strategy for NATO: Preparing for the next 50 years", BASIC Research Report 99.1, January 1999.

28. "Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation", Paris, 27 May 1997.

29. Question for the Record Submitted by Senator Harkin to Secretary of State Albright, Senate Appropriations Committee, Washington DC, 21 October 1997.

30. A major breakthrough in the CFE talks was reported, with scant details provided, on 30 March. See next issue for details and reaction.

31. See for example, testimony from Madeleine Albright to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and from William Cohen before the Senate Appropriations Committee, 1997.

32. NATO Communiqué M-1(94)3, "Declaration of Heads of State and Government", Brussels, 10-11 January 1994.

33. NATO Communiqué M-NAC-1(96)63, "Final Communiqué", Berlin, 3 June 1996.

34. "Edited transcript of speech by the Prime Minister, Mr Tony Blair, to the North Atlantic Assembly", Edinburgh, 13 November 1998, notes as prepared for delivery.

35. "Joint Declaration on European Defence", issued at the British-French summit, Saint-Malo, France, 3-4 December 1998.

36. Transcript, "Ambassador Vershbow speech on NATO Future at European Institute", USIS Washington File, 17 March 1999.

37. See for example, Joanna Spear, "Bigger NATO, Bigger Sales", The World Today, November 1997.

Nicola Butler is Senior Analyst at the Acronym Institute.

© 1999 The Acronym Institute.

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