Disarmament Diplomacy
Issue No. 35, March 1999
A Limited Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone in Northeast Asia:
A Track-II Initiative
By John E. Endicott
A New Helsinki Process for Northeast Asia?
In Helsinki this past October, in conjunction with the Finnish
Institute of International Affairs and the Finnish Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, the Atlanta, Georgia-based Center for
International Strategy, Technology and Policy (CISTP) of Georgia
Tech jointly sponsored the most recent in a series of meetings
focusing on creating a limited nuclear-weapons-free zone (LNWFZ) in
Northeast Asia (NEA). Since 1992, the Center has brought together
senior security specialists from the diplomatic, military,
scientific, business, and peace activist communities from China,
Japan, Mongolia, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Russia, the United
States, and sometimes the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
(DPRK), to candidly discuss the need for such a regional zone.
Meeting over the years in Beijing, Atlanta, Washington, D.C., New
York, Boston, San Francisco, Buenos Aires, Bordeaux, Moscow, and
Helsinki, the group has grown from a core of five individuals to
over seventy, including official government observers from most
States in the region.
In Helsinki, participants were joined by and received consul
from Finnish experts who had taken part in the development and
ultimate realization of the CSCE (Conference for Security and
Cooperation in Europe) process. Some of their recommendations will
form the basis of discussions to be conducted in April by a small
"working group" that will meet in Shanghai with the co-sponsorship
of Fudan University to prepare for the next major plenary meeting
in Tokyo in October 1999. This paper briefly describes the genesis
of this Track II initiative, its development over time, and
discusses some of the major problems that must be overcome before
it can become a Track I effort.
The Promise of the Early 1990s
Work for a nuclear-free zone in NEA began conceptually within
CISTP in 1991, in the midst of significant progress that was
occurring between North and South Korea concerning the
denuclearization of the Peninsula and related non-aggression
accords. President George Bush's decision to consolidate as much as
possible the storage of tactical nuclear weapons in the continental
US led to breakthroughs in these North-South talks, and ultimately
to a declaration by the ROK President that no nuclear weapons
remained in South Korea.
Parallel and integral to these development, the US Department of
Defense (DoD) announced its East Asian Strategic Initiative (EASI)
as part of the East Asian Strategy Report for 1991. This Initiative
outlined American force reductions in Asia, starting with specific
dates for drawdowns in the Philippines, and more general dates for
both South Korea and Japan. The perception from the region was that
America was preparing to depart. To dampen this notion, and
demonstrate that the United States could remain actively engaged in
the security of Northeast Asia even though its physical presence
was somewhat reduced, CISTP looked for a concept that could keep
America engaged in NEA and concurrently provide the foundation for
a cooperative security community for the region. In short, it was
time to replace the regional security system of confrontation with
one based on cooperation and mutual gain. The mechanism chosen was
a nuclear-free zone which would bring with it implementing and
oversight organizational structures that would require the various
States of the area to work together on a regular basis. (1) From
the interactions necessary to insure compliance with the agreement
a community of trust eventually would arise.
In early 1992 a group of retired military, diplomats, nuclear
experts, peace activists, academics, and business people - from
China, both Koreas, Japan, Mongolia, Russia, and the United States
- met in Beijing to discuss security and economic development in
NEA, including the idea for a nuclear-free zone. While the concept
received a very good reception from most of the attendees,
Participants from the People's Republic of China (PRC), including a
Representative of the National People's Congress, were unwilling to
discuss it seriously. A year later, however, during a trilateral
meeting in Atlanta between representatives from Japan, China and
the US, the PRC indicated renewed interest. Interestingly, this
change in attitude occurred one week before the DPRK announced its
withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) system.
During the remainder of 1993 and 1994, the concept was presented
throughout Asia and the United States. By January 1995, the initial
feedback encouraged a more detailed examination. Over a five-week
period, a panel of five senior security specialists met in Atlanta
to discuss the particulars of such a nuclear-weapons-free zone. (2)
The discussions produced a major document entitled "Agreement of
Principles." The new agreement focused the concept on controlling
tactical nuclear weapons and including some territory of all
participants - including the US. The Senior Panel traveled to
Washington, D.C., New York, Boston and San Francisco to present the
updated concept to arms control experts and government officials.
Reception was universally positive, but many thought it too
difficult to achieve such a zone in an area with three nuclear
powers present and great residual animosities from the Cold War,
World War II and the colonial era.
Expanding the Senior Panel
In order to test the concept further and widen the number of
expert reviewers involved, the Senior Panel was expanded to include
five participants from each country (consisting of military,
diplomatic, academic, commercial, and nuclear specialists), and in
March 1996 this Expanded Senior Panel (ESP) of 25 met in Buenos
Aires. Taking advantage of the Argentine and Brazilian system of
intrusive inspection of their nuclear facilities, and the fact that
Argentina is a member of the Latin America Nuclear-Free Zone, the
session became a non-proliferation tutorial. In a sense, the
Northeast Asia effort gained insights based on over 25 years of
Latin American negotiations in a few days. (3) This experience
further highlighted the importance of gaining insights from
non-regional actors - a lesson that led to Finnish participation in
1998. The results of the meeting, produced in the form of the
Statement of Buenos Aires, lent credibility to the effort.
In October that same year, the ESP convened in Bordeaux, France.
With the increased credibility from Buenos Aires, the group was
joined by a number of Official Observers from all the nations
involved, the next step on the path toward a Track-I, or official,
status for the concept. The meeting developed what came to be
called the "Bordeaux Protocol" that outlined the next steps for
advancing the concept. Most importantly, the concept moved toward
institutionalization and codification of the relationships when the
ESP established an Interim Secretariat of the LNWFZ-NEA. (4)
Through this action, the participants made a bold statement about
the long-term commitment they were making.
In October 1997, the newly created Interim Secretariat brought
together the Expanded Senior Panel in Moscow where the concept
received a boost in the form of two specific proposals: the notion
of a League for Non-Nuclear States for Northeast Asia, and a Pilot
Program involving the nuclear States so that China, Russia and the
US could allow a small percentage of tactical nuclear weapons to
come under the regional control of an LNWFZ-NEA Agency. The idea of
having an inspection regime with representatives of all members of
the region remains at the heart of the entire concept: through
frequent opportunities to work together on security issues, it is
argued that a cooperative security community could begin to take
form in Northeast Asia.
It is worth noting the important distinction between the ongoing
efforts of the LNWFZ-NEA and other conferences, roundtables and
discussions. As the participants had been focused on a specific
concept for a long period of time, the Moscow conference provided
an opportunity to present unique and creative proposals for
detailed discussion. Most importantly, the ongoing focused
discussions meant that proposals were not left as orphans upon the
closure of the meeting. They were nurtured and discussed after
Moscow. Arriving at the next meeting in Helsinki, the proposals
were reinvigorated with new proposals for providing a positive
environment for growth.
Finland Steps to the Front
In October 1998, in conjunction with the Finnish Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and the Finnish Institute of International Affairs,
the Expanded Senior panel, in its largest meeting ever, met in
Helsinki to be critiqued by Finnish experts and discuss next steps.
One of the significant absentees since 1992 has been North Korea;
all members at the Helsinki meeting re-emphasized the common desire
to have the DPRK participate. The special circumstances of
Helsinki, having embassies from the ROK and the DPRK, permitted
frequent contact between the Finnish participants and local DPRK
representatives.
In a post-meeting briefing of the conference to North Korean
officials in Helsinki, it became clear that DPRK interest in
rejoining the process (potentially at the Shanghai meeting) is
growing. Later, contact with high officials of the DPRK through the
Mongolian Team Leader indicated that the Chairman of the Interim
Secretariat of the LNWFZ may be invited to Pyongyang during the
first part of 1999 to brief appropriate individuals and invite
their active participation.
The other substantive contribution of the Helsinki forum was the
examination of the concept of "baskets" to organize and prioritize
the research and deliberations of the ESP. Successfully used in the
CSCE process, the ESP looked favourably on three candidate
"baskets": the LNWFZ, Supplementary Security Measures, and Economic
Incentives. Again, the experience of non-regional actors proved
important as the lessons of the Helsinki Process found their way
into the LNWFZ-NEA.
While no nation in NEA has as yet officially endorsed the LNWFZ
concept, the Helsinki meeting endorsed a program to have a
technical meeting in Shanghai in April of 1999, and a meeting of
the entire plenary group in Tokyo in October 1999. Invitations to
meet in Beijing in 2000 and the Republic of Korea in 2001 are also
in the planning stages. As the meetings now start to have regular
Asian venues, it is hoped that the work will move from informal and
unofficial (Track II) to formal and official (Track I). Having the
meetings in close proximity to national governments will permit
greater "walk in" involvement by senior bureaucrats who need to be
exposed to the dialogue and members of the Senior Panel.
Obstacles to Progress
The United States officially still holds to nuclear-free zone
policies made at the dawn of such concepts. Its seven criteria for
such zones may be inconsistent with the dynamic international
system of the 21st Century. These criteria are:
- the initiative for the creation of the zone should come from
the States in the region concerned
- all States whose participation is deemed important should
participate in the zone
- the zone arrangement should provide for adequate verification
of compliance with its provisions
- the establishment of the zone should not disturb existing
security arrangements to the detriment of regional and
international security or otherwise abridge the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense guaranteed in the UN
Charter
- the zone arrangement should effectively prohibit its parties
from developing or otherwise possessing any nuclear device for
whatever purpose
- the establishment of the zone should not affect the existing
rights of its parties under international law to grant or deny
other States transit privileges within their respective land
territory, internal waters and airspace to nuclear-powered and
nuclear-capable ships and aircraft of non-party nations, including
port calls and overflights
- the zone arrangement should not seek to impose restrictions on
the exercise of rights recognized under international law,
particularly the high seas freedom of navigation and overflight,
the right of innocent passage of territorial and archipelagic seas,
the right of transit passage of international straits, and the
right of archipelagic sea lanes passage of archipelagic waters.
(5)
US arms control officials, especially in light of the South Asian
nuclear tests in May 1998, should re-examine the role that could be
played by regional nuclear-free zones. The US has eliminated itself
as a serious player in some regional non-proliferation concepts by
restricting US participation in the policy formulation, excluding
US territory from such concepts, and excluding itself from limited
steps toward non-proliferation that may not include a total ban on
all weapons and weapons capability. One could even say that the
current policy prohibits the US from adequately fulfilling its
obligations under the NPT to be an active participant in the total
non-proliferation effort.
Other important obstacles are:
- the historic animosities and the residue from the Cold War
- the diverse political and economic systems
- the presence of declared nuclear powers (three of the five P-5
powers are involved)
- the constantly shifting political, economic, and security
landscape of the region
Lastly, any effort that treads onto uncharted waters often finds
that the devil is in the details, and a nuclear weapons control
regime in Northeast Asia is no exception. Still, although the
reduction of nuclear weapons is of vital interest to all States,
the development of trust and the notion of cooperative security in
Northeast Asia is the most important by-product of the LNWFZ-NEA
process. The process of nuclear arms control and reduction
can create a working cooperative security community.
A Question of Timing?
The 21st Century will find a complex group of relationships in
the region. Arms control leaders in the US and Asia can wait until
international conditions are right (actually, perfect) to create a
LNWFZ-NEA, and then move on to find appropriate confidence building
measures. But an old Russian proverb states that "the
perfect is the enemy of the good." Leaders should
take risks to build a foundation of trust that will revolutionize
relations among the nations of Northeast Asia. International
politics are still in a state of transition where there is the
possibility of influencing the shape of the international system
for the duration of the 21st Century. Today's leaders have the
obligation to pursue regional security and cooperation concepts -
and any mechanism which might add to them - even though the
conditions are not perfect.
New models and new institutions for our international system
must be developed for a new century. Non-Proliferation can play a
role in building a more secure world, but what role - and how
altered it is from the role of non-proliferation in the 1960s - has
yet to be determined. The most important factor will be a
willingness to think "outside the box" while keeping the needs of
national security paramount. Within the overall context of
non-proliferation, nuclear-free zones are only one concept. They
are not a magic elixir that will turn all relations into positive
ones.
It is important to recognize the model of Europe, where constant
interaction with other States in the region through institutions
that foster routine contacts at the operational level have led to a
realization that mutual benefit and trust evolves from the most
basic inter-State relationships. Building a security community does
not occur overnight, yet the reluctance of leaders to take the
first steps ensures that it will never happen. If the people of
Asia and America are to enjoy the benefits of a peaceful and
prosperous 21st Century, initial steps must be taken soon.
Conclusion
Events since May 1998 have awakened responsible members of the
international community to the need for basic reform of the nuclear
non-proliferation order. Science and developed technologies do not
easily fit back into the bottle once released. The international
system, in its current state, does not have the will, capacity, nor
the moral standing to force all proliferators of nuclear weapons to
stop their threatening activities. However, it may have the
capacity to deal with the causes of proliferation in many cases. It
is in this area that the concept of cooperative security regimes
and supporting nuclear-free zones must be given a closer look.
Perhaps, over time, causes of insecurity can be addressed, thereby
reducing the attractiveness of the nuclear option. In the near
term, the creation of institutions to help regularize relationships
and to produce an environment to overcome centuries of mistrust may
help. A system of viable nuclear-free zones may be part of that
picture.
Notes and References
1. The original concept called for the removal of all nuclear
weapons from a 1,200 NM circle centered on the Korean Demilitarized
Zone. The concept has undergone significant adjustments over its
seven-year life.
2. Members of what became known as the "Senior Panel" included:
General Kim Jae-chang, the former Vice Chairman of the ROK Joint
Chiefs of Staff; Lt. General Toshiyuki Shikata, former Commander of
the 7th Division in Japan and the Vice President of the Japanese
Defense Academy; Major General V. Bunin, former Senior Planner of
the Red Army and East Asian Specialist; Dr. Yan Xuetong, Deputy
Director of the Chinese Institute for Contemporary Foreign Affairs;
and the author, Dr. Endicott, former Associate Dean of the National
War College and Director of the Institute for National Strategic
Studies of the National Defense University.
3. The Latin American Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone began in 1967,
with the final treaty specifications and agreement not occurring
until the 1990s.
4. The Expanded Senior Panel determined that the Interim
Secretariat would be temporarily housed at the Center for
International Strategy, Technology, and Policy at Georgia Tech, and
would be headed by a Chairman, the author of this article, until an
official agency could be housed within the region.
5. The criteria mentioned here come from a list submitted to the
Interim Secretariat by the US Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency.
John E. Endicott, Ph.D., is Founding Director of the
Center for International Strategy, Technology and Policy, and
Professor at the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, at the
Georgia Institute of Technology
© 1999 The Acronym Institute.
Return to top of page
Return to List of Contents
Return to Acronym Main Page
|
