Disarmament Diplomacy
Issue No. 40, September - October 1999
CTBT IN CRISIS
International Implications of the US Senate Vote
by Patricia M. Lewis
Introduction
The US Senate vote against ratification of the CTBT, although a
deep disappointment and worrying development, would have come as no
big surprise to observers of multilateral arms control. Ever since
the negotiation of the CTBT, arms control treaties have been an
easy and consistent target for the right-wing of the US polity. The
1998 debate over US ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention
(CWC) and the consequent reservations heralded a period of
ascendancy of anti-arms controllers in the US Senate and was a
clear precursor of the CTBT struggle. As one wry observer noted at
the time, "the Republicans have tasted blood in the CWC debate:
next time [the CTBT] they will hunger for flesh".
Despite, or perhaps because of, worsening relations between the
President and Congress, the Clinton Administration has been
extraordinarily concerned over recent months about trying to carry
the hard-line Republicans along with its arms control policies and
approaches. So much so that in Geneva talks about possible talks
about talks on nuclear disarmament and the re-establishment of an
ad-hoc committee on preventing an arms race in outer space (PAROS)
have proved elusive dreams. The three-year deadlock in the
Conference on Disarmament (CD) owes as much to shifting goal posts
in the US as it does to shifting sands in the Rajasthan desert.
Similar trends can be seen, too, in the Ad-Hoc Working Group of
the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). Long gone are
the days of US enthusiasm for a strong approach to verification and
confidence-building. The concern in the BTWC negotiations seems to
be whether it would be better to weaken the verification Protocol -
thus keeping the US in - or would it be wiser to negotiate a
stronger Protocol which would leave the US out, whilst still
keeping the door open for them to join at a later date when this
hostility to arms control has passed. For those who were involved
in the Ottawa process, this debate will feel all too familiar.
The unilateral decisions being taken by the US on the
development and eventual deployment of national and regional
ballistic missile defence systems are also symptoms of a deepening
malaise within the thinking on arms control and disarmament in the
US. There are a number of serious analysts in the US who believed
that the price for CTBT ratification was a combination of a
well-funded Stockpile Stewardship Programme and the acquiescence of
the Clinton Administration to ballistic missile defence (BMD)
development. It would seem that they were duped. In the knowledge
that they could, senators were encouraged to trample all over tacit
agreements and hammer another nail into the coffin of arms
control.
A New Turning Point?
The coffin lid, however, is not yet shut. It could be that the
US Senate's failure to ratify the CTBT marks a turning point in
international efforts in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.
In the days following the vote, both China and Russia said that
they intend to put the Treaty up for ratification and that they
expect successful ratification.
At a recent meeting with French President Jacques Chirac,
Chinese President Jiang Zemin said: "Our aim is to get the
ratification of the treaty".1 A few days earlier on
October 21 Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said that, "The
[Senate] decision caused deep disappointment in Moscow", adding
that, "We will ask the Duma, under the name of the President, to
ratify this important agreement".2
However, whether China and Russia will follow through with these
pledges is yet to be seen. There is evidence of considerable and
growing anxiety in the Russian Duma about ratification of the CTBT.
Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy Officials have pursued a
programme of hydrodynamic experiments, including sub-critical tests
at Novaya Zemlya, designed to review the functioning of a limited
number of nuclear warheads. However, according to Rady Ilkaev,
Director of the Federal Nuclear Center, the results have not been
satisfactory: "We have always believed that nuclear tests alone can
guarantee the safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons.
Nevertheless, we agreed with politicians, who insisted that we had
to try to solve this problem without nuclear tests. We dare say
that we will manage to tackle it. But if we fail, we will have to
resume nuclear tests".3
In addition, many other countries, including those of the
European Union, have expressed dismay and concern about the Senate
vote and have asked them to reconsider.
US Non-Proliferation Policy On The Line
One of the biggest problems that now faces the international
community is the credibility of US nuclear non-proliferation
policy. Following the vote, US Secretary of State for Energy Bill
Richardson again called on India to adhere to the CTBT and show
nuclear restraint in the run up to President Clinton's forthcoming
visit. Although Bill Richardson referred to the Republican senators
as "short-sighted", there are some players in India who will
interpret his calls as arrogant and discriminatory, and question
the grounds on which Secretary Richardson feels he can now make
such requests. How can the US demand that India and Pakistan ratify
the Treaty when the US administration cannot deliver the same?
Indeed, there are those who will try to use the opportunity to push
for more nuclear tests in India, using the military coup in
Pakistan as further justification for resumed weapons testing. At
the very best, the US non-proliferation approach will be severely
weakened, at worst it will be considered hollow and ignored.
Constructive Engagement
The international community could respond to the vote and these
other trends in a number of ways. The most constructive approach
would be for the states strongly dedicated to nuclear disarmament -
the vast majority - to take stock of the situation and act urgently
and forcefully. The Tokyo Forum Report issued in July 1999 drew
attention to the nuclear dangers now facing the world. In blunt
language the report stated that "the fabric of international
security is showing signs of unravelling", that "not all countries
share the view that the usefulness of nuclear weapons is declining"
and that "unless concerted action is taken, and taken soon, to
reverse these dangerous trends, non-proliferation and disarmament
treaties could become hollow instruments". The Tokyo Forum called
on all parties to the NPT to reaffirm the core bargain of that
Treaty, to eliminate nuclear weapons and to bring the CTBT into
force. Since the US Senate vote, the realistic approach contained
within the Tokyo Forum report has assumed a stronger salience and
deserves careful attention.
Another possible outcome is that the New Agenda Coalition (NAC)
approach could receive more support as a result of the crisis in
the CTBT. Whilst it is unlikely that the First Committee of the
General Assembly will see any major changes in voting patterns, a
deeper rumbling of concern among NATO allies can be detected. In
addition, the misgivings of some within the Non-Aligned Movement
(NAM) over the nuclear weapon states' (NWS) true commitment to
nuclear disarmament have been further vindicated and their analysis
of the trends in nuclear disarmament might find more support.
However, a sense of malaise could prevail in which there would
be deepening feelings of betrayal by supporters of the 1995 NPT
indefinite extension decision. Governmental and non-governmental
advocates of nuclear disarmament could give up and feel powerless
in the face of entrenched opposition within the world's strongest
military power. The trends are not good. Not only are the CTBT and
the NPT in trouble, but bilateral nuclear disarmament is still
floundering and the ABM Treaty is about to be shaken to its
core.
Missile Defence Systems
Perhaps the heart of the problem is to be found within the
debate on BMD. Whether designed against a few missiles from a small
despotic, desperate state or against an accidental launch by a
large, chaotic state, it could be argued that, in deciding to go
ahead with the development of a national missile defence (NMD)
system, the United States has given up on arms control. No longer
feeling it possible to prevent the spread of missile technology, or
to prevent the technical capability to design deliverable nuclear
warheads, the United States seems to have decided that the only way
to protect itself is through military might. This analysis could
explain the US posture with the BTWC Protocol negotiations, the
reservations placed on the CWC ratification decision, and the
difficulties faced by the US within the CD and the CTBT
ratification vote. It could also explain the thinking in Japan over
the regional missile threat. Japan, too, may feel that without
strong US support arms control processes will not succeed and,
rather than build its own counter missile force - which certainly
would be destabilizing - the country might be better served by a
regional BMD system.
The deep flaw contained within this thinking seems obvious from
the outside. Whilst increased military might for national defence
can temporarily offer a sense of security, to others it can appear
as a threat. This threat perception in turn will lead to increased
military capabilities in other countries and can further
destabilize turbulent regions.
However, if this is the US position, a pragmatic and creative
approach towards arms control and disarmament is unlikely to
flourish there in the foreseeable future. It may be that the
international community will just have to wait for a major shift in
domestic politics before the United States will be in any position
to take further steps towards multilateral nuclear disarmament. It
may be possible that the bilateral process between the US and
Russia could lead to further missile and warhead reductions - for
example going down to 1,000 strategic warheads on each side - as
well as codifying and verifying the unilateral tactical nuclear
weapons withdrawals.
On the other hand, the Russian Duma may well refuse to play the
bilateral reductions game if the US deploys a NMD system. Indeed,
recent reports suggest that not only could further reductions be
unlikely, but that Russia - finances willing - is considering
redeploying tactical nuclear weapons at its borders and would like
to deploy more MIRVed (Multiple Re-Entry Vehicles) nuclear weapons
to increase its chances of overcoming US national defences.
Similarly, China has recently been reported as developing a second
strike capability in order to counter US missile defences, and its
regional concerns over theatre missile defences (TMD) have been
stated unequivocally in recent months.
However, it is possible that Russia and China could take the
moral high ground and ratify the test ban. Such courage would make
it more difficult for the hard-liners in the US Senate to vote down
the Treaty at its next hearing and it would pave the way for a much
more constructive and interesting international dialogue.
Arms Control in 2000
It is, however, very difficult to predict what could happen in
the CD and in the NPT Review Conference next year. On the one hand,
there could be renewed efforts by both the US and its allies to
counter the effects of the Senate vote. Although it did not put
enough long-term effort into increasing the chances of Senate
ratification, the Clinton Administration is committed to the CTBT.
It is also committed to negotiating a fissile material cut-off.
Uncertainties abound, however, as to whether the US will still
attempt to reflect Republican Party opposition to arms control in
its international stances, and whether other countries will have
enough faith in the ability of the US to bring its policy machinery
along.
The question that might be asked is: is there any point in
beginning negotiations on fissile material controls when the US
cannot even deliver on the 1996 CTBT? The answer to this question
has to be "yes". Years of useful work could still be carried out
within the CD so that the negotiations would be in a position to
capitalize on changed circumstances if and when there is a policy
shift in the US. In addition, it is important not to allow a
handful of senators and a minority opinion in the US to become the
determining factor in disarmament negotiations.
Similarly for the NPT Review Conference: the review of the past
five years will not yield high marks for progress. The one big
beacon of light - the CTBT - is now dimmed and other important
progressive steps such as the Additional Protocol for International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and the trilateral
initiative for safeguarding nuclear material taken from surplus
military stocks do not inspire the international community in quite
the same way. It is likely that there will be strong recriminations
expressed at the NPT Review Conference. Not just because of the
CTBT. And not just because of the nuclear tests carried out by
India and Pakistan in 1998. But also because the window of
opportunity that was opened at the end of the Cold War is now
firmly shut.
Very little use was made of that open window. Prising it open
again will take some time, it may not even be possible, and other
openings will have to be tried. Certainly the eventual deployment
of BMD systems will have major repercussions for global and
regional security. It is an issue that needs multilateral debate
and that debate needs to consider all of the possible ramifications
of deployment. If the US decides to sacrifice the ABM Treaty then
the significance of the 1999 CTBT ratification vote in the Senate
will pale in comparison, and Herculean efforts would have to be
made to simply prevent the Treaty and security architecture built
up in the last few decades from completely crumbling.
Not all is lost. It is possible that the Senate vote will stir
the embers of the international peace movement. Strong protest from
civil society is sorely needed if there is to be nuclear
disarmament. With the notable exceptions of civil society in Japan,
India and Pakistan, peace groups were strangely absent when India
and Pakistan carried out their nuclear tests in 1998. Perhaps the
events of October 1999 will serve as a reminder that far from
having dissipated, the threat posed by nuclear weapons is still
alive and kicking. Responsible and concerned states could also be
galvanized into action and discussions or negotiations could
continue without waiting for the full support of the United States
- or of any other state. People understand the full horror of the
humanitarian disaster that would ensue if a country or terrorist
group used nuclear weapons, and for that reason alone the nuclear
dangers we face at the end of the twentieth century have to be
eliminated with all urgency.
Notes & References
1. "Russia To Send Nuclear Test Treaty To Duma-Ivanov", Los
Angeles Times, October 21, 1999.
2. "Jiang Says China Wants to Ratify Nuclear Pact", Reuters,
October 24, 1999.
3. "The US Refusal to Ratify the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Marks
the Beginning of Another Stage of the Nuclear Arms Race", Dmitry
Gornostaev and Sergey Sokut, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, October 15,
1999.
Patricia M. Lewis is Director of the United Nations
Institute of Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) in Geneva.
© 1999 The Acronym Institute.
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