Disarmament Diplomacy
Issue No. 40, September - October 1999
Report on the United Nations 54th First Committee
General Debate: Part One
by Sharon Riggle
"Together, we must refuse to accept that war, weapons of mass
destruction, or the excessive accumulation or illicit transfer of
arms are now just hallmarks of the natural human condition....
Disarmament is central to that task and to the creation of a
culture of prevention". Excerpt from remarks by the United
Nations Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, Jayantha
Dhanapala, at the opening of the UNGA 54th First
Committee, October 11, 1999.
Introduction
The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) 54th First
Committee opened its five-week session on October 11, 1999 to
discuss issues in a security environment that has undergone serious
changes, and several setbacks, since it last met 12 months ago. At
the helm sat Ambassador Raimundo González of Chile,
serving as the Chair of this year's committee. He opened with words
of encouragement and a call for "determination and vision to
develop ... 'sustainable security' to guide humanity more safely
into the future". He went on to outline the range of subjects that
this year's committee would be facing. Assisting him this year in
their capacities as Vice-Chairs are: Ambassador Günther
Siebert of Germany, Ambassador Kestutis Sadauskas of Lithuania and
Ambassador Tarig Ali Bakhit of Sudan, with Mr. Carlos D. Sorreta of
the Philippines serving as Rapporteur. Technically the session runs
until November 12, but because the last three days this year are
taken up with considering the Treaty on Antarctica, the First
Committee voting will end on November 9.
The general feeling at this year's First Committee is that there
is noticeably less "blood on the floor" than last year, when the
resolution condemning the south Asian nuclear tests and the
controversial New Agenda Coalition (NAC) resolution electrified
UNGA 53 and were the subject of much heated debate. Some suspect
that the atmosphere is "deceptively quiet", with potential
flashpoints waiting in the shadows, ready to explode. Most others
are taking the situation at face value and are grateful for the
relative calm this year. They maintain that as the resolutions are
not "new" this year, the precedent is already set and states are
haggling more over the details than fundamental conceptual
differences. Negotiations are ongoing, however, and general trends
are emerging at this half-way point, which are outlined below. A
few resolutions and debates are causing a stir, most notably the
NAC resolution, now in its second year, and the first-time
ABM Treaty resolution sponsored by Russia, China and
Belarus which threatens to cause the deepest disagreement.
This article outlines the main themes in the General Debate of the
First Committee and will be followed by a comprehensive analysis in
Disarmament Diplomacy 41, due out mid-December.
In addition to the issues addressed in more detail below, there
was also discussion of a wide array of disarmament-related issues
including: the report of the Tokyo Forum for Nuclear
Non-Proliferation and Disarmament; negative security assurances
(NSA); the upcoming Organisation for Security and Co-Operation in
Europe (OSCE) summit in Istanbul; the Register of Conventional Arms
(RCA); nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ); the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) and the model additional Protocol; the drain
of military procurement on developing nations' budgets; regional
disarmament centres; physical protection of nuclear materials; the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) legal opinion of 1996;
vertical proliferation and new weapons technology; maritime
transport of nuclear waste; export control regimes; tactical
nuclear weapons and others.
Nuclear Issues
Many general debate speeches reflected the growing pessimism in
the ability of the international fora to effect change, and painted
a bleak outlook for the future of multilateral initiatives. Much of
this sentiment was expressed even before the US Senate voted down
the CTBT, the reverberations of which are still being felt across
the spectrum of disarmament and non-proliferation discussions. The
list of failures or near misses referred to by many delegations was
longer than the successes. The relative inability of international
fora to carry the agenda forward was lamented. Even where agreement
has been forged, for example, beginning negotiations on a ban on
the production of fissile materials for weapons -- or Fissile
Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) -- there has been no action because
of the inter-linking of issues and general political game playing.
The bilateral process on nuclear arms reductions between the United
States and the Russian Federation is stalled, and now exacerbated
by the US plans to develop ballistic and theatre missile defences.
The CTBT has not entered into force, and with the US negative vote,
that legally binding instrument has been delayed for much longer.
Inaction in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva since 1996,
except for the much-welcomed membership expansion this year,
remains a source of frustration for most delegations. Missile
tests, potential proliferation and national and theatre missile
defence systems were seen to undermine the existing regimes and
increase instability in certain regions, especially in north-east
Asia. The Indian and Pakistani tests and India's new nuclear
doctrine have posed a very serious threat to the non-proliferation
regime and general norm. Several countries mentioned the new
Strategic Concept of NATO, with its renewed emphasis on nuclear
weapons, as being a major obstacle to further progress in other
areas.
The US Senate's rejection of the CTBT was seen as a major blow
to efforts in the multilateral forum. It sent shockwaves through
delegations in New York, as well as Europe and other regions. In
private, predictions for the future were dire and ranged from
"never seeing the CTBT in force" to "the beginning of the fall of
the entire nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime".
Publicly, states came out strongly against the vote, but coupled it
with a call for renewed efforts to increase adherents to the Treaty
and a welcoming of the US announcement to maintain its testing
moratorium. The Senate defeat of the CTBT has seriously injured US
credibility in international disarmament fora, at a time when
confidence was already waning. Is it just a result of an especially
intransigent Congress? Will it only last until after the elections
next year? Or has the paradigm shifted away from states following
the US lead on these issues in a post-Cold War security environment
that has changed the rules of play? These questions remain
unanswered, but the important NPT Review Conference next year has
been mentioned several times behind the scenes as the real loser in
the short term. Preparations for the NPT 2000 Review Conference
will have to seriously take into consideration the effects of the
CTBT vote, which was one of the only real accomplishments since the
NPT Review and Extension Conference in 1995.
The resolution on the CTBT does not include the strong language
of many delegations "deeply regretting" the decision taken in the
US Senate. It is a moderate appeal to countries to sign and ratify
the Treaty, and builds on the declaration adopted in Vienna at the
Special Conference on Entry Into Force (Article XIV). Although some
delegations argued for the inclusion of specific language deploring
the outcome of the US Senate vote, this was omitted on grounds that
it could be counter-productive to single out just one country,
albeit an important one for entry into force, without naming all
those who have yet to accede to the Treaty.
With the important NPT 2000 Review Conference coming up in just
six months' time, some countries used the opportunity of the First
Committee to outline expectations and frustrations. Virtually all
heralded the Treaty as the cornerstone of the nuclear
non-proliferation and disarmament regime, and held up the
Conference next year as a seminal event in its history. There were
the traditional calls for universal adherence to the Treaty, with
the usual pointed references to Israel from Middle Eastern
countries. While details were not covered in plenary speeches, it
was clear that expectations are high that the Review Conference,
especially the nuclear weapon states (NWS), must be seen to deliver
on promises undertaken in the Treaty. If obligations are not met,
or if there is no
progress by the May 2000 Review Conference, the repercussions
would be very serious for the credibility of the Treaty and the
regime as a whole. The most frequent comment besides wishes for a
successful Review Conference next year were regrets that the 1999
Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference agreed no
recommendations.
Where it exists, progress on nuclear arms control was welcomed
and further measures encouraged. The announcements in June 1999 by
the presidents of the United States and Russia were highlighted by
many as a step in the right direction. The trilateral initiative
between the US, Russia and the IAEA was welcomed, and other NWS
were encouraged to join that process. The entry into force of the
Landmine Treaty (Ottawa Convention) was heartily welcomed by most,
and de-mining activities placed at the forefront of important next
steps. The third NPT Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review
Conference was applauded for its success in taking care of the
procedural arrangements for the Review Conference, yet deep regret
was expressed by some for its failure to fulfill its mandate for
making substantive recommendations to the 2000 Review Conference.
The START process was supported, and calls were issued to renew
those efforts and begin negotiations on START III.
Of the initiatives before the assembled delegations this year,
arguably one of the most controversial is the NAC resolution
proposing accelerated efforts and specific steps towards the goal
of nuclear disarmament. This measure, launched in June 1998 by the
foreign ministers of Ireland, Sweden, South Africa, Brazil, New
Zealand, Egypt, Mexico and Slovenia, was one of the main
blood-spillers at UNGA53 as it bundled together pragmatic proposals
with a message that nuclear disarmament is needed sooner rather
than later. (See Disarmament
Diplomacy 32, November 1998). Over the past 12 months,
support for the measure has grown. Last year's resolution had 32
co-sponsors, although Slovenia - an applicant for European Union
and NATO membership - was forced by US, British and French pressure
to withdraw its sponsorship. At the 1999 NPT Preparatory Committee
meeting, the NAC garnered 44 core supporters. In the First
Committee, as of October 25, 1999, the NAC resolution is
co-sponsored by 52 states.
As was the case last year, there are debates over questioning
the commitment of the NWS to their NPT Article VI obligations to
move towards nuclear disarmament, quarrelling over the need - or
lack thereof - for an international conference to help move things
along, when exactly the NPT is binding, how quickly "speedy"
measures should be taken and the characterisation of types of NWS.
The resolution has been substantially changed from last year to
take into consideration the criticisms from states at the last
session, and the text reflects that input. It is unclear at this
point how states will vote, although it is quietly expected that
key countries will take the same position as last year.
As a result of plans in the US for a limited national BMD
system, Belarus, Russia and China have sponsored a first-time
resolution entitled "Preservation of and compliance with the
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty". It is aimed directly at curtailing
any plans by the US to develop or deploy such a system, which would
contravene the provisions in the ABM Treaty as it stands. The
resolution also "supports intensified consultations and cooperation
within the international community, between parties and
non-parties, on the ABM Treaty and related issues in the light of
emerging developments". In view of the encouraging noises from
presidents Clinton and Yeltsin in Cologne, some delegations have
expressed surprise at the strong tone of the resolution and at
Russia's new tactic of seeking to include third parties in what the
United States will undoubtedly want to keep as traditional
bilateral negotiations. At time of writing, high-level discussions
are ongoing in Moscow between these two nations, leading many to
perceive the First Committee resolution as primarily a political
manoeuvre, although there is no doubt that it reflects some core
concerns of Russia and China.
The resolution has presented many western nations with a
dilemma, since the text of the resolution has been carefully
crafted to re-state support for the ABM Treaty with language
similar to that used in other fora. This increases the difficulty
for western nations, because all states generally regard the ABM
Treaty as the "cornerstone of strategic stability". Therefore it
will be hard for western nations to vote against it or abstain.
However, indications are that opposition from Washington will
ensure that many western nations will end up abstaining on this
particular resolution, citing reasons of non-interference in a
bilateral process.
Although rarely mentioned by name, several states expressed
concern over the US proposal to establish a (limited) national BMD
system, possibly abrogating the ABM Treaty as it stands. While
upsetting the stability that many see the Treaty offers, there is
an additional worry about unilateral moves by a country as strong
as the US to protect itself under some sort of 'umbrella' and/or
share a form of that umbrella with others -- such as Taiwan or
Japan -- under a theatre missile defence (TMD) system. Those who
mentioned the TMD programme cast it in a negative light, and
generally saw it as upsetting regional efforts to organise their
own security structures.
The prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS, by its CD
acronym) also caught the attention of several delegations. Recent
rapid developments in outer space technology, and an increasing
accessibility to that technology, have led some to call for the
negotiation of a legally-binding instrument that would regulate or
ban the use of outer space for military purposes. Again the target
is generally seen to be the US, whose current programmes aim at
utilising technology in outer space to prevent missile attacks. As
one delegation said, "we all have a 'border' with outer space", and
therefore several states expressed the desire to discuss the issue
in a multilateral forum, most likely the CD, to exchange ideas on
the subject.
Other Weapons of Mass Destruction
Negotiations are ongoing in Geneva on a verification Protocol
for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), and were
commented upon by various delegations. While generally quite a
technical topic, calls went out to the wider disarmament community,
governmental and non-governmental, to become more involved in this
subject. The aim is to adopt the final Protocol next year, but
delegations still have many weeks of negotiating sessions ahead of
them. While support for the negotiations seems virtually unanimous,
the arguments against were rebutted by some delegations. Ambassador
Clive Pearson of New Zealand, for example, cited the United
Nations Special Commission's (UNSCOM) failure to detect biological
weapons in Iraq as the reason this Protocol is so necessary,
arguing that, had the mechanisms been in place as outlined in the
Protocol, the international community would have been alerted much
earlier to the danger of imminent trouble in Iraq.
The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was applauded for its
progress so far, but several speeches expressed concern at the
relatively low level of signatories and ratifiers. Full and
indiscriminate implementation was a call by some, while others
added that the concerns of the respective industries should be
taken fully into account. National economic or scientific
development should not be hampered by implementation of this
worthy mechanism, while national security goals should be
maintained as well. Universality of course was the chorus sung by
all delegations voicing support for this treaty.
Conventional Arms
Receiving much detailed attention by delegations is the proposal
for a conference on "Illicit Traffic in Small Arms". General debate
speeches were uncharacteristically detailed regarding this item, as
negotiations are underway to flesh out the intensive preparatory
process for this conference, which will most likely take place in
mid-2001. There are numerous proposals by delegations on the scope,
timing, duration, mandate, location, etc., of both the conference
and the preparatory process. A key political concern, however, is
over scope. Many non-aligned countries would like the conference to
focus solely on the "illicit trafficking" aspects of the problem,
while other countries, among them some western delegations, would
like to broaden out the debate and look at all related problems
inherent in sending small arms across borders. The phrase "in all
its aspects" was added on to mentions of a small arms and light
weapons conference at the demand of some delegations in order to
keep the scope broader than merely dealing with strictly illegal
aspects.
The Ottawa Convention banning landmines, as well as the Certain
Conventional Weapons Treaty (CCW), were frequently lauded as steps
in the right direction to rid the world of the scourge of these
indiscriminately harmful devices. By far the majority of those
weighing in on the issue saw the Ottawa Treaty as the ideal
mechanism through which to deal with these weapons, but some
delegations expressed the hope that the CD might be allowed to also
negotiate a ban on transfers of landmines. There is much
controversy over this issue, as most states would like to keep the
landmines issue out of the CD system altogether and not risk
watering down a very strong treaty. The next step on most stated
agendas was to ensure adequate funding for de-mining operations and
victim assistance, programmes which are already very much under
way.
UN Mechanisms
For the third year in a row, the United Nations Disarmament
Commission (UNDC) was not able to agree on an agenda for the
proposed Fourth Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD4). This
special session would build on the previous three, most notably
SSOD1, which, in 1978, agreed by consensus a far-reaching agenda
which has since acted as the benchmark for disarmament issues.
While some regard the 1978 priorities as still valid, many others
want there to be a new assessment of the security environment and
discussion of a new agenda for action, taking into account the end
of the Cold War and the significant changes in international
relations since 1990. The United States has been the major holdout,
rejecting the proposed agenda, though India surprised some by also
throwing away a chance of agreement in 1999. However, this year the
UNDC did adopt a new document regarding nuclear-weapon-free zones,
which currently cover roughly half the globe. This document allows
States Parties to these zones to co-operate more closely in the
strengthening of these zones, as well as input into general
guidelines in the establishments of new ones. These zones were
frequently mentioned and applauded by states as a vital item on the
nuclear disarmament agenda.
NATO
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) came in for
criticism from several delegations at the First Committee. NATO'S
50th anniversary summit in Washington and new Strategic Concept
showed no movement at all away from reliance on nuclear deterrence
as a core security guarantee for the Alliance, which enraged some
states and frustrated many others. Often naming NATO directly, many
states expressed their disbelief at the unchanged posture in a
post-Cold War world. One state went further and claimed that NATO's
actions represented "hegemonism and power politics" and have
jeopardised global security norms. Ambassador Christopher Westdal
said that Canada was supporting in NATO a continued adaptation to
the new security environment and that the Washington Summit
recognised the diminished salience of nuclear weapons and had
agreed that the Alliance "will consider options for confidence and
security building measures, verification, non-proliferation, arms
control and disarmament". This agenda item is widely understood to
include the nuclear weapons question. A proposal will be put to
NATO ministers in December on a process to consider such
options.
Sharon Riggle, Director of the Centre for European
Security and Disarmament, Brussels, has been covering the 54th
Session of the United Nations First Committee in New York on behalf
of the Acronym Institute. The next issue of Disarmament
Diplomacy (41) will contain a full report of the resolutions and
voting patterns in the First Committee and UNGA. A selection of
related documents can be found on the Acronym Institute
website: http://www.acronym.org.uk
© 1999 The Acronym Institute.
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