Disarmament Diplomacy
Issue No. 40, September - October 1999
CTBT IN CRISIS
How The US Senate Rejected CTBT Ratification
By Daryl Kimball
Introduction
After more than forty years of painstaking effort and three
years of difficult multilateral negotiations, the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was opened for signature on September 24,
1996 to the applause and relief of the international community. A
total of 155 nations have now signed the Treaty, which would ban
all nuclear weapon test explosions, set up a far-ranging
international monitoring system, and allow for short-notice,
on-site inspections to ensure compliance. But since 1996, progress
toward entry into force of the Treaty has been blocked by hold-out
states: India and Pakistan have yet to sign and Russia, China and
the United States have failed to ratify.
Then, on October 13, 1999, only days after the international
community gathered in Vienna to encourage all states that had not
yet done so to sign and ratify the Treaty1, the US
Senate became the first legislature to fail to give its approval to
ratification. The Treaty was rejected in a largely party-line vote
of 48 for and 51 against, with one senator voting "present", the
equivalent of an abstention. US ratification requires the approval
of at least two-thirds - 67 votes - of the Senate.
The failure of the US Senate to approve the CTBT is a severe
blow that sets back - but does not kill - efforts to secure the
ratifications necessary for global entry into force of the Treaty.
The debate and vote on the Treaty is a result of the Senate
Republican leadership's decision to score petty political points at
the expense of an initiative that affects the survival of the
planet. The outcome is also the result of the Clinton
Administration's failure to mount a serious effort to win Senate
approval of the Treaty in the preceding months.
The Senate's historic blunder clearly sends a dangerous signal
to those states that seek to acquire and further develop nuclear
weapons. There exists the danger that the Senate's October 13 CTBT
vote sends a "green light" to other nations who may use the vote as
a pretext to resume nuclear testing. There is also the potential
that it could serve as a "yellow warning light" -- alerting the
American public and the international community to the possibility
of a renewed, global nuclear arms competition if the CTBT and other
nuclear risk reduction efforts are not finalized. In either case,
the recent Senate vote on the CTBT sets back the decades-long
effort to end nuclear testing and it may also damage progress on a
broad range of other efforts to reduce nuclear weapons dangers.
This article examines the events that led to the Senate's rejection
of the Treaty, the immediate political fallout, and the outlook for
bringing the CTBT back for approval by the US Senate.
The Senate's Rush to Judgement
To understand why the Senate chose to reject the CTBT after a
brief, 13-day period of debate in October 1999, it is essential to
consider the challenges facing the CTBT in the months leading to
the vote. Following President Clinton's transmittal of the Treaty
to the Senate for its "advice and consent" for ratification on
September 23, 1997, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Jesse Helms (Republican - North Carolina) demanded that
the President transmit two unrelated treaties to his Committee
before the CTBT could move forward.
Helms took the position that: "Not until the administration has
submitted the ABM protocols and the Kyoto global-warming treaty ...
will the Foreign Relations Committee turn its attention to other
treaties on the president's agenda."2 But by late
September 1999, after blocking Senate consideration of the Treaty
for over two years, and failing to schedule a single hearing
devoted to the topic, Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (Republican
- Mississippi) and Helms suddenly reversed course and decided to
schedule a vote on the Treaty.
Their move was precipitated by several weeks of methodical and
persistent consciousness-raising by Senate CTBT proponents, led by
Senator Byron Dorgan (Democrat - North Dakota) and pro-Treaty
non-governmental organizations (NGOs). On July 20, a bipartisan
group of senators held a press briefing calling for prompt Senate
action on the Treaty, citing overwhelming public support for Senate
approval of the Treaty.3 That same day, all 45
Democratic senators wrote to Senate Majority Leader Lott, asking
for "all necessary hearings ... to report the Comprehensive Nuclear
Test Ban Treaty to the Senate for timely consideration before the
[Article XIV] CTBT inaugural conference".4
Then in late-September Senator Dorgan, along with other leading
Senate CTBT proponents and the White House, decided to try to
advance the issue by introducing a non-binding Senate resolution.
The resolution called for the beginning of the process of
consideration of the CTBT, and the scheduling of a vote on the
Treaty by March 31, 2000.5 The plan to press for the
resolution, which was never introduced, was agreed at a meeting
between National Security Advisor Samuel Berger and the Senate
Democratic leadership on the evening of September 22. At the
meeting, participants weighed the possibility that Senator Lott
might try to schedule a vote on the Treaty at short notice, but
they considered the possibility low and decided to press
forward.
On September 29, Senator Helms and Senator Lott went on the
offensive by offering a proposal for an October 7, 1999 vote on
final passage of the Treaty. Lott had polled his fellow senators in
the weeks before and was rather confident that a quickly scheduled
vote would favor Treaty opponents. Lott calculated that if he could
not further delay a vote by having Treaty supporters refuse his
terms for a truncated debate, then he could assemble the 34 votes
needed to block Senate approval for ratification. Lott's initial
proposal for 10 hours of debate on the Treaty with only 6 days
notice was not accepted by Senate Treaty supporters. Most Senate
supporters, the White House and the NGO community criticised the
offer calling it a "rush to judgement" because it did not provide
sufficient time for hearings, and a thorough and informed
debate.6
In consultation with the White House, Senate Democratic leaders
negotiated for more time and a more thorough series of
hearings.7 But on the afternoon of Friday, October 1,
they decided to accept Senator Lott's final "take it or leave it"
counter-offer for a unanimous consent resolution for three hearings
in the Armed Services Committee, 14 hours of debate, and a vote as
soon as October 12. (A single hearing in the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee was scheduled and held the following week.) The
decision to accept the offer was motivated in part by the belief
that the effect of continued inaction on the Treaty could be as
severe as outright defeat. It is very likely that if a vote were
not scheduled before the end of 1999 -- and before the 2000
election season -- the Treaty would not have come before the
Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate until the middle of 2001
or later. As the ranking Democrat on the Foreign Relations
Committee Joseph Biden said on October 2: "The question is: If you
are going to die, do you want to die with no one knowing who shot
you or do you want to go at least with the world knowing who killed
you?"8
By September 1999, Treaty proponents estimated that they needed
to win-over approximately 15 of an estimated group of 20-25
undecided senators.9 However, opponents of the Treaty,
led by Senator Jon Kyl (Republican - Arizona) and former Secretary
of Defense and Energy, James Schlesinger, began lobbying Republican
senators in earnest in September 1999. Even though these efforts
may not have swayed the undecided senators, it certainly did help
to plant seeds of doubt about the Treaty.10
The President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Energy,
the National Security Advisor and others spoke about the vital
importance of the Treaty on a number of occasions. President
Clinton made the case for the CTBT in his 1998 and 1999 State of
the Union addresses and secured the valuable support for the Treaty
from four former chairs of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, the
President did not appoint a co-ordinator for building CTBT support
and for organizing and sustaining Administration-wide work on the
Treaty, as he did with the successful NATO expansion campaign in
1998.
The Senate "Debate" on the CTBT
Thus, it was not until the end of September -- when the Senate
had scheduled hearings and a vote on the Treaty -- did President
Clinton, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense launch
a high profile, high-powered effort to win Senate support for the
Treaty. The last-ditch campaign that the President and his cabinet
waged on behalf of the Treaty was impressive. The White House
highlighted the fact that the Treaty enjoyed the overwhelming
support of America's senior military leadership and its leading
weapons scientists and seismological experts.11 The
President met with undecided senators at the White House, while
Secretary of Defense William Cohen and Secretary Albright also
engaged in efforts to lobby undecided senators and communicate the
importance of ratification of the Treaty in the news
media.12
The Administration sought the assistance of NGOs in making the
case for the Treaty.13 Non-governmental CTBT advocates
had been accelerating their public education and Senate lobbying
efforts since the beginning of September. The NGOs were crucial in
generating a massive number of calls to the Senate from concerned
citizens, encouraging newspapers to editorialize on the
topic14 and collecting support from former military and
government officials, independent nuclear weapons scientists, and
hundreds of public interest organizations.15
But the President was unable to make up for lost time and win
the support of the many undecided Republicans, who were already
being heavily lobbied by Senator Lott and other pro-nuclear
senators to oppose the Treaty. Given a 12-day schedule that barely
left time for hearings and a thoughtful debate, Treaty proponents
had too little time to address the questions and falsehoods that
Treaty opponents raised. The arguments of the Treaty's opponents
centered on the erroneous assertions that the United States cannot
maintain its nuclear deterrent without nuclear test explosions,
that the CTBT is not verifiable and that, while the US could be
counted on to comply, other nations could test surreptitiously and
gain military advantages.16 In the end, there were too
many hurdles and too little time to gain the votes needed.
Treaty supporters recognized from the beginning of their
campaign that they would need the support of a small, but very
influential group of "internationalist" Republicans to win over the
large block of undecided votes. These key senators were under
enormous pressure from Majority Leader Lott not to break rank with
the leadership. By the end of the first day of Senate floor debate
(October 8), senators Warner (Republican-Virginia), Domenici
(Republican-NM), Lugar (Republican-Indiana), Hagel
(Republican-Nebraska) as well as other Republican "moderates" would
declare their intention to vote against the Treaty. In statements
declaring their positions, several senators, such as Richard Lugar,
argued against ratification while simultaneously expressing "regret
that the Senate is taking up the treaty in an abrupt and truncated
manner that is so highly politicized".17
Senator Lott and the Hard-Liners Reject Postponement
Plan
By Tuesday October 5, only four days after the agreement to
schedule a vote on the Treaty, it became clear to many senators
that support for the Treaty was not materializing. Senators from
both parties began to suggest that the vote should be postponed to
avoid damage to US credibility and international security. Sen.
Pete Domenici, a senior lawmaker who would later vote "no" on the
Treaty, urged President Clinton to shelve the accord rather than
have it rejected. "There are international ramifications for
killing it", Domenici said.18
Recognizing that the votes needed for ratification were not
there, a number of senators tried to fashion an agreement to
postpone the vote until a future time. President Clinton sent a
letter to the Senate on October 11, saying, "I believe that
proceeding to a vote under these circumstances would severely harm
the national security of the United States, damage our relationship
with our allies, and undermine our historic leadership over 40
years, through administrations Republican and Democratic, in
reducing the nuclear threat. Accordingly, I request that you
postpone consideration of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty on the
Senate floor".19
Support for delaying action grew stronger as a letter calling
for postponement of the vote was circulated by senators John Warner
(Republican - Virginia) and Daniel Patrick Moynihan (Democrat-New
York). "We ... support putting off final consideration [of the
CTBT] until the next Congress", wrote 62 senators in the October 12
letter to senators Lott and Daschle.20 While the
Republicans had the votes to defeat the Treaty, they were faced
with the difficult choice of inviting political as well as
international risk by voting against it, or defying their party
leaders by voting for it. Faced with a choice between "arsenic and
hemlock", a large number of Republicans sought to delay the vote.
Some Democrats, confident that as a group the Republicans would be
wise enough not to poison themselves, expected the Senate to defer
the vote.21
However, agreeing to postpone the vote required the same kind of
"unanimous consent" agreement needed to schedule the vote. Under
such rules, it only takes one senator to block an agreement. Some
Republican opponents of the Treaty insisted that the President
pledge in writing that he would not press for Senate approval of
the CTBT for the rest of his term in office. This was a commitment
that the White House refused to give because it believed that
international circumstances might require that the US seek
ratification before the end of his term. Such a commitment may also
have undercut the legal basis for continued US adherence to the
"object and purpose" of Treaty in the absence of Senate
approval.
On the basis of a letter sent to Majority Leader Trent Lott by
Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle (Democrat-South Dakota), on
October 12, an agreement was almost reached to postpone voting on
the eve of the vote. Daschle said in his letter, "Like the
President, supporters of the CTBT have reluctantly concluded that
the Senate will fail to ratify the CTBT at this time and that a
vote in light of this reality risks grave damage to our national
security interests. Therefore, I support the President's request to
postpone the vote and, absent unforeseen changes in the
international situation, I will not seek to reschedule this
vote".22
However, there were several hard-line senators who decided to
oppose a delay of the vote under these or any other circumstances,
including senators Helms, Paul Coverdell (Republican-Georgia), Jon
Kyl, Robert Smith (Republican-New Hampshire), and James Inhofe
(Republican-Oklahoma).23 Senator Lott was either
unwilling or unable to persuade this small group of pro-nuclear
hard-liners to relent and agree to respect the request of the
President and the majority of the Senate to delay the vote.
The opportunity for reaching an agreement to postpone the vote
faded by Wednesday, October 13. Democrats attempted to prevent the
Senate from returning to debate on the Treaty that afternoon
through a procedural motion, but that effort failed on a party line
vote of 55-45. Debate on the Treaty resumed, and on the evening of
October 13, the Senate voted to reject the Treaty, with only four
Republican senators - Chafee of Rhode Island, Jeffords of Vermont,
Specter of Pennsylvania, and Gordon Smith of Oregon- voting for the
CTBT.
Many Republican senators were only too eager to score partisan
political points against a President who had so many times defeated
their initiatives.24 What was particularly significant
about the debate and the vote on the Treaty was that Majority
Leader Trent Lott dealt with the Treaty as he has dealt with
domestic issues like the budget, gun control, and health care. Lott
worked hard to unite his Republican colleagues against the
Democratic President, and was willing to apply strong political
pressure on individual senators to go along with his position. Most
Republicans so distrust and despise President Clinton that they
were willing to inflict damage to Bill Clinton even if it meant
harming US national security. The Senate decision on the Treaty may
have more to do with the Senate's views about the President's
handling of the Monica Lewinsky scandal than their considered
judgement about how to stop nuclear proliferation and testing.
Lott tried to deny the obvious at an October 14 press briefing.
He tried to argue that the vote "was not about politics; it was
about the substance of the Treaty, and that's all it was". Lott
also denied pressuring his colleagues to vote "no",25
but the evidence suggests the opposite.
In this politically charged environment, many senators failed to
examine the facts, respect the advice of the United States' closest
allies, and, most importantly, listen to their constituents. The
Senate vote not only contradicts the nation's leading military and
scientific officials, but Senate opponents dismissed the fact that
Japan, Britain, France, Germany and the NATO Alliance all strongly
support the Treaty. In an unprecedented opinion editorial published
in The New York Times, British Prime Minister Tony Blair,
French President Jacques Chirac, and German Chancellor Gerhard
Schröder appealed to the US Senate to approve the CTBT (see
Documents & Sources).26
Rejection of the Treaty makes little sense given that the United
States does not need to conduct nuclear test explosions to maintain
the arsenal or to make new warhead types. In fact, the United
States' leading military officials, the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
foresee no need for the production of new types of nuclear
warheads, and the nuclear laboratory directors said in testimony
before the Senate Armed Services Committee that they are
"confident" the US nuclear arsenal can be maintained without
nuclear explosive tests.27
Rejection also puts the United States in a CTBT 'limbo' that is
not beneficial to US security: by rejecting it, the Senate denies
the United States the benefits of the Treaty's monitoring and
on-site inspection provisions28, and it denies the
United States the moral and legal authority to encourage other
nations not to conduct nuclear weapon test explosions.
The Senate vote also contradicts the will of the American
people, which supports Senate approval of the Treaty by an
overwhelming 82% majority, according to a June 1999 poll. The poll
shows that support for the Treaty spans all political and
demographic groups, with 80% of all Republicans supporting Senate
approval of the Treaty. A separate poll conducted in July in North
Carolina, the home-state of Senator Jesse Helms, indicates that 75%
of adults in the state support Senate approval of the
CTBT.29
A 2000 Election Issue?
A day after the Senate vote, President Clinton lashed out at the
Republican-led Senate for making a decision based on politics
rather than substance, and said that US nuclear testing policy
would not change as a result of the vote: "I will not let
yesterday's partisanship stand as our final word on the test ban
treaty. Today I say again, on behalf of the United States, we will
continue the policy we have maintained since 1992 of not conducting
nuclear tests. I call on Russia, China, Britain, France and all
other countries to continue to refrain from testing. I call on
nations that have not done so to sign and ratify the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty. And I will continue to do all I can to make that
case to the Senate. When all is said and done I have no doubt that
the United States will ratify this treaty".30
The Senate vote is also likely to become a significant Senate
and presidential election issue. For instance, the vote raises the
stakes in upcoming US policy decisions on possible deployment of a
'limited' national missile defense (NMD) system and 'discussions'
with Russia on possible changes to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile
(ABM) Treaty that could allow for such a deployment.
The day after the Senate vote, Vice-President Al Gore ran his
first presidential campaign ads on the topic of the CTBT, vowing
that if elected, he will bring the Treaty back to the Senate to win
its advice and consent for ratification.31 In contrast,
a spokesperson for Republican presidential frontrunner George W.
Bush Jnr said that the Texas Governor "supports the current US
moratorium on all nuclear testing 'but doesn't support the [test
ban] treaty'".32
Latest public opinion survey data suggest that the CTBT could
become a potent political issue in the upcoming Senate and
Presidential elections. A June 1999 national survey shows that when
given the choice between one candidate who supports the CTBT and
another who opposes it, voters preferred the candidate who supports
the Treaty by a margin of two-to-one (62% to 31%).33
Immediately following the Senate vote, a national poll found that a
majority (57%) said it is "very important to hear what positions
presidential candidates take on this issue". A majority of
respondents said it was a "bad thing that the Senate voted against
this treaty" (47% "bad thing"; 26% "good thing", with 27% saying
neither or "don't know").34
The rejection vote may also affect the level of the US financial
contribution to the CTBT Organisation. Already under attack from
hard-line isolationists and opponents of the Treaty such as Senator
Helms, funding for the United States contribution to the CTBTO -
$20 million in 1999 and $16 million in 2000 - may be reduced or
even entirely eliminated in future years. This is a development
that could severely affect the ongoing development of the
international monitoring system (IMS).35
Most of the international community condemned the US Senate's
rejection vote.36 It also deals a blow to the
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which was extended in 1995 largely
on the basis of the promise by the United States and the other NWS
to conclude the CTBT. And, ominously, the Senate vote coincides
with the overthrow of Pakistan's elected government, highlighting
the importance of establishing effective nuclear restraint
measures, including the CTBT, in south Asia and elsewhere. However,
the US Senate's short-sighted rejection of the Treaty will likely
reduce the possibility that either India or Pakistan will sign the
CTBT in the foreseeable future. (See Patricia Lewis' article on the
international implications of the Senate vote).
Conclusion and Next Steps
There can be little doubt that the limited time available for
debate in the Senate, and the fact that Treaty opponents had begun
their lobbying work weeks earlier, meant that Clinton
Administration officials needed to have done most of their
pro-Treaty lobbying work in advance. But they had not. The Senate's
defeat of the Treaty was, therefore, not only due to the senators'
rush to judgement after two years of neglecting the issue; it was
also a consequence of President Clinton's failure to organize a
sustained campaign to build support for the Treaty in the months
leading up to this vote. Distracted by domestic policy issues,
scandal and the war in Kosovo, President Clinton failed to heed
repeated appeals to designate a group inside his government focused
solely on the task of CTBT ratification.37
It is still too early to tell how damaging the October 13 vote
will be, and how long it will take to achieve forward momentum on
the Treaty. Will the Senate's vote help trigger the resumption of
nuclear testing by some state already predisposed to doing so? Or,
perhaps, the Senate vote will re-energize CTBT supporters in the US
and around the world, much as France's widely criticized resumption
of nuclear testing did in 1995. The likelihood of these and other
possible consequences are difficult to ascertain, but some issues
are clear.
Technically, the Treaty remains at the Senate desk and can be
called up at any time. But in reality, it will take a newly elected
President to bring the Treaty before the Senate again with renewed
commitment and answers for there to be any hope of approval. The
Clinton Administration and senators interested in preventing
nuclear proliferation and advancing nuclear disarmament would be
wise to begin efforts to engage in a serious and sustained dialogue
that will ease concerns, resolve questions, build support, and lay
the groundwork for bringing the Treaty back to the Senate in 2001.
Some Republican senators who voted against the Treaty have already
made entreaties about fostering an orderly dialogue on the matter
and bringing it back for consideration.38
While the Senate has rejected the CTBT for now, it is highly
unlikely that the US will "withdraw" from the Treaty or resume
nuclear testing, as some Senate Treaty opponents suggested. Leading
opponents of the Treaty, including former assistant Secretary of
Defense under President Reagan and policy advisor to George W. Bush
Jr, Richard Perle, and former Secretary of Defense and Energy,
James Schlesinger, argue that the United States should resume
nuclear testing to build new types of nuclear weapons and/or to
maintain the existing nuclear arsenal.39
But for the time being, given that President Clinton signed the
Treaty, the United States, like other signatories, is obligated
under Article XVIII of the Vienna Convention on Treaties not to
undertake any action that violates the "object or purpose" of the
Treaty, such as conducting a nuclear test explosion.40
President Clinton confirmed that his Administration adheres to this
view when he said in an October 14 nationally-broadcast news
conference: "All I can tell you is, we're not going to test, I
signed that treaty, it still binds us unless I go, in effect, and
erase our name - unless the President does that and takes our name
off, we are bound by it".41
However, accelerating the ratifications needed for entry into
force will be very difficult to achieve as long as the United
States fails to ratify the Treaty. Two key nations - India and
Pakistan - have made conditional pledges to sign, but are highly
unlikely to do so any time soon given the Senate rejection of the
Treaty. Consequently, new international leadership on the CTBT is
needed. Traditional allies of the Treaty and other nations,
including Japan, Britain, France, Netherlands, South Africa,
Australia, New Zealand, Mexico and others must be prepared to
increase their political commitment to securing signature and
ratification from the hold-out states. States Parties must also be
prepared to lend greater financial support to the Treaty to ensure
that IMS development does not suffer from a possible reduction of
the United States' annual contribution. They must also be prepared
to continue to press the next Administration and the United States
Senate to ratify the Treaty as early as 2001.
An important opportunity to register continuing international
support for CTBT entry into force will come this month at the UN
and next April at the NPT Review Conference. As of October 27, a
draft UN First Committee resolution on the Treaty is expected to
receive overwhelming support. The resolution "endorses the Final
Declaration of the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force
of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty", and it "calls upon
all States that have not yet signed the Treaty to sign and ratify
it as soon as possible", and it "calls upon all States that have
signed but not yet ratified the Treaty, in particular those whose
ratification is needed for its entry into force, to accelerate
their ratification processes with a view to their early successful
conclusion". The draft resolution also "urges States to maintain
their moratoria on nuclear weapons tests".
The international community will also have the opportunity to
press the case for the Treaty at the second Special Conference on
Accelerating CTBT Entry Into Force. Though overshadowed by the
calamitous events in the Senate, the first Conference held in
Vienna was, generally speaking, a modest success. It afforded key
nations the opportunity to express their strong support for the
Treaty, it received global media attention - mainly due to the
concurrent debate in the Senate on the CTBT - and it allowed for
good NGO participation, including a statement delivered by
Ambassador George Bunn on behalf of the 13 NGOs that were able to
attend. Given the added difficulty of US ratification and the
crucial role of the next US President, States Parties planning the
next Special Conference on Accelerating CTBT Entry Into Force would
be wise to locate it at the UN in New York and schedule it in late
2000 - shortly after the US presidential election - in order to
improve the chances that it would receive necessary political and
media attention.
In sum, the decades-long campaign to end nuclear testing forever
has suffered a serious defeat, but the CTBT will, in the end, be
ratified and will enter into force with the continued support of
the people of the world and with the continued work of enlightened
political leaders from around the globe and in the United
States.
Notes and references
1. "Spotlight on the CTBT: Report of the CTBT Article XIV
Conference", Rebecca Johnson, Disarmament
Diplomacy 40, September/October 1999.
2. Senator Jesse Helms, Chairman of the Foreign Relations
Committee, in The Wall Street Journal, January 25, 1999.
3. "Bipartisan group pushes for action on test ban treaty", by
Bill Nichols, USA Today, July 21, 1999.
4. Letter to Senator Helms from 45 Democratic senators on the
CTBT, July 20, 1999.
5. Draft resolution on CTBT September 29, 1999.
6. "Democrats Divided on Double-Edged GOP Test Ban Offer",
Associated Press, October 1, 1999.
7. Ibid.
8. "Nuclear Test Ban Vote Set for October", Associated
Press, October 2, 1999.
9. "White House Seizes Chance to Push Test Ban Treaty", by
Jonathan Wright, Reuters, October 1, 1999.
10. Personal conversation with Eric Newhouse of the Office of
Senator Voinovich, October 24, 1999; "Quietly and Dexterously,
Senate Republicans Set a Trap", by John M. Broder, The New York
Times, October 14, 1999.
11. "Both Parties Seek a Graceful Way to Put Off a Nuclear
Treaty Vote", by Eric Schmitt, and "32 Nobel Laureates in Physics
Back Atomic Test Ban", by William J. Broad, The New York
Times, October 6, 1999; American Geophysical Union and
Seismological Society of America Joint Position Statement:
Capability to Monitor the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, October 6,
1999.
12. "Clinton Kicks Off Campaign to Pass Nuclear Test Ban", by
Marc Lacey, The New York Times, October 5, 1999.
13. Ibid.
14. Of more than 100 editorials written before the Senate
favored ratification, less than 10 favored rejection.
15. "America's Newspaper Editors Back Test Ban Treaty, Pt. 6:
Calls for Ratification Overwhelming", Coalition to Reduce Nuclear
Dangers Issue Brief, October 12, 1999; "After Chinese Spy
Scandal, New Support for Test Ban Treaty", by William Broad, The
New York Times, August 1, 1999; Congressional Record -
Senate, page S12262-63, October 8, 1999.
16. A September 9, 1999 letter to Senator Lott from 52 CTBT
opponents organized by the small, pro-nuclear weapons lobby group,
Center for Security Policy, contained key arguments against the
Treaty that would appear in the October debate. For analysis and
rebuttal of these arguments, see: "Tall Tales of the Test Ban
Opposition", Christopher Paine, Senior Researcher, Natural
Resources Defense Council, October 6, 1999.
17. "Lugar Opposes Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty", Press
Release, Office of US Senator Richard Lugar, October 7, 1999.
18. "Both Parties Seek Graceful Way To Put Off Nuclear Treaty
Vote", by Eric Schmitt, The New York Times, October 6,
1999
19. "A Plan Is In Works to Put Off A Vote On Test Ban Pact:
Clinton Satisfies a Demand by Lott in Effort to Avert Showdown", by
Eric Schmitt, The New York Times, October 12, 1999; Letter
sent by President Clinton to Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott,
requesting a postponement of voting on the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty, October 11, 1999.
20. Letter sent by 62 senators on postponement of the voting on
the CTBT, October 12, 1999.
21. "Test Ban Vote May Be Set Aside", by Roberto Suro and Helen
Dewar, The Washington Post, October 6, 1999.
22. Letter sent by Minority Leader Thomas Daschle to Majority
Leader Trent Lott on postponement of voting on the CTBT, October
12, 1999.
23. "Senate Kills Test Ban Treaty in Crushing Loss for Clinton;
Evokes Versailles Pact Defeat - Vote is 51 to 48", by Eric Schmitt,
The New York Times, October 14, 1999.
24. "The G.O.P. Torpedo", by R.W. Apple, Jr., The New York
Times, October 14, 1999.
25. Remarks by Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-MS) Following the
President's Press Conference on Senate Rejection of the CTBT,
Federal News Service, October 14, 1999.
26. "A Treaty We All Need", by Jacques Chirac, Tony Blair, and
Gerhard Schröder, The New York Times, October 8,
1999.
27. See: "Nuclear Arsenal is "Safe and Reliable" Under Test Ban
Treaty: US Doesn't Need to Test -- But Others Do Need Tests to
Improve their Arsenals", Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers
Issue Brief, October 11, 1999.
28. See: "US Security Benefits from Test Ban Monitoring & On
Site Inspections: But Test Ban Treaty Verification Tools Depend on
Ratification and Entry Into Force", Coalition to Reduce Nuclear
Dangers Issue Brief, September 27, 1999.
29. "Eight in Ten Americans Support Test Ban Treaty: More Want
Senate Approval of Pact in Year Since South Asian Blasts",
Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers News Release, July 20,
1999; and "Three in Four North Carolina Voters Want Nuclear Test
Ban Treaty: Disagree with Senator Helms' Failure to Act for 22
Months", North Carolina Council of Churches Press Release,
August 2, 1999.
30. "Press Conference by the President, The East Room 2:04
P.M.", The White House -- Office of the Press Secretary, October
14, 1999.
31. "Gore To Campaign for Nuke Test Ban", By Ron Fournier ,
Associated Press, October 14, 1999.
32. "White House Tries to Woo Senate GOP To Support Global Ban
on Nuclear Tests", The Wall Street Journal, October 5,
1999.
33. Wirthlin Worldwide and The Mellman Group. See: "Eight in Ten
Americans Support Test Ban Treaty: More Want Senate Approval of
Pact in Year Since South Asian Blasts", Coalition to Reduce Nuclear
Dangers News Release, July 20, 1999
34. "Poll finds nuclear test ban near top of issues",
Associated Press, October 22, 1999.
35. "Foes of Test Ban Treaty Now Take Aim at Monitoring System",
by William J. Broad and Eric Schmitt, The New York Times,
October 29, 1999.
36. "Around the World, Dismay Over Senate Vote on Treaty", by
Barbara Crossette, The New York Times, October 15, 1999.
37. In a June 15, 1999 letter to the President organized by the
Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers, 36 non- governmental CTBT
supporters urged Mr. Clinton to "present [the] case for the CTBT
ratification directly to the public and invite bipartisan support
for its consideration and approval on a frequent and consistent
basis; appoint a high-level full-time CTBT co-ordinator to
strengthen and focus administration-wide efforts ... and direct key
cabinet members and high-profile CTBT supporters to pursue a
sustained, public campaign to ... win approval for the treaty".
NGOs delivered similar recommendations in letters to the President
and his cabinet on January 11, 1999, March 4, 1998, and May 19,
1997.
38. "Don't Give Up on the Test Ban", by Joseph Lieberman and
Chuck Hagel, The New York Times, October 16, 1999.
39. "The Senate's Blast Wave", by James Kitfield, National
Journal, October 23, 1999.
40. The Vienna Convention on Treaties obliges a signatory to
refrain from acts that would defeat the "object and purpose" of the
treaty it has signed until "it shall have made its intention clear
not to become a party to the treaty...", Art. XVIII (a).
41. From: "Press Conference by the President, The East Room 2:04
P.M.", The White House -- Office of the Press Secretary, October
14, 1999. The United States signed the Vienna Convention on
Treaties and sent it to the Senate for approval in 1971, but it has
not yet been ratified. But the United States has previously agreed
that the Convention reflects a "customary" rule of international
law governing executive branch action pursuant to unratified
treaties. For further analysis, see: "The Status of Norms Against
Nuclear Testing", George Bunn, The Non-Proliferation Review,
Winter 1999.
Daryl Kimball is Executive Director of the Coalition to
Reduce Nuclear Dangers, an alliance of 17 leading nuclear
non-proliferation and arms control organisations which has been
working to secure approval of the CTBT in the United States. Source
documents and statements quoted in this article can be found on the
Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers website at http://www.crnd.org as well as key
relevant documents at The Acronym Institute website: http://www.acronym.org.uk
© 1999 The Acronym Institute.
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