Disarmament Diplomacy
Issue No. 41, November 1999
Preparing For The 2000 NPT Review Conference
By Rebecca Johnson
There are only four months before the next review conference of the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and things
are not looking good. The bargain between the non-nuclear weapon
states, who pledged not to acquire nuclear weapons, and the nuclear
weapon states, who pledged to pursue negotiations to get rid of
theirs is coming apart at the seams. While many of the problems are
politically, requiring security solutions outside the Treaty, more
can be done through the NPT to reassure those who renounced nuclear
capabilities and exert pressure on countries inside and outside the
Treaty.
The 2000 Review Conference, the first since the NPT was
indefinitely extended in 1995, will be held in New York, April 24
to May 19. The designated President, Ambassador Jacob Selebi, has
pulled out, after being appointed South Africa's Chief of Police.
Deciding that it did not have an alternative candidate of Selebi's
calibre, South Africa withdrew from the presidential nomination
altogether, handing the question back to the Group of African
States. At time of writing, the African States have proposed
Ambassador Abdallah Baali, the Permanent Representative of Algeria
to the United Nations in New York, who has been nominated by the
'non-aligned' states party to the Treaty. Ambassador Baali is
regarded as an unknown quantity in NPT terms. If he is confirmed by
a special meeting of states parties in December, as is now widely
expected, he will have his work cut out for him.
The non-proliferation regime is in crisis and the NPT review
process since 1995 has disappointed more than it has satisfied.
There is a correlation between the risk of losing consensus and the
relevance and significance of the issues addressed. Failure to
review the important issues might make consensus easier but would
soon turn the review process into a pointless, empty exercise that
could harm the commitment of non-nuclear countries to the
regime.
If judged on its ability to address substantive issues, which
are fundamental to the health and longevity of a strong
non-proliferation regime, the preparatory committee meetings must
be judged far from successful. The 2000 Review Conference will have
to address two distinct kinds of problem: procedural and political,
with some overlap between the two.
Political
- deepening crisis in international relations
Though much was achieved between 1990 and 1995, arms control has
dried up and conditions have deteriorated since 1995. Worrying
signs include:
- the ways in which the value of nuclear weapons is being
reinforced;
- US 'neo-isolationism' and unilateralism (CTBT rejection,
missile defences, weakening of the ABM Treaty etc.);
- the South Asian tests and development of doctrines and
weapons;
- NATO's 'new' strategic concept;
- China's modernisation programme;
- Russia's re-emphasis on tactical nuclear weapons;
- reconsideration by some NNWS members of the NPT of their
renunciation of the right and option to acquire nuclear weapons
Despite the more flexible approach of Prime Minister Ehud Barak on
a number of security and regional issues, the Israeli nuclear
programme is treated as inviolate; the US 'protects' Israel from
pressure to comply with the NPT; and there are no indications of an
Israeli willingness to give up its nuclear capabilities. Everything
depends on regional security and the peace process, but Arab
parties to the NPT continue to use the Treaty as a platform and
lever mechanism to get at Israel and the United States.
The five NPT nuclear weapon states appear unable to understand that
the options are not proliferation versus non-proliferation, the
latter assuming the continued possession 'for the foreseeable
future' of five nuclear arsenals, with perhaps some arms control
limitations and management. Since the end of the Cold War it is now
clear that the alternative to proliferation is disarmament. The
greater transparency offered by some of the NWS through the review
process is welcome, but cannot be a substitute for real disarmament
measures.
Procedural
The problems revealed by the review process are systemic rather
than specific to particular meetings, although the conduct of the
meetings varied according to factors such as preparation and
international environment. There is a lack of clarity or agreement
about the meaning and function of the 1995 decisions: for example,
what kind of recommendations should be made and what is their
status? what role should the individual PrepComs be accorded? and
so on. There is a political corollary to the procedural
difficulties, which must be acknowledged and worked on, namely the
rift between the understandings, aspirations and expectations of
the non-nuclear weapon states and the intentions and understanding
of the nuclear weapon states. The minimalist approach to the review
process shown by the nuclear powers risks undermining the NPT's
credibility as an instrument for nuclear non-proliferation and
disarmament.
The NPT may be indefinitely extended, but it could still fall
apart if non-nuclear countries lose confidence that the regime can
deal with proliferators and that the Five genuinely accept that
Article VI requires nuclear disarmament.
- There is a need to reinvigorate public awareness that
nuclear dangers did not go away with the end of the Cold War, and
that the continued possession of nuclear arsenals is irresponsible,
irrelevant to actual security needs, internationally destabilising
and life-threatening. In this regard, states parties to the NPT
should view civil society (including NGOs) as partners in
strengthening non-proliferation and achieving nuclear disarmament.
Accountability would be stronger if more of the meetings were open
to NGO observers.
- States Parties should aim to be represented at the opening of
the 2000 Review Conference by their Foreign Ministers or
Heads of States to show the seriousness of their commitment to the
NPT and the need for high level political will and
involvement in effectively addressing proliferation concerns and
the current impasse in nuclear arms control and disarmament
efforts.
- Nuclear disarmament was half of the NPT bargain, and has
not been fulfilled. The review process must develop a credible
mechanism, accepted by the NWS, for the non-NWS to participate in
identifying qualitative and quantitative targets and steps for
action and assisting the NWS to meet the objectives within
reasonable time.
- The Middle East question cannot be ignored but should
not overburden the NPT. There is an urgent need for the countries
directly concerned, particularly the United States and Egypt, to
work out how to address Israel's nuclear weapons and Arab security
concerns in the context of the NPT in ways that are appropriate to
the powers and limitations of the review process, and to work more
vigorously in parallel, regional meetings to reduce the threats
that Israel perceives as justifying and necessitating its nuclear
weapons.
- The 2000 Review Conference needs to think through the important
questions and clarify the powers, limits and tasks of the review
process. This may require an additional review process decision
document, building on - not supplementing - the 1995 decisions; or
it could be done through a President's declaration endorsed by the
RevCon.
- The ways in which each of the three PrepComs between 1995 and
2000 were conducted show clearly the importance of preparation
and advance consultation by the Chair, in soliciting ideas,
trouble shooting likely problems, and building a sense of
collective ownership and responsibility for the outcome.
- The conduct of these PrepComs also showed the need for the
NNWS to organise collectively and more effectively, with
concrete proposals and not just grandiose expressions of criticism
and wish-lists. In this regard, the New Agenda Coalition would be a
very useful starting point for cross-group issue-based alliances,
since cold war groupings are unhelpful on these issues, due to the
dominance of nuclear possessors in all three, the NAM, the Western
group and the moribund Eastern European.
- The 2000 Review Conference needs to decide if the
preparatory committees are solely to develop a rolling text
for the five-yearly RevCons, or if they can/should have an
independent function, for example to comment on
contemporaneous events, as Canada proposed.
Conclusion
It would be better to view the primary task of the post-1995
PrepCom process as a review overseeing implementation of the
previous RevCon's decisions, Principles and Objectives etc. rather
than as preparing for the next RevCon. The three annual meetings
should be regarded as 'implementing committees' rather than
preparatory. These 'ImpComs' could then be structured for
discussions aimed at agreeing an annual snapshot of progress
and obstacles, taking into account the international and political
environment at the time, which will fluctuate year by year. The
snapshot could be in the form of a factual report, agreed
declaration or a statement from the PrepCom Chair. The purpose
would be to provide both a marker against which the following
year's progress could be compared, and a mechanism for year-by-year
accountability of implementation of the previous Review
Conference's decisions and objectives. Where appropriate, the
RevCon and PrepComs could set up subsidiary bodies and/or
facilitators for intersessional work on implementing specific tasks
or objectives.
The principles for non-proliferation are enduring. They do not
need updating. They just need to be taken seriously. The objectives
will need to be updated periodically, preferably as a result of
successfully attaining some of them and moving on to the next ones!
But this is not a task for annual meetings and it is not practical
to formulate rolling text year by year. Since only the RevCons have
the political authority to decide on new or updated objectives,
this should be their job, as well as reviewing the previous five
years. The information provided in the ImpCom reports on
implementation would be a valuable input. It is time to work out
what the NPT regime needs doing, and then do it.
Rebecca Johnson is Executive Director of The Acronym
Institute. This commentary was prepared for a seminar on preparing
for the NPT Review Conference, organised by The Monterey Institute
for International Studies in New York, November 1,
1999.
© 1999 The Acronym Institute.
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