Disarmament Diplomacy
Issue No. 41, November 1999
UN First Committee seeks a new agenda on disarmament and backs
the abm treaty
By Rebecca Johnson
The First Committee of the 54th United Nations General Assembly
(Disarmament and International Security), chaired by Ambassador
Raimundo González of Chile, closed its session on November
9, 1999, after taking action on 49 draft resolutions and three
draft decisions. This report consists of a summary analysis of the
political trends indicated in the First Committee votes, followed
by an appendix listing all the resolutions, detailing their main
points, the votes and relevant comments regarding the votes. Voting
figures are also given for the General Assembly, which on December
1 adopted all but one of the resolutions passed by the First
Committee. The GA vote on the Japanese-sponsored resolution on
small arms (L.42/Rev.1) was delayed, as there were financial
implications and the Fifth Committee had not yet finalised its
budgetary deliberations.
Opening just as the US Senate rejected the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty (CTBT), the mood of the 1999 First Committee was sombre,
but curiously flat. Summing up the session on November 9, the First
Committee's Chair, Ambassador Raimundo González of Chile,
noted that the proceedings had "strongly reflected the
international community's deep concern at the impasse" over nuclear
disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, and commented that
"multilaterally, we are working at the frustration level, which is
rising".
Three issues dominated the deliberations: a first time
resolution from Russia on preserving and complying with the
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty; nuclear disarmament,
particularly the resolution from the New Agenda Coalition (NAC);
and Japan's resolution on small arms.
Preserving the ABM Treaty
Aiming to marshal wider international support for sustaining the
ABM Treaty and opposing US attempts to modify it to deploy or
assist others to build ballistic and national missile defences,
Russia's revised ABM resolution (UNGA 54/54A) was co-sponsored by
China and Belarus.
Anatoly Antonov told the First Committee that the resolution had
a "clearly declared and unambiguously constructive objective - to
guarantee the preservation and strengthening of the ABM Treaty
through its strict and full scale compliance". Claiming that if the
ABM Treaty were undermined, the fulfilment of the START process of
nuclear weapon reductions would become "impossible", Antonov
bluntly stated that "it is a false notion that Russia is ready to
discuss reviewing the ABM Treaty, much less its core provision -
Article I - according to which the Parties undertake not to deploy
ABM systems for a defence of the territory of their countries and
not to provide a base for such a defence". Explaining why Russia
had brought the issue to the United Nations, Antonov said it was "a
delusion to consider the problem of the preservation and strict
compliance with the ABM Treaty as a purely bilateral affair".
Statements from both Antonov and Ambassador Sergey Lavrov
emphasised that the draft was "non-confrontational", as it was
based on the language of the ABM Treaty and joint statements by the
US and Russian Presidents in Helsinki (1997) and Cologne (1999).
Nevertheless, US Ambassador Robert Grey reacted angrily and tried
to get Russia and its co-sponsors to withdraw. The US delegation
argued that the draft resolution was "inconsistent with the
commitments made by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin in Cologne". He
and Antonov quoted from the same paragraph of the Cologne
statement, which in Russia's view did not contain any agreement to
review the ABM Treaty, but according to Grey was "a commitment by
the Parties to review the Treaty in light of changes in the
strategic situation". No doubt the Cologne drafters intended the
language to be susceptible to either interpretation, thereby
committing no-one. Failing to get Russia and China to agree to
withdraw the resolution, the United States put considerable effort
into persuading as many of its allies and other states as possible
not to vote in favour, by arguing that it was inappropriate for the
General Assembly to take sides in ongoing bilateral
negotiations.
Despite US fury, France was willing to co-sponsor the resolution
if it would include a call to stem the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction and their means of delivery. Referring to the
"unprecedented circumstances created by one State party to the ABM
Treaty", Ambassador Hubert de la Fortelle said France wanted a text
that would address the twin necessities of preserving the Treaty,
the cornerstone of strategic stability since 1972, and combatting
the proliferation of ballistic missiles. Russia would have accepted
the French paragraphs on missile and WMD proliferation, but China
reportedly refused. France did not therefore co-sponsor, but
insisted on putting its amendments to the vote, on the grounds that
since legitimate concerns about WMD and missile proliferation were
the main reason for seeking missile defences, the resolution should
address both cause and effect. The French amendments were adopted
by 22 votes to 1, with 95 abstentions. The United States voted
against, afraid that it would make the ABM resolution more
acceptable to others. The majority who abstained included US
allies, not wanting to offend, and non-aligned countries, who
preferred to attack missile defences without acknowledging the
security concerns underlying them. The amended resolution was
adopted by the General Assembly with 80 votes to 4, and 68
abstentions.
Both sides claimed victory, with the US delegation pointing out
that in the First Committee there were more abstentions than votes
in favour. In the General Assembly, however, the votes in favour of
the resolution outweighed opponents and abstainers and provided a
rather more respectable expression of international concern than
the US would like to admit. In fact, apart from Israel, American
opposition was strangely partnered with Albania and Micronesia (a
Pacific island nation used for US nuclear testing in the 1950s and
1960s). The nuclear weapon states were thoroughly divided. France
voted with Russia and China in favour, while Britain abstained
(assuring everyone that it expressed its concerns to the US
privately, which it deemed more effective). Despite some furious
arm-twisting, the United States did not succeed in getting NATO
countries or even Japan to oppose the resolution. On the other
hand, many felt that Russia had not achieved the resounding
international endorsement that it needed, though this was partly
ascribed to poor political management of the resolution and the
disagreements over incorporating references to missile
proliferation.
Nuclear Disarmament
Nuclear disarmament again provoked some of the most interesting
and contentious debates. Four resolutions dealt directly with the
subject - sponsored by the New Agenda Coalition, Malaysia, Japan
and Myanmar (Burma). In its second year, the 'New Agenda'
resolution (UNGA 54/54G), initiated by the seven members of the New
Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand,
South Africa, and Sweden), was again the hardest fought, prompting
parliamentary debates in several countries, including the
Netherlands, Norway and Australia. Complementary strategies and
actions by New Agenda governments and non-governmental
organisations, working both internationally and on the ground in
key countries, brought several governments, including Japan, Canada
and the Netherlands, close to voting in favour. Yet again, however,
NATO members did not feel brave enough to be the first to 'break
Alliance ranks', and in the end they played it safe and abstained.
Nevertheless, the cross-group, pragmatic approach and challenges to
nuclear doctrine being raised by the New Agenda Coalition are
likely to come up again in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and
at the 2000 Review Conference of the NPT, so the debates in key
countries are likely to intensify over the next year.
Ambassador Clive Pearson of New Zealand introduced the NAC
resolution as complementary to other nuclear disarmament
resolutions, offering "a comprehensive way forward, contingent on
an 'unequivocal undertaking' to speed up the pace of engagement".
The New Agenda countries, who were joined by more than 60
co-sponsors, hoped their cross-group approach would "reinvigorate
the way we should approach the nuclear disarmament agenda" and
"galvanise the international community in a concerted push to move
forward - in realistic and achievable steps - so that we can work
to eradicate nuclear weapons once and for all." While the
philosophy was the same as in 1998, the text took into account
objections raised by NATO countries and used coded language to
encourage NATO (and others) to consider giving up the option to use
nuclear weapons first in a conflict. In calling for a multistranded
approach comprising unilateral, bilateral, five-power and
multilateral steps, the resolution was more concrete in identifying
possible measures such as the elimination of tactical nuclear
weapons, de-alerting, and transparency.
In his statement, Pearson addressed the main criticisms used
against the resolution in 1998. Making a nonsense of the claim that
it undermined the NPT, the resolution and its proponents emphasised
the importance of the NPT so strongly that India forced separate
votes on two paragraphs calling for the universality of the NPT and
supporting negotiations to give legally binding security assurances
to non-nuclear NPT parties. Ambassador Savitri Kunadi complained
that where New Delhi had endorsed the Dublin Declaration of June
1998 (from which the New Agenda initiative originated), India could
not support the NAC resolution. In response to the argument that it
was up to the NWS to determine the pace and steps towards
fulfilling article VI, Pearson observed that "the NPT carries an
explicit obligation to pursue the elimination of these weapons. And
it calls for the cooperation of all states in the attainment of
this objective. It follows then that non-nuclear weapon states have
both the right and the responsibility to pursue this obligation...
it is inherent in a Treaty based on mutual obligations that no one
group of states can determine independently the pace with which the
obligations of that Treaty are implemented."
Both the United States and Britain were more low key in their
attempts to swing other countries against the New Agenda resolution
than last year, though for different reasons. The United States
judged that it needed its political capital more for the ABM
resolution, and Britain was constrained by the fact that the
resolution came very close to Labour Party policy, and politicians
and activists were watching at home. It was left up to France,
whose ambassador, Hubert de la Fortelle, gamely stepped into the
role of rottweiler, calling the resolution "dangerous" and accusing
the New Agenda sponsors of having a "forked tongue to get credulous
delegations to yield to the siren call". France's outburst prompted
complaints from some delegations and caused Ambassador Antonio de
Icaza of Mexico to remark that it was fine not to vote for the
resolution, but not to insult the co-sponsors.
After the dust settled, the General Assembly vote on the NAC
resolution was 111 in favour, to 13 against, with 39 abstentions,
split more starkly along nuclear/non-nuclear lines than any
comparable resolution. In addition to Britain, France, the United
States and Russia, who voted solidly against all the nuclear
disarmament resolutions except Japan's, the main opponents included
India, Israel and Pakistan. China abstained. Of NATO countries,
even Turkey, which had voted against in 1998, and the Czech
Republic, joined the majority in abstaining, leaving just 'new
boys' Poland and Hungary in the NWS' camp.
This was also the third year for Malaysia's resolution (UNGA
54/54Q) linking the ICJ advisory opinion to a call for negotiations
leading to a nuclear weapons convention (NWC). Although there is
less and less debate on this each year, the resolution continues to
garner a respectable 114 votes in favour, to 28 against, with 22
abstentions. This shows solid backing from the NAM, although under
the circumstances, the support of China, India and Pakistan might
be regarded with a degree of scepticism. One of the most
interesting aspects of Malaysia's resolution was the breakdown of
voting on two separate paragraphs. The first, endorsing the ICJ's
unanimous opinion on the legal obligation to pursue and bring to
conclusion negotiations on nuclear disarmament, drew 156 votes in
favour, with 3 against (France, Russia and the United States) and 3
abstentions (Britain, Bulgaria and Israel). The paragraph calling
for negotiations leading to a nuclear weapons convention attracted
predictably fewer, but still a substantial number of supporters:
107 in favour, to 29 against, with 26 abstentions.
This year, Japan's NPT-based nuclear disarmament resolution
(UNGA 54/54D) resulted in an unanticipated split among the nuclear
powers, as well as abstentions over the wording of an operative
paragraph which called for updated Principles and Objectives
(P&O) at the 2000 NPT Conference. The offending paragraph, OP9,
caused problems for a number of delegations. Whether they supported
bringing out updated P&O or not, a number felt that it was
inappropriate to ask the UNGA to make such a recommendation, as
that pre-empted the debate for 2000. France, following on from its
isolated stand at the Third Preparatory Committee meeting in May,
voted against, while several others, including the New Agenda
Coalition abstained. On the entire resolution, though there were
153 votes in favour with none against, Japan was disappointed to
see France, Russia and China among the 12 who abstained.
Small Arms
Japan was in trouble again over its resolution on small arms, an
issue which has become a priority concern in recent years. In
presenting the Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Small
Arms, on which the resolution was based, Ambassador Mitsuro
Donowaki drew attention to the decision last year to hold an
international conference on the illicit arms trade no later than
2001. This conference is now scheduled for June/July 2001, with the
first of at least three designated PrepComs to be convened in late
February 2000. In noting the 27 new recommendations of the
government experts, Donowaki highlighted the special needs of
children in post-conflict situations and recommendations concerning
mandatory markings on small arms and light weapons indicating the
name of the manufacturer, country of manufacture, and a serial
number. He also emphasised the addition of "brokering activities",
arguing for new laws and regulations to cover re-transfer,
brokering activities and end-user requirements and
authentication.
There was widespread support for the resolution's substantive
purpose and for the proposed UN Conference. The major problem, as
expressed by Norway, South Africa, and other 'like-minded' states,
was the emphasis on governmental experts to the practical exclusion
of non-governmental experts, despite the significant contribution,
expertise and initiatives already provided by civil society on this
issue. Although the resolution in PP3 recognised the role of civil
society, only UN specialised agencies and intergovernmental
organisations received a "standing invitation" in OP4 to attend the
relevant meetings as observers. Moreover, in OP14 the resolution
requests the UN Secretary General to provide as background
documentation for the Conference, a study "with the assistance of
governmental experts... on the basis of equitable geographical
representation". Some feel that this is a recipe for tip-toeing
around national sensitivities and doing "too little, too late",
while small arms continue to fuel wars and slaughter civilians in
their hundreds of thousands around the world. Clearly the prominent
role played by civil society, especially NGOs, in the Ottawa
process is equally in the minds of those who want civil society
expertise to be appropriately represented and those who seek to
restrict participation to governments and agencies.
Donowaki noted "that much of the trade in small arms and light
weapons consisted of legal transfers to meet the legitimate needs
of states and that such legal trade should be fully respected at
the conference" but also stressed that "since the conference is to
address the question of illicit trade... 'in all its aspects',
aspects of the issue of legal transfers should also be considered
in so far as they are directly related to the illicit
trafficking...". The complexity of this link was further compounded
by obligatory references to the "inherent right to individual or
collective self defence recognised in Article 51" of the UN Charter
and "the right of self determination". Nevertheless, several
delegations discussed the importance of not narrowing the scope of
the Conference in such a way that it would fail to address the
issue sensibly and effectively.
Conclusion
The First Committee conflicts and debates reveal but only
superficially address the serious political developments that are
responsible for the lack of progress in strengthening post-Cold War
arms control and security. While some delegations expressed relief
that the 54th UN First Committee was relatively calm, others were
worried that this was symptomatic of hopelessness. On a wide range
of issues now, the US lurch towards unilateralism and pre-eminence
is undermining collective approaches and decision-making. A growing
number of countries - including some American allies - see US
policy and domestic political dysfunction as a primary factor and
in some cases the root cause of a deterioration in international
relations and concomitant inability to make better progress. At the
same time, many states feel that it would be counterproductive to
criticise or exert pressure on the United States in the United
Nations, since that might fuel the neo-isolationists of the right
who are already hostile to the UN. Trying to reconcile the two
perceptions is making some governments schizophrenic and others
passive.
Seeking to avoid unpalatable confrontation, the United States
itself withdrew two resolutions it usually sponsors, on 'Compliance
with Arms Limitation and Disarmament and Non-Proliferation
Agreements' and on 'Bilateral Nuclear Arms Negotiations and Nuclear
Disarmament', acknowledging that both resolutions "ran the risk of
being subjected to a campaign of amendment designed to introduce
contention over the ABM Treaty".
It is debatable whether the First Committee has made CD
agreement on a work programme for 2000 more or less likely. China
refused to go along with consensus on the draft resolution calling
for the CD to commence negotiations on a ban on fissile materials
for weapons purposes (fissban) early in 2000. China resisted the
proposed language, which it regarded as tantamount to a call for a
stand-alone agreement on convening the fissban committee, whereas
China wanted the call for CD negotiations to be as part of a
comprehensive work programme, i.e. including a subsidiary body on
outer space issues. Canada and the co-sponsors decided to withdraw
the resolution rather than lose the consensus obtained in 1998.
China is currently pressing for an ad hoc committee on outer space
issues, although last year it was understood to be willing to
accept an ad hoc working group, providing the mandate was for more
than talks about talks. Towards the end of the 1999 CD session, the
United States, which had since 1995 held out against reconvening
any subsidiary body on outer space, despite 'Prevention of an arms
race in outer space' (PAROS) being a long-standing item on the CD
agenda, indicated that it would agree to a working group with a
woollier mandate than proposed by Ambassador Dembri when he was CD
President.
The distance between the Chinese and American positions is
bridgeable with political will and a little flexibility. Some
observers consider that by forcing the withdrawal of the fissban
resolution in the First Committee, China has signalled that it will
block the fissban committee in the CD unless it gets what it wants
on outer space. By an alternative, more hopeful, analysis, China
may deem that its stance in the First Committee has sent an
appropriately strong signal, allowing it to exercise more
flexibility in the CD, providing the US meets it half way on the
mandate for an outer space working group.
Finally, the growing frustration with deadlock, delay and
conflicting agendas on disarmament issues across the board show
more clearly than ever the need to hold a fourth UN special session
on disarmament (UNSSOD IV). If it reflects the political reality,
it is unlikely to be easy or smooth, but the alternative to meeting
the challenge is for international disarmament efforts to decline
into dangerous irrelevance or be pursued outside UN disarmament
machinery, as happened with the Ottawa Treaty.
Appendix: Summary of Resolutions
Note
Voting is given as for:against:abstentions
'Consensus' is used when a resolution is adopted without a vote.
Some countries are diplomatically absent while others may state
that they have not participated in the consensus. The First
Committee votes are shown first, followed by the votes in the UN
General Assembly on December 1, 1999. Comments following the votes
generally refer only to debate in the First Committee. The
resolutions have been grouped according to subject, resembling but
not corresponding exactly to the clusters used by the UN. A '*' on
some resolutions is part of the identifying First Committee number.
'Rev' denotes an agreed revision incorporated before action was
taken. Where possible we identify the introducing country, which
has normally taken the lead in negotiating on the text, but we do
not necessarily mention all the co-sponsors, statements or voting
preferences. The aim of the appendix is to highlight resolutions
and statements of political significance, based on country,
representation or distinguishing characteristics.
Some resolutions were taken in parts. In this case, 'PP' refers
to preambular paragraph and 'OP' refers to operative paragraph,
which normally contain the requests and instructions. Occasionally,
representatives informed the Committee that they had been absent or
that their votes had been wrongly recorded, but this is not
reflected in the First Committee figures given, which are from the
immediate official records. A few votes may switch sides between
the First Committee and General Assembly, but the main reason why
numbers are higher in the UNGA votes is because a few delegations
(usually from non-aligned states, whose resources are stretched by
the number of parallel committee meetings) are not able to attend
all of the First Committee. Countries that are in serious arrears
with their payments to the UN are recorded as absent, whether or
not they voted, which explains why the co-sponsors of some
resolutions are not able to record their votes in favour. There may
also be discrepancies in voting figures due to mistakes or absences
during the electronic voting procedures.
The summary below identifies the major points of the resolutions
rather than excerpts from proposing statements. More space has been
given to significant or controversial debates. This does not
necessarily reflect the priority given to an issue by the
international community, but can indicate issues likely to come to
the fore over the next year or be of special interest to
Disarmament Diplomacy's readership. This appendix attempts
to represent the 'flavour' of the debate and explanations of votes
and is by no means a verbatim record. Statements were seldom issued
in written form, so this summary is compiled from contemporaneous
notes and the UN press releases, and from conversations and any
statements obtained from delegations. Quotes are therefore
indicative and may not be exact. The full list of co-sponsors, text
of resolutions, summary of statements, and voting details can be
obtained from the UN press releases at its website at: http://www.un.org/News
Nuclear Arms Control and
Disarmament
UNGA 54/54A (L.1/Rev.1)
Preservation of and Compliance with Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty (ABM)
Introduced by Russia and co-sponsored by Belarus and
China
New resolution aiming to rally international support for
the ABM Treaty and to thwart US attempts to weaken, amend or
abrogate the Treaty in order to deploy missile defences. The
resolution called for "continued efforts to strengthen the
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and to preserve its integrity and
validity" and reiterates that there should be no ABM systems for
defence of territory, or transfers to other countries of any ABM
systems or components limited by the Treaty. Considering that
measures which undermine the purposes and provisions of the ABM
Treaty also "undermine global strategic stability and world peace
and the promotion of further strategic nuclear arms reductions",
the resolution notes that the international community has a "strong
interest" in "safeguarding the inviolability and integrity of the
ABM Treaty" and supports further efforts by the international
community "in the light of emerging developments".
France proposed an amendment (L.56), which added a
reference to missile and WMD proliferation into the preamble and
inserted a new operative paragraph urging all member States "to
support efforts aiming at stemming the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction and their means of delivery". Russia had been
prepared to accept the amendment into the resolution, but its
co-sponsoring partner China would not.
First Committee, November 5:
French Amendment (L.56): 22:1:95
Whole resolution (including amendment, which was
adopted): 54:4:73
UNGA (resolution as amended): 80:4:68
First Committee comments on the amendment: The United
States gave the sole vote against the French amendment, with China,
Russia, Britain and most of NATO abstaining. Those voting with
France in favour included the Francophone and some NAM countries,
plus Canada, Ireland, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine.
The United States said it shared the concerns about missile
proliferation but that the amendment did not fix the problem and
did not belong in the ABM resolution, which the US opposed, with or
without the amendments. South Africa, which said it would abstain
on the amendments, but support the resolution if amended, stated
that both the resolution and amendment were in line with national
policy, but that the French amendments were not appropriate here.
Germany, speaking on behalf of several western, central and eastern
European countries after the vote, said they supported the
substance of the amendment, but could not vote in favour because
they could not support the resolution. By contrast, Egypt, Jordan,
Syria and Iran, raised concerns about the appropriateness of the
amendments to the resolution. Jordan felt that by including
non-proliferation in the ABM resolution it diluted and blurred the
issue. Syria considered the amendments "far removed" from the main
objective of the resolution. Iran felt the amendment was against
the spirit of the resolution, and would abstain on it but vote in
favour of the resolution. Iran had considered putting its own
amendment to the amendment to "rectify its shortcomings" but had
decided that would be too complicated.
Those voting in favour of the whole resolution included France,
China, Russia and a swathe of NAM countries, including South
Africa, with Ireland, Singapore, India, Pakistan, and Egypt. Votes
against were: United States, Latvia, Micronesia, and Israel. The
rest of Europe and NATO abstained, including Britain.
First Committee comments on the resolution: Votes against
in the First Committee were from the United States, Israel,
Micronesia, and Latvia. In the GA, the votes against were the US,
Israel, Micronesia and Albania. There had been a number of general
statements expressing concern about the impact of missile defence
plans and the problems of the ABM regime and underlining that the
issue had multilateral implications and was therefore the business
of the international community. Those voting in favour of the
resolution generally viewed the UNGA as a proper forum for this and
other disarmament questions. Several abstainers, including
Argentina, Nigeria, Canada, Japan and Venezuela, as well as Latvia,
which voted against, maintained that more could be done to resolve
the ABM problems bilaterally, but stressed their complete support
for the ABM Treaty.
The United States said that the ABM was the cornerstone of
strategic stability and had been at the core of past nuclear
reductions, but as circumstances changed, it was necessary to
engage in "prudent adaptation" to reflect new situations. The
Cologne statements reflected possible future changes to the treaty.
If a 27 year-old treaty is obsolete it does not perpetuate
stability, but merely creates an illusion of stability. The US
argued that it must protect its own interests and cannot ignore the
emergence of new threats or new technology. If the US determines
that changes are necessary, then that is what it will do.
France, author of the amendments that passed, feared that
breaching the ABM regime could revive the nuclear arms race, and
said that because of one ABM state's actions and the subsequent
'new' circumstances, it was necessary to have a text including both
the preservation of the ABM Treaty, and measures to combat the
proliferation of ballistic missiles.
On behalf of most of the EU and several central and eastern
European countries that abstained, Germany said they wholly
supported the ABM, but felt that the manner in which the subject
was raised was not effective because it did not have the support of
both the US and Russian Federation. They regretted that it had not
been possible to negotiate a consensus resolution on this issue,
and underlined the importance of progress in bilateral nuclear
disarmament talks and in other non-proliferation and disarmament
efforts and called on the NPT states parties to redouble their
efforts towards a successful Review Conference in 2000. Sweden
aligned itself with the German speech, but wanted to add that the
integrity of the ABM was of global concern as it was linked to the
overall non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament agenda. Sweden
regretted that the US and Russia could not submit the resolution
together and called on states parties to exercise restraint and
refrain from deploying systems that would undermine the Treaty.
Sweden said it abstained because it did not want to interfere with
the ongoing process of negotiations. New Zealand pointed out that
the ABM Treaty was highlighted in the New Agenda resolution, and
raised concerns about the "substance and context" of Russia's
resolution.
Some countries, including Cuba, Iraq, Kenya and Pakistan, raised
concerns about the negative impact of developments on peace and the
possibility that a new arms race may be at hand. Kenya, which voted
in favour, argued that the ABM Treaty was not the only one now
under siege and argued for full international involvement. Iraq
denounced the United State's "incipient aim to undermine" the
Treaty, as well as US bilateral co-operation with Israel on missile
defence. Pakistan said that though the NWS maintained that
disarmament was a bilateral issue, their own actions were
endangering the framework. Pakistan said it would have co-sponsored
the resolution if OP1 had included "no transfer of systems to other
states" and appealed to Russia to reconsider its re-supplying of
India. India defended the ABM Treaty as the basis for reductions,
said it must be allowed to stand until an alternative basis is in
place, and agreed that it was no longer merely bilateral, because
the 1997 Protocol made it into a matter for the wider international
community. India voted against the amendments not because of
disagreeing with their intent, but because they were not relevant
to the aims of the resolution. Brazil mentioned that certain
aspects of the resolution were not in line with the Law of
Treaties. Ukraine raised concerns about US plans for missile
defence and said that national security issues should not be solved
"at the expense of international commitments". Ukraine considered
that the proper forum for these proposals was the Standing
Consultative Council, of which Ukraine was a member.
UNGA 54/54D (L.9/Rev.1)
Nuclear Disarmament with a view to the ultimate elimination
of nuclear weapons
Introduced by Japan
This is the latest version of the traditional Japanese
resolution on nuclear disarmament and the NPT and underlines the
"vital importance" of the NPT's 2000 Review Conference, but it
ended up causing difficulties for the NWS and for some NPT members,
as well as for the non-NPT members who normally abstain. The
resolution notes the report of the Tokyo Forum and uses language
from the 1995 NPT Principles and Objectives to call "for the
determined pursuit by the NWS of systematic and progressive efforts
to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of
eliminated those weapons..." In that respect, the resolution
identifies the need for a) early entry into force of the CTBT; b)
CD negotiations on a fissile materials production ban, urging a
moratorium pending the FMCT; multilateral discussions on possible
future steps on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation (new);
entry into force of START II and progress on START III and beyond;
and "further efforts by the five nuclear weapon States to reduce
their nuclear arsenals unilaterally and through their
negotiations". The first draft of the resolution called (in OP9) on
NPT parties to reach agreement on a new set of principles and
objectives for 2000. This was amended in the final draft to read
"to intensify their efforts with a view to reaching an agreement on
updated objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament,
based on the review of the achievements since 1995", but caused
some confusion, as some NPT parties considered this a specific
question for states parties in 2000, and not for the UNGA. There
were three separate paragraph votes: on PP2 (referring to the South
Asian nuclear tests as a 'challenge'; on OP1 (universality of the
NPT); and on OP9.
First Committee, November 9:
PP2 (South Asian nuclear tests): 130:1:4
(India opposed, Pakistan, Bhutan, Sierra Leone and Israel
abstained)
OP1 (reaffirming the importance of universality of the
NPT): 134:2:3
(India and Israel opposed, Pakistan, Cuba and Bhutan
abstained)
OP9 (reference to updated objectives for 2000
NPT): 103:1:27
(France opposed, a number of NPT members, including the New
Agenda Coalition abstained. India and Israel did not register a
vote)
Whole resolution: 128:0:12
China, France and Russia abstained, together with India, Israel,
Pakistan, and Cuba, Bhutan, Algeria, DPRK, Mauritius, and Myanmar
(Burma).
UNGA: whole resolution 153:0:12
PP2: 154:2:4
OP1: 158:3:2
OP9: 132:1:22
First Committee comments: Japan was disappointed not to
get the P5 on board, as it had succeeded in doing in 1998. Not only
did China and Russia abstain, but also France, after voting against
OP9, which called for updated Principles and Objectives (P&O)
at the 2000 NPT Conference. OP9 caused problems for a number of
delegations. Whether they supported bringing out updated P&O or
not, a number felt that it was inappropriate to ask the UNGA to
make such a recommendation, as that could pre-empt the debate for
2000. Before the vote, New Zealand on behalf of the seven NAC
countries, argued that the language was misleading and could be
construed as raising questions about the consensus mandate reached
in 1995 and prejudging the outcome of the 2000 Review Conference.
NZ said the NAC believed "the imperative is to fulfill the 1995
decisions". The NAC position was supported by others including
Jordan, Colombia and Algeria. France abstained, saying it had
serious difficulties on two main counts: procedural - it was not up
to the UNGA to decide what should be the result of the 2000 RevCon;
and substantive - that the question of whether or not the 1995
P&O should be updated is subject to the work of the states
parties in 2000. The United States said it supported the revised
resolution, despite some reservations, because it offered a "more
realistic vision" than other resolutions on the issue. India
complained about the resolution's "extraneous" reference to the
South Asian tests and to its call for a moratorium on fissile
material production (OP 4b) and endorsement of the IAEA Model
Protocol (OP8, referring to INFCIRC/540). China criticised the
draft's "defects" in not placing most responsibility on the largest
NWS, mentioning the ABM, or calling for the abandonment of first
use nuclear doctrines. China said many elements of the Tokyo Forum
report were "neither realistic nor reasonable". Russia said that
although it supported most of the draft, apart from OP9, it
abstained because the resolution had failed to address the "deep
organic link" between the inviolability of the ABM Treaty and
nuclear disarmament. India considered that the NPT had proved
ineffective and did not agree with much of the Tokyo Forum report,
referred to in the resolution. India abstained because it supported
the goal, but believed that "essential elements" such as political
will were lacking. Algeria regarded the resolution as a
duplication, "even a contradiction" of the Myanmar (Burma)
resolution on nuclear disarmament, while Cuba said it did not
establish a minimum basis for universal nuclear disarmament, but -
despite its title - was really about non-proliferation and the NPT,
"a discriminatory instrument".
UNGA 54/54F (L.12/Rev.2)
Missiles
Introduced by Iran
This new resolution argues for a "comprehensive approach
towards missiles at the global and regional levels" and calls for
the UN Secretary General to seek the views of member states on "the
issue of missiles in all its aspects". Paragraphs in the first
draft calling for work by "a panel of qualified governmental
experts to be nominated by him on the basis of equitable
geographical distribution" were dropped after
objections.
First Committee, November 9: 65:0:58
UNGA: 94:0:65
First Committee comments: Those in favour were mostly NAM
countries, including India, Pakistan, South Africa, Chile, plus
Russia and China. Abstainers included Britain, United States,
France, EU and NATO countries, Brazil, NZ, Australia. Cuba called
the resolution "innovative and timely", but France regarded it as
"ambiguous on missile proliferation". France said it was willing to
help conduct a genuine debate on missiles and hoped the true
seriousness of missile proliferation would soon be clearly
acknowledged and dealt with. The US assumed that the main thrust
was to prevent the proliferation of missiles, but the resolution
did not say so. The US had problems with 'in all its aspects',
considered that the most effective way to deal with missile
proliferation was on a regional basis, and felt it was premature to
bring the issue to the UN. Finland for the EU and associated
countries recognised the topic's importance but found the
resolution "vague". There was a general feeling among NATO
delegations that this resolution was not genuinely intended to
begin a process of opposing the proliferation of missiles, but
masked an ulterior motive, probably to isolate Israel, although
no-one was willing openly to say so. South Korea considered there
was an "urgent need" for missile proliferation to be addressed by
the UN, but abstained because Iran's resolution did not address the
question adequately. Japan appreciated Iran's efforts to highlight
the issue, but abstained because of its reservations.
UNGA 54/54G (L.18*)
Towards a nuclear weapon free world: the need for a new
agenda
Introduced by New Zealand and co-sponsored by over 60,
including Angola, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso,
Burundi, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Ghana,
Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Ireland, Jamaica,
Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico,
Mozambique, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Panama, Papua
New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia,
Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Swaziland, Sweden,
Thailand, Togo, Uganda, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Zambia and
Zimbabwe
In its second year, the 'New Agenda' resolution again
seeks to challenge the nuclear weapon countries and their allies by
proposing a multistranded approach for unilateral, bilateral,
five-power and multilateral progress on nuclear disarmament. While
the philosophy is the same as last year, some language has been
changed to take into account objections raised by NATO countries
last year, as well as the changing political environment. The
resolution opens by asserting that the "existence of nuclear
weapons is a threat to the survival of humanity" and calls on the
NWS to make "an unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the speedy
and total elimination of their nuclear arsenals and to engage
without delay in an accelerated process of negotiations, thus
achieving nuclear disarmament, to which they are committed under
article VI of the NPT". The preambular paragraphs recalled the 1996
ICJ advisory opinion and various treaties and obligations and
stressed that "the international community must not enter the new
millennium with the prospect that the possession of nuclear weapons
will be considered legitimate for the indefinite future", also
underlining "the imperative to proceed with determination to
prohibit and eradicate them for all time".
In 22 operative paragraphs, the resolution urges further
progress on START and calls upon all five NWS to become integrated
into the nuclear disarmament process and for consideration of how
to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in security policies. In
particular, the resolution calls on the NWS to: reduce and move
towards eliminating tactical nuclear weapons; develop steps on
de-alerting and removing nuclear warheads from delivery vehicles;
demonstrate transparency on nuclear arsenals and fissile material
holdings; and place excess materials under IAEA safeguards. There
is support for strengthening the effectiveness of the existing
regime provided by the NPT, CTBT, IAEA,ABM Treaty, security
assurances, Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material, trilateral initiative and so on. The CD is enjoined to
get on with fissban negotiations, pending which there should be a
moratorium on fissile material production, and to establish a
subsidiary body to address nuclear disarmament. The resolution
supports nuclear weapon free zones, especially in regions of
tension such as the Middle East and South Asia, and recognises that
there would have to be a "universal and multilaterally negotiated
legally binding instrument or a framework encompassing a mutually
reinforcing set of instruments" to enable the world to abolish and
eliminate nuclear weapons completely.
Two paragraph votes were required: on OP7, which called
for unconditional adherence to the NPT by states which have not yet
done so; and on OP18, which called for legally binding security
assurances to be negotiated for NPT parties.
First Committee, November 9:
OP7 (NPT): 128:3:3
OP18 (NSA to NPT parties): 128:0:5
Whole resolution: 90:13:37
UNGA whole resolution: 111:13:39
OP7: 150:3:2
OP18: 149:0:4
First Committee comments: On OP7, as expected, India,
Israel and Pakistan voted against. Bhutan, Cuba and Latvia
abstained. On OP18, India, Israel, Pakistan, Cuba and South Korea
abstained.
On the whole vote, four of the NWS, India, Pakistan and Israel,
and two of the three newcomer NATO countries voted against, with a
handful of NATO wannabes: Bulgaria, Estonia, France, Hungary,
India, Israel, Monaco, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Russian
Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
The 37 abstentions included China and 13 NATO members: Andorra,
Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bhutan,
Bosnia/Herzegovina, Canada, China, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Finland, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Japan,
Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mauritius, Myanmar,
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of
Moldova, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, FYR Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine,
and Uzbekistan.
France denounced many of the measures in this "dangerous"
resolution and accused the co-sponsors of "constructive ambiguity".
Wondering aloud if the resolution masked "ulterior motives", France
said its "straight-talking delegation" would vote no, although it
acknowledged the improvements from last year's text. France
questioned why a "new" agenda was needed and why nuclear postures
needed to be examined, saying that it would continue to implement
the agenda set out in 1995 in the Principles and Objectives'
Programme of Action. France raised concerns about "contradictions"
and accused the NAC countries of using a forked tongue, because the
resolution did not call for the CD fissban committee to be
established without conditions. France expressed particular
difficulty with the call for a reconsideration of policies and
doctrines, and said it was adapting its doctrine to the emergence
of potential new threats, evoking the UN Charter's stated right to
self-defence, and arguing that French nuclear policy already
embraced the lowest possible sufficiency compatible with its
security. France disliked the concept of an international
conference, regarding the NPT RevCon as the appropriate forum for
discussing these issues, and argued that countries should not sign
up just to "satisfy the pride of some" or because it happens to be
the fashion. Some delegations objected that France's statement
crossed onto the wrong side of the line between strong and
offensive.
Britain, which also voted against, was more conciliatory. The UK
said it welcomed the willingness of the New Agenda states to engage
and incorporate other views into the text where possible and
reiterated its commitment to nuclear disarmament and Article VI of
the NPT, manifested in its 1998 Strategic Defence Review. Britain
did not, however, like the reference to de-mating of warheads from
delivery vehicles, as it deemed such a step incompatible with a
"credible minimum deterrent". It shared the frustration over slow
progress and wanted a faster bilateral process between the US and
Russia, especially ratification of the CTBT and was impatient to
begin negotiations on an FCMT in the CD. Britain acknowledged that
the NAC resolution supported all such measures, but criticised it
for going beyond the 1995 P&O, saying that anything further
lacked consensus.
The United States asserted that it respected the motivations of
the resolution, but opposed because it did not accept the
fundamental premise that a "new" agenda was needed and because of
its call on the NWS to make "speedy" efforts. Saying that "we
already have one, even if the pace is frustratingly slow", the US
advocated practical, incremental steps that take into account the
international environment. The US argued that through the NPT, the
NWS had already made the undertakings called for in OP1, "so what
good would another do?" Like France, the US argued that the
international conference was unnecessary, as there are already too
many fora and another won't speed progress, and commented that "the
current agenda is full enough" and would be best invigorated by
getting FMCT discussions underway in the CD.
China, which abstained, gave its stock statement on how
sincerely it embraced nuclear disarmament and said that it
supported the goals and principles of the New Agenda resolution
regarding a nuclear-weapon-free world, as well as some of the
specific steps, such as the revision of nuclear doctrines,
legally-binding NSAs, strengthened NPT and its universality and
nuclear-weapon-free zones. However, addressing the ABM treaty was a
key precondition for action, as well as stopping the proliferation
of missiles and missile technology. China was disappointed that the
NAC resolution failed to urge the NWS to declare a commitment to
the non-use or threat of use policy and argued that under the
"unsettling" international circumstances, the conditions were not
ripe for de-alerting and de-mating nuclear weapons and for
transparency of fissile materials inventories, which could only
happen in an environment conducive to negotiations, which should be
linked to nuclear disarmament.
Belgium spoke on behalf of 17 countries from NATO/EU/central
Europe, which had abstained. They welcomed the NAC commitment to
nuclear disarmament and attempts made to accommodate the concerns
of many states. They acknowledged that the CTBT's lack of entry
into force and differences over the ABM Treaty might "seriously
hinder" progress, but endorsed a gradual process. They expressed
concern over certain recent developments and acknowledged that
momentum is needed to revitalise the process, but said that the
answer was not new institutions or mechanisms, but through the NPT,
especially the Principles and Objectives. They called for the
fissban to be negotiated in the CD without delay, and called for
the proposal put forward by the "NATO 5" (Belgium, Germany, Italy,
the Netherlands and Norway) in 1995 as laying the groundwork for
discussions on nuclear disarmament. They argued for a shared
responsibility for progress on nuclear disarmament and said that
states would be judged not on declarations, but by their actions,
especially the Review Conference in 2000 and CD negotiations on
FMCT. Turkey, explained that it had been able to change its vote
from a 'no' in 1998 to an abstention this year because of "better
wording" in the resolution, but also insisted on locking nuclear
disarmament into a "framework of general and complete disarmament",
which is contrary to the New Agenda position. By contrast, new NATO
member Poland, though saying it did not "disagree with the content
of the resolution", voted no, as it had in 1998, arguing for a step
by step process, with the participation of the P5. South Korea also
abstained, regarding the CTBT and missile proliferation as serious
concerns not adequately addressed in the resolution.
India said that it had welcomed the June 1998 statement of the
New Agenda nations, but could not support the resolution, accusing
NAC of "redrafting some key paragraphs to make them more palatable
to the established NWS" and questioning the need for a "new"
agenda, when "the most important element of the existing agenda
remains yet to be accomplished". India had problems with the
paragraphs that mentioned the NPT and called for its universality,
and with "extraneous elements" and language from other fora,
arguing that "a new agenda cannot succeed in [the] old framework of
the NPT". India rejected references to "nuclear-weapons-capable"
states, which is "analytically hollow" and "divorced from reality",
since India's "option has been exercised". India regarded the
reference to a NWFZ in South Asia as "bordering on the absurd",
calling into question that such arrangements must be "freely
arrived at" by the states of the region. India regarded it as
surprising "given the omnibus nature of this resolution" that there
was no mention of doctrines of first use, noting that NATO's
security policy was predicated on nuclear weapons and first use.
India also criticised the resolution for ignoring efforts in some
countries to modify and refine existing nuclear weapons, and said
that building missile defences could erode the climate for
disarmament. Syria and Algeria both announced their votes in
favour, though Syria expressed reservations about the CTBT.
Mauritius said that it abstained because of the call to sign the
CTBT, which Mauritius had not joined because it failed to provide a
timetable for eliminating nuclear weapons.
Japan said it shared the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world and
appreciated the enthusiasm of the NAC to lay out an "extended
series of concrete measures to reach the goal", but considered that
a step by step process with the co-operation of the NWS was better
than a "confrontational attitude". While Japan considered the pace
of nuclear disarmament far from satisfactory, it thought that an
attempt to short-cut the process out of frustration would not be
productive.
Australia characterised this year's national and international
debate on the resolution and its eventual abstention as
"difficult", characterising the resolution as measured and
even-handed. Overall, it regarded the resolution as positive, but
overshadowed by the premise that the NWS are not committed to the
nuclear disarmament process. Australia had few specific
reservations on the resolution and its measures, except for the
international conference which it regarded as unnecessary, but it
did not think that the old agenda wasn't working and wondered what
new insights the resolution offered.
Canada explained its abstention, not in response to the text of
the resolution (the concerns and assessments of which it largely
shared), but because this initiative will require broad support and
"partners and alliances" need to be engaged. Recalling that the
1999 NATO Washington Summit had given a mandate to discuss nuclear
issues further in an arms control working group within the
alliance, Canada said that NATO needed to develop an agenda for the
next decade, not the last. Commenting that the NPT RevCon will be
put to a big public test when it meets in 2000, Canada hoped it
would "restore momentum" to fulfilment of its process and
goals.
UNGA 54/63 ( L.23*)
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
Introduced by Mexico with over 50 co-sponsors
This resolution endorses the final declaration of the
Article XIV Conference on Entry Into Force, held in Vienna (October
1999), and calls on all states which have not yet signed or
ratified to do so and to "refrain from acts which could defeat" the
CTBT's object and purpose. It urges states to maintain a moratorium
on conducting nuclear explosions and welcomes continuing support
for the CTBTO's verification regime. There had been hope that the
CTBT resolution, traditionally sponsored by Mexico, New Zealand and
Canada, would utilise more of the language from the Special Article
XIV Conference, and go forward in the names of all the countries
which had ratified the CTBT, but in the end governments decided to
stick with past practice. Although some countries had urged
stronger language with respect to the rejection of US ratification
by the US Senate and the 1998 nuclear tests conducted by India and
Pakistan, no-one wanted a re-run of 1998's polarised debate on
nuclear testing.
First Committee, November 8: 137:0:5
UNGA: 158:0:6
First committee comments: Abstainers were India, Bhutan,
Mauritius, Syria and Tanzania, (joined by Lebanon in the GA),
countries which had either opposed or abstained when the CTBT was
adopted by the UN on September 24, 1996. Syria made a long
statement objecting to the CTBT's "inequality", including
laboratory testing and other kinds of loopholes and feared that the
inspections regime could be used for "political purposes". Syria
was "surprised" that the resolution allowed CTBT signatories to
take action against non-signatory states and opposed the Treaty's
listing of Israel as part of the Middle East (for the purposes of
appointing the Executive Committee). Iran said that it had decided
against tabling amendments arising from the negative vote against
the CTBT by the US Senate, but raised concerns about this. Pakistan
said that it was "an ardent supporter" of the CTBT, but could not
sign until there was an "atmosphere free from interpretation". In
this regard, Pakistan interpreted the words 'as soon as possible'
in the resolution to include in its meaning the removal of all
sanctions against Pakistan.
L.30 (withdrawn)
The Conference on Disarmament Decision to Establish, Under
Item 1 of its Agenda Entitled "Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race
and Nuclear Disarmament" an Ad Hoc Committee to Negotiate, on the
Basis of the Report of the Special Coordinator (CD/1299) and the
Mandate Contained Therein, a Non-Discriminatory, Multilateral and
Internationally and Effectively Verifiable Treaty Banning the
Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear
Explosive Devices (Fissban)
Introduced by Canada with a large number of
co-sponsors
First Committee: withdrawn on November 9.
This resolution, another attempt to get a UNGA resolution
backing CD negotiations on banning fissile materials for weapons
(fissban, FMT or FMCT), was withdrawn after China insisted on a
vote. China wanted the call for CD negotiations to be as part of a
comprehensive work programme, i.e. including a subsidiary body on
outer space issues. Canada and the co-sponsors decided to withdraw
the resolution rather than lose the consensus obtained in 1998.
There were a number of expressions of concern and
regret.
UNGA 54/54K (L.31/Rev.1)
Reducing nuclear danger
Introduced by India
The second year for this resolution, which emphasises the
need for NWS to assure NNWS against the threat or use of nuclear
weapons and raises the dangers of hair trigger alert, and
unintentional or accidental use of nuclear weapons. India's
resolution calls for a "review of nuclear doctrines and in this
context, immediate and urgent steps to reduce the risks of
unintentional and accidental use of nuclear weapons" and requests
the five NWS to undertake measures on this, calling at the same
time on UN member states to prevent the proliferation of nuclear
weapons and promote nuclear disarmament. The UN Secretary General
is requested to seek input from the Advisory Board on Disarmament
Matters and report to next year's UNGA on "specific measures that
significantly reduce the risk of nuclear war".
First Committee, November 4: 90:42:14
UNGA: 104:43:14
First Committee comments: In favour was most of the NAM.
No's included Russia, France, Britain and the United States, the
EU, NATO and NATO wannabes. Israel and China were among the
abstentions. This resolution, which started in 1998 as an Indian
initiative to take the moral high ground on de-alerting nuclear
weapons, has prompted ambivalence among some of the countries which
voted against or abstained. Despite their support for measures to
reduce nuclear dangers and de-alert in other contexts, many feared
that this was a cosmetic exercise by India to deflect attention
from its nuclear tests and ambitions, with corridor speculation
about whether the purpose was to promote de-alerting or sabotage
it. In 1999, there was less debate, as the resolution appears
already to have became marginalised as rhetoric. This is a pity, as
the issue of reducing nuclear dangers and taking nuclear weapons
off alert deserves serious attention from the international
community, especially the NWS.
UNGA 54/55D (L.33)
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear
Weapons
Introduced by India, with around 20 co-sponsors
India's recurring resolution against the use of nuclear
weapons refers to the 1996 ICJ advisory opinion, the final document
of UNSSOD I (1978) and the objective of a nuclear weapons
convention, this is misleadingly referred to in UN press releases
and some statements as a resolution on a 'nuclear weapon
convention'. It is not. This resolution relates to use, whereas a
nuclear weapon convention (NWC), as called for by a growing number
of governments and NGOs would abolish nuclear weapons, eliminate
existing arsenals and prohibit the possession and deployment as
well as use. India's resolution, by contrast, calls on the CD to
commence negotiations on an international convention prohibiting
the use or threat of nuclear weapons under any circumstances,
arguing that this would be an "important step in a phased programme
towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, with a
specified framework of time".
First Committee, November 4: 89:40:18
UNGA: 103:42:17
First Committee comments: The NAM mostly voted in favour,
while NATO and EU voted against. Russia and China were among the
abstainers. As this is regarded as a traditional resolution, with
little political attention, there was minimal discussion, The
United States said it had no intention of "detouring down the dead
end approach" represented in the text. Japan abstained, arguing
instead for a step by step process and for strengthening the NPT
regime.
UNGA 54/52 (L.36)
Conclusion of Effective International Arrangements to Assure
Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of
Nuclear Weapons (Negative Security Assurances)
Introduced by Pakistan with co-sponsorship from several
NAM states
Pakistan's annual resolution on negative security
assurances (NSA) recalls various statements and previous
resolutions and notes that the CD had 'no objection, in principle'
to the idea of an international convention on such security
assurances. It appeals for further intensive efforts to find a
common approach or formula to overcome the acknowledged
difficulties and recommends the CD to continue 'intensive
negotiations' with a view to reaching early agreement and
concluding effective international arrangements to assure
non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of
nuclear weapons.
First Committee, November 1: 77:0:50
UNGA: 111:0:53
First Committee comments: This is another stock
resolution which generally prompts a straight split between China
and the NAM in favour and NATO/EU abstaining, joined by Russia and
some NAM members, including South Africa. The countries who abstain
do so primarily because the resolution does not relate the right to
security assurances to adherence to the NPT. The fundamental
difference of opinion, as expressed by South Korea, was of "who
should receive security assurances and in what form should they be
given". South Korea, Australia, and South Africa argued for many
that NPT parties which had fully complied with their obligations
had a legitimate right to such assurances. This view that NSA were
part of the "NPT bargain" was not the position of the resolution's
main sponsor, Pakistan, a non-NPT party. India used the opportunity
to emphasise its NWS claims after the 1998 tests and offer Pakistan
bilateral agreements on no-first-use. Arguing that "conscious of
its responsibility" as a NWS, India had stated it would not be the
first to use nuclear weapons against a NNWS, India also proposed
multilateral negotiations on a global no first use agreement.
UNGA 54/54P (L.41)
Nuclear Disarmament
Introduced by Myanmar (Burma) and over 40 NAM states
Recurrent and ever-lengthening omnibus resolution which
utilises NAM decisions to call for the CD to convene an ad hoc
committee to 'commence negotiations early in 2000 on a phased
programme of nuclear disarmament and for the eventual elimination
of nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework through a nuclear
weapons convention'. As with last year, this resolution, which is
taken less seriously than others in part because of its content, in
part because of the nature of its sponsorship, has sought greater
popularity by adopting some of the language from both the Malaysian
and the NAC resolutions. For example, it calls "as a first step"
for a "universal and legally binding multilateral agreement
committing states to the process of nuclear disarmament..." It
recognises the need to de-emphasise the role of nuclear weapons and
to "review and revise nuclear doctrines". It calls for the NWS to
halt the qualitative improvement and stockpiling of nuclear
warheads and their delivery systems, and to de-alert and
de-activate their nuclear weapons. Backs the START process, CTBT,
CD committees on FMT and security assurances and step-by-step
reductions, though regarding them as insufficient. Notes the ICJ
opinion, the relevant references from the Durban Conference of NAM
Heads of State and the August 1996 programme of action on nuclear
disarmament and subsequent proposals by various non-aligned members
of the CD and calls for a treaty on no-first-use. There is also a
call for an international conference on nuclear disarmament to be
convened "with the objective of arriving at an agreement or
agreements on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament and for the
eventual total elimination of nuclear weapons through a set of
legal instruments, which may include a nuclear weapons
convention".
First Committee, November 8: 90:40:17
UNGA: 104:41:17
First Committee comments: China plus most of the NAM
voted in favour. NATO and NATO wannabes voted against. Abstentions
included Russia, Sweden, Ireland and New Zealand, plus NAM members
Chile and South Africa. Chile emphasised its commitment to nuclear
disarmament and the ICJ ruling, but abstained because it was not
convinced of the arguments for a timebound framework. China voted
in favour, as it argued that "like chemical and biological weapons,
nuclear weapons should be completely prohibited". In keeping with
its main theme of the year, China argued that the political
conditions for such measures were "not yet there", and highlighted
that the ABM Treaty should not be weakened or repudiated. Japan
emphasised the NPT and the step by step approach. Japan abstained
because of OP5, which called for a treaty on no first use, which
Japan regarded as "not realistic" to place as a first step, and the
call for an international conference, which could duplicate ongoing
efforts.
UNGA 54/54Q (L.43)
Follow-up to the Advisory opinion of the International Court
of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons
Introduced by Malaysia, with co-sponsorship from over 40
NAM countries
The third year for this resolution, which underlines the
July 8 1996 advisory opinion of the ICJ on the legality of the
threat or use of nuclear weapons, especially the unanimous
recognition of the legal obligation to negotiate the elimination of
nuclear weapons. Malaysia's resolution calls for multilateral
negotiations to commence in 2000 'leading to an early conclusion of
a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development,
production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or
use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination.' The
resolution also requested all states to report back to the UN on
'the efforts and measures they have taken on the implementation of
the present resolution and nuclear disarmament'. Paragraph votes
were requested on OP 1, which underlined the unanimous conclusion
of the ICJ regarding the existence of a legal obligation "to pursue
in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to
nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective
international control" and on OP2 which calls for the commencement
of multilateral negotiations in 2000 on a nuclear weapon
convention.
First Committee, November 4:
OP1 (ICJ opinion): 137:2:3
OP2 (Nuclear Weapon Convention): 94:25:22
Whole resolution: 98:27:21
UNGA whole resolution: 114:28:22
OP1: 156:3:3
OP2: 107:29:26
First Committee comments: As before, there was a wide
divergence between the paragraph vote endorsing the ICJ opinion and
that supporting negotiations on a nuclear weapon convention. The
ICJ endorsement was opposed only by the United States and Russia
(France did not record a vote in the First Committee but voted
against the ICJ paragraph in the GA). Britain, Bulgaria and Israel
abstained. China, India, Pakistan and all the non-nuclear weapon
members of NATO were in favour. This is a very significant
acceptance by the international community of the July 1996 ICJ
opinion.
On OP2, calling for a nuclear weapon convention, most of the
NAM, including South Africa and Chile, voted in favour, as did New
Zealand. There was a straight vote against by NATO and Russia.
Japan, Ireland, Sweden, Austria, Argentina, South Korea, Malta,
Finland, Kazakhstan, Latvia, and Cyprus were among the abstainers.
China did not record a vote.
On the whole resolution, China voted in favour, with most of the
NAM, Ireland Sweden and New Zealand. The other four NWS voted
against, with almost all NATO and NATO wannabes. Abstentions
included Canada, Japan, South Korea, Finland, Norway, Austria,
Iceland, Cyprus, Bosnia, Macedonia, Croatia.
Chile noted the unanimous view of the ICJ on the legal
obligation to pursue, in good faith, nuclear weapons negotiations,
and argued that there was a "solid doctrinal basis" for the ICJ
advisory opinion, including that there was no precedent for the
threat or use of nuclear weapons. Chile emphasised that the ICJ had
required that any use of nuclear weapons would have to be
compatible with international humanitarian law and that the "mere
possession of nuclear weapons in regions of great instability could
be construed as the use of force". Cuba lamented that none of the
ICJ rulings had yet led to concrete action, ascribing this to a
"lack of political will" by certain political powers.
Britain opposed the resolution, accusing its proponents of
quoting selectively from the ICJ opinion and making an "unrealistic
call" for multilateral negotiations in 2000 leading to a nuclear
weapons convention. Britain reiterated its policy and said that
"when satisfied with verified progress" it would ensure that
British nuclear weapons were included in multilateral negotiations.
The United States said the resolution had "misrepresented and
distorted" the ICJ findings and "mischaracterised" the NPT
obligations by omitting the references to general and complete
disarmament, thereby relieving the NNWS of any responsibilities.
The US feared that the resolution attempted to turn the ICJ
opinion, which was "simply not binding" into a legal edict,
requiring immediate and rapid negotiations in a legal form. The US
preferred a step by step process, starting with resumption of
fissban negotiations in the CD, which were not even mentioned in
the draft. Belgium, on behalf of the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Spain
and Greece, said they "attached great importance" to the ICJ
opinion but opposed the resolution because it had given a
"selective reading". Germany advocated a step-by-step approach.
Japan had supported the unanimous opinion of the Judges on the
legal obligation to pursue nuclear disarmament and conclude
negotiations in good faith, but preferred a step-by-step process,
prioritising the CTBT and fissban, to jumping to negotiations on a
NWC.
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones
UNGA 54/51 (L.7/Rev.1)
Establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Region of
the Middle East
Introduced by Egypt
A revised and updated version of an annual resolution,
with 12 operative paragraphs, including calls for serious
consideration of "the practical and urgent steps" required to
implement a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East and
invites 'all countries concerned' (without naming Israel) to adhere
to the NPT. The resolution also notes the importance of the ongoing
Middle East peace negotiations. It calls on "the only country which
has not yet done so" to place all its nuclear activities under IAEA
safeguards and invites all countries in the region not to develop,
produce, test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or permit them
to be stationed on their territory.
First Committee, November 8: Consensus
UNGA: Consensus
First Committee comments: Israel said that it would like
to see the eventual establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass
destruction, as determined by the parties themselves, but not when
some countries maintain a "state of war and continuing threat"
against one state in the region. Lebanon, which recalled how it had
been ravaged by war, said it was keen to save the region from
weapons of mass destruction and wanted the peace process to be
reactivated. Nigeria considered that states in the Middle East
could learn "valuable lessons" from the African states which had
established the Treaty of Pelindaba.
UNGA 54/57 (L.8/Rev.1)
The Risk of Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East
Introduced by Egypt on behalf of the League of Arab
states
The tradition is to seek consensus on the previous
resolution on a NWFZ in the Middle East, and to use this resolution
to draw specific attention to Israel's nuclear capabilities. Refers
to the resolution and decisions adopted by NPT parties in 1995 and
calls on 'the only State in the region that is not party to the
NPT' to accede without delay, renounce possession of nuclear
weapons and place all its unsafeguarded nuclear facilities under
full-scope IAEA safeguards.
First Committee, November 8: 125:3:11
UNGA: 149:3:9
First Committee Comments: Britain, France, Russia and
China joined the votes in favour. Israel, the United States and
Micronesia voted against. Abstentions included Canada, Singapore,
Kazakhstan, and Norway. As no separate vote was called on the
preambular references to the NPT, India abstained on the
resolution. Israel said the resolution was "discriminatory,
unjustified, politically motivated and counter-productive" and
called on all those who supported the peace process, which "needed
nurturing and support", should vote against the resolution. The
United States considered it inappropriate to single out one state
for criticism for non-compliance with the NPT. Syria and Iraq used
the opportunity for tirades against Israel.
UNGA 54/48 (L.17)
The African nuclear-weapon-free-zone Treaty (Treaty of
Pelindaba)
Introduced by Burkino Faso on behalf of the Group of
African States
This resolution endorses the Treaty of Pelindaba, opened
for signature in Cairo in April 1996, and calls upon all African
states to sign and ratify so that the Treaty can enter into force.
Appreciation is given to the NWS who have signed the relevant
Protocols, with calls to ratify as soon as possible. The resolution
also calls on France and Spain, to whom Protocol III applies, to
take the necessary measures to apply the Treaty to territories for
which they are responsible.
First Committee, November 4: Consensus
UNGA: Consensus
First committee comments: Spain, which is having problems
with Protocol III, due to territorial claims and confusions (the
Canaries), said that it had not joined consensus on OP3. Spain
considered that though the Canary Isles were included on the map
showing the area covered by the African nuclear weapon free zone,
the Treaty did not apply because they "belonged to the EU" and were
covered by other treaties and commitments "which went beyond those
of the Treaty of Pelindaba". Israel disassociated itself from the
references to the Middle East in the text.
UNGA 54/60 (L.24)
Consolidation of the Regime Established by the Treaty for the
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean
(Treaty of Tlatelolco)
Introduced by Mexico with co-sponsorship from the
countries covered by the Treaty of Tlatelolco.
Notes that the Treaty is now in force for 32 states in the
region, welcomes the steps taken to consolidate the regime and
urges countries of the region that have not yet done so to deposit
their ratification of the amendments to the Treaty as soon as
possible.
First Committee, November 1: Consensus
UNGA: Consensus
UNGA 54/54L (L.34)
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Southern Hemisphere and Adjacent
Areas
Introduced by Brazil with support from a large number of
African, Latin American and Pacific countries, including New
Zealand and South Africa.
Fifth year for this resolution, which calls for full
ratification of the treaties and relevant protocols of Tlatelolco,
Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba, welcomes initiatives on further
NWFZ, and stresses the 'value of enhancing cooperation' among the
NWFZ treaty members by means such as joint meetings of states
parties, signatories and observers to those treaties. Calls on
states within the region to facilitate adherence to the protocols
to NWFZ treaties by relevant states that have not yet done so, and
to 'promote the nuclear-weapon-free status of the southern
hemisphere and adjacent areas' and to explore and implement further
cooperation among themselves. Stresses the role of NWFZ in
'strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime and in
extending the areas of the world that are nuclear free' and
(referring especially to the NWS) calls for support for 'the
process of nuclear disarmament, with the ultimate goal of
eliminating all nuclear weapons'.
France, Britain and the United States dislike this
resolution, arguing that the purpose appears to be to create a new
zone, covering the high seas, since the resolution would otherwise
add nothing to existing NWFZ. Three votes were taken, as India and
Pakistan wanted to remove the words 'and South Asia' from OP3,
which welcomed steps to conclude further NWFZ treaties, and when
the offending three words were adopted, required a separate vote on
OP1, which was also resoundingly adopted.
First Committee, 4 November:
OP3 vote on three words 'and South Asia': 128:1:10
OP3 (further NWFZ) as a whole: 128:1:10
Whole resolution: 136:3:5
UNGA whole resolution: 157:3:4
OP3: 147:2:9
First Committee comments: In both votes on OP3, India
voted against. Pakistan, Israel, Britain, and US joined the
abstainers. France did not record a vote. On the whole resolution,
Britain, France and the United States voted against; Russia, India,
Israel, and Micronesia abstained. India, after voting against OP3,
abstained on the resolution, arguing that the sponsors needed to
take into account the "new realities" in the region. Pakistan said
it had abstained on the words 'and South Asia' but had voted for
the resolution as a whole. Pakistan had supported the concept of a
South Asian NWFZ prior to the nuclear tests in May 1998, when the
region had become "nuclearised", but had to recognise that it was
now too late.
L.35 (no UNGA number yet)
Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia
(draft decision)
Introduced by Uzbekistan
Unlike last year, in which there was consensus supporting
the establishment of a NWFZ in Central Asia, as sought by
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan,
the UN this year decided only to place the issue on next year's
agenda.
First Committee, November 4: Consensus
UNGA: Consensus
Other Weapons of Mass Destruction
UNGA 54/54C (L.6)
Prohibition of the Dumping of Radioactive Wastes
Introduced by Burkino Faso on behalf of the Group of
African states
Expresses concern about radiological warfare and the
dumping of nuclear or radioactive wastes and calls on the CD to
include radwastes as part of any convention on the prohibition of
radiological weapons, which it is encouraged to
negotiate.
First Committee, November 1: Consensus
UNGA: Consensus
First Committee comments: India pointed out that while
the international community needed to remain vigilant about the
dangers of nuclear waste, India attached importance to the complete
fuel cycle and viewed spent fuel not as a waste, but as a valuable
resource. This statement is understood to refer to plutonium
production, which since neither the economics nor technology of
breeders have met criteria for practical energy production, is
valuable primarily for nuclear weapons.
UNGA 54/54E (L.11)
Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons
and on Their Destruction (CWC)
Introduced by Canada, with Poland
Supports the CWC, appreciates the ongoing work of its
implementing organisation, the Organisation for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons (OPCW), and stresses the importance of all
possessors of chemical weapons or chemical weapons production or
development facilities to adhere to the Convention. Endorses full
and effective implementation of all provisions of the CWC, urges
all States Parties to meet in full and in a timely manner their
obligations under the convention and calls on states which have not
yet done so to becomes parties to the CWC without
delay.
First Committee, November 1: Consensus
UNGA: Consensus
First Committee comments: Egypt expressed reservations
over OP5, which called for universal adherence to the CWC, arguing
that regional concerns kept it from signing the CWC. In advocating
a complete prohibition of WMD in the Middle East, Egypt cited
Israel's continued possession of nuclear weapons as grounds for
declining to join the CWC until Israel signs the NPT. Cuba, Iran
and Pakistan raised concerns about the relationship between the UN
and the OPCW, which Cuba feared could create "a dangerous legal
vacuum". India raised concern over some states not supplying full
information, thereby hindering verification, and said that "ad hoc
control regimes" created two categories of states parties within
the CWC. Israel said that it supported the CWC and joined consensus
on the resolution, having signed but not yet ratified the Treaty
because of its regional concerns, in which two chemical weapon
producers had stayed outside the CWC and "continued to improve"
their weapons.
UNGA 54/61 (L.19/Rev.1)
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production
and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons
and on their Destruction (BWC)
Introduced by Hungary with over 60 co-sponsors
Notes increases in BWC members, calls on the rest to
ratify, and welcomes the progress achieved so far in negotiating a
protocol to strengthen the BWC. Reaffirms the decisions of the
Fourth Review Conference urging conclusion by the Ad Hoc Group of
negotiations on a protocol to strengthen the Convention, if
possible before the Fifth Review Conference. Calls for these
negotiations to be accelerated to conclude an "efficient,
cost-effective and practical regime" and calls on all states
parties to participate in the exchange of information and data, as
agreed.
First Committee, November 4: Consensus
UNGA: Consensus
First Committee comments: There were no dissenting
comments after the resolution was adopted, but a number of the
co-sponsors had paid special importance in their general statements
to the necessity for concluding an effective verification protocol
to the BWC and their hope that the remaining difficulties would be
resolved during the forthcoming year of negotiations.
UNGA 54/44 (L.26)
Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types
of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such
weapons
Introduced by Belarus
This new resolution recalls previous resolutions on new
types of "weapons of mass destruction", the most recent being 1996.
It calls for effective measures to prevent the emergence of new
types of WMD and requests the CD "to keep the matter under review,
... with a view to making ... recommendations" on possible
negotiations. It also asks the Secretary-General to transmit
relevant UNGA54 documentation to the CD, and requests the CD to
"report the results of any consideration" to the UNGA.
First Committee, November 1: Consensus
UNGA: Consensus
Outer Space
UNGA 54/53 (L.22)
Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS)
Introduced by Sri Lanka with co-sponsorship by a number
of NAM countries and China
Recognises the "common interest of all mankind in the
exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes" and
affirms the importance and urgency of preventing an arms race in
outer space. Emphasises the "paramount importance" of strict
compliance with existing arms limitation and disarmament
agreements, including bilateral agreements, relevant to outer space
and considers that "wide participation in the legal regime
applicable to outer space" could enhance its effectiveness, while
recognising that the existing legal regime "by itself does not
guarantee the prevention of an arms race in outer space" and that
there is a need to "consolidate and reinforce" the regime. Raises
concern that the growing use of outer space increases the need for
greater transparency and better information. Calls especially upon
states with major space capabilities to contribute to the peaceful
uses of outer space and the prevention of an arms race in space,
and "to refrain from actions contrary to that objective and to the
relevant existing treaties in the interest of maintaining
international peace and security and promoting international
cooperation".
Reiterates that the CD has the "primary role" in
negotiating multilateral agreements and invites the CD to "complete
the examination and updating" of the February 13, 1992 mandate, and
to establish an ad hoc committee "at the earliest during the 2000
session of the Conference on Disarmament".
First Committee, November 1: 138:0:2
UNGA: 162:0:2
First Committee comments: Only the United States and
Israel abstained. This vote sustains the big breakthrough in 1999,
when most of NATO, with Britain and France, shifted from
abstentions to votes in favour. Iran raised concerns that the US
hoped to control outer space through anti-satellite laser weapons
and missile defences, which, if executed, would violate the Outer
Space Treaty, which stipulated that the exploration of space should
be for peaceful purposes as part of humanity's common heritage. The
United States expressed its agreement with some elements of the
text, but abstained because some provisions were "overstated" or
"unwise", and it was "almost incontestable" that there was "no arms
race in outer space". The US considered that there had been
unprecedented peaceful cooperation in space and provided examples
to support its contention that the military uses of outer space
would enhance international peace and security. The US regarded the
issue as non-urgent, but said that in order to get the CD working,
it had shown flexibility on this matter. As it did last year, the
UK spoke on behalf of itself and Germany to say that although they
supported the resolution and recognised the validity of the
subject, they did not want this misconstrued as support for any
particular model for discussions in the CD or to imply that they
regarded the issue as a high priority. France had voted in favour
and considered that constructive activities were possible on this,
although it joined the UK and Germany in their support for putting
the FMCT at the top of next year's CD agenda.
Conventional Weapons
UNGA 54/54B (L.2*)
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling,
Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel Mines and on their
Destruction (Ottawa Treaty)
Introduced by Mozambique with over 100 co-sponsors from
all groups
Welcomes the March 1, 1999 entry into force of the Ottawa
Treaty and urges further accessions and ratifications to the
Treaty. Notes "with regret that anti-personnel mines continue to be
used in conflicts around the world, causing human suffering and
impeding post-conflict development". Invites and encourages all
interested states, the UN, ICRC and NGOs to participate in the
Convention's programme of intersessional work established by the
first meeting of the States Parties scheduled in Maputo and
requests the UN to make preparations for convening the second
meeting in Geneva, September 11-15,2000.
First Committee, November 8: 122:0:19
UNGA: 139:1:20
The abstainers included the United States, Russia, China,
Israel, India, Pakistan, Burma (Myanmar), Azerbaijan, Cuba, Egypt,
Iran, Latvia, Libya, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Morocco, South
Korea, Syria, Viet Nam.
First Committee comments: China abstained because it
considered that the Ottawa Treaty had not taken into account
security concern, and that the correct approach would have been
"reasonable and appropriate restrictions" without impinging on a
state's sovereign right to protect its borders. Egypt made a
lengthy statement calling for international assistance in
de-mining, criticising the Ottawa Treaty for containing no binding
legal framework for states to remove the mines they had laid and
for not recognising the right of states to self defence and the
importance of mines for protecting borders against terrorists,
bandits, drug traffickers, etc. Libya also castigated the Treaty
for failing to put responsibility on warring countries for planting
mines in others' territories and for failing to mention assistance
to countries afflicted with landmines planted during the Second
World War. Morocco agreed in principle, but said it could only
abstain on the resolution due to concerns in its southern region.
Sri Lanka and Turkey argued that they were not in a position to
accede to the Ottawa Convention, but had voted in favour of the
resolution because of its humanitarian objectives. For the same
reason, Israel and South Korea abstained, while sharing the
humanitarian concerns and condemning the "irresponsible and
indiscriminate use" of landmines. They argued that their particular
security situations meant that they were unable to accede to the
Treaty for the present. Israel announced that it had ceased
production of APL and both declared a moratorium on exports. South
Korea, Turkey and others expressed the wish that the CD would
negotiate a ban on the transfer of landmines. India abstained
because it believed a "phased approach" would bolster confidence
and allow states with long borders to safeguard their security.
Cuba emphasised that it was against the use of mines in internal
conflicts or ways that would harm civilians, but cited the "right
of self defence" as enshrined in the UN Charter to argue that the
military use of landmines should not be limited.
UNGA 54/54J (L.25)
Assistance to States for Curbing the Illicit Traffic in Small
Arms and Collecting Them
Introduced by Mali
Principally concerns the Saharo-Sahelian subregion of West
Africa. Basing itself on the statement on small arms made by the
president of the UN Security Council on September 24, 1999, the
resolution welcomes the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs'
coordinating work and related initiatives, and encourages further
work, with the support of the UN Regional Centre for Peace and
Disarmament in Africa and in close cooperation with the
Organisation of African Unity. Welcomes the declaration of a
Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Small
Arms and Light Weapons in West Africa, and expresses its "full
support for the convening of the international conference on the
illicit arms trade in all its aspects no later than
2001".
First Committee, November 4: Consensus
UNGA: Consensus
L.42/Rev.1* (vote pending)
Small Arms
Introduced by Japan, with over 40 co-sponsors from across
the groups
Raising concern about the "wide range of humanitarian and
socio-economic consequences", especially to civilians, this
resolution follows on from the Report of the Group of Governmental
Experts on Small Arms, chaired by Ambassador Mitsuro Donowaki. It
seeks international action to control and reduce small arms and
light weapons and decides to convene the UN conference on the
illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in June/July 2001.
The resolution establishes a preparatory committee for the
conference, to be held in New York, February 28 to March 3, 2000,
and requests the Secretary General to carry out a study using
governmental experts on the basis of equitable geographical
representation, from which it would produce a background document
"on the feasibility of restricting the manufacture and trade of
such weapons to the manufacturers and dealers authorised by states,
which will cover the brokering activities, particularly illicit
activities, relating to small arms and light weapons, including
transportation agents and financial transactions". As it has done
in previous years, France called for a separate vote on PP8, which
referred to "the right of self determination of all peoples, in
particular peoples under colonial or other forms of alien
domination or foreign occupation" and abstained on
this.
First Committee, November 8:
PP8 (self determination): 127:1:14
Whole resolution: 143:0:3
UNGA: Action on the draft resolution on small arms,
concerning the convening of an international conference in 2001, is
to be taken at a later date because of budgetary
implications.
First Committee comments: Russia voted against PP8 and
then abstained on the whole resolution, together with Kuwait and
Saudi Arabia. Abstentions on PP8 included France, Britain, United
States, Spain, India, Israel, Romania, Moldova, Georgia,
Azerbaijan, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Monaco, and Myanmar
(Burma). Russia argued that PP8 could be used as a cover for those
dealing in illicit weapons, and "watered down" the resolution.
Israel considered that the subject matter of PP8 should be dealt
with in the UN Third Committee, not First.
This year, the small arms resolution caused more contention than
in previous years, as the issue is attracting increasing attention.
Japan struggled to negotiate a text that would retain the support
of the non-aligned, many of whom wanted to emphasise sovereignty,
national security and self defence, and other -- predominantly, but
not exclusively western -- countries working more and more with
NGOs to find direct ways to address small arms and light weapons.
The central dispute revolved around the preparations and
participation envisaged for the UN conference on small arms
scheduled for June/July 2001. In particular, some delegations
feared that the resolution intended to support an approach that
pandered to those governments that opposed the Ottawa process and
would seek to exclude the valuable input that civil society and
non-governmental experts have been making in highlighting and
addressing the issues of small arms and light weapons. South
Africa, while supporting the resolution, said that "the important
role of civil society" in the successful outcome of th conference
should have been better highlighted. Norway agreed, and pointed out
that "non-governmental organisations possess knowledge and useful
expertise" and argued that "disarmament, human rights, humanitarian
and developmental expertise should... be involved in the
preparatory process and the conference itself." Norway, South
Africa and others criticised OP14 of the resolution, which
requested the UN to prepare a background document based on a study
by governmental experts. Norway called this "inconsistent with the
objective" and argued that the preparatory committee for the
conference should decide on background information and studies,
rather than a parallel process. South Africa considered that such a
"parallel mechanism" as the study proposed in OP14 would be costly
and unrepresentative. Pakistan raised concerns that the working
process of the panel of governmental experts envisaged in OP14
would be "non-transparent" and unrepresentative.
UNGA 54/54R (L.44*)
Illicit Traffic in Small Arms
Introduced by South Africa and co-sponsored by over 50
delegations from all groups
Recognising the "human suffering caused by illicit
trafficking in small arms" and the "interface between violence,
criminality, drug trafficking, terrorism and illicit trafficking in
small arms", the resolution requests the UN Secretary General to
continue his "broad based consultations" and to submit to the
Conference in 2001 "information on the magnitude and scope of
illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons, measures to
combat illicit trafficking in and circulation of small arms and
light weapons, and the role of the United Nations in collecting,
collating, sharing and disseminating information on illicit
trafficking in small arms and light weapons". Also encourages
regional and subregional initiatives, assistance from member
states, and appropriate national measures to destroy surplus small
arms and light weapons.
First Committee, November 1: Consensus
UNGA: Consensus
First Committee comments: Cuba said it was right to give
priority attention to the problem of illicit traffic in small arms,
but that concrete measures should respect the "unique" features of
each region and country.
UNGA 54/58 (L.52)
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively
Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW)
Introduced by Sweden, with co-sponsorship from a large
cross-group of states, including France, Russia, US, UK, Canada,
South Africa and Finland, as in previous years.
This annual resolution supports the CCW, welcomes the
entry into force of the amended Protocol II (mines, booby traps
etc.) on December 3, 1998 and of Protocol IV (blinding laser
weapons) on July 30, 1998, and urgently calls on all states which
have not yet done so to adhere to the CCW and its protocols.
Welcomes the calling of the annual conference of contracting
parties to the Protocol December 15-17, 1999 and hopes for a
further conference in 2000, to be followed by a Review Conference
of the CCW in 2001.
First Committee, November 4: Consensus
UNGA: Consensus
First Committee comments: France argued that it was
possible to co-sponsor different resolutions and approaches on
curbing landmines and called for long term goals and the interests
of mine victims to be placed above technical aspects. Cuba said it
attached the highest priority to sending a signal supporting
Optional Protocol II, which was "potentially the most effective
instrument the international community had" regarding AP landmines.
Stressing that a balance must be found between humanitarian and
security concerns, Israel called on all states in the Middle East
to accede to the CCW.
Regional Disarmament and Security
UNGA, 54/54M, (L.37)
Conventional Arms Control at the Regional and Subregional
Levels
Introduced by Pakistan with several co-sponsors from all
groups, including Bangladesh, Nepal, the Czech Republic and the
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
This resolution, which in past years has been aimed rather
obviously at India, notes the importance of conventional arms
control at regional and subregional levels and various initiatives
in this regard, including the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces
in Europe (CFE) and proposals made in the context of Latin America
and South Asia. Refers to the need for balance in defence
capabilities "at the lowest level of armaments" and the "special
responsibility" of those states with larger military capabilities
in promoting arms control and regional security. Calls for urgent
consideration of these issues and for the CD to consider "the
formulation of principles, that can serve as a framework for
regional agreements on conventional arms control".
First Committee, November 1: 133:1:2
UNGA: 159:1:1
First Committee comments: India voted against, arguing
that it had security concerns that were not confined to the
"so-called region of South Asia" cited in PP6, and wondering
whether the request to the CD had any productive value. Benin and
Bhutan abstained (only Bhutan in the GA). Norway withdrew its
co-sponsorship on the day of the First Committee vote.
UNGA, 54/54N, (L.38)
Regional Disarmament
Introduced by Pakistan with a few co-sponsors
Gives generalised support to proposals for disarmament and
confidence-building at global, regional and subregional levels,
supports and encourages confidence-building measures and stresses
that "sustained efforts are needed", within the framework of the CD
and UN to make progress on disarmament issues.
First Committee, November 1: Consensus
UNGA: Consensus
Confidence-Building Measures
Including Transparency-In-
Armaments
UNGA 54/55A (L.5)
Regional Confidence-Building Measures: Activities of the
United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in
Central Africa
Proposed by Cameroon on behalf of the members of the
Economic Community of Central African States
Long, detailed resolution which supports the work of the
standing advisory committee, particularly activities aimed at
confidence-building measures, the promotion of peace, and the
prevention, management and settlement of political crises and armed
conflicts in Central Africa at regional and sub-regional levels.
Appeals for voluntary contributions to the Trust Fund for
implementing the standing advisory committees work and requests
continued assistance from the UN for continuing its
work.
First Committee, November 5: Consensus
UNGA (as amended): Consensus
First Committee comments: Algeria said it had joined
consensus out of solidarity, since this was an African text, but
recalled its difficulties from last year regarding PP11 and OP9
(the Brazzaville and Bata Declarations on promoting lasting
democracy, peace and development and references to setting up a
subregional centre for human rights for human rights and democracy
in Central Africa), saying that such matters should be considered
in another committee.
L.13 (no UNGA number yet)
Compliance with arms limitation and disarmament and
non-proliferation agreements (draft decision)
This decision replaces the usual US-sponsored resolution
on the subject and ensures that the issue appears on next year's UN
agenda. The US did not introduce its resolution because it wanted
to avoid amendments and discussion likely to be critical of the US
position on the ABM Treaty, rejection of CTBT ratification by the
US Senate, and even the US stance on verifying the CWC and BWC,
which some regard as protecting commercial interests at the expense
of international and collective security agreements.
First Committee, November 1: Consensus
UNGA: Consensus
First committee comments: This year's draft decision can
be seen as a placeholder for the debate to continue next year.
China wanted to highlight the vital nature of compliance, arguing
that any abrogation would harm existing agreements, including the
ABM Treaty. The US in the thematic debates preceding the voting
explained that it would not be presenting its traditional
resolutions on compliance with arms agreements and on bilateral
non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament efforts. It explained
that although these resolutions would have been especially timely
this year, they would have undoubtedly been opened up to the
amendment process with states attempting to inject the subject of
the ABM Treaty.
UNGA 54/54I (L.21/Rev.1)
Transparency in Armaments (including WMD)
Introduced by Egypt
Recognises that the UN Register of Conventional Arms
"constitutes an important first step towards the promotion of
transparency in military matters" but calls for the Secretary
General "with the assistance of the Group of Governmental Experts
to be convened in the year 2000 and taking into account the views
submitted by member states to report on a) the early expansion of
the scope of the Register" and b) "the elaboration of practical
means for the development of the Register in order to increase
transparency related to weapons of mass destruction, in particular
nuclear weapons, and to transfers of equipment and technology
directly related to the development and manufacture of such
weapons". Separate votes were called for PP8, which stressed the
need for universality of the NPT, the CWC and the BWC, and for
OP4b, relating to practical means for expanding the Register to
include nuclear and other WMD.
First Committee, November 9:
PP8 (universality of NPT etc): 132:2:2
OP4b (expanding Register to include WMD): 77:45:16
Whole resolution: 81:45:13
UNGA whole resolution: 97:48:15
PP8: 156:3:3
OP4(b): 93:50:17
First Committee comments: As expected, votes against PP8
were India and Israel (with Turkey opposing in the GA). Pakistan
and Cuba (plus Libya in the GA) abstained. (Canada abstained in
error in the first committee and retracted later.) On expanding the
register (OP4b), Britain, France, Russia, the United States and
various NATO and European countries opposed. Abstainers included
China, Japan, South Africa, India, Pakistan, Argentina, Kazakhstan.
On the whole resolution, most of the NAM, including South Africa,
voted in favour; NATO and NATO wannabes plus Israel and Russia
opposed, while China joined India, Pakistan, Japan, and a few
others in abstaining.
Finland, on behalf of the EU and associated nations said they
would vote against the resolution because it was unrealistic to
link "transparency in armaments", which traditionally has dealt
with conventional weapons, with transparency on WMD, as if they
were on a par. South Africa supported the resolution, arguing for
exploring how to make the principles of transparency apply to
nuclear weapons and related technology, but it abstained on OP4, on
grounds that the existing register should focus on conventional
arms and not be linked with the wider goal. Argentina expressed a
similar argument. China said that the goal should be the
elimination of weapons of mass destruction, and in the interim
transparency was needed. China again used the opportunity to link a
future nuclear weapons convention to the Chemical Weapons
Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention and accused the
NWS with first-use policies of also threatening the ABM Treaty and
condoning the use of force in international relations. Israel spoke
against expanding the existing Register, as it would "impair its
functioning" and noted "with surprise" that some of the Middle
Eastern countries calling for expansion had not even filed a report
with the Register.
UNGA 54/43 (L.27)
Objective Information on Military Matters, Including
Transparency of Military Expenditures
Introduced by Germany
Second year for this resolution supporting the guidelines
on reporting military expenditure, as reported by the UN Secretary
General (A/54/298). Calls on states to report to the UN annually,
by April 30, on their military expenditure and encourages
international bodies and regional organisations to promote
transparency in military matters, support education on these issues
and dissemination of the reports. Calls for further ideas to
broaden, develop and strengthen participation in the standardised
reporting of military expenditure.
First Committee, November 1: Consensus
UNGA: Consensus
UNGA 54/46 (L.29)
Verification in all its aspects including the role of the
United Nations in the field of verification
Introduced by Canada
Short resolution noting "the critical importance of, and
the vital contribution that has been made by, effective
verification measures in arms limitation and disarmament agreements
and other similar obligations" and reaffirming support for "the
sixteen principles of verification drawn up by the Disarmament
Commission".
First Committee, November 5: Consensus
UNGA: Consensus
First Committee comments: Iraq complained about the
violation of confidentiality regarding sensitive information during
international inspections and accused UNSCOM of making "the
verification process a 'cover' to implement... the policies of one
or two States..."
UNGA 54/54O (L.39)
Transparency in Armaments
Introduced by the Netherlands with over 100
co-sponsors
This annual TIA resolution backs the UN Register of
Conventional Arms, calls for universal participation and invites
members to provide additional information on procurement from
national production and military holdings, including types and
models. Refers to its previous request for a group of governmental
experts to be convened in 2000 to prepare a report on the
continuing operation of the Register and its further development,
taking into account the work of the CD (OP4b) and invites the CD to
consider continuing its work on TIA (OP6). Also calls for
cooperation among states at the regional and subregional levels and
for the UN to ensure sufficient resources to operate and maintain
the Register. As in previous years, paragraph votes were called for
OP4b and OP6.
First Committee, November 1:
OP4b (experts and CD): 121:0:12
OP6 (CD): 120:0:15
Whole resolution: 128:0:13
UNGA whole resolution: 150:0:12
OP4(b): 140:0:16
OP6: 139:0:17
First Committee comments: This resolution was strongly
supported, although some were less keen to see the CD continue work
on TIA. In favour were all NATO/EU states and wannabes, Russia, and
most of the NAM states, including India. The abstainers included
those which pushed for the Register to be expanded to include WMD
and states unhappy with the principle of transparency and the
Register's requirements, including China, Pakistan, Myanmar
(Burma), and several Middle Eastern states, such as Algeria, Iran
and Egypt.
China abstained because of US arms sales to Taiwan. Egypt, the
main sponsor for the second TIA resolution (calling for expansion
to include WMD) abstained because it believed that the Register
should provide a broad degree of transparency in all fields of
armaments in a non-selective manner. Libya, Saudi Arabia, Algeria,
and Kuwait made similar points, while Syria gave a tirade against
Israel and said it had abstained because the draft had not taken
into account the special situation in the Middle East. Mexico
abstained, saying that in its view, OP6 was unrealistic and that
the non-aligned group (G-21) in Geneva considered that the CD had
fulfilled its mandate on TIA, and that this was no longer a
priority for CD work. Cuba, which voted in favour, echoed Mexico's
questions regarding TIA work in the CD. Myanmar (Burma) regarded it
as "premature" and "unnecessary" to develop the Register further
and wanted the CD to concentrate on nuclear disarmament and banning
fissile materials.
Disarmament Machinery
UNGA 54/56A (L.3)
Report of the Disarmament Commission
Proposed by Mexico with co-sponsors from all groups
Pledges support for the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC)
to continue to work according to the mandate in UNSSOD I (1978) and
relevant UN decisions and urges enhanced dialogue and cooperation
among the First Committee, UNDC and the Conference on Disarmament.
Notes "with regret" that the Commission was not able to reach a
consensus on the question of whether to hold a fourth special
session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (UNSSOD
IV).
First Committee, November 1: Consensus
UNGA: Consensus
UNGA 54/55B (L.10)
United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in
Africa
Introduced by Burkino Faso on behalf of the Group of
African states
Commends the revitalisation of this African Regional
Centre to promote confidence-building and sustainable development,
emphasises the need for resources to strengthen its activities and
carry out its programmes and appeals for continued UN support and
for voluntary contributions to strengthen the Regional Centre's
programmes and activities.
First Committee, November 1: Consensus
UNGA: Consensus
UNGA 54/55C (L.14)
United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in
Asia and the Pacific
Introduced by Nepal on behalf of most of the Asian and
Pacific states
Supports the Regional Centre's activities and meetings and
the "Kathmandu process" for enhancing openness, transparency and
confidence building in the Asia-Pacific region. Appeals for
continued UN support and for government and NGO voluntary
contributions to support the Centre's work.
First Committee comments: Bangladesh explained its
withdrawal of its co-sponsorship because of the shift away from New
York to Kathmandu. It joined consensus, although it did not feel
the wording was strong enough.
First Committee, November 1: Consensus
UNGA: Consensus
UNGA 54/56B (L.16)
Report of the Conference on Disarmament
Introduced by Australia, as current President of the
CD.
Considers the report (A/54/27) and work of the Conference
on Disarmament and reaffirms its role as the "single multilateral
disarmament negotiating forum of the international community" and
urges the CD to "fulfil that role in the light of the evolving
international situation, with a view to making early substantive
progress on priority items of its agenda". Welcomes the decision to
admit five new members. Welcomes also the CD's "strong collective
interest in commencing substantive work as soon as possible during
its 2000 session" and hopes the presidential consultations will
enable this to happen. That was about as close as the resolution
got to acknowledging that the CD was deadlocked and hadn't done any
real work since concluding the CTBT in 1996.
First Committee, November 1: Consensus
UNGA: Consensus
First Committee comments: Several statements agreed with
the outgoing CD President, Ambassador Les Luck of Australia, who
presented the resolution by acknowledging disappointment that the
1999 sessions "was not a productive one if measures in terms of
progress made in tackling items on its agenda". In drawing
attention to the strong collective interest in starting work, Luck
was also supported in his assessment that the Conference had
nevertheless given "serious and substantive consideration" to
important questions of security and disarmament" and remained "a
vital and unique forum for an expchange of views on evolving
positions on, and attitudes to, arms control and
disarmament...[which may be seen as a necessary step in defining
new priorities and forging the requisite consensus to launch
negotiations". Non-CD members Portugal, speaking also on behalf of
EU countries Denmark, Greece and Luxembourg, said that they
attached "major importance" to becoming members of the Conference
and called for a special coordinator in 2000 to address the further
expansion of CD membership.
L.28 (no UNGA number yet)
Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters (draft
decision)
Introduced by France
The purpose of this draft decision was to support the work
of the Secretary General's advisory board on disarmament,
especially its proactive advisory role on disarmament matters. In
relation to the Board's improved functioning, the decision
contained the Secretary General's endorsement for GA approval of
changes in the language of the 1982 mandate so as to "reflect its
actual functions as they have been performed for more than a
decade" i.e. current practice. The Board's function as trustees for
UNIDIR would remain unchanged, and it would keep its role of
advising on the implementation of the UN Disarmament Information
Programme.
First Committee, November 5: Consensus
UNGA: Consensus
First Committee comments: Iraq complained that the
Advisory Board's report had ignored "acts of spying and
falsification" exercised by UNSCOM inspectors and said that the
report's "non-objectivity" on this undermined the credibility of
the UN in the field of disarmament.
UNGA 54/54U (L.48)
Convening of the Fourth Special Session of the General
Assembly Devoted to Disarmament (UNSSOD IV)
Proposed by South Africa on behalf of the NAM.
Similar to the previous two years' resolution, decides
"subject to the emergence of consensus on its objectives and
agenda", to convene UNSSOD IV, but mentions no date.
First Committee, November 5: Consensus
UNGA: Consensus
First Committee comments: There was very little debate on
SSOD IV this year, and the resolution is viewed as a place holder
to keep the concept alive until political conditions are deemed
ripe for agreement on a mandate and agenda. Many disarmament
discussions hark back to the consensus document from UNSSOD I in
1978 and a growing number of states now consider it necessary to
take account of the fundamental changes since then and develop an
agenda relevant for pushing disarmament objectives forward more
effectively and invigorating UN disarmament machinery, including
the CD. Though some are concerned that international political
relations have deteriorated so far that reaching agreement on such
a disarmament agenda would be impossible, most consider that a
fourth special session is long overdue and should at least be
attempted. The principal obstacles have been first the United
States, then India.
UNGA 54/55E (L.49)
United Nations Regional Centres for Peace and
Disarmament
Introduced by South Africa on behalf of the NAM
Reiterates the importance of UN activities at the regional
level to increase stability and security, backs the work of the
three regional centres in carrying out educational programmes on
these issues, and appeals for UN, governmental and NGO
support.
First Committee, November 1: Consensus
UNGA: Consensus
UNGA 54/55F (L.51)
United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and
Development in Latin America and the Caribbean
Introduced by Peru on behalf of the Group of Latin
American and Caribbean states
Notes with satisfaction and support the reinitiating of
the activities of the regional centre, headquartered in Lima, Peru,
and appeals for voluntary contributions to strengthen its
programme. Also urges states in the region to make "greater use of
the potential" of the Centre regarding peace, disarmament and
development and requests the UN to provide the Centre with support,
within existing resources.
First Committee, November 1: Consensus
UNGA: Consensus
Other Disarmament Measures
UNGA 54/49(L.4)
Developments in the Field of Information and
Telecommunications in the Context of International Security
Introduced by the Russian Federation
The second year for this resolution, which raises concerns
about the "misuse or exploitation of information resources or
technologies for criminal or terrorist purposes". Calls for
promotion of information security, prevention of unauthorised
interference or misuse and the development of "international
principles" to "enhance the security of global information and
telecommunications systems and help combat information terrorism
and criminality".
First Committee, November 2: Consensus
UNGA: Consensus
First Committee comments: This resolution has not yet
worked out what it is wanting to do, beyond waving a coded flag of
warning about the implications of US technology dominance, the
so-called Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and the potential
for information and high tech warfare.
UNGA 54/50 (L.32)
Role of Science and Technology in the Context of
International Security and Disarmament
Introduced by India with several NAM co-sponsors
Relates to dual (military-civilian) use goods and
technologies, emphasises that transfers of high technology with
military applications should take account of States' "legitimate
defence requirements", and criticises restrictions on exports to
developing countries. Calls for greater efforts to apply and share
science and technology "for disarmament-related purposes" and "to
promote the sustainable economic and social development of all
states and to safeguard international security", and urges
multilateral negotiations for "non-discriminatory" guidelines for
the international transfer of dual use goods and
technologies.
First Committee, November 2: 84:45:15
UNGA: 98:46:19
First Committee comments: This annual NAM-based
resolution had the backing of China, but South Africa, Uruguay and
Brazil abstained, as did Russia. NATO, the EU and associated states
oppose this resolution, which is viewed as hostile to the export
control regimes, providing too broad a justification for seeking to
develop hi-tech weapons. Concerns were raised that the resolution
did not recognise the contribution of control regimes to enhancing
cooperation.
UNGA 54/47 (L.45)
Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a
Zone of Peace
Introduced by South Africa on behalf of the NAM
This NAM resolution backs the ad hoc Committee on the
Indian Ocean and calls for UN resources and the participation of
the NWS and major maritime users of the Indian Ocean to "greatly
facilitate the development of a mutually beneficial dialogue to
advance peace, security and stability in the Indian Ocean region".
Sri Lanka had earlier submitted the 1999 Report of the Ad Hoc
Committee on the Indian Ocean, hoping that it might be adopted by
consensus, and noting that though implementation of the objectives
of the 1971 Declaration was difficult, the countries concerned
believed that "the objectives of the Declaration should continue to
be preserved by the General Assembly… as an ideal towards
which all concerned… continue to strive".
First Committee, November 2: 105:3:36
UNGA: 120:3:41
First committee comments: Britain, France and the United
States voted against. They rightly see this resolution as
enshrining opposition to the retention of British control over
Diego Garcia, which is leased to the United States as a
military-nuclear base, and also of the use of the Indian Ocean for
nuclear armed submarines. NATO and NATO wannabes abstained, while
Russia, China and the NAM voted in favour. The United States
complained that the resolution failed to recognise navigational
rights and the freedom of the seas and considered the issue a waste
of UN money.
UNGA 54/54S (L.46)
Observance of Environmental Norms in the Drafting and
Implementation of Agreements on Disarmament and Arms
Control
Introduced by South Africa on behalf of the NAM
Raises concerns about the 'detrimental environmental
effects' of the use (without mention of the production and testing)
of nuclear weapons and calls for measures to 'ensure the
application of scientific and technological progress' in
international security, disarmament and related areas without
harming sustainable development or the environment.
First Committee, November 2: 138:0:4
UNGA: 159:0:4
First Committee comments: As in previous years, Britain,
France, the United States and Israel abstained. The United the
United States who questioned the resolution's relevance to the
First Committee, as well as its purpose and utility, saying that
although disarmament agreements should be carried out in compliance
with environmental protection, there was no direct connection with
arms control negotiations. Iraq accused Britain and the US of
intentionally violating UN commitments on environmental protection
through their use of depleted uranium against Iraq and
Yugoslavia.
UNGA 54/54T (L.47)
Relationship between Disarmament and Development
Introduced by South Africa on behalf of the NAM
Stresses the 'growing importance of the symbiotic
relationship between disarmament and development' and urges
resources from arms limitation and disarmament agreements to be put
towards economic and social development, in order to reduce the
widening gap between developed and developing
countries.
First Committee, November 2: Consensus
UNGA: Consensus
First Committee Comments: The United States said it
rejected the link, had not participated in the consensus and would
not be bound by resolutions on this issue. Finland, on behalf of
the EU and associated states, said that while the EU gave more
international aid than anyone else, they did not accept the linkage
between disarmament and development.
Disarmament and International
Security
UNGA 54/54H (L.20)
Consolidation of Peace through Practical Disarmament
Measures
Introduced by Germany with over 70 co-sponsors from all
the groups
This fourth year resolution supports arms control,
especially of small arms and light weapons, confidence building
measures, demobilisation and the reintegration of former
combatants, demining and conversion. It welcomes the adoption of
the UNDC 'Guidelines on conventional arms control/limitation and
disarmament' and notes the report of the Panel of Governmental
Experts on Small Arms and the Secretary-General's report on
"consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures" and
encourages member states, agencies etc. to help implement the
recommendations. Encourages member states to collect and destroy
small arms and light weapons in post-conflict situations and
invites the Group of Interested States which formed in New York in
1998 to continue "to analyse lessons learned from previous
disarmament and peace-building projects" and to "promote new
practical disarmament measures to consolidate peace".
First Committee, November 2: Consensus
UNGA: Consensus
UNGA 54/59 (L.15)
Strengthening of Security and Cooperation in the
Mediterranean Region
Introduced by Algeria, with co-sponsorship from almost all the
countries bordering the Mediterranean
The premise for this resolution, as stated in OP1, is that
"security in the Mediterranean is closely linked with European
security". It raises concerns about "persistent tension and
continuing military activities" in parts of the Mediterranean
region, castigates economic and social disparities, and reaffirms
the responsibility of all states to contribute to the stability and
prosperity of the region. Notes the peace negotiations in the
Middle East, "which should be of a comprehensive nature". Calls on
all states to adhere to the multilaterally negotiated legal
instruments related to disarmament and non-proliferation (this
covers those holding out on the BWC and CWC as well as NPT and
arguably covers also the CCW and even the Ottawa Treaty). Calls for
greater transparency on all military matters, including the UN
Register of Conventional Arms, and for cooperation to deal with
problems and threats such as terrorism, international crime, arms
and drug trafficking.
First Committee, November 2: Consensus
UNGA: Consensus
UNGA 54/62 (L.40/Rev.1)
Maintenance of International Security: stability and
development of South-Eastern Europe
Introduced by the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
This is a follow on to the previous years' resolutions
relating to "the violent disintegration of States" such as occurred
this decade in the Balkans, updated following the war over Kosovo.
It notes the "direct negative repercussions of the Kosovo crisis"
on neighbouring countries which hosted large numbers of refugees
and stresses the importance of regional efforts for preventing
bilateral conflicts. Welcomes the Stability Pact of July 30, 1999
and stresses the "crucial importance of its adequate and timely
implementation". It stresses the need for "good neighbourliness"
and the normalisation of relations, full observance of the UN
Charter regarding sovereign equality, territorial integrity and
inviolability of international borders and underlines the need for
international cooperation and solving disputes by peaceful
means.
First Committee, November 5: 137:0:2
UNGA: 155:0:2
First Committee comments: China and Belarus
abstained.
This report and appendix was written and compiled by Rebecca
Johnson, with valuable assistance from Nicola Butler, Sharon Riggle
and Sean Howard, whom the author would like to thank for help
finding elusive documentation and cross checking votes and
details.
© 1999 The Acronym Institute.
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