Disarmament Diplomacy
Issue No. 42, December 1999
Strengthening the BWC: Issues for the Ad Hoc Group
By Henrietta Wilson
Introduction
The Ad Hoc Group of States Parties to the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention (BWC) met for its Seventeenth Session in Geneva
between November 22 and December 10, 1999. The BWC was concluded in
1972, strengthening the prohibition against the use, development,
production and stockpiling of biological weapons, but it contained
no measures for implementing, verifying, or enforcing its
provisions. The ending of the Cold War and, in particular, the
conclusion of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) stimulated
renewed attention to these matters. For the past five years the Ad
Hoc Group has been meeting in Geneva to negotiate an additional
Protocol to the BWC, to strengthen the effectiveness and improve
the implementation of the original Treaty, and is now working in
earnest on a Rolling Text, expected to be the basis for the
Protocol to the Convention. The Rolling Text is far advanced, but
this stage of the negotiation is marked by serious differences
within the Western Group regarding compliance measures (Article
III), and between the Western Group and the Non-Aligned Movement
and Others Group (NAM) regarding technological co-operation
(Article VII).
Article III on Compliance Measures deals with measures for
verifying adherence to the protocol, and Article VII, on Scientific
and Technological Exchange for Peaceful Purposes and Technical
Cooperation, covers the promotion of co-operative exchanges between
States Parties. Though there may be no intrinsic link between
Articles III and VII, they are frequently treated by States Parties
as though they are linked, each one to be traded off against the
other. Many in the NAM would like to maximise the cooperative
aspects of the Protocol. The majority of the Western Group desire
strong compliance measures. Some NAM countries feel that if they
move towards accepting particular compliance measures, the Western
Group should make compromises on the co-operative aspects of the
Protocol. Simultaneously, some in the Western Group believe that
the support of NAM countries for certain compliance measures can be
obtained by accepting some of their requests for co-operative
measures.
It was felt by many in the Ad Hoc Group that, prompted by a NAM
Working Paper,1 significant progress had been made on
the Article III sections dealing with visits during the Sixteenth
Session (September 13 - October 8, 1999).2 Partly as a
result of this progress and the perceived link between the two
articles, and partly because of the importance of the issues
themselves, there has been increasing pressure on the Ad Hoc Group
to engage in a more thorough debate on aspects of Article VII.
Article VII: Technological Cooperation
Article VII addresses one of the most sensitive issues for BWC
States Parties: the relationship between technology sharing,
commercial trade and export restrictions. The current debate has
two focal points: first, disagreement over the role of existing
export controls in the Protocol regime, and second, the proposal to
establish a Cooperation Committee in the international implementing
organisation of the Protocol, to promote the effective
implementation of Article VII of the Protocol.
Role of Existing Export Controls
Central to the current Article VII debate on existing export
controls is the role of the Australia Group, an informal
arrangement set up in the mid-1980s with the object of obstructing
international transfers of dual-use goods or technologies into
chemical or biological armament programmes. Such transfers, from
private western and Asian companies, had enabled Iraq to use
blister and nerve gases against Iran and, later, its own
population. The Australia Group comprises the following countries,
all of which are also States Parties to the BWC: Argentina,
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Britain, Canada, the Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, South Korea, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States.3 The
Australia Group is an informal arrangement to coordinate the
national export controls of participating countries and to
harmonize their implementation, which it does in part by
facilitating the sharing of intelligence information, and by
sharing information on export requests that have been
denied.4 The national export controls are typically in
the form of state regulations prohibiting the export of particular
goods to particular countries unless an export licence has first
been granted, the application for which must have disclosed such
details as the identity of the importing agency or company. An
effect of the Australia Group is to improve the quality of the
input into this licensing process by national intelligence
authorities. Another effect is to diminish the probability of a
participating country that is not very good at implementing export
controls thereby creating a loophole in the overall control system.
The states that comprise the Australia Group determine the listed
dual-use goods according to internally agreed criteria, as well as
the countries that might in the future join the Group. For this
reason, some non-members regard the Australia Group as arbitrary
and discriminatory - a club of the rich dictating to developing
states.
The debate over export controls can be summed up as disagreement
over whether or not the Australia Group should continue to operate
after the entry into force of the Protocol. This issue is dividing
certain elements of the NAM, such as India, Iran and Pakistan plus
China - who are opposed to the continuation of the Australia Group
- and the Western Group, who are committed to its
continuation.5
The above mentioned countries are driving the debate, couching
their position in terms of a wider argument focussing on measures
proposed for inclusion in Section C of Article VII of the Rolling
Text on "Measures to Avoid Hampering the Economic and Technological
Development of States Parties", which currently includes suggested
language on the relationship of the Protocol to existing regimes
involving technology transfers. This aims to refer to existing
export control regimes, with text suggesting that states should
commit themselves to not maintaining any regimes which restrict
trade in activities that the Protocol rules as legitimate.
While all of the NAM recognise the need for national export
controls as an impediment to proliferation, India, Iran and
Pakistan plus China argue that when the Protocol enters into force,
States Parties should be able to trust each other sufficiently that
multilateral arrangements like the Australia Group will be
redundant within the Protocol framework. These elements also
suggest that the continuation of the Australia Group is
antithetical to the aims of the Protocol, in that the workings of
the Australia Group restrict their access to materials for
legitimate purposes, and so threaten to hamper their economic
development.6 Although they accept that all export
controls involve some degree of discrimination, allowing for the
export of certain goods to some countries and not to others,
opponents of the Australia Group view it as particularly
discriminatory, maintaining that its strictures usually comprise
prevention of exports from developed countries to developing
countries. A further objection to the Australia Group is that its
decision-making processes are not transparent and cannot be
appealed against.
Furthermore, experience from the negotiation and implementation
of the CWC is influencing the attitude of some NAM countries to the
Australia Group. A similar debate about the continued relevance of
the Australia Group was evident during the negotiation of the CWC.
Although the Australia Group is not expressly mentioned in the CWC,
during the endgame all Australia Group participants undertook to
review the operation of Group activities in conjunction with
implementation of the CWC. Many NAM countries are angered by the
fact that in more than two and a half years since entry into force
of the Convention, the Australia Group has not been seen to change
its mechanisms. However, it is important to bear in mind that,
since the Australia Group does not publicise its mechanisms, any
changes may not be evident to countries external to the Australia
Group.
In addition, opposition to the Australia Group is expressed in
terms of more general perceived problems with the negotiation and
implementation of multilateral arms control agreements. In this
line of reasoning, the achievement of the Protocol is frequently
depicted as only serving the interests of the West. According to
this view, the risks of biological warfare are most keenly felt by
the West. While achievement of the non-proliferation goals of the
Protocol would bring with it security benefits to all nations, the
risk of biological weapons is not perceived with equal urgency
around the world. Many developing countries have more immediate
security risks than the threat of potential biological warfare
proliferation and use, in terms of natural disasters, for example
natural epidemics, and man-made problems, for example the problems
arising from regional conflicts, or small arms proliferation.
Accompanying this view, that the achievement of the
non-proliferation aspects of the Protocol will not serve all
countries equally, is the idea that the terms of the Protocol could
be inherently discriminatory. In this context, it is clear that
legacies from past international arms control and disarmament
regimes are playing an adverse role. Notably, in addition to the
perceived failure of the nuclear-weapon States (NWS) to make
sufficient progress toward the eventual elimination of nuclear
weapons in keeping with their obligations under the NPT, some refer
to problems with the CWC.7
In contrast, many in the Western Group are convinced of the
continued need for the Australia Group, and are simply not prepared
to enter into any discussion that threatens its future. They argue
that, even when the Protocol enters into force, ratification will
be no guarantee of compliance. In addition, they reason that after
entry into force it will take some time for the Protocol to be
fully implemented, using their experience of the CWC as an example.
Although many aspects of the work of the Organisation for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) are in place, several
countries have still not fully implemented their basic obligations
to the Convention. Indeed many of the NAM that have traditionally
been opposed to the Australia Group have apparently not even
enacted the domestic implementing legislation which the CWC
requires of them. The Western Group argues that, following this
pattern, even when the BWC Protocol enters into force it may take
many years to be fully implemented, and until it is, additional
safeguards are needed to minimise the risk of biological warfare
proliferation. In this context, Western governments argue that they
have to maintain the Australia Group to maintain their security
provisions. Some consider that there is no need to discuss the
Australia Group in the Ad Hoc Group, since the Australia Group and
the emerging Protocol are independent.
The very inclusion of provisions addressing existing export
control regimes is itself not universally recognised as being
appropriate for Article VII. Western Group delegates especially
dispute this, since Article VII is primarily concerned with
promoting technical co-operation. Export controls are dealt with
elsewhere in the Protocol and in the Convention inasmuch as States
Parties are obliged to maintain national export control
arrangements in order to promote the anti-proliferation purposes of
the Convention. Thus, in Article III of the Convention, each State
Party to the BWC, "… undertakes not to transfer to any
recipient whatsoever, directly or indirectly, and not in any way to
assist, encourage, or induce any State, group of States or
international organizations to manufacture or otherwise acquire any
of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery
specified in Article I of this Convention", and Section F of
Article III of the Protocol (which is currently in square brackets)
offers guidelines for transferring dual-use items. In other words,
the Convention and the Protocol both put States Parties under an
obligation to maintain national export controls.
The debate on the future role of export controls was moved
forward by the submission of a NAM Working Paper on "Measures to
Strengthen the Implementation of Article III of the
Convention"8 on the last day of the Sixteenth Session
(September 13 - October 8, 1999). The working paper acknowledged
the importance of the Convention's Article III obligations for
States Parties not to transfer materials intended for purposes
prohibited by the Convention and Protocol, while calling on the Ad
Hoc Group to avoid "measures that hamper the peaceful economic and
technological development of States Parties". It is clear that this
is a relatively moderate expression by the NAM group, and does not
reflect the national positions of all NAM countries. Many in the
Western Group saw the NAM paper as a breakthrough, in that it is a
non-confrontational statement with a great degree of flexibility in
how its countries are prepared to deal with the subject of export
controls, and thus a genuine opportunity for the whole of the Ad
Hoc Group to engage on this difficult topic. It is understood that
some of these countries hoped that the Western Group would respond
at the Seventeenth Session with a statement of equal flexibility.
However, it is clear that others in the Western Group are not
prepared to address this issue, and as a result no progress was
made on technology transfers at the Seventeenth Session. Progress
on this issue is not expected to be easily achieved.
The Cooperation Committee
The second emphasis of the debate on Article VII is the proposal
to establish a Cooperation Committee within the organisation
appointed to oversee implementation of the Protocol, which would
coordinate and promote effective and full implementation of Article
X of the Convention and Article VII of the Protocol. This has
gradually come to be accepted by all the Ad Hoc Group, with the
exception of the US, which is waiting to see the details of what
the proposal would entail before stating its position. But
disagreement remains as to the structure and role of the
Cooperation Committee, and the powers allocated to it.
A small group of Western Group countries made a move on this
issue during the Seventeenth Session. Australia, France, Germany,
Sweden, Switzerland and the UK circulated a 'non-paper' containing
suggested language for the operation of the Cooperation Committee,
dated 29 November 1999. This paper outlines the possible
functioning of the Cooperation Committee, including details of its
relative positioning within the hierarchy of the implementing
organisation, and the relative weight of its capacity for making
recommendations. Although the paper gives the Cooperation Committee
weaker powers than would be preferred by the NAM, the majority of
the NAM viewed the paper as a useful first step towards real
engagement on this issue, in that its very presence recognises the
importance of the question of a Cooperation Committee, and gives a
certain degree of credibility to the idea.
Article III: Compliance Measures
Further to this work on Article VII, the Seventeenth Session
spent the majority of its time discussing aspects of Article III
Compliance Measures, the part of the Rolling Text that provides
mechanisms by which States Parties to the Protocol will be able to
gain confidence in the compliance of other States Parties. There
are three main areas where fundamental controversy remains in
Article III, namely in the parts of the Rolling Text that deal with
Declarations, Investigations and Visits. These are all issues which
are fundamental to the success of the Ad Hoc Group in achieving a
successful Protocol, and the disagreements reflect the different
visions and aims that States Parties have for the Protocol, based
in part on their different perceptions of the risk of biological
warfare.
Declarations
Declarations are the means by which States Parties submit
information on facilities identified as relevant to the Protocol,
including inter alia their involvement in activities and with
materials deemed to be of relevance to the Protocol. One particular
purpose of declarations is to understand the distribution of the
legitimate existence of specified dual-use goods, activities and
equipment, so that the undeclared presence of any such items might
represent non-compliance with the basic prohibitions of the
Protocol.9 There is a general recognition in the Ad Hoc
Group that declarations are an essential component of Article III
Compliance Measures, providing transparency in legitimate
activities and building confidence in the regime. The Ad Hoc
Group's work on composing appropriate declaration procedures has
been divided into two parts: looking at the triggers that will
define which facilities will be covered by declarations, and
devising the declaration forms to be completed and submitted.
Although inevitably the two aspects are intertwined, to the extent
that it is difficult to consider what to declare without fully
understanding who will be asked to declare it and vice versa, the
discussions on the declaration forms have made far steadier
progress than the discussions on the declaration triggers. At the
Seventeenth Session, the debate on the declaration triggers
revealed core differences in States Parties' attitudes to their
desired scope for the Protocol's means of monitoring
compliance.
The challenge to the Ad Hoc Group in developing appropriate
declaration triggers is to define facilities that have legitimate
purposes for dual-use goods, equipment and activities deemed of
particular relevance to potential biological weapons purposes. The
difficulty in doing so stems from the fact that the dual-use
materials, equipment and techniques necessary to make biological
weapons overlap to a great extent with a large array of civilian
activities. While it is not considered feasible to aspire to
include all the facilities that employ dual-use equipment or
techniques in a declaration regime, the pervasiveness of tools and
techniques that might be needed to make biological weapons demands
declaration triggers that are flexible enough to include a range of
activities, as well as clear enough to be implemented
unambiguously.
In general, there have been two ways of thinking about means of
devising particular declaration triggers. The first is to attempt
to define triggers in accordance with existing definitions of
containment practices at different facilities - that is, the
practices of containing input and output from particular
facilities, for example through filtered air supplies, air locks on
entry, etc. This approach piggybacks on existing classification
systems for health and safety controls, such as that of the World
Health Organisation which defines categories of Biosafety Levels
(BL) for the containment levels thought necessary for working with
different biological materials. BL4 is classed as the highest
containment level, and BL3 as the second highest level. The second
general approach is to base declaration triggers on particular
processes of relevance to the Protocol.
During the Ad Hoc Group's Seventeenth Session there was a
general level of acceptance of several broadly defined categories
of triggers to demarcate the facilities that would need to be
declared in the Protocol regime, although there was disagreement on
the definitions for these categories. These included facilities
involved in biodefence work, facilities working with BL4
containment levels, facilities involved in vaccine production, and
facilities that work with particular agents and toxins listed in a
separate annex of the Rolling Text. But debate focussed on defining
the category of Other Production Facilities, where differences in
opinion were both more divergent and more entrenched. China and the
Western Group represented the two extremes in this debate on
declaration triggers. China, feeling that the scope of the trigger
on other production facilities is too wide, reportedly wanted to
restrict the trigger to those other production facilities that
operate at BL3 levels of containment. In addition, China would like
to see a separate trigger for BL3 facilities included in the
Protocol in its own right. It is understood that the reason for
China's attachment to BL3 as a trigger for making a declaration is
that this carries a clear-cut definition that will identify
relevant facilities. This position seems to be based on a rationale
that the Protocol will only be able to monitor the activities of
states - rather than activities at the sub-state level - and any
state that would be planning an illicit offensive programme would
be more likely to locate such a programme in a facility with at
least BL3 levels of containment.
Underlying some of the disagreements between the Western Group
and China on interpreting the Other Production Facilities trigger,
are insights into the history of past biological warfare
programmes, and differences in the nature of the affected industry
around the world. First of all, the Western Group argues that to
concentrate declarations triggers too closely on containment levels
is misleading, since past offensive biological warfare programmes
were conducted without any formal containment levels. Thus a
potential proliferator would not have to locate an illicit
programme at a site with any containment, and not doing so would
not necessarily endanger the health and safety of workers or the
environment. Furthermore, the Western Group finds the concept of
any triggers based on a BL3 definition unacceptable and
impractical. The balance of the number of BL3 facilities is heavily
weighted towards countries in the West, so a BL3 trigger would have
the implication of producing a set of declarations similarly
weighted towards the West. It is understood that China acknowledges
this implication, but feels it is appropriate; since the majority
of resources are in the West, China postulates the most likely risk
of illicit biological warfare proliferation comes from the
West.
The fact that countries from the Western Group have such a
relatively large number of BL3 facilities may in itself reflect a
difference in the way the related industry is regulated in
different parts of the world. Some industry in the West is obliged
to operate at BL3 levels of containment to conform to domestic
health and safety regulations; a BL3 containment practice does not
necessarily reflect that a facility is employing technologies or
techniques of particular interest to the Protocol. Moreover, in
many Western countries industries operating at BL3 levels of
containment are already closely monitored nationally. Although such
indigenous regulation does not have an international component, and
so might not necessarily inspire confidence in the legitimacy of
the BL3 facilities among other states, it does enhance the West's
analysis that a BL3 trigger would not be a particularly relevant
category to monitor through declarations, and also that inclusion
of such a trigger would not be an effective use of the resources of
the international implementing organisation.
Investigations
Investigations, in the Rolling Text, are the mechanisms by which
States Parties can conduct on-site examinations at short notice in
cases of suspected non-compliance. Two different types of
investigation have been identified as necessary for the Protocol
regime: facility investigations, whereby states could investigate a
facility suspected of hosting an illicit biological weapons
programme, and field investigations, whereby states could
investigate an area where it was suspected that biological weapons
had been used. There is a lot of agreement on most of the sections
of the Rolling Text on investigations, which are remarkably free
from the square brackets that reflect the alternative formulations
for desired text by different states. But the Seventeenth Session
addressed two areas of fundamental disagreement: the means by which
investigations might be invoked, and the newly identified issue of
the process by which a field investigation might transition to
become a facility investigation.
It was widely recognised at the Seventeenth Session that the
prospect for further progress on these two issues was extremely
limited in the current stage of the negotiating format, that is,
discussion based on the Rolling Text; and it was felt that these
issues would not be resolved until the production of a Chair's
Text, i.e. a text produced by the Chair which eliminates most of
the brackets and anticipates likely acceptable compromises. In this
context it is interesting to note that the last scheduled Friend of
the Chair
meeting on Investigations at the Seventeenth Session was
cancelled, which would indicate that the discussion was not
progressing. (In fact, there was concern among some States Parties
that had this meeting happened the discussions may well have become
counter-productive, with the reintroduction of square
brackets).
The division over the appropriate means for invoking an
investigation separates those states favouring a 'red light'
mechanism from those who would prefer a 'green light' mechanism.
Both of these terms refer to the means whereby the Executive
Council of the international implementing organisation will decide
whether or not to proceed once a state party has requested an
investigation, and both rely on the Executive Council deciding by a
majority vote, with the necessary majority tightly defined. If a
'red light' mechanism were chosen, an investigation would proceed
unless the Executive Council voted by a specific majority against
doing so. On the other hand, with a 'green light' mechanism, an
investigation would proceed only if the Executive Council voted by
a specific majority to undertake the investigation. The problem in
deciding between these alternatives is that the Ad Hoc Group needs
to construct a system of invoking investigations that will deter
frivolous challenges, but that will be able to proceed with
investigations in genuine cases of suspected non-compliance.
The subject of potential cases of field investigation which may
require access to particular facilities, and how to construct
appropriate mechanisms for a field investigation to transition to
become a facility investigation, was a difficult and contentious
issue at the Seventeenth Session. There are a couple of provisions
that need to be resolved in this area of the Rolling Text. The most
problematic of these concerns possible cases in which a field
investigation might clearly indicate that a particular facility was
the source of the suspected contamination. This position is
informed to a great extent by the Sverdlovsk incident, in which an
unusual outbreak of anthrax in Sverdlovsk in the Soviet Union in
1979 in the vicinity of a previously known military biological
facility gave rise to suspicions that the facility was engaged in
illicit biological weapons activities. However there is nervousness
about giving the investigation team too many powers to promote the
transition from a field investigation to a facility investigation,
in that field investigations might thus provide quicker and easier
access to sensitive facilities than a facility investigation.
Several NAM countries - including India, Iran, Pakistan and China -
are particularly anxious about this.
Visits
The Rolling Text envisages visits as on-site activities
following the submission of declarations, providing mechanisms for
building confidence that declarations are complete and accurate.
Different types of visits have been proposed to fulfil several
specific functions, perhaps the most important of which is the role
of deterring illicit activities. All the proposed types of visit
have typically been the source of contention in the Ad Hoc Group
within and between the different negotiating caucuses. Such
disagreements continued to be a problem at the Seventeenth Session,
where the differences in states' ideas for visits particularly
focussed on the proposed provisions for clarification visits - i.e.
visits to clarify declarations, and randomly-selected visits - i.e.
infrequent mandatory visits to facilities selected on a random
basis as a follow up to declarations. During the Sixteenth Session
it became clear that the issue of visits was causing political
problems within the Western Group, and these problems continued
during the Seventeenth Session, where it was evident that there are
still differences within the Western Group on the necessary
provisions for randomly-selected visits, and between the Western
Group and the NAM on the necessary provisions for clarification
visits.
The Western Group favours developing an intrusive system of
measures to monitor compliance. The majority interpret this as
requiring strong provisions for randomly-selected visits, although
it is understood that this majority has not necessarily included
the US, Japan and to a lesser extent Germany, although with the
development of common European positions favouring intrusive
compliance measures Germany has come to accept such provisions more
and more. The resistance of these three countries to the inclusion
of strong randomly-selected visits is understandable given that
their analysis suggests that the burden of most of these visits
will fall on them, since they have the largest relevant industry,
and, in the case of the US, the biggest biodefence programme.
Britain attempted to bridge this gap, suggesting a compromise at
the Sixteenth Session within the Western Group. The majority felt
that Britain's suggested 'transparency visits' (a proposed
alternative to randomly-selected visits) were too weak, although
the US felt they were too strong. (The US initially stated that it
could not accept Britain's compromise paper, then made it known
that if everyone else in the Western Group accepted the paper it
would too). Subsequently, considerable pressure was exerted on
states to accept the proposed compromise. It is understood that,
while Britain would favour a more rigorous approach to
randomly-selected visits, it is also concerned to find constructive
suggestions to get the right overall balance in the package of
different sorts of visits.
Also at the Sixteenth Session, the NAM submitted a working paper
on a package of visits, which included stronger measures for
randomly-selected visits than Britain's proposed compromise
paper.10 Although it is understood that this paper is
not agreed to in all its provisions by China, the production of the
paper signalled a great success for the NAM - indicating that South
Africa, as coordinator, had achieved some sort of agreement within
the group on a very contentious issue. Meanwhile, in the context of
the Western Group differences over the scope of randomly-selected
visits, the NAM working paper presented a means for those states in
the Western Group unhappy with the less rigorous suggestion for
compromise to register their discontent more publicly. But the NAM
working paper also contained elements that are unacceptable to the
whole of the Western Group, in that it contained provisions for
that would allow voluntary visits (i.e. visits initiated
voluntarily by the state party to be visited, in order to clarify a
problem or to provide assistance) to eat up the quota of other
visits in any given year, and also because it contained weaker
provisions for clarification visits than had previously been deemed
acceptable to many in the Western Group - including the US. The
Western Group want clarification visits to be a mandatory
conclusion to clarification procedures which have failed to clear
up discrepancies about particular declarations, and argue that the
Protocol must include the possibility that clarification visits can
be applied to facilities that have not submitted declarations, as
well as those that have. Many in the NAM are anxious that
clarification visits provide more access to facilities on their
territories, and would prefer that they should only be conducted on
a voluntary basis, and that they should only be applied to
facilities that have submitted declarations. They also argue that
if States Parties were concerned that a relevant facility was not
included in a declaration, or a perceived problem was not resolved
through consultation procedures, or there was a failure to
volunteer to host a clarification visit, they could instigate an
investigation against the facility.
Following the introduction of the NAM paper on visits, some
Western Group states, including Australia, New Zealand, Norway and
the Netherlands, publicly welcomed the NAM paper on the floor of
the Ad Hoc Group, as providing a helpful contribution to
stimulating negotiations on this difficult issue. Others in the
Western Group were not pleased by this, particularly the US which
is anxious that the Western Group presents a united front on this
and other issues. US officials reportedly depicted those elements
of the Western Group that supported the NAM paper as having
endorsed the paper's weaker measures for clarification visits. (It
is understood that the US is particularly keen to maintain an image
of a united Western Group because it fears its own position may
isolate it, revealing how close many of its actual positions are to
those of China and India). The US and some other Western states now
claim that the debate on visits has shifted from randomly-selected
visits to clarification visits, wishful thinking that some
interpret as manoeuvring by the US to deflect attention away from
the impression that the US is rather isolated within the Western
Group on matters of visits.
The NAM paper reportedly changed the dynamics within the Western
Group in several ways. The fact that the NAM could get enough
consensus to produce such a carefully argued paper was a dramatic
success, and has enhanced the recognition of deep divisions among
the Western Group. Many feel that, because of the spectrum of views
in the Western Group and the NAM, issue based alliances might be a
more effective mechanism for consensus-building. The NAM working
paper has now been incorporated into the language of the Rolling
Text. At the Eighteenth Session, in addition to finding solutions
to the differences between and within the Western Group and the
NAM, the Ad Hoc Group must address the selection mechanisms for
visits.
Conclusions
Although there were no major breakthroughs at the Seventeenth
Session, progress was made in finding solutions to less contentious
measures. This should be recognised as a success, not least because
it has set the stage for a good start to the Eighteenth Session,
scheduled for January 17 - February 4, 2000.
It is expected that, at least for the first two sessions of
2000, progress will continue to be incremental on many measures.
Many feel that for several of the most difficult issues only
limited progress is possible from discussions based on the Rolling
Text, and fundamental breakthroughs will only transpire once the
negotiations have moved on to discussion of a Chair's Text. At the
same time, there are concerns that a premature Chair's text could
exacerbate present difficulties, and that the time will not be
right for this before April 2000.
BWC Ad Hoc Session Dates for 2000
Eighteenth Session, January 17 to February 4; Nineteenth
Session, March 3 to 13;
Twentieth Session, July 10 to August 4;
Twenty-First Session, November 13 to 24.
There is also the possibility of scheduling a further two-week
meeting if necessary in the second half of 2000.
Notes and References:
1. BTWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP.402, September 22, 1999.
2. See "The BTWC Protocol: The Debate About Visits",
Henrietta Wilson, Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue 40,
September/October 1999.
3. The CBW Conventions Bulletin, No 46, December 1999,
p 33.
4. "Biological Weapons: Easy to produce and difficult to
control", Alexander Kelle, Biotechnology and Development
Monitor, No 35, June 1998, pp18-21.
5. There are three regional groups in the Ad Hoc Group. The
Western Group, the Eastern European Group and the NAM and Other
Countries Group. The Western Group consists of all western European
countries, Turkey, Argentina, US, Canada, South Korea, Japan, New
Zealand and Australia. The Eastern European Group consists of
former Warsaw Pact countries (including Hungary and Poland). The
NAM and other countries Group consists of all the traditional
Non-Aligned countries (mostly developing nations) as well as China,
Brazil and Mexico.
6. "Complementary Measures Inside and Outside the Framework
of the BWC", Hassan Mashhadi, in Susan Wright (ed), "Current
Problems of Biological Warfare and Disarmament", preprint of
Symposium published in Politics and the Life Sciences, March
1999.
7. There are two relevant problems cited in connection with
the CWC, the first being the unequal way it has been implemented;
most frequently mentioned in this respect is the fact that the US
included several restrictions in its domestic implementing
legislation which unilaterally reduce the scope of the verification
provisions of the treaty. The second cited problem is the perceived
inadequacy of the final compromise achieved in the CWC's Article XI
- Economic and Technological Development.
8. Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the Convention on
the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their
Destruction, "Working paper submitted by the NAM and Other States;
Statement on Behalf of the Group of the Non-Aligned Movement and
Other States; Measures to Strengthen the Implementation of Article
III of the Convention", BWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP.407.
9. "Routine and Challenge: Two Pillars of Verification",
Douglas J MacEachin, The CBW Conventions Bulletin, No 39,
March 1998.
10. Op Cit, BTWC/AD HOC GROUP/WP.402, 1999.
Henrietta Wilson attended the Seventeenth Session of the
Ad Hoc Group of the BWC in Geneva (November 22 - December 10,
1999) on behalf of the Acronym Institute and
VERTIC.
© 2000 The Acronym Institute.
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