Disarmament Diplomacy
Issue No. 44, March 2000
Russian Perceptions of Nuclear Weapons
By Daniel Sumner
Introduction
At a time of political uncertainty in Russia, economic chaos,
military reforms and general deadlock in the international arms
control regime, a new sociological poll - commissioned by the PIR
Center for Policy Studies in Russia (Moscow) and the Center for
Nonproliferation Studies (Monterey, California) - has revealed that
the Russian public supports non-proliferation and disarmament but
believes that Russia needs to retain its nuclear capabilities.
The poll, which was conducted in October 1999, covered a
representative sample of adults from cities, towns and villages
throughout Russia, across all age-groups and levels of
education.1 In terms of its scale and specificity to
nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, the survey is the first
of its kind in Russia. This paper summarises the main findings and
considers the broader implications they may have for the
formulation of Russian nuclear policy in the coming months.
Since the poll was conducted, a number of events of potentially
great significance for the direction of that policy have taken
place. In December 1999, elections to the Duma, the lower house of
the Russian Parliament, returned a majority of members broadly
supportive of then-Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, opening up a
strong prospect of Russian ratification of the START II Treaty,
albeit hedged with conditions and reservations concerning American
plans to deploy a national missile defence at the possible expense
of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. In January, following
the abrupt resignation of President Boris Yeltsin, Putin became
Acting President and almost immediately signed into law a new
National Security Concept (see the last edition of Disarmament
Diplomacy for substantial extracts and coverage) which
reaffirmed the strong commitment of the previous, 1997 Concept to
nuclear deterrence and the possible first use, in extremis,
of nuclear weapons. A new Military Doctrine, replacing a 1993 text
and reaffirming support for Russia's nuclear status, has been
published in draft form and is awaiting final approval. And in late
March, Putin was elected President in elections brought forward
from July and to the backdrop of a bloody, ongoing war against
Chechen separatists.
After considering some of the key findings from the poll, this
paper also briefly addresses the implications and ambiguities of
the new National Security Concept. Taken in conjunction with the
findings of the survey, they offer little solace to those searching
for any groundswell of support in favour of a more proactive
nuclear disarmament stance by the Kremlin. The predominant mood,
both officially and publicly, is one of unease about US arms
control policy and the growing power and activism of NATO, mixed
with a desire to reassert Russian power and influence.
That said, the Russian Government is prepared - and, for
financial reasons, keen - to cut nuclear weapons back to
significantly lower levels. If nuclear weapons reductions could
take place in the context of a stable US-Russia relationship,
serious momentum towards disarmament might once again be driven
forward from Moscow.
Poll Findings: Summary & Assessment
In perhaps the most important single finding, 76% of those
interviewed said that Russia still needs nuclear weapons, with a
similar percentage believing that they play a key role in ensuring
Russia's national security. In this respect, public opinion
corresponds with the official government stance, as set forth in
the Concept of National Security:
"A vital task of the Russian Federation is to exercise
deterrence to prevent aggression on any scale against Russia and
its allies, either nuclear or non-nuclear. The Russian Federation
should possess nuclear forces that are capable of guaranteeing the
infliction of the desired extent of damage against any aggressor
(state or coalition), in any conditions and under any
circumstances."2
The male respondents were more inclined to voice their support
for Russia's nuclear weapons (82% of men, compared with 71% of
women), and there was also a clear correlation between positive
backing and education. Interestingly, 83% of those with higher
education considered Russia's nuclear status to be important,
compared with only 62% of those with only primary education.
The respondents were asked to choose from a list which arguments
of the pro- and anti-nuclear lobbies they found the most
convincing. The most popular argument put forward by the proponents
of Russia's nuclear arms is that Russia's nuclear status gives the
country political might, with which 40% of respondents agreed. Also
considered important is the suggestion that other countries would
not dare to attack a nuclear-armed Russia (37%). This belief in the
deterrence potential of nuclear weapons is particularly prevalent
in Moscow and St Petersburg (47%, compared to 38% in the villages).
The most popular argument against nuclear weapons is their cost
(24%; 27% among the educated), followed by a conviction that the
use of Russia's nuclear weapons would ultimately be too damaging to
Russia, and the belief that there is no point in nuclear weapons if
no one dares to use them.
When asked how many nuclear weapons Russia should possess, the
respondents were divided. The most popular answer overall was that
Russia needs the same number as the United States (US) (32%) but,
worryingly, 26% of those interviewed argued that Russia should
strive for more nuclear weapons than the US; in other words,
26% preferred the idea of superiority and a renewed arms race.
Whilst the educated are more inclined to come down heavily in
favour of parity (43%), as are the inhabitants of Moscow and St
Petersburg, the less educated actually prefer the concept of
nuclear superiority (28% call for more nuclear weapons than the US,
against 18% who stand for parity). Also supporting numerical
superiority are the elderly and the inhabitants of rural areas.
There are some supporters of the principle that the size of
Russia's arsenal should be determined independently from the US
(i.e. Russia should have several dozen, several hundred or several
thousand warheads, regardless of the US stockpiles), but these
amount to only 11% of the respondents. This demonstrates that the
Russian public still thinks of its nuclear weapons programme as
being in direct competition with the United States.
At present, Russia has an estimated 1,174 strategic delivery
systems (the US possesses 1,100 and Britain 48), and 22,500 nuclear
warheads (compared with 12,070 in the US and 192 in
Britain).3 Under the START II Treaty, the total number
of warheads possessed by Russia and the US would be cut to 3500
each by December 2007. A START III treaty, if and when it is
negotiated, would involve further quantitative reductions (as well
as qualitative measures), but all the measures under these
US-Russian bilateral agreements (past, present and future) proceed
from the premise of parity. There is a possibility, however, that
such reciprocal reductions are under threat, and the Russian
government has hinted that a new phase of the arms race may be
round the corner.4
On the question of First Use, the majority of Russians are in
favour of keeping the option open: 35% believe that Russia should
relinquish its right to use nuclear weapons when not in direct
response to a nuclear attack, while 47% say it should be retained.
The percentage calling for No First Use is highest in Moscow, St
Petersburg and other large cities5, where a small
majority is in favour of abandoning the right. The Soviet Union had
pledged a policy of No First Use in 1982,6 but this was
abandoned in the first Russian Military Doctrine of 1993, and both
the new Concept of National Security and the draft Military
Doctrine officially reaffirm Russia's right to use nuclear weapons
first.7 It seems that this stance enjoys public backing.
However, there is high-level support in Russia for the abandonment
of the policy. In an interview with a German newspaper, State Duma
Defence Committee Chairman Andrei Nikolayev said that Russia should
relinquish the right to First Use because it "harms Russia's
reputation and increases the threat of a nuclear war."8
This suggests that the issue is not set in stone, although it is
highly unlikely that Russia would take a unilateral step to pledge
No First Use.
Asked about the level of alertness and targeting of Russia's
nuclear weapons, the majority of respondents (51%) believed that
the missiles should not be pointed at any particular state. This is
in line with the official Russian position, which formally
de-targeted its nuclear weapons in 1994 in a bilateral agreement
with the United States.9 That said, experts believe that
Russian missiles retain Cold War target co-ordinates in their
memory banks, and that to return the weapons to fully targeted
status would take a scant ten seconds. Moreover, if a Russian
nuclear weapon were to be launched accidentally, it would
automatically revert to its primary Cold War target, be that
Washington, London, Beijing, Paris or any other city or
facility.10
Although the majority support de-targeting, they fall short of
advocating full-scale de-alerting. Only 12% believe that the
weapons should be kept in storage, while 82% maintain that missile
systems must be kept on full military alert. It is estimated that,
at present, Russia would be able to launch approximately 2,100
nuclear warheads within a few minutes of the command being given;
even with the full implementation of START I and II, this figure
would amount to several hundred.11 Such levels of
nuclear alertness call into question the effectiveness of
quantitative reductions, and de-alerting (a form of qualitative
disarmament) is a key measure advocated under proposals for START
III. The results of this poll suggest that such a step would be
unpopular with the Russian public.
There is still fear among the Russian population that the
country might be the target of nuclear aggression from another
state. 52% of the respondents consider such an attack to possible,
while 38% think it impossible. Women are considerably more likely
to believe that Russia may be on the receiving end of a nuclear
strike than men (58% and 44% respectively), whilst the young are
understandably more certain than the elderly that it could never
happen (not having lived through WWII and the entire Cold War).
Interestingly, the inhabitants of Moscow and St Petersburg - the
most likely targets of aggression by another state - are relatively
sure that there is no threat of nuclear attack (62%, against 28%
who consider it possible), whilst the rural respondents see things
rather differently: 53% of those living in villages think nuclear
aggression is a real threat, and only 38% believe it to be
impossible. This is perhaps an indication that mind-sets in the
countryside take longer to alter than they do in the cities, and a
suggestion that this aspect of Cold War mentality has not yet
dissipated in the villages.
Considerably more worrying is the possibility of nuclear
facilities in Russia becoming the target of terrorists. 89% of
those questioned believe that terrorists may attack such
facilities, whilst only 7% have enough faith in the security of
Russian nuclear facilities that they consider terrorist attacks to
be impossible. Strikingly, only 5% of the elderly believe the
facilities to be secure. It is worth remembering that the poll was
conducted in the wake of the Moscow apartment bombings, however,
and at a time when the Russian mass media was obsessed with
terrorism and the threats from bandits.
The Russian public is also concerned about the theft of
hazardous material from nuclear facilities: 83% of the respondents
said that such theft would be possible (86% of the educated
population, and 91% of those in Moscow and St Petersburg), whilst
only 10% were confident that it was impossible. This public fear
exists despite the repeated assurances of Minatom (Ministry of
Atomic Energy) officials that the nuclear material in Russia is
effectively guarded. In an interview given in November 1999, Victor
Yerastov, Head of the Department of Nuclear Material Accounting and
Control, asserted that the last registered case of fissile-material
theft was in 1995. However, he admitted that there were 52 cases of
such theft currently registered in the Department's database, which
suggests that the Russian public perception is not entirely
misplaced. Yeratsov maintains that most illegal trafficking
"involves radioactive substances having nothing to do with fissile
material. These sources of radiation are mainly used in the
national economy, in various industries", but this claim is less
than fully reassuring.12
The respondents were overwhelmingly against the transfer of
Russian nuclear technologies and materiel to other states (78%).
However, 14% considered that such nuclear transfer was permissible,
regardless of international responsibilities. This can be seen as a
firm commitment on the part of the Russian public to the principles
of non-proliferation, which is an endorsement of the obligations
Russia accepted under the terms of the 1968 Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).13 Despite being a major
exporter of conventional arms, the Russian government firmly and
vocally supports nuclear non-proliferation, officially recognising
the proliferation of nuclear arms as a principal threat to Russian
national security.14
In response to a direct question about the consequences of
nuclear proliferation - whether or not the world would become more
stable if more countries acquired nuclear weapons - a considerable
majority saw no benefit in proliferation: 76% of those interviewed
answered that an increase in the number of nuclear weapon states
would not enhance global stability, although a surprising 11%
believed that it would.
A majority of public opinion clearly regarded universal nuclear
disarmament (the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons) to be
the answer, but around a third disagreed. Overall, 57% of the
respondents thought that universal disarmament would make the world
more stable, and 34% believed it would not. As the level of
education increases, faith in global disarmament tends to decrease.
Of those with only basic education, 63% believe that elimination of
nuclear weapons will bring about global stability; only 51% of the
educated share this view. This correlation may be due to increased
exposure among the educated to government arguments on deterrence.
Of those who had maintained that there would be no gain from the
emergence of more nuclear-weapon States (NWS), only 60% suggested
that eliminating all nuclear weapons would increase stability. The
lack of clear commitment to global disarmament among the Russians
is mirrored by a less than enthusiastic approach to the issue of
START II ratification. Thus 55% believe that Russia should ratify
the Treaty, and 25% are against ratification. Some 20% of
respondents were not able to answer the question (32% among those
with only primary education). Some comfort can be drawn from the
fact that the young are more supportive of ratification than the
elderly (57% compared with 51%), and the educated are most in
favour (62%).
Russians do not trust the US to meet its international
obligations in arms control. Only 15% believe that the United
States will honour all its arms reduction commitments, while 72%
suspect that the Americans will carry out only those parts of the
agreements which serve its national interests. This mistrust could
be linked to the US plans to develop its national missile defence
(NMD) and possibly violate the terms of the ABM Treaty. However, it
turned out that only 41% of the respondents had heard anything
about the US NMD plans before the interview (65% of the educated).
An astonishing 54% knew absolutely nothing about the issue (amongst
those with only basic education, 74% either did not know about the
plans or could not answer the question). Knowledge about the NMD
issue increases with education, and those in large cities are more
aware than those in rural areas. However, given the considerable
coverage of the problem in the Russian mass media, the level of
ignorance is worrying. That something which threatens to derail the
international disarmament and non-proliferation regime could have
completely bypassed the majority of Russians suggests that the
average Russian really does not consider these issues except when
confronted with them explicitly, as in this poll.
When asked what they believed the Russian response should be, if
the US goes ahead with NMD plans, most respondents advocated
symmetric measures (i.e. the building of a Russian missile
defence). 47% thought that a Russian missile defence system would
be the best response (56% of the educated; 37% of those with
primary education), while 32% preferred diplomatic efforts and only
8% suggested increasing Russia's nuclear arsenal. The high
percentage calling for diplomacy is encouraging, as is the low
level of support for a resumption of the arms race. Russian
government officials have warned that their most likely response to
US NMD deployment would be to withdraw from START and build up the
Russian nuclear arsenal.15 Whilst this may be a bluff of
sorts, as the Russian economy would find it very difficult to
support a new build-up, it is interesting to note that the move
would probably be unpopular with the public if it were taken.
An overall analysis of the results of the poll enables us to
conclude that Russians generally support non-proliferation and
disarmament measures, and are in favour of compliance with existing
international obligations preventing the spread of nuclear arms.
However, they are not quite ready for universal disarmament, and
believe that Russia's nuclear weapons still play a major role in
national security.16
Nuclear Weapons in the National Security Concept
The poll could not have come at a more opportune moment. The
publication of the Concept of National Security in early January
turned the eyes of the world's media and public on to Russia's
nuclear weapons once again, and the developments in Chechnya have
forced the international community to see Russia as a military
power prepared to exert its authority. In such circumstances, it is
both interesting and valuable to have a picture of Russian public
opinion.
In fact, the Concept is recognised as a broad document - dealing
with internal policy and issues such as terrorism and social
malaises as well as matters of military security17 - but
international attention was focussed on the nuclear provisions,
which were seen by some as a lowering of the threshold for use. The
1997 Concept had reserved the right to a nuclear strike "in case an
armed aggression creates a threat to the very existence of the
Russian Federation as an independent sovereign state". This wording
has been altered in the new version to allow Russia "the use of all
forces and means at its disposal, including nuclear weapons, in
order to repel armed aggression against itself or its allies, when
no other means are deemed possible to prevent the liquidation of
Russia as a party to international relations."
Russian officials were quick to deny that there had been any
significant change in policy in this area,18 but the
expert community was divided on the matter. Some believe that the
circumstances under which nuclear weapons may be used have been
"considerably broadened."19 Dr Nikolai Sokov (Center for
Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey), for example, concluded that
"no longer are nuclear weapons reserved solely for extreme
situations; now they can be used in a small-scale war that does not
necessarily threaten Russia's existence."20 However,
there are also those who doubt that Russia's position has shifted
so dramatically. Ivan Safranchuk, of the PIR Center for Policy
Studies in Moscow, suggested that Putin used the early signature of
the document to make a political statement to the Russian elite;
taking the opportunity to make his mark as Acting President. The
furore caused by the wording was, in his opinion, accidental: the
result of a piece of careless editing which appeared, at first
glance, to put nuclear weapons on the same level as conventional
arms. Safranchuk doubts that the government intended to imply the
lowering of the nuclear threshold. His opinion appears to be
supported by the official Russian statements and by the parallel
Russian Military Doctrine, which includes security assurances and
clarifies nuclear arms as weapons of last resort.21
Other provisions of the Concept of National Security dealing
with nuclear arms are encouraging. Russia strives to:
- Achieve progress in nuclear arms control and maintain nuclear
stability in the world through states' compliance with their
international obligations in this respect;
- Fulfil mutual obligations to reduce and eliminate weapons of
mass destruction and conventional arms;
- Adapt existing arms-control and disarmament agreements in line
with the new climate in international relations, and also develop
when necessary new agreements especially for enhancing confidence-
and security-building measures; and
- Assist in establishing nuclear-weapon free zones.
Such objectives demonstrate that, at least on paper, Russia is
committed to international disarmament and non-proliferation.
Vladimir Putin did not develop a manifesto outlining his policy on
nuclear weapons for the Presidential campaign, so his actions as
Secretary of the Security Council, Prime Minister and Acting
President are all we have as indications of the directions he might
take. Putin was reportedly instrumental in the development of the
Concept, so conclusions about his attitudes may be drawn from the
broad support shown for the arms control regime, qualified by an
implicit distrust of NATO and the United States. In this respect,
the government position mirrors the attitudes given in the
PIR/Monterey public opinion poll outlined above. Putin himself has
repeatedly voiced his support for the ratification of START
II22, and showed that he regarded the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty (CTBT) (yet to be ratified by the Duma) as meeting the
vital interests of Russia.23 At time of writing, the
official Russian position on the ABM Treaty also remains unchanged:
any modification of the Treaty is regarded as unacceptable, and US
withdrawal from the Treaty may force Russia to pull out of the
START process, thus risking a new arms race.
In reality, Russia can ill afford to build up its nuclear
arsenal. There are serious financial barriers which make increasing
Russia's nuclear might an unrealistic prospect. Indeed, the dire
economic position is a key reason for the government's eagerness to
press ahead with further reductions under START III. Although arms
reductions are also costly to the national purse, the Comprehensive
Threat Reduction (CTR) programme provides Russia with financial aid
for disarmament. The public understand that maintaining nuclear
weapons at their present level is economically undesirable, and so
does the Russian government. Financial reasons are not everything,
but in the current climate in Russia they count for a lot.
Conclusion
It is unlikely that the results of the PIR/Monterey poll will
directly influence the government's decisions regarding nuclear
weapons and the corresponding treaties. However, it is interesting
to note the broad similarity between the current official stance
and public opinion. The government is in favour of nuclear
non-proliferation and disarmament, but is reluctant to take
unilateral measures and always relates its actions in this sphere
to those of the United States. In this respect, it is suspicious of
recent US and NATO developments. The public shares these feelings,
agreeing with the official position that Russia's nuclear weapons
are crucial to its status as a political power and vital for the
protection of its security interests.
Daniel Sumner, a Cambridge University student, is an
Acronym Institute intern working with the PIR Center for Policy
Studies in Moscow. The author would like to thank Ivan Safranchuk
and Sean Howard for their advice and assistance in preparing this
paper. The Acronym Institute also wishes to thank The Ploughshares
Fund for their generous support of Daniel Sumner's internship with
PIR.
Editor's note: Further information about the PIR Center
project, "Examining Attitudes of Russians Towards Nuclear Weapons
and Nuclear Challenges", is available from the project
director, Ivan Safranchuk: (subscription@pircenter.org).
Notes and References:
1. The respondents were divided into the following age groups:
18-28; 29-39; 40-59; 60+. For our purposes, "young" refers to the
18-28 band, and "elderly" refers to respondents over 60. Similarly,
the poll divided interviewees into four educational groups; in this
analysis, "educated" refers specifically to those with higher
education.
2. Concept of National Security of the Russian
Federation, January 2000.
3. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
4. The 2000 Concept of National Security predicts that "The
growing technical advantage of a number of leading powers and their
enhanced ability to create new weapons and military equipment could
provoke a new phase of the arms race and radically alter the forms
and methods of warfare." This can be interpreted as a reference to
US NMD plans, and also to the development of so-called "High
Precision Weapons" (HPW).
5. Cities with over one million inhabitants.
6. Bruce G. Blair: Statement before Subcommittee on Military
Research and Development, House National Security Committee, March
17, 1997.
7. The Concept of National Security asserts that Russia would be
prepared to use "all available forces and assets, including nuclear
weapons, in the event of the need to repel armed aggression, if all
other measures of resolving the crisis have been exhausted or have
proven ineffective".
8. Interview with Berliner Zeitung, March 6, 2000.
Reported in Russia Demands Security Guarantees from the
West, Gisbert Mrosek, Inopress, March 7, 2000.
9. Bruce G. Blair: Statement before Subcommittee on Military
Research and Development, House National Security Committee, March
17, 1997.
10. Ibid.
11. Nuclear Turning Point: A Blueprint for Deep Cuts and
De-Alerting of Nuclear Weapons, Harold A. Feiveson, Editor, The
Brookings Institution, July 1999
12. Interview conducted by D. Litovkin, PIR Center Staff Writer,
Yaderny Kontrol, No. 6, Vol. 48, November-December 1999.
13. See Articles I & III, 2 of the NPT prohibiting nuclear
transfer.
14. The 2000 Concept of National Security sees proliferation as
a "fundamental threat in the international sphere", and considers
the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime to be one of the
"principal tasks for ensuring the Russian Federation's national
security".
15. See, for example, Missile Shield Would Unravel Arms Pact,
Claims Russia, Russia Today (Reuters) March 6, 2000.
16. Compare this with the results of a British MORI poll,
published in March 2000 by the Oxford Research Group. The MORI poll
found that 68% of Britons would think more highly of Tony Blair if
he were to take a lead in negotiations to remove nuclear weapons
worldwide.
17. See Sergei Ivanov's Foreign Ministry Statement of February
16, 2000, clarifying the National Security Concept http://www.acronym.org.uk/urclar.htm
18. Ibid.
19. Dr Alexander Pikaev, Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace (Washington Post, January 15, 2000)
20. Nikolai Sokov, Russia's New National Security Concept:
The Nuclear Angle (CNS Report), Center for
Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute for International
Studies.
21. The Military Doctrine has yet to be finally approved by the
Russian Government. A draft has been published in full which is
expected to be passed soon without difficulty. See Draft of the
Military Doctrine: The Nuclear Factor (Arms Control Letter of
November 1999, PIR Center).
22. In this, he has the support of the Russian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense. See Russian Foreign
Ministry statement, document 181-21-3-2000, March 21, 2000.
23. A speech given on August 30, 1999 to mark the
50th anniversary of the first Soviet nuclear test.
(Reported in Security Issues, Volume 1, No. 6 - PIR Center,
March 2000).
© 2000 The Acronym Institute.
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