Disarmament Diplomacy
Issue No. 45, April 2000
Words and Deeds: What Japan Should Do To Promote Nuclear
Disarmament
By Motoko Mekata
Introduction
The Tokyo Forum on Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation,
convened by the then Foreign Minister Keizo Obuchi as a reaction to
the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in 1998,
presented its Action Plan in July 19991. For proponents
of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, the result of its
deliberations was far from satisfactory. Some seriously questioned
the Tokyo Forum's retreat from the passionately abolitionist tenor
and emphasis of the report of the Canberra Commission on the
Elimination of Nuclear Weapons in 19962. However, the
Tokyo Forum did provide a comprehensive agenda for nuclear
disarmament and non-proliferation, carefully incorporating the
opposing views that existed within the group. And, at the least,
its proposals were a big step forward from the official position
held by the Japanese Government. The two co-chairs of the Tokyo
Forum formally handed the final outcome to United Nations
Secretary-General Kofi Annan in New York and the paper was
presented to the UN General Assembly (UNGA) to be filed as an
official document. Nevertheless, the Japanese Government has to
date not made clear its official stance vis-à-vis the
proposals, despite the fact that the Forum was a
government-initiated project.
Why is this so? The official Japanese policy on nuclear
disarmament has always incorporated some degree of ambiguity. On
the one hand, Japan, the only state to have experienced atomic
bombings, has advocated the total elimination of nuclear weapons,
and has reiterated its commitments in promoting global nuclear
disarmament. Non-nuclear diplomacy has been, and still is, a pillar
of Japanese foreign policy. On the other hand, Japan
imposes some restrictive barriers on its own diplomatic style and
activity, sometimes unconsciously, refraining from taking an
independent stance on nuclear disarmament issues principally
because it remains under the US nuclear umbrella3. The
Japanese Government's total silence on the recommendations of the
Tokyo Forum reflects this reality.
Perhaps due to this ambiguous stance, Japan has never fully
convinced its neighbors that it will not engage in developing
nuclear capabilities of its own. Having sophisticated technologies
and enough plutonium for nuclear weapons production, there have
been constant suspicions of Japan acquiring its own nuclear weapons
should the security environment in North East Asia change
dramatically. Even deep within the mind of its American ally,
suspicions remain, and some have seen the US-Japan Security Treaty
as a means to prevent the militarisation and nuclearisation of
Japan4. In spite of the fact that it has been a member
of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
since 19765, has accepted the full scope safeguards of
the International Atomic Energy Agency, and has renounced war in
its Constitution, Japan has been unable to fully convince the
international community of its determination not to go nuclear.
What, then, should Japan do? How could Japan be a more credible
proponent of nuclear disarmament? This paper proposes that Japan
should not remain silent, but be more vocal and take concrete
actions. The government has for seven consecutive years introduced
resolutions on nuclear disarmament at the UNGA to demonstrate its
commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons. It is time for
Japan to put words into deeds, and conscientiously seek to take
stronger initiatives.
As the world steps into a new century, gloom has replaced the
euphoria that the world experienced immediately after the Cold War.
The nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in May 1998
reopened the discussion about the vulnerability of the
non-proliferation regime. A possible build-up of Chinese and North
Korean nuclear capabilities has, along with their missile testing,
raised new security concerns in another key region, North East
Asia. More fundamentally, the deteriorating political relationship
between the United States and Russia, coupled with a conservative,
anti-arms control backlash in both the Duma and the Congress -
illustrated most dramatically by the Senate's October 1999
rejection of the CTBT - has created a serious impasse in the
bilateral nuclear disarmament process.Although the Duma has now
approved the ratification of both the CTBT and the START II Treaty,
severe difficulties remain to be overcome, particularly with regard
to the future of the ABM Treaty, before the US-Russia arms control
agenda can safely said to be back on track.
In light of these dramatic changes in the global security
environment, this paper focuses on four areas that demand urgent
action to prevent further nuclear proliferation and to promote
global and regional nuclear disarmament. In all of these areas, it
will be argued, a more pro-active and dynamic contribution from
Japan is both desirable and capable of exerting an important
influence for positive change.
CTBT Implementation and the NPT Regime
When the NPT was indefinitely extended in 1995, it was
understood by the non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) that, in
exchange for their acceptance of indefinite extension, the
nuclear-weapon states (NWS) would accept increased responsibility
for promoting nuclear disarmament in good faith, in accordance with
Article VI of the NPT. However, within most of the NNWS there
remains considerable dissatisfaction over the lack of concrete
accomplishments achieved during the five years since 1995. One
example of this discontent is reflected in the resolution presented
to the UNGA by the New Agenda Coalition, a group of NNWS that cuts
across existing regional groupings6. The NAC introduced
its resolution over two consecutive years (1998 and 1999), calling
on the NWS to make "an unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the
speedy and total elimination of their nuclear arsenals." Although
all the NWS voted against it, thirteen NATO members plus Japan and
Australia abstained, while more than one hundred nations voted in
favour of it each year.
Unless there are new prospects for nuclear disarmament in the
foreseeable future, and the NWS and their allies seriously come to
grips with nuclear disarmament, some states may think twice about
their commitment to the NPT. Even if a NNWS should withdraw from
the NPT, this does not necessarily mean that it will seek to
acquire nuclear weapons of its own. The majority of the NNWS are
part of regional nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) treaties and thus
dissatisfaction with the NPT should by no means be linked directly
with a desire to possess nuclear weapons. However, should there be
a growing number of countries that lose patience with an NPT that
seems to serve only the interests of the NWS and their allies, the
NPT could lose its credibility as a basis for promoting nuclear
disarmament. As a consequence, both the non-proliferation regime,
and attempts to achieve multilateral nuclear disarmament, would
face a major crisis.
In order to avoid such a critical situation, the most urgent
priority must be to ensure early implementation of the CTBT; this
is a task that Japan should take a leading role in achieving.
The only - albeit valuable - achievement of multilateral nuclear
disarmament efforts in the post-Cold War era has been the
conclusion of the CTBT in 1996. Significant impetus for the
conclusion of the accord was provided by the "Principles and
Objectives" which were adopted as a "package deal" when the NPT was
indefinitely extended in 1995 and which specifically made reference
to completion of the CTBT negotiations by the end of 1996. Because
the conclusion of the CTBT was the only commitment towards nuclear
disarmament that was accompanied by a deadline in the "Principles
and Objectives", the NWS - including the United States - put
substantial energy into finalising the CTBT text in 1996.
Nevertheless, the fate of the Treaty is radically uncertain. Entry
into force requires the ratification of all 44 states listed as
possessing nuclear facilities. Three of these states - India,
Pakistan and North Korea - have yet to sign the Treaty, and seem
unlikely to do so in the near future. Of the declared
nuclear-weapon states, France, Britain, and now Russia have
ratified, and China is expected to, but the US Senate's rejection
is unlikely to be overturned while the Republican Party retains a
firm grip on Congress, a situation of stalemate which will clearly
delay efforts to persuade other states, particularly in South Asia,
to make a decisive commitment.
If the worst comes to the worst and the CTBT becomes a "dead
document", the international community will lose not
only the legal basis for banning nuclear tests, but also the
confidence that has been built between the NWS and NNWS since
indefinite extension of the NPT. If the NWS fail to ratify the
CTBT, it will be understood among the NNWS that the NWS would
prefer to continue with nuclear testing and strengthen their
nuclear capabilities. If the self-interest of the NWS is thus
emphasized, discomfort over the inequality of the NPT will be
amplified. Therefore, the entry into force of the CTBT is
indispensable not only for the non-proliferation regime that the
NWS vigorously want to maintain, but also for the international
community which seeks to advance nuclear disarmament.
Japan, which advocates early entry into force of the CTBT,
chaired the CTBT Article XIV Entry-Into-Force Special Conference
held in Vienna in early October 1999. After the US Senate refused
to ratify the CTBT shortly after the Special Conference, the
Japanese Government immediately sent special missions to
Washington, New Delhi and Islamabad to convey the Japanese Prime
Minister's wish that the utmost efforts be directed towards early
ratification. However, there still remains strong opposition among
Republicans in the US Senate, and no prospect of ratification under
the Clinton Administration. Moreover, the United States is no
longer in a position to urge other states to ratify the CTBT, nor
to create momentum for its early entry into force.
This vacuum of leadership badly needs to be filled. Japan should
take a constructive lead along with the NWS that have already
ratified the CTBT, such as Britain and France, and NNWS such as
Germany and Canada, to encourage those countries that have not yet
done so to ratify the Treaty. One of the measures which could be
adopted is to establish some updated "Principles and Objectives" at
the 2000 NPT Review Conference, which include specific reference to
a deadline for the entry into force of the CTBT, and which
reiterate the political responsibilities of the United States,
Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea to ratify
the Treaty. As President Clinton stated when he signed the CTBT, it
is "the longest-sought, hardest-fought prize in the history of arms
control."
The 1995 "Principles and Objectives" state that the NWS "should
exercise utmost restraint" with regard to conducting nuclear tests
during the period before the CTBT enters into force. In the updated
"Principles and Objectives" this phrase should be amended to
prohibit nuclear tests, even before the entry into force of the
CTBT. In this way, further nuclear tests should be, de
facto, eliminated.
Reform of the NPT and Multilateral Disarmament
A Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) was set up
even before the Treaty entered into force in order to renew the
verification regime and promote CTBT ratification. The Organization
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) was also established
a few years after the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons
Convention to support the implementation of that convention.
However, the NPT - which entered into force in 1970 and has more
than 180 member states - has yet to establish an executive
organisation. Since its inception, the NPT has relied upon the IAEA
for verifying the fulfilment of obligations assumed under the
Treaty. In order to strengthen the non-proliferation regime through
the NPT, the 2000 Review Conference should establish a Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty Organization (NPTO) that includes a
Permanent Secretariat and Standing Committee to institutionalise
negotiations on nuclear disarmament.7
The principal tasks of the NPTO would be to strengthen the NPT
regime and review the processes of the Treaty, which would include
monitoring the implementation of the updated "Principles and
Objectives." Although indefinite extension of the NPT was realised
only as a result of a package of decisions including a strengthened
review process, the three preparatory committees held from 1997 to
1999 failed to agree on either substantive or procedural matters.
The NWS must acknowledge that nuclear disarmament is an essential
component of non-proliferation, and that the shortcomings of the
review process must be rectified so that nuclear disarmament can be
negotiated in an ongoing forum.
The NPTO should also take up the challenge of a new and
innovative task, namely to facilitate the commencement of
negotiations on a Framework Convention on Nuclear Weapons (FCNW),
based on Article VI of the NPT8. The FCNW could be
modeled after the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone
Layer (Vienna Convention) and the Framework Convention on Climate
Change (FCCC). Both of these conventions first established their
basic objectives and principles through "framework conventions,"
and then the member states concluded protocols that elaborated
numerical targets and timetables. Likewise, the FCNW should first
clearly set forth the commitment to conclude separate protocols to
achieve comprehensive nuclear disarmament.
Article VI of the NPT reads: "[E]ach of the Parties to the
Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective
measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early
date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and
complete disarmament under strict and effective international
control." The "Principles and Objectives" adopted in 1995 state
that the NWS "reaffirm their commitment, as stated in Article VI,
to pursue in good faith negotiations on effective measures relating
to nuclear disarmament." The adoption of the "Principles and
Objectives" was, as mentioned earlier, a "package" deal along with
indefinite extension of the NPT, and as such established a clear,
sound basis for the NWS to commit themselves to the FCNW. The
incremental nature of this process should ease the participation of
the NWS since the FCNW would not itself include numerical targets
or timetables for nuclear disarmament. Even if member states were
not able to agree on specific protocols in a short time, the FCNW
would partially contribute to implementing the obligations of the
NWS spelled out in Article VI.
Although the legal foundation for negotiations on the FCNW would
be Article VI of the NPT, the negotiation conference would need,
however, to be independent of the NPT. The reason for this is,
firstly, that the FCNW should seek to address comprehensive nuclear
disarmament based on multilateral negotiations directed towards
"nuclear elimination", and not just be limited to the task of
preventing the "horizontal proliferation" of nuclear weapons.
Secondly, this would enable the participation of states that are
non-members of the NPT, such as India, Pakistan, and Israel. By
opening the door for India and Pakistan, in particular, to join the
negotiations on comprehensive nuclear disarmament, these countries
should have no excuse for being critical of - or refusing to join -
the NPT.
Once the FCNW is concluded, the member states should move on to
negotiate protocols as soon as possible. Protocols could cover a
variety of agenda items including a Fissile Materials Cut-Off
Treaty (FMCT), the international storage or management of plutonium
and highly enriched uranium, and negative security assurances,
among others.
Bearing in mind the fact that the arms control gloom which
dominated the latter half of the 1990s was largely due to a lack of
political leadership from the NWS, it is also imperative that Japan
co-operate closely with other non-nuclear allies of the United
States, as well as with NAC countries, to convince all states which
possess nuclear weapons to join efforts to establish an NPTO, and
subsequently an FCNW. Japan could act as a facilitator in
sponsoring and funding the meetings at the initial preparatory
stages.
A North East Asia Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone
In addition to global efforts on nuclear disarmament, a high
priority should be placed on regional disarmament arrangements.
Among various initiatives for establishing regional NWFZs, special
attention should be paid to North East Asia (Japan and the Korean
Peninsula). This is, first, because three of the NWS face each
other in this region: China, the United States, and Russia. In
addition, potential nuclear capable actors such as Japan, South
Korea and Taiwan, as well as North Korea, are located in or near
the region. Secondly, in contrast to Europe where the Cold War is
now history, remnants of the Cold War are still present in North
East Asia, giving rise to an urgent need for a new security regime
in the region. Easing tension in this region would also have
positive impacts on global nuclear disarmament efforts.
The NWS also have incentives to establish a NWFZ in North East
Asia. Doing so would not only ensure that North Korea renounces
nuclear weapons, but would also reinforce Japan and South Korea's
commitment to non-proliferation. Apprehensions about the
possibility of Japan developing nuclear weapons would be
practically eliminated if Japan were to join such a legally binding
instrument, in addition to the NPT. Also, the potential danger that
a reunified Korean Peninsular might inherit North Korea's potential
nuclear capability, should unification occur, would be
erased.9
Undoubtedly, the most immediate concern is posed by North Korea:
a concern that took on a new dimension when North Korea launched a
medium-range Taepo-Dong missile in August 1998. North Korea,
a country that suffers from poverty, famine, and international
isolation, shocked the international community with this
demonstration of its missile technology. Efforts by the United
States, South Korea, Japan and others - through the US-North Korea
Agreed Framework of October 1994 - to provide proliferation
resistant light-water reactors in exchange for North Korea
terminating its dubious nuclear programmes seem not to have
dissuaded North Korea from taking such provocative actions.
The current focus is on how North Korea will respond to the
Perry initiative, a comprehensive policy review conducted by former
US Defense Secretary William Perry at the request of President
Clinton. The new policy - the "Perry process" - presented to the
President and the Congress in September 1999, uses a
carrot-and-stick approach to entice Pyongyang to curtail its
missile and nuclear ambitions: that is, further negative
developments will bring further sanctions, while co-operation
brings rewards. Following bilateral talks with the United States,
North Korea agreed to refrain from conducting further missile
tests, in exchange for the partial lifting of economic sanctions
imposed on it by the United States ever since the Korean War in the
1950s.
Soon after this US effort to eventually normalise diplomatic
relations with Pyongyang, Japan agreed to resume preliminary talks
on the normalisation of diplomatic ties between Japan and North
Korea. It remains to be seen whether this initiative will produce
any tangible results, especially when non-security concerns such as
the "abduction issue" - suspected kidnappings of Japanese citizens
by North Korean agents - remains a major political stumbling block
between the two countries. Nevertheless, the concerned states must
seize this opportunity and strive to engage North Korea in a
constructive dialogue. As the Perry report emphasises, the
establishment by Washington, Tokyo and Seoul of a framework to
jointly deal with future situations is imperative. Such joint
efforts would set a solid foundation for beginning negotiations on
establishing a nuclear-free North East Asia.
A key factor in the process toward a North East Asia NWFZ is the
Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO),
established in March 1995 on the basis of the United States-North
Korean Agreed Framework. KEDO assists North Korea in building
light-water nuclear reactors for electric power generation. The
question of how best to utilise KEDO in the future will be an
important issue related to a non-nuclear North East Asia. First of
all, it will be important for the concerned parties to fulfil
KEDO's initial mandates10. Doing so will not only keep
North Korea from having an excuse for nuclear weapons development,
but will also be important in building trust among North Korea and
the other states concerned. But even if KEDO's current limited
mission is successful as a catalyst in clarifying North Korea's
status as a NNWS, it cannot completely assure denuclearisation.
Even with the decommissioning of a spent-fuel reprocessing plant
and carbon reactors from which weapons-grade plutonium can be
extracted, as the KEDO mission stands today there is no way of
guaranteeing that each nuclear-related facility is inspected and
its use verified by an internationally authorised body.
One way of compensating for this would be by incrementally
empowering KEDO so that it evolved into an organ like the European
Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM, established in 1957), with the
simultaneous task of promoting both the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. EURATOM
originally came into being as a means of promoting the peaceful use
of nuclear energy in Germany while preventing that country from
developing nuclear weapons, but later it became an important
stepping-stone towards the political and economic unification of
Europe. EURATOM has its own mechanism of inspections and
verification, which ensures a double-lock system along with IAEA
safeguards.
Taking this as an instructive precedent, KEDO could eventually
evolve into a system of co-operation that would include, for
example, the transfer of safety technologies, safety training at
nuclear energy facilities, the management and disposal of nuclear
wastes, development of other types of energy technologies, and
measures for environmental protection. In working towards this
goal, a concept for modifying KEDO - as well as an expanded North
East Asia nuclear energy community - could be discussed through
"twin-track" diplomacy. In the longer term, these discussions could
be used as a stepping-stone towards official negotiations.
A programme for the use of plutonium in nuclear power plants is
a potential window of proliferation. Today, Japan is the only
non-nuclear-weapon state that has active program of plutonium use
in this region. As long as Japan maintains its position on
plutonium use, it will be extremely difficult for her to convince
other members of the NWFZ in North East Asia not to adopt the
plutonium economy. Therefore, Japan should freeze plutonium fuel
cycle option, and adopt one-through policy of nuclear energy.
An important factor in institutionalising such a process to
create the NWFZ in North East Asia would be the participation of
China. Although China is not a member of KEDO, and its influence
over North Korea should not be overestimated, engaging China in the
dialogue would be essential in establishing a regional NWFZ. As
stated earlier, China is a major player in the region and so
tensions in US-China relations, in particular, would inevitably
make it more difficult to undertake constructive initiatives.
One important way in which China should be engaged would be for
it to provide legally binding negative security assurances to
Japan, South Korea and North Korea. This could also be promoted by
the other two NWS that have a large stake in the region doing
likewise. Such an effort should be seen as complementary to the
global Protocol on Negative Security Assurances that has already
been proposed. Negative security assurances would also provide
realistic incentives to Japan, South Korea and North Korea to
participate in establishing a regional NWFZ.
At the same time, it is indispensable that all the relevant
states strongly urge North Korea to join the CWC. Although North
Korea has already ratified the BWC, doubts still remain about its
possible possession of chemical weapons. The United States, which
maintains its option to use nuclear weapons to counter the use of
any weapons of mass destruction (WMD), will not agree to such
negative security assurances unless there is a clear commitment by
North Korea to renounce all types of WMD. Therefore, it is also be
necessary for all states concerned to convince North Korea to
abandon all its options for WMD-development.
Refraining from TMD Deployment
The United States is actively considering the deployment of two
types of ballistic missile defense systems: a US national missile
defence (NMD) system designed to protect the United States from
attacks by a limited number of intercontinental-range ballistic
missiles (ICBMs), and a theatre missile defense (TMD) system
designed to counter short-range missiles launched at US troops and
allies abroad. However, the ABM Treaty only allows for the
construction of very limited missile defence systems. In order to
deploy the ballistic missile defence systems (BMDs) it would like
to, the United States will either have to modify the Treaty - which
Russia has said it will not agree to11 - or abrogate it
- a move which Russia has said it will respond to by withdrawing
from all its nuclear arms control commitments and refusing to enter
any further negotiations.
Russia and China jointly introduced a resolution on the
"preservation of and compliance with the ABM Treaty" to the UNGA in
late 1999, and while 68 countries, including Japan,abstained and
four countries (Israel, Latvia, Micronesia and the US)voted
against, 80 voted in favour, including France.
The Russian Foreign Ministry emphasized the significance of the
ABM Treaty and its opposition to NMD by stating "the results of the
vote are a reflection of the increased concern of the world
community over the fate of the ABM Treaty, which is the basis of
world strategic stability and of the entire system of international
accords on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, in connection
with the US plans to develop a national ABM system, a system that
is prohibited by the Treaty."12
For its part, China's long-term concern is that initially
limited TMD systems might evolve into full-scale NMD systems. In
the words of China's UN Ambassador for Disarmament Affairs: "The
so-called Theater Missile Defense systems… which certain
countries are going all out to develop will in fact possess the
capacity to intercept strategic missiles, thus breaking the limits
imposed by the ABM Treaty and rendering the treaty virtually
meaningless."13 Specifically, China is worried that
deployment of a TMD system in Japan will eventually lead to
deployment in Taiwan. If the United States decides to deploy NMD
and accordingly continues to pressure Russia to agree to modify the
ABM Treaty or, without such an agreement, abandons the Treaty, it
is hard to see how serious military and political destabilisation
on a global scale could realistically be avoided. In the Asian
context, China would be highly likely to accelerate its efforts to
obtain Multiple Independently-Targetable Re-entry Vehicle (MIRVed)
ICBMs, precipitating a new nuclear arms race. This, in turn, would
doubtless be used to justify new, enhanced missile defences, thus
drastically reducing the likelihood that the initial NMD deployment
decision would ever be reversed.
Despite these huge dangers and ominous stormclouds, the United
States and Japan are jointly proceeding with TMD research, based on
a Memorandum of Understanding signed in August 1999. The Japanese
Government explained this decision as a reaction to the launching
of the Taepo-Dong missile by North Korea, interpreting TMD
as a means to counter further North Korean missiles. Japan should
take an extremely cautious approach towards the proposed TMD
system: if the TMD system is really designed to deter any future
missile attack by North Korea, Japan should refrain from deploying
it as long as North Korea remains committed to the Perry process.
Japan should also make clear to China that should it decide to
employ TMD, the system would not be targeted against Chinese
missiles, nor would it be used to defend Taiwan. Japan should also
urge the United States to refrain from deploying a TMD system in
Taiwan.
Instead of overestimating the utility of a TMD system, whose
military capabilities are still far from demonstrated, Japan should
consciously try to advance the Perry process and achieve diplomatic
normalisation with North Korea. As for the NMD system, its
deployment should be moderated to maintain the current ABM Treaty
framework. Preventing any worsening of regional tension is the
purpose of confidence building measures, and, as such, they should
be used to facilitate the establishment of a NWFZ in North East
Asia.
From Words to Deeds
In October 1999, the then Vice-Minister of the Japan
Self-Defense Agency, Shingo Nishimura, shocked the world by stating
that the Diet should consider the option of possessing nuclear
weapons.14 Although he was immediately dismissed from
his post and the government reiterated its official position of
maintaining Japan's non-nuclear status, his statement evoked severe
criticism and suspicion of Japan's "potential ambitions".
This incident brought to the surface an underlying problem: the
lack of sufficient sensitivity in Japan to the concerns that exist
abroad. Actually, the great majority of Japanese have a strong
aversion to nuclear weapons and could not imagine Japan developing
such weapons of its own. Nevertheless, to firmly demonstrate that
Japan will never become a NWS, and that she is a credible actor in
the nuclear disarmament process, Japan will have to take concrete
actions, rather than make rhetorical statements. Only through deeds
can Japan make a "positive-sum game" a reality, both within Japan
and the international community.
Notes and References
1. The Tokyo Forum on Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation,
attended by twenty-five experts from eighteen countries, including
all nuclear-weapon states, India and Pakistan, held four meetings
in Tokyo (August 30-31), Hiroshima (December 18-19), New York
(April 9-10), and Tokyo (July 23-25), and presented its final
proposal, "Facing Nuclear Dangers: An Action Plan for the
21st Century," on July 25. The full text of the report
is available from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs http://www.mofa.go.jp. See also Disarmament Diplomacy No. 39,
July/August 1999.
2. The full text of the report of the Canberra Commission is
available on the website of the Australian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Trade, http://www.dfat.gov.au/dfat/cc/cchome.html.
The site also has a wealth of information on the Commission's
establishment and mandate.
3. A recent example of this self-constraining tendency may be
Japan's reluctance to associate itself with the New Agenda
Coalition initiative. The Japanese Government's establishment of
the Tokyo Forum can perhaps be seen in part as an attempt to
re-emphasize Japan's credentials as a strong, pro-active,
high-profile, pro-disarmament state, albeit one unable to criticise
nuclear policies and doctrines with the same degree of political
consistency and credibility as is possible for New Agenda
states.
4. A recent opinion poll conducted jointly by the Asahi
Shimbun and the Harris Poll showed that 49% of Americans saw
the purpose of the US bases stationed in Japan as a means to
prevent militarisation by Japan. The Asahi Shimbun, April
13, 1999, p. 1.
5. The government signed the treaty on February 3, 1970 but did
not ratify it until June 8, 1976.
6. The NAC was launched by a declaration - 'A
Nuclear-Weapons-Free World: The Need for a New Agenda' - released
on June 9, 1998, by Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand,
Slovenia (which subsequently disassociated itself from the
initiative), South Africa and Sweden. For the full text of the
declaration and related materials, see Disarmament Diplomacy No. 27, June
1998.
7. The establishment of a permanent secretariat and consultative
commission for the NPT formed one of the recommendations of the
Tokyo Forum.
8.The Institute for International Policy Studies (IIPS - Tokyo),
the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, and the Belfer Center for Science
and International Affairs (BCSIA) of Harvard University also
propose to establish a Framework Convention on Elimination of
Nuclear Weapons. See "Joint Proposal on Nuclear Non-Proliferation
and Disarmament", Research Institutes of Japan, Germany, and the
United States, March 5, 1999. Full text available on the website of
IIPS, http://www.iips.org/joint.html.
9. Morton Halperin, Director of the Office of the Policy
Planning at the State Department, stated that the "US policy
continues to be premised on the assumption that further reductions
in the US nuclear arsenal, accompanied by no-first use guarantees,
would increase the chances that Japan would develop nuclear
weapons," but he concludes that "if the United States took the lead
in suggesting a North East Asia nuclear free zone, Japan would not
find it possible to resist. …the concern of Japanese leaders
about the future direction of a unified Korean government creates
an opportunity for the United States to involve Japan in an effort
to resolve the situation in a way that would both strengthen the
non-nuclear status of Japan and Korea…" See The Nuclear
Dimension of the US-Japan Alliance, East Asia Nuclear Policy,
the Nautilus Institute, July 9, 1999.
10. The implementation of the Agreed Framework by KEDO has been
dogged by delays and financial crises. The original date set for
the completed construction of the replacement nuclear reactors was
2003; it is now set at 2007. See Disarmament Diplomacy No. 42, December
1999, for details of the current situation.
11. With regard to the proposed TMD system, the United States
and Russia agreed in September 1997 to the following points: that a
TMD system is a system with interceptor missiles whose maximum
demonstrated velocities are not to exceed, and have not exceeded,
3.09 kilometers/second; and that the TMD components or systems will
not violate the ABM Treaty if the target missile does not exceed a
velocity of 5.0 kilometers/second, or a range of 3500 kilometers.
The purpose of this agreement was to make it impossible for the
United States to defend against Russian strategic missiles.
12. Statement by the Official Spokesman of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Russia, December 4, 1999, unofficial
translation.
13. Statement by Sha Zukang, China's UN Ambassador for
Disarmament Affairs, before the UN General Assembly on October 18,
1996.
14. See Disarmament Diplomacy No.
41, November 1999, for Nishimura's remarks.
Motoko Mekata is a Research Fellow at the Tokyo
Foundation. The Foundation - an independent, non-profit policy
think tank - has initiated a year-long research project on nuclear
disarmament issues, designed to form part of the three year
'Project Alliance Tomorrow' initiative headed by Yoichi Funabashi,
Chief Diplomatic Correspondent for The Asahi Shimbun. The
initiative's research on nuclear issues led to the establishment of
a study group that brought together five Japanese scholars, as well
as drawing on international expertise. While this paper is based
largely on the study group discussions, the opinions expressed are
solely those of the author.
© 2000 The Acronym Institute.
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