Disarmament Diplomacy
Issue No. 45, April 2000
NPT Update
The Review Conference Opens: Dominant Issues & Contested
Claims
By Rebecca Johnson and Jenni Rissanen
Appendix includes:
The Sixth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) opened at the United
Nations in New York on April 24, 2000. Ambassador Abdallah Baali of
Algeria was elected by acclamation as President of the Conference.
In his opening address, Baali welcomed the nine accessions to the
NPT since 1995 and gave a brief overview of positive and negative
developments. He drew particular attention to the nuclear tests by
India and Pakistan, the US Senate's refusal to ratify the CTBT,
delayed progress on nuclear disarmament, the continued existence of
over 30,000 nuclear weapons, the nuclear strategies of NATO and
Russia, and US plans to deploy ballistic missile defences that
would be incompatible with the ABM Treaty. But warning against
"yielding to pessimism", Baali also spoke of positive developments,
including unilateral nuclear reductions and greater transparency,
developments on nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ), the model
additional IAEA protocol to increase the effectiveness of the
safeguards regime, and the conclusion of the CTBT. Saying that "the
outcome of this Conference will have a major impact on deciding the
future course of the NPT and the nuclear non-proliferation regime
for generations to come", and commending the role of civil society
and NGOs, Baali called for differences to be bridged with a
"determination to find a common agreement on realistic measures
that could help us in advancing further towards the fullest
realisation of the goals of the Treaty from now until the next
review conference in 2005 and beyond".
After much behind-the-scenes negotiations with key states in the
run-up to the Review Conference, Baali confirmed consensus
agreement on the establishment of two subsidiary bodies, on nuclear
disarmament and on regional issues, with reference to the Middle
East. The subsidiary bodies were set up along the lines proposed
during the Preparatory Committees (PrepComs) by South Africa and
Egypt and taken up by the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), despite
opposition from some of the nuclear powers, especially the United
States, in the run-up to the Conference.
The United Nations Secretary-General and the Director General of
the IAEA both addressed the opening of the Conference. The
Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, reminded Conference participants
that "the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including
nuclear weapons, remains a major threat to peace" and that the
challenge for NPT Parties was to "embark on a process that will
ensure the full implementation of all of the provisions of
the treaty by all of the States Parties". Like Baali and
many of the speakers who followed, the Secretary-General made
reference to some of the regime's challenges, such as the thousands
of nuclear weapons still on hair-trigger alert, tactical nuclear
forces, the "re-affirmation of nuclear doctrines", including
retention of first use by some of the nuclear-weapon states (NWS),
and the "pressure to deploy national missile
defences...jeopardising the ABM Treaty". He also expressed concern
that "the established multilateral disarmament machinery has
started to rust...due...to the apparent lack of political will to
use it". Considering that the most effective way to implement the
Treaty and build on past progress would be "to embark on a
results-based treaty review process focussing on specific
benchmarks", Annan suggested what such marks might be: entry into
force of the CTBT; deep irreversible reductions in nuclear weapons
stocks; consolidation of nuclear-weapon-free zones and negotiation
of further NWFZ; binding security assurances; improvements in
transparency of nuclear weapon arsenals and nuclear materials.
IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei spoke of the importance
of safeguards and verification and summarised some of the problems,
challenges and developments in the IAEA's work. In particular, he
urged all states to conclude their Article III safeguards
obligations and also to sign up to the additional protocol
developed after the problems with Iraq and North Korea, as this
would enhance the effectiveness of inspections and the enforcement
of the NPT. ElBaradei also referred to "sluggish" progress on
disarmament and the danger of unravelling the non-proliferation
regime. He quoted the 1996 advisory opinion of the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) and called for "comprehensive and in-depth
dialogue among the weapon states on practical measures to gradually
reduce the number of, and move away from dependence on, nuclear
weapons for their defence strategies, and thus lead by
example".
More than 90 national and group statements were heard, many of
which echoed the points made in the opening addresses of the
President and the UN Secretary-General. There were references to
the lack of universality of the Treaty and worries arising from the
nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, emphasised especially by
European countries and Japan. Algeria's Secretary-General for
Foreign Affairs, Abdelmajid Fasla, called for a NWFZ in the Middle
East. Several of the Arab States and others raised concerns about
Israel's unsafeguarded nuclear programme. Many pointed to the
continuing failure to resolve the compliance challenges from Iraq
and North Korea and expressed disappointment at the slow uptake of
IAEA full-scope and strengthened safeguards. While the NWS
emphasised their own efforts, others were unhappy with the slow
progress of START reductions and of nuclear disarmament in general,
and castigated the reaffirmation of the central or continuing role
of nuclear weapons in strategic concepts. Many also raised the
destabilising impact of missile defence plans, while some noted
that missile proliferation also needed to be addressed.
The deadlock in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and
consequent failure to negotiate the agreed ban on the production of
fissile materials for weapons (fissban) was repeatedly highlighted.
Ireland proposed that the time had come for the NWS to negotiate
and jointly submit a draft text for a cut-off treaty to the CD for
further elaboration and adoption as a multilateral instrument, and
that they should apply its core provisions pending entry into
force. Germany insisted that the 1995 Shannon mandate (which
specified a cut-off of future production) "must not be called into
question", but Algeria emphasised that the negotiations "need to
provide for existing stocks to be placed under international
controls". Norway made a comprehensive proposal for dealing with
fissile materials and reinforcing any future multilateral cut-off
treaty.
On the positive side, many welcomed the conclusion of the CTBT
by the target date of 1996 and the number of ratifications so far,
with especial praise for Britain, France and the recent vote by the
Russian Duma. Though there were several mentions of the US
rejection of CTBT ratification, the Administration's continued
commitment to the Treaty was welcomed. Among those who lamented the
delayed entry into force of the CTBT, many urged a continued
moratorium on nuclear tests and concerted actions and high-level
missions to persuade the hold-outs to ratify. Many also welcomed
Russia's recent ratification of START II and urged speedy bilateral
agreement on START III and deeper reductions. Unilateral reductions
by Britain and France and China's long-held position on no-first
use were also applauded, amidst calls for further steps to be
undertaken.
Nuclear-Weapon States
P-5 Statement
To the surprise of many, the NWS managed to agree a "P-5"
statement by the beginning of the second week of the Conference,
after months of wrangling. This is notable for being the first such
joint statement in an NPT Review Conference, though there were P-5
statements at two of the PrepComs. Inevitably it papered over the
fissures of division over the ABM Treaty, the CD's programme of
work and the fissile materials ban. In presenting the paper, the
French Ambassador, Hubert de la Fortelle, particularly highlighted
paragraph 10, which declared that "none of our nuclear weapons are
targetted at any state". Although nuclear weapons can be
retargetted relatively quickly (in some cases in minutes), this
paragraph was welcomed as a confidence-building measure that would
ensure that accidental or unauthorised launches of nuclear weapons
would not annihilate targetted cities.
Among 23 paragraphs covering non-proliferation, disarmament,
safeguards and nuclear energy, the declaration on detargetting was
the only possitive, new development. Faced with strong pressure
from non-nuclear-weapon states to make an "unequivocal undertaking
to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals",
which the weapon states continue to avoid, the P-5 statement
utilised the language of "unequivocal commitment" twice: for
fulfilling all their obligations under the NPT and for the
"ultimate goals of a complete elimination of nuclear weapons and a
treaty on general and complete disarmament". As made clear in their
statements the following day, this linguistic sleight of hand did
not satisfy the New Agenda or NAM states.
One problem for the non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) is that the
language of these two commitments turns the clock back to before
the 1996 ICJ advisory opinion, accepted by the majority of states,
which went beyond the Article VI language of pursuing negotiations
in good faith (in part because for the first 20 years after the
Treaty's entry into force, Article VI presided over an escalating
nuclear arms build-up). According to the ICJ, there exists a legal
obligation that nuclear disarmament should be pursued and brought
to a conclusion without conditions or linkages with general and
complete disarmament. The P-5 statement puts nuclear disarmament
back into the distant context of total worldwide disarmament.
The P-5 welcomed indefinite extension and reaffirmed commitment
to all the decisions adopted in 1995, including the resolution on
the Middle East. In calling for India and Pakistan to undertake the
measures in UN Security Council resolution 1172, adopted shortly
after the May 1998 tests, the P-5 underline that those countries
are not to be accorded any special status. Notwithstanding (and not
mentioning) the failure so far of the United States and China to
ratify the CTBT, the statement stressed that "no efforts should be
spared to make sure that the CTBT is a universal and
internationally and effectively verifiable treaty and to secure its
early entry into force", and that there should be "no doubt as to
the commitment of our five countries to that effect".
The NWS' position was rather more equivocal when it came to the
ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons, as
referred to in paragraph 4 (b) of the 1995 Principles and
Objectives. China's demand that the negotiations on a fissban be
conditional on agreeing a programme for work in the CD won out over
the desire of the other four to have the negotiations start without
delay or conditions. The CD's ability to negotiate a fissban or
cut-off treaty is currently deadlocked because China and others
want outer space issues and nuclear disarmament to be addressed as
well. The United States opposes setting up a committee on
'prevention of an arms race in outer space', recognising that the
pressure to address space issues arises from concerns about US
plans for ballistic missile defences. Recalling that negotiations
on the CTBT had gone ahead in 1995, when the CD was similarly
unable to adopt a full programme of work, many delegations have
pushed for a firm commitment from the NPT parties to commence
fissban negotiations without conditions. But after days of tough
negotiations with China, the P-5 seem to have accepted the linkage,
which is likely to undermine attempts by others to get a stronger
endorsement of immediate fissban negotiations into the NPT's final
document. Western delegations put a brave face on the deal by
emphasising that at least the P-5 did not say that the programme of
work had to be 'balanced and comprehensive' as China has insisted
in the CD.
The five also held tough talks on paragraph 11, dealing with the
START process and the ABM Treaty. In the end, the statement
welcomed Russia's recent ratification of START II and stressed the
importance of the "completion of ratification" of START II by the
United States, which has yet to ratify the September 1997 protocol
to the accord. The P-5 "look forward to the conclusion of START III
as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the ABM
Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for
further reductions of strategic offensive weapons..." The rest of
the statement: commits to putting fissile materials "designated by
each of us as no longer required for defence purposes" under
safeguards or international verification; supports NWFZ, including
in Central Asia and the nuclear-weapon-free status of Mongolia;
expresses a willingness to discuss security assurances; endorses
the strengthened safeguards developed by the IAEA and promises to
ratify their own Additional Protocols; affirms the nuclear energy
provision of Article IV, while promising "to maintain the highest
practical levels of nuclear safety".
Reaction to the P-5 statement was mixed. Some welcomed it as a
sign that deep divisions among the weapon states over missile
defence and arms control priorities could be papered over and would
not now derail the Review Conference. The commitment to preserving
the ABM Treaty was welcomed, if it meant that the United States
will not abrogate the Treaty. But there are concerns that each of
the nuclear states has a different interpretation about what
"strengthening" the ABM Treaty would entail, including the US
argument for modifications to permit it to deploy a national
missile defence system.
On the one hand, the fact that there is a P-5 statement at all
is viewed as an achievement, with credit due especially to France
for its persistence and coordination and to Britain for getting
agreement on the de-targetting paragraph. On the other hand there
is cynicism that despite their own deep divisions, the nuclear club
will stick together to sustain their privileges in the face of
concerted efforts by the non-nuclear states to press for the
delegitimisation and elimination of nuclear weapons. In particular,
as statements from the New Agenda Coalition and NAM the following
day made clear, many NNWS are disappointed at the inability of the
NWS to make a clear and unequivocal commitment to eliminating their
nuclear arsenals, without conditions or nebulous, far-off concepts
like 'in good faith' and 'ultimate goal'. Both the New Agenda
Coalition (NAC) and the NAM stressed that "the total elimination of
nuclear weapons is an obligation and a priority and not an ultimate
goal, and even less a goal that is linked, subject or conditioned
to general and complete disarmament".
In advance of their joint statement, each of the NWS made
national statements identifying and explaining their positions and
the steps they have taken to comply with the Treaty.
United States
By the time US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright spoke on
the opening day, US missile defence plans had already been
criticised by several delegations, and even the UN
Secretary-General had raised concerns that the pressure to deploy
national missile defences was jeopardising the ABM Treaty.
Describing the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 as "a
priceless gift for our children - and ourselves", Albright said
that the Treaty "has transformed acquiring a nuclear weapon
capability from an act of national pride to a cause for
international alarm". The Secretary of State openly acknowledged
that "the sharpest suspicions under the Treaty are directed to
whether the five nuclear-weapon states are doing enough under
Article VI to bring about nuclear disarmament" and stressed that
"we share the frustration many feel about the pace of progress
toward a world free of nuclear weapons". Addressing "broader
concerns raised by missile defences", Albright defended the Clinton
Administration from accusations of "sabotaging the ABM Treaty and
strategic arms control". She argued that the world had changed
since the Treaty was signed, that it had already been amended once
"and there is no good reason it cannot be amended again to reflect
new threats from third countries outside the strategic deterrence
regime".
Presenting a comprehensive booklet setting out the nuclear and
disarmament-related steps undertaken by the United States over the
past decade, she quoted President Clinton as noting that "the
United States has devoted more time, effort, and resources to
nuclear arms control and disarmament than any other country".
Albright welcomed Russia's recent steps in ratifying START II and
the CTBT and also stressed US support for the test ban
notwithstanding the Senate defeat. In particular, she stressed the
Administration's firm commitment not to resume testing and
continued support for the CTBTO Preparatory Commission, assuring
the Conference that "like the President, I am convinced that
America will ratify the CTBT". The statement concluded with
a warning that "if countries demand unrealistic and premature
measures, they will harm the NPT and set back everyone's
cause".
Russia
Russia's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Igor Ivanov, opened with
"heartfelt greetings" from President Vladimir Putin, underlining
the importance he attached to the NPT Conference. Ivanov then
referred to "new serious threats to international security and
stability", including "local conflicts, international terrorism and
militant separatism". He also castigated "attempts to build
national stability at the expense of the interests of other
states...[and] misappropriation of the right to use force" in
violation of the UN Charter and international law, calling such
actions "a direct invitation to a new arms race". Presenting also a
longer, detailed "National Report on the Compliance by the Russian
Federation with the Non-Proliferation Treaty", Ivanov enumerated
the concrete reductions and confidence-building steps which Russia
has undertaken in the past decade, and said that Moscow was
prepared to reduce its nuclear arsenal to 1,500 warheads, providing
that the United States would do the same. Such a "historic chance"
would be missed, however, if the ABM Treaty were to be destroyed.
In case anyone missed the point, Ivanov reiterated it in several
ways, underlining that "compliance with the ABM Treaty in its
present form without any modifications is a prerequisite for
further negotiations on nuclear disarmament in accordance with
Article VI" of the NPT. Ivanov then put forward Russia's March 2000
initiative to establish a Global Missile and Missile Technologies
non-proliferation control system as a "real alternative" for
addressing missile threats and missile proliferation.
China
Ambassador Sha Zukang reiterated China's policy with regard to
support for ridding the world of nuclear weapons and its call for
the other weapon states to join China in promising not to use
nuclear weapons first, and said that CTBT ratification was being
considered by the National People's Congress. While acknowledging
that the NWS "must faithfully implement their obligations for
nuclear disarmament", Sha identified two preconditions for
Beijing's participation in arms control negotiations: that they did
not compromise global strategic balance and stability or undermine
China's national security interests. As the NNWS have increased
their demands for more information about nuclear weapon and fissile
material holdings, China has felt it necessary to justify its
reticence in this area. Sha explained China's position with
reference to "a superpower which rampantly intervenes in other
countries' internal affairs, and wilfully resorts to force,
continuously improving its overwhelming first-strike nuclear
capability". Under such circumstances, he said, "it is neither
conducive to their own security nor in the interests of global
strategic balance and stability to ask the small or medium sized
nuclear countries to take transparency measures".
Much of Sha's statement focussed on US missile defence plans. He
quoted President Jiang Zemin that such programmes "will inevitably
exert an extensive negative impact on international security and
stability and trigger off a new round of arms race in new areas..."
Responding to criticisms that China was blocking CD attempts to get
fissban negotiations underway, Sha countered that "the prevention
of the weaponisation of outer space is a task even more urgent than
the FMCT negotiations".
Britain
Britain's statement, entitled "Towards a nuclear-free world",
was delivered by Foreign Office Minister Peter Hain MP. He endorsed
the European Union (EU) statement and said that the Labour
Government had made an unequivocal commitment to the pursuit of
nuclear disarmament and "transformed Britain's role". Arguing that
Labour was "driving the agenda forward", Hain reiterated UK policy
that "when we are satisfied with progress towards our goal of the
global elimination of nuclear weapons, we will ensure that British
nuclear weapons are included in negotiations". He enumerated UK
achievements, including: early ratification of the CTBT; a
moratorium on the production of fissile materials for weapons and
support for FMCT negotiations; withdrawal and dismantlement of all
air-delivered nuclear weapons, leaving just one remaining
submarine-based system (Trident), with reduced warheads, all
of which have been de-targetted, single patrols, and a reduced
state of readiness. Describing how Britain has led the way in
providing greater transparency, Hain announced the publication of a
UK study on verifying the reduction and elimination of nuclear
weapons.
France
Describing French policy as one of "strict sufficiency",
Ambassador Hubert de la Fortelle presented a detailed report of
French efforts to comply with the NPT, including: early
ratification of the CTBT and the closure of the Moruroa test site;
cessation of fissile materials production and dismantlement of its
military production facilities; the complete phasing out of
land-based nuclear weapons (leaving submarine-based and airborne
nuclear systems, of which the delivery vehicles have been halved);
a reduction in alert status; and commitment to security assurances,
especially in the context of NWFZ. France also repeated its
willingness to discuss issues relating to disarmament at the CD
"subject to a mandate adopted by consensus", along the lines of the
proposal made by five NATO countries (Belgium, Germany, Italy,
Netherlands and Norway) in 1999. In a clear warning to the United
States, de la Fortelle said that France was "anxious to avoid any
challenges to the Treaty liable to bring about a breakdown of
strategic equilibrium and to restart the arms race".
Non-Nuclear-Weapon States
New Agenda Coalition
The New Agenda Coalition of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New
Zealand, South Africa and Sweden, has been a significant political
force so far at the Conference. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of
Mexico, Ms. Rosario Green, presented a joint statement, which was
followed by a working paper. Drawing on the New Agenda's 1999 UNGA
resolution, co-sponsored by over 60 states and supported by more
than a hundred, the NAC working paper underlined the necessity for
the NWS to make an "unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total
elimination of their nuclear arsenals and, in the course of the
forthcoming review period 2000-2005, to engage in an accelerated
process of negotiations..." The Coalition wanted the disarmament
process to be more transparent, irreversible and accountable. As
well as emphasising the importance of the CTBT, fissban and
universality of the NPT, they proposed several interim steps,
including: measures to adapt nuclear policies to "preclude the use
of nuclear weapons"; de-alerting and the removal of warheads from
delivery vehicles; reducing and eliminating tactical nuclear
weapons; transparency; and further measures to remove fissile
material from weapons programmes.
Non-Aligned Movement
The NAM proposed 47 draft recommendations to be considered by
the review conference. Following on from earlier criticisms of NATO
nuclear sharing arrangements, nuclear cooperation between Britain,
France and the United States, and concerns that Israel, India or
Pakistan may still be receiving assistance in nuclear-related
technology, the NAM paper carried strong statements endorsing
articles I and II and calling on nuclear and non-nuclear weapon
states to "refrain from nuclear sharing for military purposes under
any kind of security arrangements", and also to prohibit the
transfer of nuclear-related equipment and technology etc. to states
non-party to the NPT "without exception".
Five paragraphs dealt with nuclear testing, endorsing the CTBT's
prohibition of "peaceful nuclear explosions", which Article V of
the NPT had allowed. The NAM urged universal adherence to the CTBT
and called on all states which had not yet done so to sign and
ratify the Treaty. In an unmistakable reference to sub-critical
tests and laboratory testing, the nuclear powers were enjoined to
refrain from conducting all types of tests in conformity with the
objectives of the CTBT and to "comply with the letter and spirit of
the CTBT".
Twelve paragraphs were devoted to nuclear disarmament and
article VI. These re-affirmed nuclear disarmament as the priority
in disarmament negotiations, endorsed the START process and gave
support for an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament in the CD.
The call for negotiations for a treaty "banning the production and
stockpiling of fissile material" for nuclear weapons went beyond
the basic Shannon mandate. Particular concerns were raised about
missile defences and "the pursuit of advanced military technologies
capable of deployment in outer space", and the NAM called on the
United States and Russia to comply fully with the ABM Treaty.
Reiterating the proposals first made by South Africa in 1998, the
NAM backed the establishment of a subsidiary body to Main Committee
I (Nuclear Disarmament) to "deliberate on practical steps for
systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons"
and for specific time to be allocated for the same purpose at the
Preparatory Committee meetings.
The NAM emphasised the importance of universality and gave
support to NWFZ, including the initiatives in Central Asia and
Mongolia. They supported NWFZ in South Asia and the Middle East "on
the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the states of the
region" and devoted a further seven paragraphs to the Middle East
resolution, supporting the establishment of a subsidiary body and
calling for the resolution's full implementation. They stressed
"the special responsibility of the depositary states", Britain,
Russia and the United States, which had co-sponsored the resolution
in 1995.
Under article III, the NAM supported the IAEA safeguards regime
and supported full-scope safeguards as a "necessary precondition"
for new supply arrangements. No mention was made of the
strengthened IAEA safeguards arising from Programme 93+2 developed
after the discovery of Iraq's clandestine nuclear programme. Much
was made of the "inalienable right" to develop nuclear energy, and
the paper called for the removal of "unilaterally enforced
restrictive measures" - namely the export controls operated through
the Zangger List and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) - saying that no
NPT-party should be denied technology, equipment or assistance on
the basis of "allegations of non-compliance not verified by the
IAEA".
European Union
The European Union made joint statements in the general debate
and to each of the Main Committees. In its statement to MC.I, the
EU noted that the programme of action (paragraph 4 of the
Principles and Objectives) adopted in 1995, which provided
"concrete standards against which progress in the field of nuclear
disarmament can be measured" had not been completed and that
further steps needed to be identified. The statement referred to
the US Senate rejection of the CTBT as a "setback" and said that
the tests by India and Pakistan ran "contrary to global efforts
towards nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament". Regretting that
"annual haggling" over the adoption of the CD work programme had
prevented concrete negotiations on a fissban, the EU urged NPT
parties to commit themselves to getting the negotiations underway
without further delay and without conditions. Pending conclusion,
the EU wanted a complete moratorium and halt to the production of
military plutonium and highly-enriched uranium. Underlining the
principles of "transparency, accountability, confidence-building
and irreversibility", the EU backed the START process "with a view
to achieving further deep reductions in strategic nuclear weapons
and the verified dismantlement of warheads destined for disarmament
under this treaty".
In a new move, the EU highlighted the problems of tactical
nuclear weapons, and called for them to be brought into
negotiations "with the objective of their reduction and eventual
complete elimination". Reaffirming the importance of the ABM
Treaty, the EU said it shared concerns about the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles, but that
in responding, it was important not to take actions "which have the
effect of harming the integrity and validity of the Treaties which
underpin nuclear non-proliferation and strategic stability". There
was also a section on 'general and complete disarmament' making
reference to the CWC, BWC, conventional arms, and the importance of
regional peace and stability.
Specific Issues of Concern
The Middle East
As in past years, Egypt has taken the lead in pushing for NPT
parties to address the problems posed by Israel's unsafeguarded
nuclear facilities and nuclear weapon capabilities. After calling
in the general debate for a "mechanism to monitor and follow-up the
progress made" in implementation of the 1995 resolution, Egypt
followed up with a working paper to Main Committee II (Safeguards
and NWFZ), which began to be discussed in the first meeting of
subsidiary body II on regional issues and the Middle East, chaired
by Ambassador Christopher Westdal of Canada.
Egypt proposed that there should be: i) a follow up committee
comprising the chair of each session of the PrepComs plus the three
depositary states, to initiate contacts with Israel and report back
to successive review conferences; ii) a special envoy from among
NPT states parties to pursue discussions with Israel and report
back; and iii) further work undertaken by the depositary
states.
In its statement to subsidiary body II, Britain disagreed with
Egypt's view of the special responsibilities of the depositary
states and said that the resolution clearly called on all
States Parties to work for the early establishment of a Middle East
zone free of weapons of mass destruction. However, Britain
reiterated its call to Israel to adhere to the NPT as a
non-nuclear-weapon state and to place all its nuclear facilities
under full-scope IAEA safeguards. Furthermore, Britain indicated
guarded interest in Egypt's proposal for a special envoy to be sent
to the Middle East on behalf of NPT parties "with the task of
assisting the states of the region in their endeavours to establish
a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction". Britain asked for
further details, including a possible mandate and arrangements for
financing such a special envoy, saying that "in certain
circumstances", this "could be a positive move".
Safeguards
Many statements shared IAEA Director-General ElBaradei's stated
concerns that 54 NPT Parties had still not brought their safeguards
agreements into force. South Africa, however, recognized that the
failure to complete the agreements was often due to the lack of a
nuclear infrastructure. Disappointment was expressed over the
sluggish pace in which states have signed and/or ratified
additional protocols based on the 1997 Model Protocol. In their P-5
statement, the NWS urged all NNWS to sign the additional protocol
and said that they were in the process of seeking ratification for
their own agreements. The EU considered that the additional
protocols "form an integral part" of the IAEA agreements, are
relevant for the implementation of the NPT, and that adherence to
them should be considered mandatory.
Australia, Canada and New Zealand suggested that not only the
safeguards agreement but also an additional protocol should in the
future be regarded as constituting the full-scope safeguards
required by Article III of the NPT and specified as a condition of
supply in the Principles and Objectives. It is expected that the
G-10 (a group of Western non-nuclear states which regularly meets
in Vienna: Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Hungary, Ireland,
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden) will propose that
the Conference's forward-looking documents include a reference that
the 2005 Review Conference consider the adoption of the additional
protocol as a condition of supply in the future. The proposal comes
at a time when there are reports that China and the Russian
Federation have allegedly expressed reservations about the
principle, agreed in the 1995 package, that the recipient country
must have full-scope safeguards in place and pledge not to acquire
nuclear weapons. According to an article by Mark Hibbs in
Nuclear Fuel on April 17, these views came to light during
the drafting of the NSG and the Zangger Committee reports. The
question is reportedly a hot topic at the NSG at the moment due to
an announcement on April 6 that Russia is planning to sell two new
nuclear power reactors to India, an action the US is expected to
object to. Ireland stated in its Main Committee III (Nuclear
Energy) statement that "under no circumstances should those who
have refused to accept the non-proliferation commitment…be
treated more favourably than those very many states who have taken
on this obligation."
Iraq referred to the IAEA Director General's report from 1998
and said it was "in full compliance" with all its obligations under
the NPT and the IAEA's safeguards regime, protesting that "no
action had been taken" to force Israel join the NPT and place its
facilities under safeguards.
The EU and the NAM called for fissile material regarded as
excess to defence needs to be placed under IAEA safeguards. The P-5
were committed to placing their excess materials under IAEA or
other verification "as soon as practicable". Britain, for its part,
said it had placed its excess material under EURATOM safeguards and
subjected them also to inspection by the IAEA. The United States
said it was working together with Russia and the IAEA on this.
Export Controls
Concern was expressed again by several NAM states that export
controls were administered in ways that hindered their right to
participate in the "fullest possible exchange of equipment,
materials and scientific and technological information" provided
for in Article IV. Furthermore, perceptions differed as to whether
the goal of increased transparency on export controls, called for
in the 1995 Principles and Objectives, had been reached. Italy,
currently chairing the NSG, gave examples of the measures the NSG
had taken to increase transparency, and stressed that the process
was still ongoing. The EU assured that it would take part in the
promotion of further measures. Australia said that both the NSG and
Zangger Committee "have acted with determination to improve
transparency..." The United States argued that export controls were
"more transparent than ever." In contrast, Egypt, whose view was
shared by many NAM states, said the objective of increased
transparency had not been achieved yet and that instead "the
limitations…are increasing in a flagrant contravention of
the letter and spirit of both the Treaty and the Decisions on
Principles and Objectives."
Iran said that the record of commitment to Article IV of the NPT
had not been promising, arguing that the progress made on
cooperation in and transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful
purposes had been "slow and dismal". Iran expressed its "dismay
over the systematic denial of transfer of technology…and
restrictive export control policies" by the nuclear suppliers. It
said that the main objective, the domination and exclusive
possession of nuclear technology by developed countries, was
disguised "under the pretext of non-proliferation" and called for
the situation to be rectified. Iran's view was reflected in the NAM
working paper, which called for the removal of "unilaterally
enforced restrictive measures beyond safeguards" and instead
promoted "multilaterally negotiated, universal, comprehensive and
non-discriminatory agreements" as the best way to address
proliferation concerns. Furthermore, the NAM argued that no NPT
Party should be denied technology, equipment or assistance on the
basis of "allegations of non-compliance not verified by the
IAEA".
Nuclear Energy
Statements on the non-military application of nuclear energy
predictably reaffirmed the NPT's "inalienable right" to develop
research, production and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
The developing world particularly emphasized the need for
unrestricted transfers of technology and better cooperation and
technical assistance and stressed that the IAEA's technical
cooperation funds must be made adequate. Ensuring the safety of
nuclear material and waste were stressed, particularly in
transhipment.
The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia endorsed Article IV
but stressed that the dangers of the old nuclear plants should be
addressed because "another Chernobyl should not occur". Japan
talked openly about the criticality accident that occurred in
Tokai-mura last September and said information sharing was
necessary so that others too could learn from such experiences.
Amidst the many pro-nuclear energy statements, some had
reservations. Ireland reminded delegations of the dangers of
nuclear energy, saying that although the world had been relatively
fortunate until now, "the potential for catastrophe is always
there". Austria spelled out its position, saying that nuclear
energy did not contribute to sustainable development and could
therefore not play a key role in future energy policies.
In expressing concern about the maritime transport of nuclear
materials and radioactive waste, New Zealand was joined by
Australia, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), Ireland, MERCOSUR
(Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay) plus Bolivia and Chile,
and the South Pacific Group (SOPAC). These countries raised the
issues of safety, security, liability and compensation in the case
of an accident, underlining the need for further discussion. New
Zealand said it was disappointed that the dialogue on compensation
and liability issues with Japan, France and Britain had recently
been "suspended" by them. It was seeking a regime of prior
notification and, ideally, also prior consent for the transboundary
movement of radioactive waste. France said that it intended to be
fully transparent and inform concerned countries of the conditions
of the shipments of nuclear material and waste, but stressed that
"the right of navigation and the freedom of the seas…cannot
be infringed upon". The South Pacific states want the shipments
only to be made if the cargo is of minimal risk, the ships of the
highest standards, and by states that agree to promote the safety
of the material, and in the case of an accident, are prepared to
provide compensation to countries harmed.
The Review Process
China has reportedly put forward an argument that, strictly
speaking, the language of Decision 1 on strengthening the review
process (1995) covers only the five years from 1995 to 2000.
Although its representatives have assured everyone that this does
not mean that China wants to curtail the review process, the
analysis has caused some disquiet among delegates. Calling for the
"revitalisation of the review process", several states acknowledged
that the review process had not met the 1995 expectations. Ireland
proposed that the NPT parties establish a small secretariat and
hold annual meetings of states parties with decision-making powers.
Lithuania proposed extending the review process from three to four
sessions and wanted a mechanism to "transform principles and
objectives into action". Switzerland wanted a package of
"reaffirmed principles and updated and supplemented objectives" and
an action plan on a range of issues. Similarly, Norway's Foreign
Minister, Thorbjorn Jagland proposed a "programme of action" for
the review process to follow up the decisions taken in the review
conference, with annual meetings devoted to a limited number of
specific issues, such as developing a comprehensive strategy for
dealing with fissile materials, increased transparency for nuclear
materials, arsenals and export controls, the CTBT, tactical nuclear
weapons, and increasing uptake of the IAEA's additional
protocol.
Without wanting to reopen or renegotiate the 1995 decisions,
Japan proposed that the early PrepComs should focus more on the
review, implementation and universality of the NPT, and should be
able to address relevant international and regional issues at each
session, and that drafting recommendations and preparing for the
next review conference should be left to later PrepComs. Canada
argued that the review process should be enhanced "with a
requirement to more frequently track, discuss and document movement
toward translating our commitments into action". Egypt stressed
that the questions which "lend themselves to easy agreement" should
not be treated separately from those on which consensus is harder
to attain. Further working papers are expected soon, with the
likelihood that Baali will convene a special closed plenary to
discuss proposals for improving the review process.
Conclusion
The 2000 Review Conference will have to decide how well the
Treaty has been functioning during the past five years. According
to the 1995 decisions, the Conference must also look forward and
identify ways and means to strengthen the non-proliferation regime.
For most, this task includes discussing and agreeing on next steps,
especially to bring about nuclear disarmament among the five
defined nuclear-weapon states and the three remaining outside the
NPT.
Until the Russian Duma ratified START II and the CTBT, forecasts
for the 2000 Review Conference were pessimistic. Russia's swift
seizure of the arms control initiative helped shift the logjam.
Though welcomed by the United States, it also put Washington on the
defensive, which made the Americans more willing to compromise on
procedural questions such as the subsidiary bodies on nuclear
disarmament and regional issues/the Middle East.
Unknown in non-proliferation circles before being designated
President of the Review Conference in December 1999, Baali has
impressed with his determination to achieve compromises, his
willingness to consult, and his deft brokering of issues of
contention. Though many of the non-nuclear states are profoundly
dissatisfied with the joint P-5 statement, they consider that
without it the deep divisions over US plans to deploy national
missile defences would probably have deadlocked the meeting.
Depending on what emerges from the deliberations of the two
subsidiary bodies and the main committees, the chances of this
Conference adopting a final document have improved, but can by no
means be guaranteed. There are concerns, however, that as the
Conference progresses, the nuclear-weapon states are being let off
the hook.
The real test of the NPT Review is not whether the Conference
can adopt a consensus document, although such agreement would be
symbolically important, but how the parties get to grips with the
worrying signs that the nuclear powers are mistaking the NPT
provisions as a carte blanche to develop leaner, meaner nuclear
forces. In addition to encouraging the START process to take
irreversible steps to much lower levels, beyond even the
1,000-1,500 that Russia has proposed, what steps will be undertaken
to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in strategic doctrine and
military policy? Over the next two weeks, decisions will have to be
made not only on the basis of what would contribute to the
successful conclusion of this conference, but on what would make it
harder for individuals or countries to buy, make, keep, deploy or
use nuclear weapons in the future. True success, therefore, will be
measured by what NPT Parties and the holdouts do in the next five
years, and whether more effective measures can be agreed to ensure
better implementation, greater accountability, and the prevention
of nuclear accident or war.
Rebecca Johnson is Executive Director and Jenni Rissanen
is the Geneva analyst for The Acronym Institute. They are attending
the NPT Review Conference and providing regular reports. This
article is drawn from seven of the Acronym reports, available at http://www.acronym.org.uk/index.htm,
covering the first part of the Conference, to May 4. A full report
and analysis will appear in the next issue.
Appendix: Selected Documents
P-5 Statement
'Statement by the delegations of France, the People's
Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of
America,' May 1
"1. The delegations of China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom
and the United States, on the occasion of the sixth Review
Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, formally reiterate the strong and continuing support of
our countries for this Treaty, the cornerstone of the international
nuclear non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for
nuclear disarmament. We remain unequivocally committed to
fulfilling all of our obligations under the Treaty.
2. We welcomed the decision on indefinite extension of the
Treaty adopted in 1995 by its member states. We reaffirm our
commitment to strengthening the review process of the Treaty and to
the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and
disarmament. We reaffirm our commitment to the resolution on the
Middle East adopted in 1995. The principles established by those
documents will make a continuing contribution to the review
process, the Treaty remaining its fundamental guide.
3. The progress of NPT universality has been confirmed after the
1995 conference. We welcome the accession to the Treaty by Chile,
Vanuatu, the United Arab Emirates, Comoros, Andorra, Angola,
Djibouti, Oman and Brazil. Today, there are 187 member states. We
reiterate the need for universal adherence to the NPT and call upon
states that have not yet done so to accede to the Treaty at an
early date. The nuclear explosions carried out by India and
Pakistan in May 1998 were a cause of deep international concern. We
continue to call upon both countries to undertake the measures set
out in UNSCR 1172. Notwithstanding their nuclear tests, India and
Pakistan do not have the status of nuclear-weapon states in
accordance with the NPT.
4. We stress that compliance with the NPT by all member states
is essential to further the comprehensive goals of the Treaty.
5. We reiterate our unequivocal commitment to the ultimate goals
of a complete elimination of nuclear weapons and a treaty on
general and complete disarmament under strict and effective
international control.
6. A program of action was set out by the 1995 Review and
Extension Conference as important in the full realization and
effective implementation of Article VI. In pursuit of that program,
there have been highly significant multilateral, bilateral and
unilateral developments since 1995.
7. The CTBT was opened for signature in New York on September
24, 1996. The five nuclear-weapon states all signed it that very
day. Today, 155 states have signed it and 55 of them, including 28
whose ratification is necessary for its entry into force, have
deposited their instruments of ratification with the Secretary
General of the United Nations, including France and the United
Kingdom in a joint ceremony on 6 April 1998. The recent
ratification of the CTBT by the Russian Federation is welcome. The
Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization has been set up in
Vienna and is putting into place the international monitoring
system of the Treaty. Important progress has been made so far in
the setting up of the verification system. We remain committed to
ensuring that, at entry into force of the CTBT, the verification
regime will be capable of meeting the verification requirements of
this Treaty. The first conference of states having ratified the
Treaty to consider the issue of its entry into force took place in
Vienna in October 1999. No efforts should be spared to make sure
that the CTBT is a universal and internationally and effectively
verifiable treaty and to secure its early entry into force. There
should be no doubt as to the commitment of our five countries to
that effect.
8. As one logical multilateral step in the full realization and
effective implementation of Article VI, we reaffirm the necessity
of a non-discriminatory, universally applicable and internationally
and effectively verifiable convention banning the production of
fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices negotiated in accordance with the 1995 statement of the
Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the
mandate contained therein. We urge the Conference on Disarmament to
agree on a program of work as soon as possible, which includes the
immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on such
a treaty.
9. The contribution of the five nuclear-weapon states to
systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons
globally has been and will be highlighted by each of us
nationally.
10. Emphasising the essential importance of cooperation,
demonstrating and advancing mutual trust among ourselves, and
promoting greater international security and stability, we declare
that none of our nuclear weapons are targeted at any state.
11. Ratification of START II by the Russian Federation is an
important step in the efforts to reduce strategic offensive weapons
and is welcome. Completion of ratification of START II by the
United States remains a priority. We look forward to the conclusion
of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening
the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a
basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in
accordance with its provisions.
12. We are committed to placing as soon as practicable fissile
materials designated by each of us as no longer required for
defence purposes under IAEA or other relevant international
verification. We have launched a number of significant initiatives
to provide for the safe and effective management and disposition of
such materials.
13. We welcome the creation of two new nuclear-weapon-free zones
since 1995 as a significant contribution to the enhancement of
regional and international peace and security: South-East Asia and
Africa. The five nuclear-weapon states have signed and, in most
cases, ratified all the relevant protocols to the treaties of
Tlatelolco, Rarotonga and Pelindaba; internal processes are
underway to secure the few lacking ratifications. The consultations
with States Parties to the treaty of Bangkok have recently been
accelerated, paving the way for our adherence to the additional
protocol. We are looking forward to the successful and early
conclusions of those consultations. We encourage the states in
Central Asia to pursue successfully their efforts to create a
nuclear-weapon free zone in their region. We support and respect
the nuclear-weapon free status of Mongolia.
14. We note that the actions of the nuclear-weapon states since
1995 on the relevant additional protocols to nuclear-weapon-free
zone treaties have increased the number of non-nuclear-weapon
states eligible for legally binding Negative Security Assurances to
over 100. We reaffirm our commitment to United Nations Security
Council resolution 984 adopted in April 1995 on security assurances
for NPT non-nuclear-weapon states. According to operative paragraph
10 of resolution 984, the issues addressed in that resolution
remain of continuing concern to the Security Council. We are ready
to exchange views relating to the positive security assurances
referred to in the resolution.
15. We consider the international safeguards system of the
International Atomic Energy Agency as one of the essential pillars
of the non-proliferation regime. This system acts as a guarantee
for stability and the preservation of world peace. We call on all
States Parties, which are required by Article III of the Treaty and
have not yet done so, to sign and bring into force comprehensive
safeguards agreements without delay.
16. The development and the implementation of the strengthened
safeguards system of the IAEA through new agreements is a
significant achievement. We praise the remarkable work carried out
by the IAEA in this field and hope that the strengthened system
soon spreads across all regions of the world. Here again,
universality is the challenge we face. To date, Additional
Protocols have been signed by more than fifty non-nuclear-weapon
states; nine of them have entered into force. We urge all
non-nuclear-weapon states that have not yet done so to sign without
delay the additional protocol with a view to its early
implementation.
17. As regards states not members of the NPT, one of them has
recently signed an Additional Protocol with the IAEA. We encourage
the three others to negotiate an Additional Protocol with the
IAEA.
18. All the five nuclear-weapon states signed an Additional
Protocol with the IAEA and shall seek to ratify their agreements as
soon as possible.
19. We support the promotion of transparency in nuclear related
export controls within the framework of dialogue and cooperation
among all interested States Parties to the treaty and we welcome
the initiatives taken in order to carry out this objective.
20. We reaffirm the inalienable right of all the parties to the
Treaty to develop research, production, and use of nuclear energy
for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in accordance with
the relevant provisions of the Treaty and the relevant principles
on safeguards. Pursuant to our obligation under Article IV, we have
provided our support for the technical cooperation programs
administered by the IAEA, which has enabled many nations to make
progress in the application of nuclear technologies in important
fields such as agriculture, hydrology, medicine and
environment.
21. We stress the importance of international cooperation in
order to maintain the highest practicable levels of nuclear safety.
In this regard, we welcome the entry into force and the first
review meeting of the convention on nuclear safety as well as the
opening for signature of the joint convention on the safety of
spent fuel management and on the safety of radioactive waste
management. We call on all states which have not yet done so to
sign and ratify those two conventions.
22. We are determined to take a forward-looking approach to
nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. The NPT provides
an indispensable framework for future efforts against nuclear
proliferation and towards nuclear disarmament. We fully acknowledge
our particular responsibility and key role in ensuring continued
progress in the implementation of the NPT.
23. The five nuclear-weapon states hope similarly genuine
commitment to the pursuit of nuclear non-proliferation and
disarmament as a contribution to enhanced peace and security will
be shown by all states members of the NPT and states outside the
NPT. We will continue to work together and with the non-nuclear
weapon states for the success of the review process."
NAC Working Paper
NAC Working Paper on Nuclear Disarmament, April 24;
unofficial version
"The Delegations of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand,
South Africa and Sweden, propose the following text as the
identification of areas in which and the means through which
further progress should be sought in the future regarding the
obligation under Article VI to achieve nuclear disarmament:
Nuclear Disarmament
The Sixth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
Reaffirming the preamble and articles of the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
Stressing the importance of the full implementation of
the decisions and the resolution adopted at the 1995 Review and
Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and their continued
validity,
Bearing in mind that the overwhelming majority of states
have entered into legally binding commitments not to receive,
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices, and recalling that these undertakings were made
in the context of corresponding legally binding commitments by the
nuclear-weapon states to the pursuit in good faith of nuclear
disarmament,
Recalling the unanimous conclusion of the International
Court of Justice in its 1996 advisory opinion that there exists an
obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion
negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects
under strict and effective international control,
Reaffirming that the strict observance of the provisions
of the Treaty remain central to achieving the shared objectives of
preventing under any circumstances the further proliferation of
nuclear weapons, and preserving the Treaty's vital contribution to
peace and security,
Concerned that negotiations on nuclear arms reductions
are currently stalled,
Concerned also at the continued retention of the
nuclear-weapons option by those three states that operate
unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and that have not acceded to the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and at their
failure to renounce that option,
Stressing that the Treaty on the Limitation of
Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems remains a cornerstone of strategic
stability and underlining the responsibility of its States Parties
to preserve its integrity,
Underlining the imperative, in the interim leading to the
elimination of nuclear weapons, of lessening the role of these
weapons in security policies in a manner that enhances strategic
stability so as to facilitate the process of elimination,
Affirming that the maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free
world will require the underpinnings of a universal and
multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument or a framework
encompassing a mutually reinforcing set of instruments,
Bound by the Treaty to the achievement of a
nuclear-weapon-free world,
Affirms the need to move with determination to the full
realisation and effective implementation of the purposes and all
the provisions of the Treaty, and affirms the accountability of the
States Parties for the fulfilment of their obligations under the
Treaty, and to this end:
1. The five nuclear-weapon states make an unequivocal
undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear
arsenals and, in the course of the forthcoming Review period
2000-2005, to engage in an accelerated process of negotiations and
to take steps leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States
Parties are committed under Article VI;
2. The United States of America and the Russian Federation
undertake to fully implement START II and commence without further
delay negotiations on START III with a view to its early
conclusion;
3. The nuclear-weapon states undertake to proceed to the early
integration of all five nuclear-weapon states into the process
leading to the total elimination of their respective nuclear
weapons;
4. The five nuclear-weapons states undertake, as early and
interim steps:
(a) To adapt their nuclear policies and postures so as to
preclude the use of nuclear weapons;
(b) To proceed to the de-alerting, to the removal of nuclear
warheads from delivery vehicles and to the withdrawal of all
nuclear forces from active deployment pending their complete
elimination;
(c) To reduce tactical nuclear weapons and to proceed to their
elimination as an integral part of nuclear arms reductions;
(d) To demonstrate greater transparency with regard to their
nuclear arsenals and fissile material inventories;
(e) To further develop the Trilateral Initiative between the
United States of America, the Russian Federation and the
International Atomic Energy Agency so as to include all five
nuclear-weapon states in similar arrangements and 'to ensure the
irreversible removal of fissile material from weapons
programmes.
(f) To apply the principle of irreversibility in all nuclear
disarmament, nuclear arms reduction, and nuclear arms control
measures;
5. States Parties agree on the importance and urgency of
achieving:
(a) The signature and ratification, unconditionally and without
delay, of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and, pending
the entry into force of the Treaty, the observance of moratoria on
nuclear tests;
(b) A non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and
effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile
material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,
taking into consideration both nuclear non-proliferation and
nuclear disarmament objectives, and pending the entry into force of
the treaty, the observation of a moratorium on the production of
fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices;
(c) The establishment in the Conference on Disarmament of an
appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear
disarmament;
6. States Parties agree on the importance and urgency of the
pursuit, extension and establishment of nuclear weapon free zones,
on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at, among states of the
regions concerned, especially in regions of tension, such as the
Middle East and South Asia, as significant contributions to a
nuclear-weapon-free-world;
7. The States Parties agree on the importance of the negotiation
and conclusion at an early date of an internationally legally
binding instrument to effectively assure non-nuclear-weapon states
party to the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
8. The States Parties call upon those states that have not yet
done so, to adhere unconditionally and without delay to the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to take all the
necessary measures required by adherence to that instrument as
non-nuclear-weapon States Parties;
9. The States Parties call upon the three states that operate
unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and that have not yet acceded to
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and that
have not renounced the nuclear weapons option to reverse clearly
and urgently the pursuit of all nuclear weapons development or
deployment and to refrain from any action that could undermine
regional and international peace and security and the efforts of
the international community towards nuclear disarmament and the
prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons."
NAM Working Paper
'Working Paper presented by the members of non-aligned
countries parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons,' April 24; unofficial version
"The Non-Aligned Movement States Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons believe, in terms of the
strengthened review process and in the context of fully
implementing the Treaty and pursuant to the decisions and
resolution adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference,
that recommendations which have been deliberated upon throughout
its preparatory process, should be considered at the 2000 Review
Conference with a view to their adoption at the Conference.
The Non-Aligned Movement States Parties to the Treaty recall
that at the Durban Summit Meeting, the Heads of State or Government
of the Movement recalled their principled positions on nuclear
disarmament and the related issues of nuclear non proliferation and
nuclear tests, which were contained in the Final Document of the
1995 Cartagena Summit Meeting. They expressed their concern at the
slow pace of progress towards nuclear disarmament, which
constitutes their primary disarmament objective. They noted the
complexities arising from nuclear tests in South Asia, which
underlined the need to work, even harder to achieve their
disarmament objectives, including elimination of nuclear weapons.
They further recalled that at the 2000 Ministerial Meeting, held in
Cartagena, Colombia, the Foreign Ministers reiterated the
Movement's longstanding principled position for the total
elimination of all nuclear testing and expressed concern over the
recent negative developments with regard to the ratification of the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
The Non-Aligned Movement States Parties to the Treaty recall
further that the Heads of State or Government of the Movement at
the Durban Summit also considered positively the commitment by
parties concerned in the South Asian region to exercise restraint,
which contributes to regional security, to discontinue nuclear
tests, and not to transfer nuclear weapons-related material,
equipment and technology.
The Non-Aligned Movement States Parties to the Treaty believe
further that the 2000 Review2 Conference of the NPT should engage
immediately, in good faith, in substantive work for the speedy and
meaningful implementation of the obligations under the Treaty and
the commitments in the 1995 Principles and Objectives document, and
the resolution on the Middle East.
The Non-Aligned Movement States Parties to the Treaty recall
that at the Ministerial Meeting in Cartagena, Colombia, the Foreign
Ministers, called for the full implementation at the 2000 NPT
Review Conference of, and the firm commitment by all States Parties
to, the package agreed to at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension
Conference which comprises the decision on 'Strengthening the
Review Process for the Treaty', the decision on 'Principles and
Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament', the
decision on 'Extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons', and the 'Resolution on the Middle East'.
We recall that the Preparatory Committee agreed to recommend to
the Conference that Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure be amended to
allow for the establishment of subsidiary bodies to the Main
Committees of the Conference so as to provide for a focused
consideration of specific issues relevant to the Treaty. In this
context, the Cartagena Ministerial Meeting reaffirmed the
importance of the implementation of the call by the NAM Heads of
State or Government for the Review Conference to establish a
subsidiary body to Main Committee I to deliberate on practical
steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear
weapons, as well as a subsidiary body to Main Committee II to
consider and recommend proposals on the implementation of the
resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and
Extension Conference of the NPT.
We believe that this kind of approach will strengthen the review
process and will provide the basis for a successful outcome of the
2000 Review Conference. In this vein, the NAM proposes the
following draft recommendations to be considered by the Review
Conference.
Preamble
1. The States Parties believe that the Treaty is a key
instrument to halt vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear
weapons and they will work towards a fair balance between the
mutual obligations and responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon
states and non-nuclear-weapon states with a view to achieving the
complete elimination of nuclear weapons.
2. The States Parties undertake to prevent the proliferation of
nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, without
hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States Parties to
the Treaty and they shall fulfil their commitments on the unimpeded
and non-discriminatory transfer of materials, equipment, scientific
and technological information for peaceful uses of nuclear energy
to all States Parties without exception.
3. The States Parties agree that to ensure the effective
implementation of the Treaty, and of decisions, resolutions and
documents adopted at the Review Conference, an open-ended standing
committee, which would work inter-sessionally to follow up
recommendations concerning the implementation of the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, should be established by the
Treaty's 2000 Review Conference.
Article I
4. The States Parties agree that the strict observance of the
terms of Article I remains central to achieving the shared
objectives of preventing under any circumstances further
proliferation of nuclear weapons and preserving the Treaty's vital
contribution to peace and security.
5. The nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT reaffirm their
commitments to the fullest implementation of this Article and to
refrain from nuclear sharing for military purposes under any kind
of security arrangements, among themselves, with non-nuclear-weapon
states, and with states not party to the Treaty.
6. The States Parties remain concerned about the ability of
certain states not parties to the Treaty to obtain nuclear
materials, technology and know-how to develop nuclear weapons. The
States Parties call for the total and complete prohibition of the
transfer of all nuclear-related equipment, information, material
and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of
assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to
states non-parties to the Treaty without exception.
Article II
7. Non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT reaffirm their
commitments to the fullest implementation of this Article and to
refrain from nuclear sharing for military purposes under any kind
of security arrangements with the nuclear-weapon states,
non-nuclear-weapon states, and states not party to the Treaty.
Article III
8. The States Parties believe that the International Atomic
Energy Agency is the competent authority to verify the compliance
of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons and reaffirm that IAEA safeguards are an essential
element in guaranteeing compliance with their Article III
undertakings. In this regard, all States Parties which have not yet
done so should sign without delay the safeguards agreements
required by Article III of the Treaty.
9. The States Parties call on the nuclear-weapon states and all
States not party to the Treaty to place their nuclear facilities
under full-scope safeguards of IAEA.
10. The States Parties that have concerns regarding
non-compliance with the safeguards agreements of the Treaty by any
States party should direct such concerns, along with supporting
evidence and information, to the Agency to consider, investigate,
draw conclusions and decide on necessary actions in accordance with
its mandate. Measures should be taken to ensure that the
inalienable rights of all States Parties under the provisions of
the preamble and articles of the Treaty are fully protected and
that no State party is limited in the exercise of this right based
on allegations of non-compliance not verified by the IAEA.
11. The States Parties support the principles that new supply
arrangements for the transfer of source of special fissionable
material or equipment or material specially designed or prepared
for the processing, use or production of a special fissionable
material to non-nuclear-weapon states should require as a necessary
precondition, acceptance by all States Parties of fullscope
safeguards; and that excess nuclear material in military stockpiles
and nuclear materials removed from nuclear weapons as a result of
nuclear weapons reduction agreements should be placed under IAEA
safeguards.
12. Every effort should be made to ensure that the IAEA has the
financial and human resources necessary in order to meet
effectively its responsibilities in the areas of technical
cooperation, safeguards and nuclear safety.
Article IV
13. The States Parties reaffirm their inalienable right to
engage in research, production and use of nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes without discrimination; and that free and
unimpeded and non-discriminatory transfer of nuclear technology for
peaceful purposes to all States Parties be fully ensured.
14. The States Parties reaffirm that beyond safeguards required
under the Treaty, unilaterally enforced restrictive measures which
prevent peaceful nuclear development should be removed.
15. The States Parties note with concern that undue restrictions
on export to developing countries of material, equipment and
technology, for peaceful purposes persist. They emphasise that
proliferation concerns are best addressed through multilaterally
negotiated, universal, comprehensive and non-discriminatory
agreements. Non-proliferation control arrangements should be
transparent and open to participation by all states, and should
ensure that they do not impose restrictions on access to material,
equipment and technology for peaceful purposed required by
developing countries for their continued development. They express
their strong rejection of attempts by any member state to use the
International Atomic Energy Agency's…technical cooperation
programme as a tool for, political purposes in violation of the
IAEA's statute.
16. The States Parties reaffirm the responsibility of nuclear
supplier States Parties to the Treaty to promote the legitimate
needs of nuclear energy of the States Parties to the Treaty, with
preferential treatment rendered to developing ones, by allowing the
latter to participate to the fullest in possible transfer of
nuclear equipment, materials, scientific and technological
information for peaceful purposes with a view to achieving the
largest benefits and applying pertinent elements of sustainable
development in their activities.
17. The States Parties reaffirm the inviolability of peaceful
nuclear activities emanating from the international norms
prohibiting the use of force in international relations, and in
particular Article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter in
considering that any attacks or threat of attack on nuclear
facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy would entail
highly dangerous political, economic and environmental implications
particularly on the civilian inhabitants; and believe that they
bear a solemn responsibility to continue to play a leading role
towards the establishment of comprehensive and universal norms and
standards specifically prohibiting attacks, or threat of attacks on
nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
18. The States Parties encourage the adoption of appropriate
measures to regulate international maritime transportation of
radioactive waste and spent fuel to the highest standards in
international security and support current efforts within the IAEA
to adopt and improve international regulations in that regard.
Article V
19. The States Parties will take into account all the provisions
of the CTBT related to this Article.
20. The States Parties call upon the nuclear-weapon states to
refrain from conducting all types of tests in conformity with the
objectives of the CTBT. They also call upon nuclear-weapon states
to provide transparency on-site and other measures to build
confidence in the full implementation of the provisions of the
Treaty in order to meet international concern.
21. The States Parties stress the significance of achieving
universal adherence to the CTBT including by all the nuclear-weapon
states which, inter alia, should contribute to the process
of nuclear disarmament.
22. The States Parties call upon all of the states which have
not yet done so to sign and ratify the CTBT. Pending the entry into
force of the CTBT, the States Parties call upon the nuclear-weapon
states to comply with the letter and spirit of the CTBT.
23. The States Parties reiterate that if the objectives of the
Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all
signatories, especially the nuclear-weapon states, to nuclear
disarmament would be essential. The States Parties express their
concern over the recent negative developments with regard to the
ratification of the CTBT.
Article VI
24. The States Parties note with regret that, despite the
conclusion of limited agreements, the provisions of Article VI and
the ninth to twelfth preambular paragraphs of the Treaty have not
been fulfilled since the Treaty came into force. In this regard,
the States Parties stress the need to take effective measures
towards nuclear disarmament, thus reaffirming their role in
achieving this objective.
25. The States Parties reaffirm that nuclear weapons pose the
greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization. It
is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its
aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear
weapons. In this context, the goal is the complete elimination of
nuclear weapons. In the task of achieving the goal of nuclear
disarmament, all States Parties bear responsibility, in particular
those nuclear-weapon states which possess the most important
nuclear arsenals.
26. The States Parties welcome the progress made towards the
full ratification of START II and call for the full and early
implementation of the Treaty by both parties as well as of the
early commencement of negotiations of START III.
27. The States Parties are concerned over the negative
implications of the development and deployment of anti-ballistic
missile defense systems and the pursuit of advanced military
technologies capable of deployment in outer space which have,
inter alia, contributed to the further erosion of an
international climate conducive to the promotion of disarmament and
the strengthening of international security. In this connection,
the States Parties call upon the parties to the ABM Treaty to fully
comply with its provisions.
28. The States Parties reaffirm that priority in disarmament
negotiations shall be nuclear weapons in accordance with the Final
Document of the first special session of the General Assembly on
disarmament.
29. The States Parties reaffirm their commitment to fulfil with
determination their obligations under Article VI, in particular the
nuclear-weapon states to pursue negotiations in good faith on
effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race
at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.
30. The States Parties in particular the nuclear-weapon states
shall inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the
efforts and measures they have taken on the implementation of the
unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that
there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a
conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its
aspects under strict and effective international control.
31. The States Parties call upon the Conference on Disarmament
to establish an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament taking into
account all proposals which have been submitted by members of the
Group of 21, and to commence negotiations on a phased programme of
nuclear disarmament and for the complete elimination of nuclear
weapons with a specified framework of time, including a
nuclear-weapon convention prohibiting the development, production,
testing, employment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of
nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination.
32. The States Parties, renew their call for the immediate
commencement and early conclusion of negotiations within an
appropriate ad hoc committee in the Conference on Disarmament for a
treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material
for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, as
essential measures of nuclear disarmament as well as
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons taking into account the 1995
report of the Special Coordinator on that item and the views
relating to the scope of the Treaty. The Treaty should be
non-discriminatory, effectively verifiable and universally
applicable.
33. The States Parties regret the continuing lack of progress on
items relevant to nuclear issues in the agenda of the Conference on
Disarmament.
34. The States Parties agree that specific time should be made
available at Preparatory Committee meetings to deliberate on the
practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate
nuclear weapons.
35. The States Parties agree to establish a subsidiary body to
Main Committee I of the 2000 Review Conference to deliberate on
practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate
nuclear weapons.
Article VII
36. The States Parties express support for measures taken by a
State Party or Group of States Parties to conclude
nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties. They also support proposals for
these zones in other parts of the world where they do not exist,
such as the Middle East and South Asia, on the basis of
arrangements freely arrived at among the states of the region
concerned as a measure towards the strengthening of the nuclear
non-proliferation regime and realizing the objectives of nuclear
disarmament. The States Parties welcome the initiative taken by the
States in Central Asia freely arrived at among themselves to
establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region. The States
Parties also welcome and support the recent adoption by the
Mongolian Parliament of legislation as a concrete contribution to
the international efforts to strengthen the non-proliferation
regime.
37. The States Parties and signatories to the treaties of
Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba that are parties to
the NPT reaffirm their commitment to promote the common goals
envisaged in those treaties, explore and implement further ways and
means of cooperation, including the consolidation of the status of
the nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere…
Article VIII
38. The States Parties will continue their endeavors to
strengthen the review process of the operation of the Treaty with a
view to ensuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the
provisions of the Treaty in their entirety are being realized.
Article IX
39. The States Parties re-emphasize the urgency and the
importance of achieving the universality of the Treaty,
particularly by the accession to the Treaty at the earliest
possible date of those States possessing nuclear capabilities. They
will make determined efforts to achieve this goal.
Security Assurances
40. The States Parties reaffirm that total elimination of
nuclear weapons is the only genuine guarantee for all
non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of
nuclear weapons. Pending the achievement of such a goal, a
legally-binding negative security assurances regime, which will
ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or
threat of use of nuclear weapons must be urgently concluded. Hence,
the States Parties should negotiate a legal instrument to assure
non-nuclear-weapons states against the use or threat of use of
nuclear weapons to be adopted by the 2000 NPT Review Conference as
an annexed protocol to the NPT. They note that an ad hoc Committee
on NSA was established by the Conference on Disarmament in 1998 to
conclude an international legally-binding instrument to assure
non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of
nuclear weapons.
The Resolution on the Middle East
41. The States Parties recall that the adoption of the
Resolution on the Middle East by the 1995 Review and Extension
Conference on 11 May 1995 constituted an integral part of the
package of the 1995 outcome comprising three decisions and a
Resolution, and as such they reaffirm their firm commitment to work
towards the full implementation of that Resolution. In this regard,
the States Parties recognize the special responsibility of the
depository states, as co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution on the
Middle East.
42. The States Parties note that since the adoption of the 1995
Resolution on the Middle East, all states in the region have become
parties to the Treaty, with the exception of Israel. The States
Parties stress the urgent need for Israel to accede to the Treaty
without further delay, to place all its nuclear facilities under
full-scope IAEA safeguards and to conduct its nuclear related
activities in conformity with the non-proliferation regime, in
order to enhance the universality of the Treaty and to avert the
risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East.
43. The nuclear-weapon states, in conformity with their
obligations under Article I of the Treaty, solemnly undertake not
to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or
control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or
indirectly to Israel, and further undertake not in anyway to
assist, encourage, or induce Israel to manufacture or otherwise
acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or [to
transfer] control over such weapons or explosive devices under any
circumstances whatsoever.
44. All States Parties, in conformity with the seventh
preambular paragraph and Article 4 of the Treaty, hereby declare
their commitment to exclusively prohibit the transfer of all
nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities,
resources or devices, and the extension of know-how or any kind of
assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to
Israel, as long as it remains a non-party to the Treaty and has not
placed all its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA
safeguards.
45. The States Parties reaffirm once again, their determination
to extend their fullest cooperation and to exert their utmost
efforts with a view to ensuring the early establishment in the
Middle East a zone free of nuclear as well as all other weapons of
mass destruction and their delivery systems.
46. The States Parties agree that specific time should be made
available at Preparatory Committee meetings to consider proposals
on the Resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Review and
Extension Conference.
47. The States Parties agree to establish a subsidiary body to
Main Committee II of the Review Conference to consider and
recommend proposals on the implementation of the resolution on the
Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension
Conference."
European Union Statement on Nuclear
Disarmament
Statement by Ambassador Filipe de Albuquerque of Portugal on
behalf of the EU and associated states, Main Committee I (Nuclear
Disarmament), April 26; unofficial version
"1. I have the honour to take the floor on behalf of the
European Union on Main Committee I. The Central and Eastern
European countries associated with European Union (Bulgaria, Czech
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania,
Slovakia, Slovenia) and the associated countries (Cyprus, Malta and
Turkey), as well as Iceland and Liechtenstein, EFTA [European Free
Trade Area] countries members of the EEA [European Economic Area],
align themselves with this statement.
2. The EU member states are strongly committed to the
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, to the ultimate goal of
complete elimination of nuclear weapons, and to general and
complete disarmament under strict and effective international
control as set out in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons and in the decisions and the resolution adopted by
the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. The objectives laid down
in these documents also reflect the commitment of all States
Parties to the Treaty to work on effective measures pertaining to
nuclear disarmament.
3. The 1995 Review and Extension Conference was a milestone in
international and collective efforts towards nuclear
non-proliferation and disarmament. The programme of action agreed
upon in paragraph 4 of the Decision on Principles and Objectives
for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament gave us concrete
standards against which progress in the field of nuclear
disarmament can be measured.
4. Five years later, at the sixth Review Conference of the
Treaty, how do we assess where we now stand?
5. Paragraph 4a of the Principles and Objectives called for the
completion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
negotiations no later than 1996. The CTBT was indeed concluded by
September 1996 and signed by the five nuclear-weapon states, all
European countries and many others. It has since been ratified by
all members of the European Union, including the two European
nuclear-weapon states, France and the United Kingdom.
6. South Asia continues to be an area of deep concern to the EU.
The tests conducted by India and Pakistan in 1998 run contrary to
global efforts towards nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.
We continue to call upon both countries to meet all the
requirements set out in [UN Security Council resolution
1172]… We have noted that the governments of India and
Pakistan have now committed themselves to a moratorium on nuclear
testing and have expressed their willingness to sign the CTBT.
7. The US Senate's rejection of CTBT ratification in October
1999 has also been a setback, but we welcome the commitment
expressed by the US Government to abide by the Treaty and support
the verification regime and ongoing work of the Preparatory
Commission of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation in
Vienna. We call upon all states, especially the 44 states whose
ratification is required for the Treaty to enter into force, to
sign and ratify the CTBT without delay and without conditions. We
welcome therefore the announcement by the Russian Federation that
the State Duma has approved the treaty for ratification. Pending
entry into force, we urge all states with nuclear capabilities to
abide by a moratorium and refrain from any actions which are
contrary to the obligations and provisions of the CTBT. The Review
Conference moreover should consider what more can be done by States
Parties to accelerate ratifications, prevent a resumption of
nuclear testing, and facilitate the Treaty's entry into force at
the earliest possible time.
8. The second goal which we set ourselves in 1995 was the
immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations of a
non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning
the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices. To our deep regret, concrete
negotiations on this treaty, which is of vital importance both to
nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, have not yet
started in the Conference on Disarmament, although the CD reached
an agreement on a negotiating mandate in 1995 and on establishment
of an Ad Hoc Committee in 1998. The second goal has thus not been
met.
9. It is a matter of real concern to the EU that annual haggling
over the adoption of the CD work programme has prevented any real
work from starting. The EU countries stand ready and eager to
commence negotiations ill the CD immediately on the basis of the
Shannon report and the mandate contained therein. We attach no
conditions. Work should begin as soon as the Conference on
Disarmament meets again at the end of May and should be resumed
each year until such a Treaty is concluded. NPT States Parties
attending the Review Conference should reaffirm their commitment to
the goal of negotiating a ban on the production of fissile
materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices
and should commit themselves to getting the negotiations underway
without further delay. We welcome the moratorium on the production
of fissile materials declared by four of the five nuclear-weapon
states. Pending the conclusion of such a Treaty, the EU calls on
all states which have not yet done so, to halt the production of
fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices and to undertake and abide by a moratorium.
10. The third part of the Programme of Action contained in the
Principles and Objectives adopted in 1995 was 'the determined
pursuit by the nuclear-weapons states of systematic and progressive
efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal
of eliminating those weapons and by all states of general and
complete disarmament under strict and effective international
control'. We welcome the progress that has been made, unilaterally
and bilaterally, toward the reduction of nuclear weapons, noting
especially the continuing steps undertaken by the United States and
Russia to fulfil START I and ratify START II, and by France and the
United Kingdom to reduce the number and type of nuclear forces in
their arsenals. We are encouraged by the declarations made by the
United States and Russia relating to transparency and
irreversibility with regard to fissile materials.
We welcome efforts by nuclear-weapon states to increase overall
transparency, and further efforts by them to close down and
dismantle nuclear weapon facilities. The European Union contributes
to and welcomes others' involvement in cooperative programmes aimed
at providing assistance for safe and secure management and
disposition of fissile materials and related facilities.
Additionally, we commend various initiatives to place fissile
material designated as 'excess' to defense needs under appropriate
IAEA safeguards, thereby taking them forever out of the stock
available for use in nuclear weapons. The EU supports efforts based
on the principles of transparency, accountability,
confidence-building and irreversibility. In this regard, the EU
supports efforts by NWS to consider measures in fulfilment of
paragraph 4 of the Program of Action in the 1995 Principles and
Objectives and encourage them to further these efforts.
11. The last five years have also witnessed negative
developments which have retarded progress towards nuclear
disarmament. The EU deeply regrets that important agreements
necessary for the fulfilment of Article VI of the NPT have not yet
entered into force. The EU welcomes the approval for ratification
of START II by Russia as an important step towards enhancing global
stability and security. We now call for the prompt entry into force
and timely implementation of START II and its protocol and for the
early commencement of negotiations on START III with a view to
achieving further deep reductions in strategic nuclear weapons and
the verified dismantlement of warheads destined for disarmament
under this treaty.
12. These efforts should not only address transparency measures
relating to strategic nuclear warhead inventories but also include
non-strategic nuclear weapons. The EU underlines the importance of
addressing non-strategic nuclear weapons in the framework of
nuclear arms reduction efforts and urges the Review Conference to
encourage the nuclear-weapon states which possess such weapons, and
in the first instance the United States and Russia, to explore ways
to bring these weapons within future nuclear reduction and
disarmament arrangements, with the objective of their reduction and
eventual complete elimination. In this context, we underline the
importance of the unilateral and reciprocal commitments made by the
US and Russia in 1991 on non-strategic nuclear weapons. The
European Union hopes that within the framework of START III
negotiations, verifiable reductions of non-strategic nuclear
weapons will also be incorporated.
13. We reaffirm the importance of the ABM Treaty, as one of the
pillars of strategic stability. The EU wishes that Treaty [to be]
preserved.
14. The EU shares the growing concerns about the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. We
believe it important that in responding to these threats states do
not take actions which have the effect of harming the integrity and
validity of the Treaties which underpin nuclear non-proliferation
and strategic stability.
15. While we acknowledge that for the time being the primary
responsibility rests with the five nuclear-weapons states to
negotiate the reduction of their arsenals, it is also an obligation
of all States Parties to further the implementation of Article VI
of the NPT. In this regard we support the establishment of an Ad
Hoc Working Group within the Conference on Disarmament under Agenda
item I 'cessation of nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament'
subject to a consensus agreement on a mandate for such a group.
16. It is also necessary, and an obligation on all NPT States
Parties both nuclear and non-nuclear, to work for progress towards
general and complete disarmament under strict and effective
international control. In this regard we welcome the entry into
force of the Chemical Weapons Convention, and commend the work
carried out since to ensure its effective implementation. We look
forward to completion of negotiations in Geneva on a Protocol to
strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. We also
welcome the range of agreements in the field of conventional
armaments, including in our own European region. All these measures
contribute directly towards international and regional peace,
stability and security, and thereby towards our shared goals of
nuclear, and general and complete disarmament.
17. We, the members of the European Union, take very seriously
our obligations under the NPT and the Decisions and Resolutions of
the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. The Program of Action
agreed by consensus in 1995 has not been completed. Every effort
must be made to take forward the obligations which we took upon us
when we extended the NPT indefinitely in 1995. But we must also go
further and identify the progressive and systematic steps to be
undertaken during the next five years. To that end, the EU has
adopted a Common Position in order to contribute to a structured
and balanced review of the operation of the Treaty at the 2000 NPT
Review Conference, with a view to helping build consensus on
substantive issues in this Conference.
18. Continued and steady progress on nuclear disarmament is of
vital importance to preserving the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, and thus to preserving stability and international
security."
© 2000 The Acronym Institute.
Return to Acronym
Main Page
|
