Disarmament DiplomacyIssue No. 55, March 2001NATO Secretary-General US VisitRemarks on Missile Defence 'Trans-Atlantic Relations: Overcoming New Challenges', Speech by NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson, Forum hosted by the American Free Enterprise Institute, March 7, 2001. "Just over ten years ago, there was a strong trans-Atlantic consensus that the principal threat to NATO was the USSR. If you were to ask the question today 'What is the principal threat to NATO?', at least some Americans would say 'ESDI' [European Security and Defence Identity] and some Europeans would say 'NMD.' ... I raise these two issues - European defence and missile defence - because they are two of the major sources of the current furrowing of brows in trans-Atlantic security. Many American commentators continue to see ESDI as a latent threat to NATO. I think Mr. Gedmin's argument in the Senate here just one week ago was that ESDI is indeed a threat, but since the Europeans won't really do anything anyway, it is less important than many of the other issues we face. Not exactly a rousing endorsement. Many Europeans, meanwhile, continue to fear the effects of the United States proceeding with deployment of a missile defence system. But they feel that since such deployment is inevitable anyway, it is better to stop discussing whether it will happen and start discussing how. Hardly a resounding call for dealing with missile threats. In my view both of these negative attitudes, towards ESDI and missile defence, are wrong - wrong on the substance, and wrong on the prescriptions. I want to begin with missile defence... For its first forty years, NATO's job in protecting and promoting our nations and our shared values was dominated by the need to defend against the Soviet Union. Today, the threats come from different quarters. Clearly, the most immediate risk to peace in Europe today is in the Balkans, and that is why NATO is engaged in keeping the peace and pushing for political resolution of the conflicts there. ... The other new type of risk for NATO countries comes from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. And NATO itself recognises this. The requirement to address WMD threats is in the 1999 NATO Strategic Concept. NATO is already conducting its own theatre missile defence feasibility study, and some NATO nations have already joined the United States in plans to deploy theatre missile defence systems in southern Europe. When I was in Moscow two weeks ago, Defence Minister Sergeyev handed me his plan for non-strategic missile defence in Europe, a plan that identifies missile threats and acknowledges that a military solution is part of the answer. The details are still sketchy, and part of the Russian impulse may be about driving wedges between Europe and America. But when I met with President Putin, he mentioned four states by name and actually used the term 'rogue states.' So I believe that not only the Allies, but also the Russians agreed that the missile challenge is real and must be addressed. The question is, 'How?' The concerns previously expressed in Europe about NMD have focused on 'de-coupling' and strategic stability. A 'national' missile defence for the US, say its critics, could risk decoupling US and European security. And a defence system, they claim, that tears up the ABM Treaty but offers no coherent concept of nuclear strategy to augment or replace mutual deterrence, is a great worry. But the Bush Administration's approach, which aims to include Allies and fielded forces in the net - in other words, dropping the 'N' from 'NMD' - and to put missile defence into a larger strategy of nuclear and WMD security, has helped address these concerns. And the commitment to close consultations with the NATO Allies by both the Clinton and Bush Administrations has made clear that decisions on something that so fundamentally affects the security of the NATO Allies will not be made over their heads. So I am very confident that instead of seeing a major trans-Atlantic row over 'whether' America should deploy a 'national' missile defence system, we are actually going to see some very serious consultations on 'how' a broader missile defence system and strategy will come into effect. And this will reflect again our commitment to common values, common security, and shared risks and burdens. ..." Source: Text - Robertson Speech on ESDI, Missile Defense, US-Europe Ties, US State Department (Washington File), March 7. Robertson-Rumsfeld Press Conference Press Conference with NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson and US Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, The Pentagon, March 8, 2001. "Opening Remarks by Robertson: '... And we spoke about missile defence, an important and current issue, but where the alliance has no intention of being divided or split in any way and where we are keen to get right down to the promised consultations on missile defence - on the how and the when, rather than on the whether, which has been decided by the will of the American people.' ... Question: 'Mr. Secretary...intelligence experts still say that North Korea...could possibly have ICBMs capable of hitting the US in the next four or five years. ... What will you do if in fact North Korea...starts testing or starts building missiles capable of hitting the US? Would you advise the President perhaps to conduct a first strike, or what would you do?' Rumsfeld: 'You've got to be kidding! ... [Y]ou are correct; there's no question but that North Korea has had a considerable appetite for ballistic missiles of various ranges. And they have also been a significant proliferator of those capabilities throughout a good many countries across the globe, and they still are. We are approaching the missile defence issue in a fresh way and have made some progress in our thinking. And very likely we'll be visiting with the National Security Council at some point in the period ahead and discussing the things we think we think at this stage, and getting guidance and ultimately decisions from the President as to how to proceed.' ... Question: 'In your mind, is theater missile defence a higher priority than national missile defence?' Rumsfeld: 'I have gotten to the point where I now am sufficiently into this subject where I've concluded that 'national' and 'theater' are words that aren't useful. At least for me they're not, in how to think about it, for this reason: What's 'national' depends on where you live, and what's 'theater' depends on where you live. The United States has friends and allies that we're linked very tightly to. We have deployed forces in the world. Our interest is in recognizing that ballistic missiles constitute a threat and weapons of mass destruction constitute a threat - not the only threat, but a threat, one of the threats. And I would say that the so-called 'asymmetrical' threats constitute more significant threats today than the risks of a major land, sea or air war, where some country decides to threaten Western armies and navies and air forces. I think that the threats of terrorism and cruise missiles, as well as ballistic missiles, information warfare, are all things that we need to be attentive to. And so I feel that we're approaching it in a rational way by avoiding something that could create significant differentials in vulnerabilities. And my interest is in seeing if we can't find ways to develop defences against ballistic missiles where we have interests. And we have interests in NATO, we have interests in the Middle East. Obviously, you've all seen the Scuds flying in there during the Gulf War. And so I've pretty much stopped using those two words.' Question: 'By differentiation of vulnerability, do you mean different between the United States and its allies, or...' Rumsfeld: 'Yes, indeed. I think, for example, that over time, one has to recognize that it's every bit as important to us to be able to defend this piece of real estate and our population in this location as it is to defend our deployed forces and to have our allies feel equally secure to the extent that's possible. So I've pretty much stopped using the words, to be perfectly honest.' ..." © 2001 The Acronym Institute. |