Disarmament Diplomacy

Preventing Missile Proliferation

Incentives and Security Guarantees

By Professor Viacheslav Abrosimov

Edited version of paper entitled 'Incentives and Security Guarantees to States Relinquishing Missile Weapons Delivery Systems: Problems and Possible Solutions', presented by Professor Viacheslav Abrosimov to the Second International Working Meeting of Experts on the Problem of Creating a Global Control System for the Non-Proliferation of Missiles and Missile Technologies (GCS), Moscow, February 15, 2001.

The prudent provision of security guarantees, incentives and other means of encouragement and assistance is a key issue in the international community's elaboration of a non-military response to missile proliferation. For all their extreme sensitivity, the issues of incentives and guarantees were discussed at, and further reflected upon following the first meeting of GCS experts (GCS-1) in Moscow on March 16, 2000. Let us try to summarise, in a preliminary manner, our existing thoughts and ideas and identify the key questions to be addressed. It would appear that a substantive, equal, and frank discussion of this subject should be based on the following fundamental propositions:

• recognition of the fact that there are no universal international legal mechanisms prohibiting the development of missile-delivered weapons;
• recognition of the importance of compliance with the main principles of international space law contained in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, allowing all states to pursue the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes;
• recognition of the role of the United Nations as the principal guarantor of international security.

As a rule, the main motive for obtaining and possessing missiles and missile technologies is a desire to ensure prestige and security. The decision to pursue missile programmes is an internal, sovereign matter for the state concerned. Given this fact, how can one influence such decisions?

Prestige. In the modern world, arguing that the possession of missiles is not a symbol of prestige and scientific-technological and industrial progress is tantamount to defending a proposition detached from reality. One must, instead, appeal to rational calculations, to the attractiveness for the state concerned of a line of conduct which alleviates the risk of missile proliferation and thus reduces the incentive or temptation to engage in missile development.

Security. One has to admit that, within any GCS regime, it would be absurd to seek the complete elimination of missiles and rocket technologies, even as an ultimate objective, if only because of the fact that, with peaceful space exploration bound to continue and expand, it is not yet possible to establish authentic criteria distinguishing military missiles from peaceful space-launch vehicles (SLVs). This is why any state which gives up or refrains from pursuing its own missile programmes cannot expect that other countries' missiles will be eliminated. Complete "de-missilisation" can hardly be expected. Realistically, one can only expect that the process of reductions to and/or limitations of existing arsenals of military missiles will continue. In the process, one has to establish the clearest possible criteria for such reductions and limitations, in addition to verification measures and the best means of "proliferating" the results of peaceful space activities in exchange for the non-proliferation of missile weapons. Such criteria will be required, in particular, to avoid suspicions that the GCS simply "conserves" the missile possession status quo, that is, legalises possession of missiles by those who have them while making it harder for others to follow suit.

Missile non-proliferation would also be assisted by states' confidence in their basic territorial security and integrity, and by a shared belief that existing and potential threats to security can be removed in ways other than developing military missile programmes.

To achieve this at the global level, it is important to ensure the sustainability and enhancement of the most important principles and structures of international security, first of all the principle of abiding by the core postulates of international law - non-use of force, non-interference in internal affairs, respect for sovereignty, etc. Maintenance of global strategic stability and its key agreements - in the non-proliferation context, the ABM, INF and START Treaties - is critical in this context. Missile non-proliferation incentives could also include a system of measures seeking to prevent the militarisation of outer space and efforts to develop multilateral agreements on a code of conduct in space helping to ensure the transparency of space activities and predictability of states' intentions in this area.

The reality and perception of regional security threats are in many cases the principal and direct sources of missile proliferation, and this problem should be given particular attention in the GCS framework. A first obvious measure would be increased transparency and the development of predictability measures in the missiles area, including the establishment of a missile-launch notification regime. Other proposals related to the GCS system have also been made, in particular the merit of agreements to the effect that the states of a particular region should refrain from developing missile programmes either as a matter of principle, or in excess of certain criteria and parameters.

Proposals have also been made for the development of regional systems of mutual visits (inspections) to facilities related to missile programmes. One might also consider establishing, within an overall GCS framework, regional and inter-regional dialogues on missiles (involving the creation of relevant structures, as appropriate), facilitating the exchange of information and experience. Existing organisations dealing with regional cooperation could become more actively involved in discussing and coordinating missile proliferation prevention activities.

A more far-reaching idea, still to be fully developed, has to do with establishing missile-free zones, with respect to which states possessing missiles could provide guarantees of the non-use of missiles or other security guarantees. Such initiatives would not have to start from scratch: there already exists an obligation by the states parties to current nuclear-weapon-free zones not to develop, acquire or possess missile-delivery systems for nuclear weapons.

Development. The biggest opportunity to influence internal decisions by sovereign states in missile matters is offered by cooperation in the peaceful exploration of outer space, and in extending access to this area to all interested countries.

Some positive experience has already been accumulated in this area. At GCS-1, we noted that the UN Conference on the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes - UNISPACE-III (Vienna, 19-30 July, 1999) - had already formulated the main areas of cooperative space-activity in the political, economic, and humanitarian areas. In particular, the conference considered the possibilities for providing assistance to states, primarily developing countries, seeking to apply the results of space exploration for the purpose of assisting sustainable development; in creating and strengthening national mechanisms assuring the required development of national peaceful space activities; in expanding the possibilities for education and personnel training for space exploration; and in improving information exchange on the results of space activities. The UNISPACE-III Declaration also stressed the need for measures to seek new and non-traditional sources of worldwide financing for the purpose of assisting the implementation of the recommendations adopted by that Conference.

For those states which voluntarily relinquish their missile development programmes, one could envisage establishing an additional system of incentive measures within the framework of the GCS. One idea, among others, is to create a special international foundation to finance commercial space launches by such countries on the basis of the existing technical capacities of other states. Russia, for example, presently has such a capacity.

There are a number of general requirements for any effective system of incentives, encouragements and guarantees.

Voluntary nature of decisions. It is important not to create the impression that a system of incentives and guarantees would in any way restrict the right of states under the UN Charter to self-defence, or infringe on the right of any country to pursue missile space activities. There should be no outside pressure, and the system should apply only to those countries which voluntarily relinquish missile weapons.

Efficiency. Given the strategic and regional complexity of contemporary international relations, it will remain probable that some states will continue to seek ways to obtain missile capabilities. Therefore, it is necessary to establish a truly effective system of incentives and guarantees, for use in conjunction with political and diplomatic efforts aimed at the identification, neutralisation and removal of factors encouraging states to move in this direction. Such incentives and guarantees should aim to create conditions in which a state renouncing the possession of missile weapons is unlikely to wish to reverse its decision except in conditions of extreme or endemic strategic destabilisation.

Differentiation. The system of incentives and guarantees should fully take into account the specific political, military and economic situation in a given region. Such an approach would include the elaboration of measures tailored to suit individual countries' economic position, geopolitical importance and vulnerability, etc.

Stage-by-stage approach. Movement towards the relinquishing of missile weapons can be gradual and progressive, sustained through the pursuit first of responsible export policies, then by the limitation and curtailment of missile programmes - for example, by renouncing the production and deployment of certain types of missile - and, finally, crossing the threshold of complete renunciation. It would obviously be advisable to design the system of incentives and guarantees to be able to encourage and foster such evolutionary, step-by-step processes where the state concerned feels that a one-step abandonment of missile weapons would be premature or unrealistic.

With regard to the possible content of specific incentives and guarantees, they should generally be compensatory in nature and thus applicable in those cases where the state, relinquishing its missile programmes, fears losses of some kind, for instance:

• in the military area - the state's defenses becomes more vulnerable in the event of a possible attack;
• in the economic area - the country loses relevant export markets and revenue;
• in the area of science and technology - the country is faced with worse prospects of realising its own programmes for outer space exploration, and more limited opportunities for development and use of high technologies.
• In the economic area, it is difficult to foresee the compensatory requirements and priorities of the states concerned - they could include providing assistance in the development of the fuel industry and electric power engineering, the construction industry, the supply of foodstuffs, etc. Intensification of cooperation and provision of different economic assistance should be in keeping both with the existing achievements of the country in the area of missile space technology development and with its potential capabilities for utilising such technology. Probably, it is necessary to develop GCS legal instruments which could regulate this new type of international activity. To be candid, we currently have more questions than answers in this area. For example, what are the criteria for economic incentives? Should this category of incentive be provisional or permanent, or a mixture of both?

It is well known that missile technologies enable the achievement of considerable progress in various technological fields such as cybernetics, artificial intelligence, etc. States renouncing missile-based weapons could be provided with such technologies as well as with manufactured devices and instruments for use in their national economies. One could also consider the possibility of assisting relevant national programmes for peaceful outer space exploration, particularly by providing services for launching non-military space vehicles. A certain degree of international experience has already been gained in this area: space vehicles of some countries are brought into orbit by SLVs of other countries; photographs of the Earth's surface, as well as meteorological data, can be provided to different countries; and cooperation is developing in the areas of natural disaster prevention, space communications, navigation, tele-education, tele-medicine, etc. The scope for further development along these lines is quite evidently considerable.

The principal military and political incentives would take the form of guarantees of military security for states relinquishing missiles. International security guarantees, adopted by states according to the UN Charter and the wider corpus of international law, are widely recognised as important means of relaxing tension in the world, promoting disarmament, and assisting in the peaceful resolution of crisis situations and international disputes. In the absence of appropriate security guarantees it is unreasonable to expect many states to give their consent to the curtailment or abandonment of existing military missile programmes. The participants of the GCS should thus attach priority attention to this complex but crucial issue.

At their most far-reaching level, security guarantees could provide for the active military defence of such a missile-renouncing country from missile attack. One should probably not rule out a situation when such a country would be defended by international peace-keeping forces (only, of course, on the basis of a decision by the UN Security Council) equipped with theatre ballistic missile defense systems. At a preventive and supportive level, a certain degree of defensive assistance could in some cases be provided to the country concerned, for instance with the training of national experts who would operate anti-missile systems. At a minimum, guarantees should be offered of the non-use of missile weapons against such countries, formulated in a form acceptable to them.

Suggestions have also been put forward that one could consider separately a different type of guarantee, related to the minimisation of the consequences of a missile attack. Such a guarantee would take the form of a detailed and substantial commitment to the provision of technical, medical or humanitarian assistance from individual states as well as by international organisations, as well as the elaboration of mechanisms for allocating appropriate financial compensation for damages inflicted by the missile attack.

The nature of military and political guarantees, as well as procedures for their application, should be reflected in the relevant legally-binding international agreements. The crucial point, in terms of confidence and credibility, is that security guarantees should be provided not by an individual state or a limited group of states but by the entire world community. A viable legal framework would require the participation of such major international organizations as the UN, specifically the UN Committee on Outer Space, and the Conference on Disarmament.

With regard to the future work and deliberations of the GCS Experts' Working Group, it is necessary to emphasise the key issues requiring further elaboration:

Which initial approaches are more appropriate? Should the first step take the form of an elaboration of global criteria ('rules of the game'), or should the immediate concentration be on the search for optimal regional approaches, with a subsequent generalisation of regional experience into "global" formulas?

How can we guard against the misuse of a GCS system of incentives and guarantees? Specifically, how can one avoid a situation in which incentives to relinquish missile programmes would be turned into 'anti-incentives', i.e. inducements to commence new national missile programmes in the mercenary expectation of receiving future 'compensation' for the decision to give them up? Of equal concern, how can one verify the fulfillment of possible commitments to relinquish the national missile programmes as well as irreversible character of such commitments? This question highlights once again the matter of specificity, tailoring, and both conceptual and technical clarity: what exactly would the system be encouraging, and seeking to prevent, in a given case (R&D, manufacturing, acquisition, deployment, etc)?

A final point. As is well known, in July 2000 the Democratic People's Republic of Korea put forward an important proposal offering to relinquish the development and testing of long-range ballistic missiles capable of placing space satellites in orbit, on condition it is provided with the opportunity for free launches of two or three satellites annually. This proposal has been considered between the DPRK and Russia at the highest levels, and also between the DPRK and the US. This international meeting of experts is not in a position to consider the details of this specific proposal. Two aspects of the DPRK initiative, however, are of general, international importance.

Firstly, this is the first example since the Working Group was established last year of a state announcing its conditional preparedness to relinquish its missile programme, thus providing a dramatic illustration that the issue of incentives and guarantees, raised within the GCS framework, is of considerable and urgent practical import and demonstrably not merely an academic or irrelevant exercise. Secondly, it has clearly demonstrated that, as a matter of political principle, even acute and seemingly intractable problems of missile proliferation and missile technologies can be resolved by political and diplomatic means on a mutually beneficial basis.

Professor Viacheslav Abrosimov is a Russian arms control expert, a participant in numerous international conferences and consultations on missile defence issues, and a Corresponding Member of the International Informatization Academy in Moscow (http://www.iiaun.ru). He has conducted research for a number of scientific organisations on the application of modern mathematical methods to the analysis and solution of political problems.

© 2001 The Acronym Institute.