Disarmament Diplomacy

News Review

North Korea Extends Missile Test Moratorium, Holds Firm on Exports

As reported in the last issue, the United States has suspended discussions with North Korea on nuclear and missile issues and initiated a review of its policy in the region. In the absence of active involvement from Washington, the European Union has intensified its efforts to persuade the government of Kim Jong-il to call a permanent halt to the testing and export of long-range missiles. The two sides held discussions in Pyongyang in early May, during which Kim Jong-il announced an extension of North Korea's moratorium on missile test-flights until 2003, while defending the state's desire to generate funds from sales of missiles and missile-related technology. According to Javier Solana, former NATO Secretary General and now the senior EU foreign policy official, speaking to reporters in Seoul on May 4, the North Korean leader referred to such sales as "part of trade", adding "his message was, 'I need money.' I'm able to produce this, and I will sell it.'" As Solana stressed: "You can imagine this is an answer we cannot take. ... [T]he message we gave very clearly was that to have a relationship with the European Union, you have to be a state who behaves by the rules of the game."

Regarding the extension of the test-flight moratorium, Solana expressed guarded content: "I don't know exactly why he picked 2003, and I didn't want to ask why. It's a longer period than it will take for the [US] review. The message is, he wants to continue [the moratorium] and he is going to continue it even after the review is over." Solana also recalled: "At one point, he made a comment on the side: 'well, the US called me a rogue state again'... He felt free, once the dialogue was stopped, not to continue with the moratorium. But he said he would like to express restraint." Also on May 4, South Korean President Kim Dae-jung greeted the news of the extension with warm enthusiasm: "To win the North Korean promise to maintain its missile moratorium until 2003 is an achievement bigger than we had expected. I believe it will have a positive effect on resuming [the] US-North Korea dialogue." US State Department spokesperson Richard Boucher was more reserved, noting (May 4) that the issue was crucial but not all-important: "The nature of the regime, the conventional forces, the missile exports, the missile developments, all these events in North Korea have been of serious concern to the United States, and remain of serious concern. We need to figure out how best to deal with that... We will conduct our review in a thorough manner and we'll anticipate completing it in a timely fashion. ... We've said before that maintaining the missile-launch moratorium is really essential for any future progress in our dialogue. If North Korea does maintain this moratorium, that would be constructive..."

Speaking in Washington on May 7, senior EU official Lars Danielsson spoke of the Union's "great concern" about North Korea's stance on the question of exports, suggesting that a sustained dialogue would be impossible in the context of ongoing sales. Notwithstanding this serious reservation, on May 14 the EU announced it was establishing diplomatic relations with the country, a move immediately and warmly welcome in South Korea, which noted in a Foreign Ministry statement: "The decision of the EU and North Korea to establish diplomatic relations will positively contribute to achieving peace and stability on the Korean Peninsular and improving inter-Korean relations." US Secretary of State Colin Powell observed simply (May 14): "[This is] a choice for the EU to make. I don't have anything critical to say about it." Powell has explicitly ruled out establishing diplomatic relations with Pyongyang for the foreseeable future. State Department spokesperson Boucher noted positively (May 14): "We think the European Union has played a constructive role on the Korean Peninsular. We'll work with them to promote common goals." For its part, the EU is anxious not to be seen as taking America's place as lead-negotiator. In the words of Swedish Prime Minister Goeran Persson (May 4): "We will not replace the United States. It's not possible. It's nothing we want to do."

South Korea's anxiety about the Bush policy review was expressed openly by Foreign Minister Han Seung Soo on May 4: "South-North relations are at a standstill... We are waiting for the early conclusion of the US government policy review... Until that is done, the uncertainty overhanging this issue will not be cleared. On our part, we are trying, but North Korea is waiting for the end of the policy review... One cannot go it alone. We hope when [the US] concludes its policy review, it will resume negotiations..." On May 10, Lee Bong-jo, a senior official at South Korea's Unification Ministry, told reporters that US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, in Seoul for consultations on missile defence, was confident that US-North Korea dialogue would resume: "These talks were important because we received confirmation that US talks with North Korea would resume and Washington has shown strong support for South Korea's Sunshine Policy..." Secretary of State Powell told reporters on May 14 that "we will re-engage" with North Korea, "but it will be at the place of our choosing and after our policy review is completed."

Unease is also evident with regard to the future of the 1994 US-North Korea Framework Agreement, under which North Korea is to be provided with replacement nuclear reactors incapable of directly producing weapons-grade fissile materials. On May 7, the South Korean Foreign Ministry issued a statement designed to quash one of several rumours about the deal: "It is not true that the US made a decision to replace the reactor project with steam-powered generators and delivered the decision to our government." On May 16, North Korea issued a statement expressing exasperation at the uncertainty and delay surrounding the accord, and warning: "The failure by the US to live up to its obligations...by the year 2003 would possibly drive us to respond...[by] abandoning [our] ongoing nuclear freeze. We cannot sit idle over our loss while maintaining the nuclear freeze... If the US goes without [paying us] compensation, it would possibly create the situation where we have to re-operate the graphite-moderated reactors..." The State Department responded bluntly, with spokesperson Boucher noting (May 16): "Our position has always been that we intend to abide by the Agreed Framework. And we expect them to abode by the Agreed Framework."

Speaking in Washington on April 17, John McLaughlin, Deputy Director of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) claimed that North Korea "probably has one or two nuclear bombs - and it may also have biological ones alongside its chemical ones."

Note: on June 6, President Bush announced that his administration was ready to resume talks with North Korea. The President's statement noted: "Over the past several months, my administration has been reviewing our policy towards North Korea. We have recently discussed the results of our thinking with our close allies, South Korea and Japan. We have now completed our review. I have directed my national security team to undertake serious discussions with North Korea on a broad agenda to include: improved implementation of the Agreed Framework relating to North Korea's nuclear activities; verifiable constraints on North Korea's missile programmes and a ban on its missile exports; and a less threatening conventional military posture. ... Our approach will offer North Korea the opportunity to demonstrate the seriousness of its desire for improved relations. If North Korea responds affirmatively and takes appropriate action, we will expand our efforts to help the North Korean people, ease sanctions, and take other political steps." See next issue for further details and reaction.

Reports: Remarks by Deputy Director of Central Intelligence John E. McLaughlin to Texas A&M Conference 'North Korea: Engagement or Confrontation?', April 17, 2001, CIA website (http://www.ocdi.gov); N. Korea's Kim says missile moratorium to stay, Reuters, May 3; US would welcome longer N. Korean test moratorium, Reuters, May 3; North Korea promises to extend moratorium on missile tests, New York Times, May 4; N. Korea extends missile test halt, Washington Post, May 4; EU - N. Korea won't stop arms exports, Associated Press, May 4; US says it favors second Korean summit, Reuters, May 4; S. Korean President applauds North, Associated Press, May 4; Missile moratorium will boost NK-US dialogue - President Kim, Korea Times, May 4; North Korea refuses to stop arms exports, delegation says, New York Times, May 4; N. Korean leader to continue sale of missiles, Washington Post, May 5; Bush to N. Korea - no missile tests, Associated Press, May 5; S. Korea denies change in N. Korea nuclear project, Reuters, May 7; EU - N. Korea talks hinge on missiles, Associated Press, May 7; US shield to be offered to allies, Reuters, May 10; US woos S. Korea on missile shield with 'sunshine', Reuters, May 10; N. Korea warns US on missile plan, Associated Press, May 13; EU opens ties with N. Korea, Associated Press, May 14; Powell says US-North-Korean engagement important, Reuters, May 14; Transcript - Secretary of State Powell's interview on CNN May 14, 2001, US State Department (Washington File), May 14; N. Korea says may end reactor deal, cites US delay, Reuters, May 16; N. Korea might quit nuclear deal, Associated Press, May 16; Statement by the President, The White House, June 6.

© 2001 The Acronym Institute.