Disarmament Diplomacy

Preventing Missile Proliferation

Editor's Note

At the 15th plenary meeting of the member states of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in Helsinki, October 10-13, 2000, a draft code of conduct was circulated and discussed. Under pressure from states outside the MTCR regime and an implied US lack of confidence, represented by plans for national missile defence, the member states wanted to show that the MTCR regime could address missile proliferation more pro-actively and effectively than before. As described by a Finnish Foreign Ministry statement issued when the MTCR plenary concluded on October 13: "The Partners continued their deliberations, started in the previous Plenary in 1999, on a set of principles, commitments, confidence-building measures and incentives that could constitute a code of conduct against missile proliferation. They decided to approach countries outside of the MTCR in order to engage them in a broader common effort to agree on a multilateral instrument open to all states."

The MTCR proposals were also seen as a response to Russia's vague proposals in February-March 2000 for a Global Control System for the Non-Proliferation of Missiles and Missile Technologies (GCS). At first, MTCR members requested media silence on the draft code of conduct in order to allow discussions with other governments to take place without undue pressure. The international debates on missile proliferation and missile defence have now moved on, driven by the ill-defined but far-reaching plans of the Bush administration. In view of the alternative approaches to preventing and combatting the proliferation of missiles and missile technology, it is now necessary that the MTCR draft code of conduct be discussed more openly. As part of our ongoing debate on missile proliferation and defence, Disarmament Diplomacy has decided it is time to publish the draft code of conduct, as received in October 2000. It will be followed by an edited version of a paper on incentives and security guarantees, delivered to the second working group meeting on Russia's GCS concept, held in Moscow, February 2001.

At the time of the Helsinki Plenary, the MTCR had 32 'partners', or member states, including Russia: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States. In late March 2001, the Republic of Korea was admitted to the regime.

MTCR Draft Code of Conduct

'Draft International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation,' Final Draft, agreed at the 15th Plenary meeting of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Helsinki, October 10-13, 2000. MTCR/HEL/PL/00/CHAIR/01

Subscribing states...agree to respect and implement the following principles, commitments and other measures in all national and collective activities relating to rockets and rocket systems.

a) Principles:

1) Recognition by subscribing states of the increasing security challenges caused by the ongoing proliferation of ballistic missile systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction and of the need to prevent and curb such proliferation through international endeavours, including through this International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation;

2) Recognition by subscribing states of the importance of strengthening, and gaining wider adherence to, existing disarmament and non-proliferation regimes;

3) Recognition by subscribing states that adherence to, and full compliance with, disarmament and non-proliferation norms build confidence as to the peaceful intentions of states;

4) Recognition by subscribing states that participation in this International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation is voluntary and open to all states and that this Code of Conduct will complement and strengthen existing national, bilateral, regional and multilateral security arrangements and disarmament and non-proliferation regimes;

5) Recognition by subscribing states that all countries alike must be able to continue to reap the benefits of the utilisation of space for peaceful purposes in ways that do not contribute to the proliferation of ballistic missile systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction;

6) Recognition by subscribing states that space launch vehicle programmes should not be used to conceal ballistic missile programmes, considering that there are similarities between both types of programmes in terms of technology, facilities and expertise;

7) Recognition by subscribing states of the necessity of appropriate transparency measures on ballistic missile programmes and space launch vehicle programmes in order to increase confidence and to promote non-proliferation of ballistic missiles and ballistic missile technology;

8) Confirmation by subscribing states of their commitment to the United Nations Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of All States taking into Particular Account the Needs of Developing Countries, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly (resolution 51/122 of December 13, 1996).

b) Commitments:

1) Commitment by subscribing states to ratify:

• the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,
• the 1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, and
• the 1974 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space;

2) Commitment by subscribing states to curb the proliferation of ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, and to undertake measures to prevent such proliferation, both at a global and regional level through multilateral, bilateral and national endeavours;

3) Commitment by subscribing states to exercise maximum possible restraint in the development, testing and deployment of ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, including, where possible, to reduce national holdings of such missiles, in the interest of global and regional peace and security;

4) Commitment by subscribing states to exercise the necessary vigilance in the consideration of assistance to space launch vehicle programmes in any other country so as to prevent contributing to delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction, considering that such programmes may be used to conceal ballistic missile programmes;

5) Commitment by subscribing states not to support any ballistic missile programme in countries which might be developing or acquiring weapons of mass destruction in a way incompatible with the norms established by the disarmament and non-proliferation treaties.

c) Incentives:

1) Consideration by subscribing states to provide, on a voluntary and case-by-case basis, incentives to subscribing states who choose to eliminate their existing ballistic missile and/or space launch vehicle programmes, as appropriate, and who commit to forgo such programmes in the future.

d) Confidence Building Measures:

1) Agreement by subscribing states to implement transparency measures as follows, with an appropriate and sufficient degree of detail, to increase confidence and to promote non-proliferation of ballistic missiles:

i) With respect to ballistic missile programmes, to:

• make an annual declaration providing an outline of their ballistic missile policies. Examples of openness in such declarations might be relevant information on ballistic missile systems and land (test-) launch sites;
• provide annual information on the number and generic class of ballistic missiles launched during the preceding year, as declared in conformity with the pre-launch notification mechanism referred to hereunder, in tiret iii).

ii) With respect to expendable space launch vehicle programmes, and consistent with commercial and economic confidentiality principles, to:

• make an annual declaration providing an outline of their space launch vehicle policies and land (test-) launch sites;
• provide annual information on the number and generic class of space launch vehicles launched during the preceding year, as declared in conformity with the pre-launch notification mechanism referred to hereunder, in tiret iii);
• consider, on a voluntary basis (including on the degree of access permitted), inviting international observers to their land (test-) launch sites.

iii) With respect to their ballistic missile and space launch vehicle programmes, to:

• exchange pre-launch notifications on their ballistic missile and space launch vehicle launches and test flights.

These notifications should include such information as the generic class of the ballistic missile of space launch vehicle, the planned launch notification window, the launch area, and the planned direction.

Implementation of the above confidence building measures will have no bearing on the question of legitimacy of the rocket programmes concerned in respect of the obligations and norms deriving from the disarmament and non-proliferation treaties, and of the principles and commitments set out in this code.

e) Organisational Aspects:

1) Agreement by subscribing states to:

• hold regular meetings, annually or as need be, to define, review and further develop the workings of the International Code of Conduct;
• establish a mechanism for the exchange of notifications and other information in the framework of the International Code of Conduct;
• establish an appropriate mechanism for the voluntary resolution of questions arising from national declarations, and/or questions pertaining to space launch vehicle and ballistic missile activity.

© 2001 The Acronym Institute.