Disarmament Diplomacy

UK Parliament Report

Labour Government Faces Tough Questioning on Missile Defence

By Lorna Richardson

Introduction

Just a few days after being re-elected on June 7¹, Labour Prime Minister Tony Blair faces serious opposition from leading trades unions over missile defence.

On June 14 - while Members of Parliament (MPs) were still being sworn back into the House of Commons, and following the Prime Minister's broadly supportive stance towards President Bush at the NATO summit in Brussels the day before - seventeen trades union General Secretaries signed a letter to the Guardian noting that they considered it "wholly inappropriate" for the government to support US plans for missile defence. The union leaders framed their opposition in terms of support for the non-proliferation regime as a whole, not just the immediately-threatened ABM Treaty, believing that President Bush's plans would "considerably undermine international confidence in treaties as a system of resolving problems, if the US is set to set them aside when it feels it is expedient to do so".²

The signatories included most of the major Labour-affiliated unions. Several large unions who did not sign the letter have nonetheless passed resolutions at their annual conferences criticising plans for missile defence. Whilst the unions' immense influence within the Labour Party has been greatly reduced over recent years, and whilst Labour's Annual Conference is now more a party showcase than the rambunctious locus of decision-making power it once was, the prospect of vocal dissent over missile defence at this autumn's party conference is likely to raise fearful memories for the party leadership of the passionate defence debates within the Labour movement in the 1980s.

In the House of Commons itself, Malcolm Savidge, Labour backbencher and convener of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Global Security and Non-Proliferation - a semi-official grouping bringing together MPs and Peers from all sides of the debate to discuss defence and security issues - has in the new session re-tabled an Early Day Motion (EDM) endorsing last year's influential Report on WMD from the Foreign Affairs Select Committee. The EDM quotes the Report's recommendation "that the Government voice the grave doubts about NMD in the UK", and "questioned whether US plans to deploy NMD represent an appropriate response to the proliferation problems faced by the international community".³ EDMs have no legislative impact, and serve mostly as a barometer of parliamentary opinion. In this regard, the fact that 181 MPs (mostly, but not all, Labour) were prepared to sign the motion just a few days before parliament dissolved in May indicates the strength of backbench feeling on this issue. At the time of writing, the re-tabled EDM has been open for signature for two days, and has already attracted 177 signatures.⁴

Missile Defence and the General Election

Notwithstanding the intense international controversy swirling around US missile defence plans, the issue - or any other related to arms control and disarmament priorities and concerns - was all but invisible during the election campaign. This was hardly due to a unanimity of position among the main parties. The Liberal Democrats were clear in their opposition to the US 'shield', referring to the scheme as "a threat to international stability and arms control agreements".⁵ Labour merely said it would "encourage the US to consult closely with NATO allies on its ideas for missile defence".⁶ The Conservatives expressed strong support for the Bush administration: "We will...end this Government's equivocation over the development by the US of ballistic missile defences. We believe our close ally deserves our support in countering new threats from rogue states and terrorists equipped with weapons of mass destruction. We will take a lead in building support for ballistic missile defence against threats to Europe and America".⁷ None of the parties, however, chose to debate security issues, focussing instead on the Euro single currency, health, education and public services.

With the election now over - and in combination with the invigorating effect, from a pro-arms control perspective, of the Democrats' unexpected assumption of control in the Senate - there is a growing sense that the decisive moment has now arrived in the parliamentary and broader domestic debate over UK policy on missile defence. The empowering realisation that there is still everything to play for has given critics of the plans the conviction that informed, considered opposition may actually now make a difference.

New Appointments

To almost universal astonishment, including reportedly his own, Robin Cook, who served as Foreign Secretary throughout the last parliament, was replaced by Jack Straw, previously Home Secretary. Unlike Cook, who entered the Foreign Office with an established record of opposition to nuclear weapons and the arms trade, Jack Straw is a largely unknown quantity on foreign policy.

Peter Hain, previously in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) as a junior minister covering non-proliferation, arms control and Africa, returns to foreign affairs as Minister for Europe, a portfolio which does not include arms control. Ben Bradshaw, a young MP from the 1997 intake appointed as one of three FCO parliamentary secretaries, will take the arms control brief.

Geoff Hoon is back as Secretary of State for Defence, a post he has held since George Robertson's elevation to NATO Secretary General in late 1999.

The front-bench appointments of the opposition parties have also been announced. As expected, Liberal Democrat leader Charles Kennedy has reappointed Menzies Campbell as Foreign Affairs Spokesperson, while Paul Keetch has been promoted to Defence Spokesperson. The shape of the long-term Conservative Shadow Cabinet will not be known until their leadership election is concluded in the coming months. Among those standing for election, at the time of writing, is Iain Duncan-Smith, the former Guards officer on the right of the party, who had served as Shadow Defence Secretary under William Hague. The Shadow Foreign Affairs spokesperson Francis Maude, once thought to be in the running, is now Michael Portillo's leadership campaign manager on a more centrist ticket.

Missile Defence in the Last Parliament

Throughout the 2000 session, and in the run-up to the election, the government's approach to missile defence remained unchanged: to express willingness to discuss missile defence with the US, to encourage the US to consult fully with its allies, and to be receptive and supportive to any plans they might suggest, but to refrain from commenting on what their final attitude might be to any particular plan until such a plan had been made as a formal request from the US administration.

Numerous written and oral questions were submitted throughout the session by MPs from all parties in efforts to elicit details on what preparations or commitments had already been made. In February, Jeremy Corbyn (Labour) asked what expenditure had been made or allocated with regard to the future of Fylingdales, one of the two radar and early-warning bases in Yorkshire - Menwith Hill being the other - earmarked for likely incorporation into a US system. Secretary Hoon noted that no request from the US had been received, and "nor have we incurred any expenditure on any works at RAF Fylingdales in preparation for any such request".⁸ An answer provided later the same day reiterated that if such a request by the US was made, then "we would, of course, want to respond helpfully ... That point has been made in our early discussions with the new US administration".⁹

A common concern raised by members of both Houses was that abrogation of the ABM Treaty would destabilise relations with Russia, China and others, and decrease rather than bolster global security. In the Lords debate on Anglo-American Relations on May 2, Lord Wallace of Saltaire (Liberal Democrat) noted his concern about the arguments deployed by the Bush administration when discussing the ABM Treaty: "I merely want to remark on the dangerous language used to dismiss treaties as 'relics' when they no longer suit immediate political interests. If all states start to pick and choose which treaties they will continue to observe, we shall really be in trouble. The North Atlantic Treaty is, after all, 23 years older than the ABM Treaty. Should that be considered a relic, too?"¹⁰ In February, in reply to a number of questions raising this issue, Hoon reiterated his faith in the US' consultation process: "A number of considerations ... have been addressed by the US and in this country .... Clearly, before the US takes a specific decision, it is important that it should consult allies and, indeed, Russia. The new US administration have made it clear that they would do so - thereby dealing with the type of strategic implications indicated ...".¹¹

Throughout these exchanges, the government's view of the almost automatic correctness of the US threat assessment was made clear. In the words of the then-Foreign Office Minister Keith Vaz: "Clearly, there is a threat, because our closest ally and strongest friend, the United States, believes that there is one".¹²

Such unquestioning acceptance was not shared by all MPs. During the debate on the Foreign Affairs Select Committee's Report on WMD in March this year (some nine months after the report itself was published), Liberal Democrat spokesperson Menzies Campbell noted sadly that 'states of concern' have, under the new US administration, reverted to their original status as 'rogue states'. Campbell stated: "I am concerned that describing states as rogue states and treating them as such means that political change is unlikely to be encouraged. Of the four so-called rogue states that bulk substantially in the minds of policy makers in the United States, with the exception of Iraq, the other three - North Korea, Iran and Libya - are all states in which there has been, or is, contemplation of political change. If they are lumped together in a single category and described in a deprecatory way, we may inhibit the very political change that would make safer our lives and those of people in those countries".¹³

Dr. Phyllis Starkey, a Labour member of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee, believed the flaw in the Bush administration's threat assessment lay in the fact that they had examined capabilities, not intent: "The [Rumsfeld] Commission did not attempt to assess the intent of a missile-owning state to attack another state - to assess whether there was a rationale to attack - but simply examined the state's missile capability, drew a circle around the state and said, 'Everything within that circle is at risk.' If that approach had been followed when assessing American nuclear weapons, for example, one could say that the United Kingdom is 'under threat'; from American nuclear weapons. That exposes the fallacy in the Rumsfeld Commission's argument. ... In a proper risk assessment, one considers both the possession of weapons and intent".¹⁴ The Conservative backbencher (and former air force pilot) John Wilkinson, however, identified China, as well as the 'rogue states', as sufficient rationale for missile defence, and noted his belief that this view was shared by the US, "otherwise why would the early-warning installations in Alaska be the first to be upgraded?" Wilkinson continued: "The policymakers in the United States place more emphasis on the risk of rogue states, because we all assume that they are so inherently unstable that an aggressive dictator is more likely to come to power in them. ... Nevertheless, it would be extremely imprudent not to take note of the steady increase in China's military power and its potential".¹⁵

A professed faith in the consultation process has been the cornerstone of the government's public warmth towards Bush's plans. However, as Menzies Campbell pointed on March 15, the beauty of a consultation exercise is that while concerns may be raised, there is no guarantee they will be heeded: "It was clear from the contribution of Mr. Rumsfeld and other Americans at the [Munich security] conference [in February] that the administration are determined to proceed with national missile defence. There may be an acknowledgement of the need to consult, but if the consultation continues to reveal opposition there is no suggestion that effect will be given to that opposition".¹⁶

After President Bush's speech on May 1, officially launching the global consultation process while setting it firmly in the context of a US determination to proceed with its plans, Tony Blair told the Commons that Britain would welcome the discussions, refusing once again to be drawn on any specifics concerning Fylingdales or Menwith Hill. William Hague, in his turn, reiterated the Conservative position of pledging support for whatever proposals the Bush administration chooses to put forward. Some confusion and controversy was then generated, it is not known whether deliberately or by mischance, when Blair's outspoken and influential Press Secretary, Alistair Campbell, told reporters that he thought missile defence was 'a good idea', leading to speculation as to whether Campbell was offering Blair's real opinion, or merely his own.¹⁷

Just before parliament dissolved in May, the Commons Defence Select Committee warned that the government would have to pronounce on its plans towards missile defence early on in the session, even if a formal approach concerning Fylingdales or Menwith Hill hadn't yet come from the US government, and noted that the stance of the government would be tested "quickly and sharply". Blair repeated his intention to wait for a firm proposal, an attitude that was ridiculed by opposition spokespeople.¹⁸ Following Blair's June meeting with Bush in Brussels, however, he referred to the threat from "highly unstable states who are developing nuclear capability", adding: "We have got to look at all the different ways, including defence systems, that we can deal with that threat".¹⁹

British Nuclear Weapons and International Law

In light of recent legal challenges by grassroots activists to the deployment of nuclear weapons, the veteran Labour leftwinger Tony Benn, tabled a commendably succinct question in January, asking "if Her Majesty's Government will forthwith cease to deploy the Trident weapons system on the basis that it is illegal"? Defence Secretary Hoon, equally brief, replied "No. The Government remains confident that our entirely defensive minimum nuclear deterrent is consistent with international law".²⁰

Both the Commons and the Lords held lengthy sessions debating the detail of the bill to ratify the International Criminal Court (ICC). Asked whether a decision by the UK to use nuclear weapons would contravene the Statute of the ICC, Foreign Secretary Cook said in April that he was "happy to reassure the right hon. and learned Gentleman that that matter was, indeed, debated in Rome. There is no offence within the Rome statute or before the International Criminal Court on the use of nuclear weapons per se, although the circumstances in which they are used are always a matter of judgment. However, that is a matter of judgment that any British Prime Minister or US President would have to exercise in the present state of international law. The statute does not make any change, nor is there any reference to nuclear weapons. The possession of nuclear weapons is not an offence".²¹

Conservative opposition to much of the bill was not based on the Court's principles - which the party supported - but on the details of its remit. Sir Nicholas Lyell, who as Attorney General under John Major had argued for the legality of nuclear weapons on behalf of the British Government in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at the Hague, said he believed that while the ICJ had "left the door open to the possibility of their use in proper defensive circumstances", "what would be the position" in the context of the ICC Statute "if we did have to consider using them?" Lyell asked: "if we look carefully at [the bill] we will ask ourselves whether we were entitled to use nuclear weapons in those [defensive] circumstances. That is a genuine question."²² Despite Conservative dissent, the Third Reading of the ICC bill was passed in the Commons shortly before the session ended, and now only awaits legislation in Scotland before ratification.

Conclusion

In concentrating largely on the British debate on US missile defence plans, this brief report does not imply that other security issues are being neglected by either the Blair administration or the Parliament. The future of a range of arms control and non-proliferation agreements - particularly the NPT and the BWC - are still sources of concern. The future of Britain's relationship with the United States is also of prime concern in both Houses, with some members and Peers raising fears about the unilateralist tendencies of the Bush administration, and others worrying whether NATO and Anglo-American relations might be damaged by establishment of the European Rapid Reaction Force. The inescapable fact, however, is that missile defence deployment would have a devastating impact on almost every aspect of the global non-proliferation regime. Decision-time is fast approaching for the government on this most momentous of post-Cold War arms control subjects. Parliament has an important role to play in the outcome of this drama.

Notes and References

1. The result of the General Election was as follows: Labour, 412 (41% of the vote); Conservatives, 166 (32%); Liberal Democrats, 52 (18%); Others, 29 (10%). Voter turnout, 59.2%, was the lowest since 1918. For further details, and analysis of the implications of the campaign and the outcome for UK policy on arms control and disarmament, see the Acronym Institute website, http://www.acronym.org.uk/uk/ge2001.htm.

2. Bill Morris (T&GWU), John Edmonds (GMB), Dave Prentis (Unison) and fourteen others, The Guardian, June 14, 2001.

3. EDM 650, Missile Defence, 2000-2001, tabled May 8, 2001 by Malcolm Savidge MP, and EDM 23, Missile Defence, 2001-2002, tabled June 20 2001 by Malcolm Savidge MP.

4. This figure is all the more impressive bearing in mind the convention that Ministers, whips and other officials do not sign EDMs, and that, out of some 1,400 such motions tabled every session, few attract more than 150 signatures.

5. The Liberal Democrat manifesto, "A real chance for real change", can be found in full at http://www.libdems.org.uk.

6. The Labour Party manifesto, "Ambitions for Britain", can be found in full at http://www.labour.org.uk.

7. The Conservative Party manifesto, "Time for Common Sense", can be found in full at http://www.conservatives.com. For extracts on foreign affairs and defence issues from all three manifestoes, see the Acronym Institute website, http://www.acronym.org.uk/uk/ge2001.htm.

8. Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon MP, in Hansard, February 12, 2001, Column 9.

9. Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon MP, replying to a question from Malcolm Savidge MP, in Hansard, February 12, 2001, Column 11.

10. Lord Wallace of Saltaire, in Hansard, May 2, 2001, Col 1893.

11. Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon MP, in reply to a question tabled by Dr. Vincent Cable MP, in Hansard, February 12, 2001, Column 10.

12. Keith Vaz MP, Minister of State at the FCO, in reply to Diane Abbott MP, in Hansard, March 27, 2001, Column 802.

13. Rt. Hon Menzies Campbell, QC, MP, in Hansard, March 15, 2001, Column 1235.

14. Dr. Phyllis Starkey MP, in Hansard, March 15, 2001, Column 1249.

15. John Wilkinson MP, in Hansard, March 15, 2001, Column 1256.

16. Rt. Hon Menzies Campbell, QC MP, in Hansard, March 15, 2001, Column 1235.

17. See Disarmament Diplomacy No. 56 (April 2001), pp.31-32.

18. Richard Norton-Taylor in The Guardian, May 10, 2001.

19. Rt. Hon Tony Blair MP, quoted by Ian Black in The Guardian, June 14, 2001.

20. Commons Written Answers, in Hansard, January 25, 2001, Column 661W.

21. Rt. Hon Robin Cook MP, in Hansard, April 3, 2001, Column 223.

22. Sir Nicholas Lyell MP, in Hansard, April 3, 2001, Col. 251 and Column 252.

Lorna Richardson is the Acronym Institute's Parliamentary Analyst.

© 2001 The Acronym Institute.