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Disarmament DiplomacyIssue No. 58, June 2001Documents and SourcesPresident Bush Visit to Europe: I. Bush-Putin Summit Summit Meeting between President George W. Bush and President Vladimir Putin, Ljubljana, Slovenia, June 16, 2001.
Bush-Putin Press Conference, June 16 "President Bush: '...More than a decade after the Cold War ended it is time to move beyond suspicion and towards straight talk; beyond mutually assured destruction and toward mutually earned respect. ... [W]e've agreed to launch regular detailed and serious consultations on the nature of our security relationship. I said to President Putin that we need a new approach for a new era, an approach that protects both our peoples and strengthens deterrence by exploring and developing our new attitudes towards defenses and missile defenses. I've directed Secretary of State Powell and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to work with their Russian counterparts, to begin discussing a new security framework. I have invited President Putin to Washington this fall. He accepted. He invited me to Russia, and I accepted. ...' President Putin: '... President Bush, as a person who has studied history, proposed a very global, wide-scale approach and view to history. And it was very interesting and positive. We sat, talked about the past, about the present, about the future of our countries and about the development of the situation in the world for many years into the future. This was really a very interesting discussion. I think that we found a good basis to start building on our cooperation. We're counting on a pragmatic relationship between Russia and the United States. We compared our approaches in key areas. And, once again, we established our common ground. I want to return now to what the President said very recently - that Russia and the United States are not enemies, they do not threaten each other, and they could be fully good allies. And taking into account the fact that the United States and the Russian Federation...have accumulated huge amounts of nuclear weapons, weapons of mass destruction, we bear a special responsibility for maintaining the common peace and security in the world, for building a new architecture of security in the world. ... One of the central topics of our discussion was the strengthening of strategic stability. We exchanged our views on our approaches. It was very important for me to hear how and what the President of the United States thinks, and to hear directly from him. In turn, naturally, I expressed the approaches of Russia in this sphere. The differences in approaches do exist and, naturally, in one short moment it's impossible to overcome all of them. But I am convinced that ahead of us we have a constructive dialogue and the will to talk about these topics, to discuss, to hear, to listen... And to my mind, this is very important. The President and I have agreed that we're going to tell our Ministers of Defense, Secretaries of Defense, Foreign Ministers, to continue in this vein, to continue this discussion, without any pauses. ...' Question: 'President Putin, President Bush has said that he's going to go forward with his missile defense plans basically with or without your blessing. Are you unyielding in your opposition to his missile defense plan? Is there anything you can do to stop it? And to President Bush: did President Putin ease your concern at all about the spread of nuclear technologies by Russia, and is this a man that Americans can trust?' President Putin: 'Now, as far as the issue of anti-missile defense, the official position of the Russian government is known. I don't think we need to spend time to yet again declare it. We proceed from the idea that the 1972 ABM Treaty is the cornerstone of the modern architecture of international security. We proceed from the premise that there are elements which unite us with our partners in the United States. When we hear about things like concerns of the future and about threats from the future, we do agree that together, we have to sit down and have a good think about this. But we proceed from the idea that these concerns and threats are different kinds of things. Threats have to be defined. We have to look at where they come from and then make some decisions as to how we have to counter them. We feel that we can do it best together. Based upon today's dialogue, I've come to the conclusion, and the impression, that we might have a very constructive development here in this arena; at least the President of the United States listened carefully. ... But I think the specialists, as I have said before, have to sit down, have contact to identify the overall platform that we're going to work from, and try to find a way together to solve these problems. Now, as far as the issues of proliferation and non-proliferation, I have to say that in our opinion, this is a topic that's very, very closely tied to the ABM Treaty, because many other things are hooked onto this same string, and many threshold states, when it comes to the destruction of a previous accord, can only be happy and say, look, fantastic. Yesterday, we were threshold, nobody...took any account of us; now, today, recognize us. This is a problem we're going to have to really think very hard about. Can we trust Russia? I'm not going to answer that. I could ask the very same question.' President Bush: 'I will answer the question. I looked the man in the eye. I found him to be very straightforward and trustworthy. We had a very good dialogue. I was able to get a sense of his soul; a man deeply committed to his country and the best interests of his country. ... Secondly, I appreciate the opportunity to be able to talk about a new relationship, and we will continue these dialogues. The basis for my discussion began with this simple premise: that Russia and the United States must establish a new relationship beyond that of the old Cold War mentality. The Cold War said loud and clear that we're opponents and that we bring the peace through ability for each of us to destroy each other. Friends don't destroy each other. People who cooperate do not have a basis of peace on destruction. Our nations are confronted with new threats in the 21st century. Terror in the hands of what we call rogue nations is a threat. I expressed my concern, and so did the President, very openly, about nations on his border and nations that can't stand America's freedoms developing the capacity to hold each of us hostage. And he agreed. I brought up concerns about Iran. And I'm hesitant to put words in the President's mouth, but he said he's concerned, as well - I think that accurately categorizes your position - and we'll work together to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction. And I believe as we go down the road that we'll be able to develop a constructive relationship as to how to use our technologies and research and willingness to keep the peace, in a way that makes the world more peaceful. ...' ... Question: 'Mr. President, did you offer President Putin any inducements in this conversation to ease his opposition to a US missile defense plan?' President Bush: 'I offered something: Logic. And a hopeful tomorrow. I offered the opportunity, which the President is going to seize, for us, as leaders of great powers, to work together. ... [But] we didn't have a bargaining session. We had a session of two men who have come to office for the right purpose: not only to represent our countries, but given our standing, our respective standings, to work together to deal with the threats of the 21st century. A threat of the 21st century is energy. A threat of the 21st century is poverty. A threat of the 21st century is the spread of weapons of mass destruction. And as the President said to me clearly, he said that, 'you're not the only nation that cares about weapons of mass destruction; we care.' And we have an opportunity to do that. We have an opportunity to reject extremists that could threaten our respective nations and...threaten our alliances. And we will do so. ... [O]ur relationship is larger than just security relationships. It's bigger than figuring out how to deal with the ABM Treaty, it's much bigger than that. It deals with two leaders who share values. ... This is not a bargaining session. The President didn't say, you know, if you do this, I'll do that. It's bigger than that. It's a bigger relationship than that, and it's important to understand that.' ... President Putin: '... Look, we didn't just sit down and say that our specialists are going to meet, and they're going to have an exchange of views. But we agreed that they're going to discuss very specific questions which cause concern to both sides. Very specific items. I'm not prepared right now to get into this publicly, but we're talking about specifics. Moreover, I have to say that between Russia and the United States, we have two protocols that we signed on non-strategic ABM systems - in New York, and I think it was in Helsinki. And this, too, is a subject of very special review. I think the specialists should define all these things. ...'" Source: Press Conference by President Bush and Russian Federation President Putin, Brdo Castle, Slovenia, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, June 16. President Putin, interview with US journalists, the Kremlin, June 18 "'Question: 'Before the summit, Vladimir Vladimirovich, you said you wanted to learn as much as possible about the new antimissile system of Mr. Bush. You succeeded. You have a good idea of the essence and scale of this programme? Is that enough for Russia to think of, say, reviewing its stand on ABM?' President Putin: '...Our partners in the [United] States...are saying now, we should think of the threats we're all facing and which will arise in the future as missile technologies develop. Here in this country the attitudes to this thesis also vary, but I personally share it. We should think about this. And I think the President is right here: we have to think about how armament is developing in the most dangerous area - the area of missiles. ... Is there anything new in our relations on this issue after the meeting with President Bush? I believe there is. We have agreed that our experts will isolate, and talk specifically on questions of a purely technical character: what, strictly speaking, we understand by the term 'threat,' and what hinders us together or separately, if such is the will of our partners, from countering these threats? What specifically, what elements of the ABM Treaty stand in the way of overcoming the threats that we have yet to define together? That's where we have no common position so far. For, when we are speaking of the Treaty on Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of 1972, of its possible modification or, as you heard earlier, the United States' presumably pulling out unilaterally from this Treaty, in either case the issue is about counteracting missile threats. Yet this is not the sole threat. Speaking in the language of professionals, where exactly is the aim? ... Then, say, we know the thesis about a threat from so called 'rogue nations.' You know what is in [military] service with the so called 'rogues.' ... If somebody does not know, I will tell: it's Soviet Scud missiles. And what are Soviet Scud missiles? They are, strictly speaking, modernized German Fau-1 and Fau-2 missiles, the same missiles which Germany in the period of the Second World War rained on London. North Korea has advanced farthest in their modernization. But there exists the limit to this modernization, and it has already been reached. To develop missiles of another generation - that's quite a different story. ... This requires new, absolutely new materials. It calls for an entirely new fuel, fuel of a new generation. It requires a developed, very expensive system of test sites. It requires a very large set of components of this entire programme. Generalizing this all, one can say that it requires an absolutely different economy and an absolutely different level of science and technology of the country which is seeking to develop those technologies. It requires economic growth. It will take decades. Now let us look at the condition that as of now is known to us in the field of antimissile defenses. By preliminary estimates, the programme itself will call for $50-60 billion dollars. ... What are we to achieve? You know at what speed a ballistic missile flies? 7-7.5 kilometers per second. To shoot it down, the antimissile must fly at the same speed, that's 15 kilometers per second upon addition [acceleration]. It's like a bullet hitting a bullet. Is it possible today or not? Today experts say that it is impossible to achieve this. And the experience of real tests demonstrates that today it is impossible. And what if it's not one bullet? If they are ten, twenty, a thousand? Two thousand, three or five thousand? And that's exactly the potential of nuclear arms of Russia and the United States. Then we must give thought to what we need to prevent the threats. I repeat, it has yet to be defined where they lie. ... [W]e are told that the main threat is 'rogue nations'. But we know that, for example, in February of this year a new American tracking station, Globe-2, began...[operating] on an island in the north of Norway. ... [T]he Globe-1 station there...records the launchings of missiles; now there is an additional station...that records not only a launch, but also tracks the movement of a trajectory. Where do the 'rogues' fit in here?' ... Question: 'Condoleezza Rice said on Sunday that the missile defense system does not prevent war, and that with Russia or without Russia the United States will deploy its system. Don't you consider this a toughening of the stand as compared to what you talked about with President Bush?' President Putin: '... Strictly speaking, this question needs somehow to be separately discussed. It needs to be clarified... But we took due note of the other statements of senior administration officials. Now the Secretary of State, for example, said the following. He, as is known, is a military man, one can say he's an expert. He said: 'The United States is not seeking the destruction of the ABM Treaty of 1972, but firmly intends to follow the course for creating effective but limited missile defenses.' We took note of this statement by Powell. I think this is a very serious statement. The US is not seeking the destruction of the ABM Treaty. This is for us a very serious message. ... When we hear...that some programme or other will be carried out with or without us - well, we can't counter that. ... We cannot force anyone to cooperate with us, nor will we try to. We offer our cooperation. ... If that is not needed, fine. We are ready to act on our own. But what will this lead to? For connected with this Treaty are, say, the Treaties on the Reduction of Strategic Offensive Arms - START I and START II - and they contain a mechanism for verification and monitoring in the nuclear-missile sphere. Let us assume that we're speaking about the reduction of strategic offensive arms. Imagine we're...discarding the ABM Treaty of 1972. This means that automatically we exclude START I and START II from the practice of international relations. And if this is so, then we will not be able to monitor each other and see how many missiles we've removed from service. ... [We] unscrewed a warhead - [did we] put it nearby or did we destroy it? This so called 'return potential' of both Russia and the United States can be so large that the questions of nuclear arms control will altogether cease to exist. There will be no control at all. ... We aren't intruding, we aren't threatening or blackmailing anyone. We offer cooperation. And if it is acceptable, then we will do that with pleasure. If not - well, we will then act on our own. I don't think that the States and Russia and then all mankind too will benefit from this. I think not. ...' Question: 'Mr. President, you spoke of the threats and that you stand ready to consider those threats together and to fight against them jointly. If that occurs, won't it so happen that China, which objects to the creation of any type of missile defense system, will feel more endangered and show its resentment? ... And the second question, with your permission, I would like to turn to Iran. You are carrying out joint projects with Iran, helping Iran build a nuclear power plant. Sergei Ivanov in his time declared that the United States was supplying North Korea with the same kind of nuclear reactors. But...the United States specifies that North Korea should give up its military nuclear programme. Can you stipulate your cooperation in the nuclear field with Iran by approximately similar conditions?' President Putin: '... You've so formulated this question that China generally regards negatively any missile defenses. This is not known to me. But the 1972 ABM Treaty already provides for a certain missile defense system. It is provided for there, for the missile defense of two areas. ... As far as I know, China does not object to what is written down in this Treaty, therefore it cannot be said that it is generally against any missile defenses. As I understand our Chinese counterparts, they are against the destruction of the Treaty itself. ... We, of course, must figure out all our actions in this sphere and see how other nuclear powers will react to this. In this sense the transparency of our action is very important, lest none of the nuclear powers would feel abandoned or that two countries are making agreements behind their backs; otherwise the result may be contrary to the expectations. We will not improve international security, but only make the world more vulnerable. Do you know how many ballistic missiles China has?' Questioner: 'Eighteen.' President Putin: 'The economic potentialities are also known to you? Therefore one must be very careful here. I repeat, no one should feel abandoned. We must here act according to the principle, "don't harm". ... [A]ll our actions must be confined to certain limits. Therefore the 'nuclear club,' each state of the nuclear club, of course, should be informed of what's happening and of the talks with our American partners. ... Regarding Iran. Our relationship with Iran is not simple. This is our neighbor, we have a centuries-old history of interstate relations. Iran is going through, I think, a process of renewal and gradual entry into the world community, and the results of the last election bear this out. ... We understand the concerns of the United States and the concerns of Israel. We take this into account in our relations with Iran. When we are told that we're seeking to rearm Iran, it is necessary to clear up the notions here. We feel that the political theses that are sometimes being used to oust Russia from arms markets, including on the market of Iran's armament, are just an instrument of unfair competition. Therefore we have been cooperating with Iran, we have some definite obligations with respect to military-technological cooperation, and we are going to honor them. But there is an area that arouses the special concern of the United States, and the President told me about this at the meeting in Ljubljana. This is, of course, about weapons of mass destruction: nuclear weapons and missile technologies. I must tell you, and I told the President about this, in the plans of military-technological cooperation by Russia with Iran these programmes are missing and are not being planned. And this position of Russia is known to the leadership of Iran. Russia has assumed certain obligations with respect to non-proliferation and is going to abide by these obligations. Moreover, this also meets our national interests. If you inquire of experts about what missile weapons Iran has, and what is their range, you will understand that I exaggerate nothing here. As to defensive arms, this is a separate theme and I think it should cause no concern in anyone. ... You've mentioned the construction by the United States of a nuclear power plant in North Korea. ... It is precisely such a nuclear power plant that we are helping to build in Iran. Nothing special is happening here. Experts will tell you this is absolutely not related to facilities for production of nuclear weapons. You're saying that the United States has stipulated the construction of the nuclear power plant in North Korea... Then why is North Korea being presented to us as a 'rogue nation' that poses a danger? I tell you that we even out of considerations of our own security are not going to transfer to other countries, including Iran, any nuclear technologies. Of course, we can well imagine that someone clandestinely in circumvention of our law and the official policy of the state, some people may try to sell something, in order to earn money. We will do everything to cut that short. But that holds not only for Russia, it holds for any other country.' Question: '[W]hat now most alerts, worries you in the behavior and in the policy of the US administration?' President Putin: '... [T]here is no concern, but a certain degree of wariness regarding the possibility of any unilateral action, although we are ready for it. I am confident that at least for the coming 25 years this will not cause any substantial damage to the national security of Russia. ... Moreover, if we encounter unilateral actions and the destruction of the START I and START II treaties, I think our nuclear capability will be reinforced. This will require practically no financial injections. If you look at the START I Treaty, you will see what the issue is about. It is that new warheads can be mounted on the existing missiles. Yes, a meager sum, it will cost almost nothing. Thus, the nuclear potential of Russia will be augmented multifold. Multifold. But something different worries us. That this could lead to an unbalancing of the existing balance. There will begin an uncontrolled armament of other countries, and many of them are somewhere near us. And that's what concerns us. Though the United States is speaking of this concern more. But it concerns us much more, actually. ...'" Source: President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin interview with Bureau Chiefs of leading American media, The Kremlin, Moscow, Monday, June 18, 2001; full transcript available on the website of the Russian Embassy in Washington, http://www.russianembassy.org. President Bush interview with The Associated Press, June 16 "Question: 'What did Putin mean when he talked about a constructive development and a common approach?' President Bush: '... You ought to look at the fact that Rumsfeld and Ivanov are going to visit about ways to address the current threats we face and it became clear to me in our discussion that the Russians feel the same threats we feel and there are no specifics on the table. But he [Putin] understands my frame of mind, my philosophy, and the fact that there's an opportunity for the United States to develop, through research and development, the capacity to develop a system which is limited in nature but effective against the true threats. Mr. Putin himself earlier talked about intercepting missiles on launch and it was on that basis that we began discussions. He also understands that...we're still going to have nuclear arsenals. We'll be reducing ours. ...' Question: 'Did you get the impression that he is willing to think so differently that he is open to allowing the development of a missile defence system within the ABM framework?' President Bush: 'I think he's willing to...understand our intentions, to get a sense for the direction of our research and development, and he wants to hear how the ABM constrains research and development...' Question: 'Is it fair to say President Putin was more open toward your missile development position than you thought?' President Bush: 'I would think [so]... I'm careful not to put words in his mouth...' Question: 'Nothing was rejected out of hand, including the ABM?' President Bush: 'Nothing was rejected out of hand and there was a receptivity that I was most pleased to see.'" Source: Bush Q&A with AP, Associated Press, June 16. Press Conference by Secretary of State Colin Powell and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, June 16 "Question: '[T]o paraphrase President Putin, he said the 1972 ABM Treaty lies at the centre...of the modern architecture of arms control. Can you give us a sense...how wide the gap was between the countries on that issue? ...' Secretary Powell: '... I don't share President Putin's view that it remains at the centre of the entire arms control structure or the entire strategic framework that exists between our two nations. It was a treaty that was written for the red and the blue map of 30-odd years ago... [W]hy not talk about changing it? It was interesting that President Putin made that point, but he also said "now let's get into a dialogue to see what it is that we think should be updated". So at the same time that he held his position, he also invited dialogue.' ... Dr. Rice: '... It would be a mistake to think that even the bulk of this discussion was about missile defence or the ABM Treaty; it was not. ... This was one small part of the discussion, and they did not try...to get into a negotiating session about trying to close the gap. But I think it is also important to note that they gave experts - both the Secretaries of the Foreign Ministry and State and the Defense Secretaries - a desire to go now and talk about concrete issues.' ... Question: 'Did they agree on the basic idea that it was important to reduce nuclear arsenals on a general level?' Dr. Rice: 'Well, I think we have known for some time that the Russian Federation feels strongly that nuclear reductions are in its interest, and the President has made clear that he believes that getting to a level that is consistent with our deterrent needs is important to us. So I don't think there was anything there to bridge.'" Source: Transcript - Powell, Rice press briefing on Bush-Putin meeting June 16, US State Department (Washington File), June 16. Television Interviews by Secretary of State Powell, June 17 I. Interview on Fox News Sunday "Question: '[W]hen it comes to dealing with nuclear weapons, can we trust Russia to help us track down and either destroy or inventory nuclear materials that have left Russia and are now unaccounted for?' Secretary Powell: 'We are anxious to engage with the Russians on subjects such as that. The President and Mr. Putin talked about this kind of proliferation, especially proliferation activities related to Iran, a country that we are concerned about. And so we have set up working groups...to examine all of these issues, to include proliferation issues and tracking down proliferation activities and materials and equipment, and even as important as that, knowledge...' Question: 'So we really don't know where these materials or even scientists are right now?' Secretary Powell: 'Well, no, we don't exactly have a social security system that captures every Russian scientist, but this is something that is of concern to us and should be of concern to Russia as well. Russia should see that it is even more in their interest than our interest not to have this kind of knowledge leave Russia. And you keep that knowledge from leaving by finding alternative sources of employment for these scientists, and we have had programs with Russia that accomplishes this purpose. We can do more of that. Russian scientists want to stay in Russia. They don't want to go to some foreign country to practice their trade or use their knowledge for these kinds of purposes. But we have to make sure there is a reason for them to stay in Russia so they don't share this knowledge elsewhere.' ... Question: 'When it comes to Iran, we've been concerned about nuclear proliferation. Russia has sold some very high-strength aluminum to Iran. This has been something that everybody up the food chain, including, I presume, the President, has talked to President Putin about. He says that they merely sold this high-strength aluminum, normally used for nuclear weapons, for aircraft. Do you buy that?' Secretary Powell: 'That's what they say. We have a slightly different view. We have discussed it with them on a number of occasions, and it was a subject - not that particular case, but the whole issue of what's being sold and transferred to Iran was the subject of discussion between the two presidents and between me and my colleague, Foreign Minister Ivanov. They have communicated to us in various ways that they understand the danger in selling various kinds of technologies and weapons, that they have no interest in seeing Iran develop the kind of capability that we are worried about. But we have to keep talking about this to make sure that we are of a common mind on this and we have a unified approach to this. They sell for the purpose of generating hard currency, and we are troubled by some of the sales that have taken place in the past.' ... Question: '[T]he Russian administration just last week held talks with China in which they agreed to work together against nuclear missile defense, particularly the plan that this Administration has been advancing. Do you see any signs that he is going to back away from that?' Secretary Powell: 'Well, their defense ministers, after this meeting in Shanghai...issued a statement saying that they were all supporting the 1972 ABM Treaty. And Mr. Putin made it clear yesterday at the press conference that he still holds that treaty to the centerpiece of the strategic framework. We have said that it is time to move beyond that. And I think what we saw yesterday...is that they want to talk about it, they want to hear, they want to listen, they want to see more, they want to know about what we have in mind. And so I think there are opportunities to move forward. But are they holding to their position? Yes. Are we holding to our position that it is time to move forward? Yes. And now we have to begin the dialogue between these two nations.' Question: 'Does that mean that we are not going to abrogate, that is, get out of the treaty right away?' Secretary Powell: 'We will get out of the constraints of the treaty when those constraints do not allow us to move forward with our technology. The exact timing and how we would actually get out of the constraints of that treaty remains to be determined. And Secretary Rumsfeld is hard at work with the technology, and at some point he will come forward to the President and say, I can't go forward unless certain constraints in the treaty are removed. And at that point, we will have a decision to make.' Question: 'Well, it sounds as if the decision has been made. At that point, we will say the treaty no longer binds us?' Secretary Powell: 'The President has made it clear that he is going to move forward with missile defense. And he believes it is so important for the future strategic stability of the world to move forward that we can't allow ourselves to be stopped by the constraints of a treaty that is almost 30 years old and was designed for a different strategic situation in a different world.'" Source: Transcript - Powell on Fox News Sunday June 17, Washington File, June 18. II. Interview on ABC "Question: 'Now, on the subject of the ABM Treaty, there was not agreement, and there were stories here while you were there from scientists saying that the United States can test under the treaty. And here's a quotation from a scientist: 'They're not seeking to find a way to do this within the treaty,' said Jack Mendelsohn of the Arms Control Association. 'They want to break the treaty.' Why not do this testing within the framework of the treaty when you have all of Europe saying they want to keep the treaty?' Secretary Powell: 'There's a lot of testing that is being done now, there is a lot of development being done now. It is all treaty-compliant. So we are not looking for a way to break the treaty. We are looking for a way to develop missile defenses that are effective and that will work. But we know that the treaty constrains how far you can go. There will come a point in time, with all of the technologies that Secretary Rumsfeld is looking at, where you run into a specific prohibition contained in the treaty. And at that point, we are going to have to find a way to remove that prohibition, remove that constraint, and it may involve removing the treaty as an obstacle to development. But we're not looking for a way to break the treaty. If this treaty allowed us to do what we needed to do and have to do to provide a limited missile defense, it could stay in effect forever. But it doesn't. It is designed to keep us from moving in this direction. And that was the original purpose of it, but that purpose no longer exists. It is a different world. It is not 1972.' Question: 'But you didn't seem to convince the Europeans of that. Jacques Chirac says it's "a fantastic incentive to proliferate."' Secretary Powell: 'It is not a fantastic incentive to proliferate. If there was no ABM Treaty tomorrow, there is no nation that's going to run out and start developing nuclear weapons just for the sake of it. I think that is a false characterization. And while some of our European friends continue to have concerns about this, other of our European friends were quite supportive, such as the Spanish and the Poles and others. And so what we have to do is to keep consulting, as the President said he would do, but make it also clear, as the President did, we are going to move forward with missile defense...'" Source: Transcript - Powell on ABC's 'This Week' June 17, Washington File, June 18. © 2001 The Acronym Institute. |