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Disarmament DiplomacyIssue No. 58, June 2001Documents and SourcesCarnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference Carnegie Endowment for International Peace International Non-Proliferation Conference, Washington, June 18-19, 2001. Note: for comprehensive documentation of the Conference, including full texts of speeches presented, see the website of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/resources/nppconf2001.htm. Speech by Igor Sergeyev Speech by General Igor Sergeyev, former Russian Minister of Defence, June 18. "The abrupt ending of the Cold War in the beginning of the '90s resulted in an overall optimism, unfounded optimism, on the decrease of nuclear proliferation. It seemed that with the end of bipolar confrontation...we would see a reduction in the proliferation of nuclear weapons and launchers, and that the whole scope of nuclear issues would cease to exist as a focal point in international politics. However, something else happened. The nuclear factor, even though changed, is still present. The Non-Proliferation Treaty, signed by 187 countries, is not much to talk about after the explosions in South Asia. And the situation in the nuclear area is more dangerous than ever. The world may enter the phase where the use of nuclear weapons will be more likely than ever before. ... The stability of the non-proliferation regimes may be characterized as negative. If it is too premature to speak about the nuclear arms race in the regions, we can see the first signs of that, and that will happen unless we take preventive measures. What are the main reasons of instability of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, as well as other non-proliferation regimes? There are individual reasons which push countries to acquire nuclear weapons and launchers. ... Those countries are all in unstable regions, more susceptible to large-scale military conflicts. Second, the growth of anti-West moods...especially in the aftermath of the Western actions in Yugoslavia...leads countries to think that nuclear weapons would be the only guarantee against such actions in the future. Third, one of the main reasons to acquire nuclear weapons is that the nuclear weapons are viewed through the prism of the nuclear weapon countries, which consider nuclear weapons as the main deterrent force. I must say that we see a substantial decrease in strategic arms in Russia and the US under the framework of the [main] treaties... We have seen no reaction from the United States to the proposal made by President Putin to bring down the warheads to 1,500. In this respect, we see hope in the willingness of the US and Russia to reduce their arsenals, and it is paramount to start consultations immediately on those issues. Russia has submitted its proposals to the United States. ... French and British decisions...on freezing the levels of their warheads [should be viewed positively]. A [further] positive sign would be if those countries and China will [under]take [a] legal obligation not to increase the number of their warheads in the future, and a good stimulus for that would be preservation of the historic [ABM] treaty of 1972. ... We need to build confidence. To resist proliferation, we need to analyze the risks and the dangers. Russia has been ready for this work for a while. When I visited the United States back in '93 for the first time, we handed over to the Joint Chiefs of Staff our proposals on the analysis of threat. We have not seen any reaction. ... We need to differentiate between the categories as risks, threats and real actions. Risks are always there, but not always do the risks develop into threats, and even less frequently they develop into actions. And this relates fully to the anti-missile defense plan for development in the United States because this promotes development of threat into actions. ... Strengthening of the existing international non-proliferation regimes needs to be based on an additional set of measures which can be developed on the analyses of the risks and threats. And that should include pre-emptive measures for the international community to take. Of course that needs to be in compliance with the UN principles. When that is insufficient, countermeasures, both political, economic and other measures are possible against the countries whose actions in everybody's opinion may pose a threat to the regional and international safety. It is important, however, to avoid double standards. ..." Questions and Answers "Question: '[O]ne of the most important developments in the last decade was the speeches in 1991 by President Bush...and President Gorbachev about taking unilateral steps to eliminate some tactical and strategic nuclear weapons. And I was curious if the Marshal could give us an update on what Russia has done on implementing its side of those unilateral initiatives. Has it completed the elimination, or the removal and elimination, of the tactical nuclear weapons it said it would do by the end of the year 2000?' Sergeyev: 'You are absolutely correct. In 1991, President Gorbachev announced and in 1992, Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin repeated, our plans to unilaterally reduce tactical arms. And as a person who was directly responsible for the implementation of unilateral obligations, I would like to report to you that tactical nuclear weapons are being liquidated in Russia in a planned matter. And as far as the most serious approach to tactical nuclear weapons as a whole [is concerned], we believe that the issue of tactical nuclear weapons should be considered separately from strategic nuclear weapons. ...' Question: 'Maybe I missed some of the details... [Has Russia removed and/or eliminated] all the tactical nuclear weapons in the ground forces, as it said it would do by the end of the year 2000?' Sergeyev: 'There was no such promise that all tactical nuclear weapons would eliminated by the year 2000. ... [C]ertain types...of tactical nuclear weapons have been eliminated; that is correct.' ... Question: 'Marshal, one of the major sources of contention between the United States and Russia is your country's continuing supply of nuclear technology to Iran. As much as you are concerned about the proposed abandonment of the ABM Treaty by the United States and all that, how about perhaps revisiting your nuclear program toward Iran and perhaps using that as a negotiating topic?' Sergeyev: 'I envy...how convinced [you are] when you are asking this question. I am almost confident that you don't have any facts... I am completely aware of the information about various complaints towards Russia, which have never been confirmed, not even once. Let's take the main problem, and this is the construction of the nuclear power plant in Iran, in Bushehr. In principle, all scientists have admitted...that to obtain the materials which could be used for weapons on such light reactors...is impossible. ... Moreover... [the] United States is building [the same type of reactors] in North Korea, so why are these complaints only towards Russia?'" Speech by Abdul Sattar Speech by Abdul Sattar, Foreign Minister of Pakistan, June 18. "The Doomsday Clock took a big leap in 1998. Following the nuclear explosion tests, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists advanced the Clock from an alarming 14 minutes before midnight to a frightening 9 minutes. No wonder President Clinton called South Asia 'the most dangerous place in the world.' The real wonder is that official Washington did not recognize the danger in 1974 [when India conducted a nuclear explosion]. The Atomic Scientists did and advanced the Clock to minus 9 minutes in May of that year. Official Washington was then less apocalyptic in perception in 1974. I [still] can't believe they swallowed the line that the test was a 'peaceful explosion'! We in Pakistan could not afford to take a benign view. The iron logic was manifest. Pakistan decided to follow it, and embarked on efforts for acquisition of deterrence capability. By [the] mid-1980s our scientists and engineers were there. But then the government decided to rest the oars. Although the capability was then recessed and the menace not so imminent, mature opinion in Pakistan already recognized the need for restraint. Focus shifted to reducing nuclear dangers. Pakistan put forward proposals for restraint measures long before 1998. These evoked no response, perhaps because of doubts about Pakistan's possession of capability. ... Enough about the past! I wholeheartedly share the hope implicit in the Conference theme - 'New Leaders, New Directions'. ... In the field of disarmament, the record of progress is quite encouraging. Biological and chemical weapons have been outlawed. Reductions in strategic weapons since 1972 have no parallel in history. Other pointers to desirable directions are before us in the shape of [the] CTBT. [The] FMCT would be another milestone on the road to reduction of nuclear dangers. Pakistan voted in favor of the former. On the latter too we shall bring a positive predisposition to negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament. Such universal and non-discriminatory frameworks provide the best hope for limiting nuclear arsenals, especially in South Asia. Bilateral understandings are problematic, partly because of differing visions and program rationales, and partly because of the history of failures in negotiations on any significant issue. Difficulties and delays in negotiating limitation measures cannot, however, relieve leaders of the obligation they owe to the world and indeed to their own people to put the genie under chains, if not back into the bottle. Our government has given serious attention to this matter and taken measures that we can take unilaterally in order to reduce the dangers implicit in possession of strategic weapons. I am proud to be able to say that in the last year our government has reinforced custodial controls and demonstrated in words as well as deeds the policy of restraint and responsibility. We have decided and declared that just as Pakistan was not the first to conduct nuclear tests, similarly, we will not be the first to resume tests. In effect, Pakistan is observing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in anticipation of its coming into force. Those familiar with the Pakistani scene understand why Pakistan is carrying out the no-test obligation without reaping the benefit of signing the CTBT. The reasons are multiple. A section of the opposition decided to exploit the issue for political profit. The trauma of 1971 makes our people hypersensitive to any unilateral move that seems to compromise the country's deterrence capability. Our government, preoccupied with urgent tasks of economic revival, improving governance and systematic ratification for sustainable democracy, cannot afford a distraction. We decided therefore in favor of patient efforts to explain the contents of the Treaty, confident that a consensus will emerge on basis of logic and merits of the Treaty. In any case, there is little urgency. For it is not Pakistan alone that stands in the way of the Treaty's entry into force. US imposition of sanctions on Pakistan in 1990 came as a surprise. Surely, the United States was not unaware of our uranium enrichment program and the research Pakistan was conducting since mid-1970s? There was little secretive about it. In fact, I thought our leaders and some of our scientists were too up-front. They started talking about nuclear achievements quite unnecessarily and prematurely; failing to emulate another country that devised innovative euphemisms, and spoke of 'other uses' of nuclear energy and described the bomb test as a 'peaceful nuclear explosion.' The United States also knew that our pursuit of nuclear capability was driven by security compulsions. Our sole purpose then as now is the defense of our state and prevention of aggression and war. Pakistan harbors no animus or ill will against any country. We do not nourish any design of domination nor hanker after great power status. Nor should we have been forgetful of multiple power centers in the United States. Mistakenly, we credited the remark of a high official in 1981 that the United States understood our concerns, and that Symington and Glenn sanctions would continue to be waived. For the same reason we paid little attention to [the] Pressler [Amendment]. But no sooner were the Soviet forces out of Afghanistan than the laws were invoked, and continue to haunt Pakistan to this day. The United States has no legal obligation to provide economic assistance or sell military equipment to Pakistan. But friends have a right at least to expect non-discrimination. The sanctions deny Pakistan not merely economic assistance and military sales, but even spare parts for the equipment we purchased, ignoring the implicit warranty in past sales. It is not necessary in this forum to mention the risks inherent in erosion of conventional capability and consequent increase in reliance on strategic deterrence. Sanctions are paradoxical in another significant way. Denial of economic cooperation retards our efforts to relieve poverty which breeds hopelessness and desperation, and fosters extremism that needs to be opposed. Also, the sanctions have only slowed down the pace of our economic revival, and prolonged poverty and hardship which give rise to a host of undesirable trends including extremism. Recognizing the risks inherent in strategic weapons, Pakistan has taken steps to strengthen custodial controls against risks of leakage of technology and accidental or unauthorized launch. We have over the last two years upgraded command and control mechanisms. A National Command Authority, chaired by the Head of Government and including three federal ministers and chiefs of armed services, provides policy direction, oversees development and employment of assets and approves measures to ensure custodial safety and complete institutional control over fissile materials and sensitive technology. Procedures have been implemented to minimize the chance of accidental or unauthorized launch. We are studying the U.S. Personnel Reliability and Nuclear Emergency Support Teams concepts for adaptation. We have also taken measures to further tighten administrative and legal mechanisms to prohibit and prevent export of fissile materials and leakage of sensitive technology. To these ends, government has issued Statutory Regulatory Orders and a comprehensive law on the subject is under preparation for early promulgation. In addition to custodial control to be exercised through the National Command Authority, the government has established Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority, another monitoring body for safety and checks. ... The scarlet thread in our doctrine is 'restraint and responsibility.' We continue to support international arms control and disarmament initiatives, which are universal and non-discriminatory in nature. Given our limited...aim that is confined solely to Pakistan's peace and security, and does not include any aspiration to regional or global power status, it is not surprising that we have adopted Minimum Credible Deterrence as the guide to our program. We have ruled out any arms race. For us, the US-USSR paradigm offers little relevance. Pakistan does not need to enter into an arms race with India. In General Sundarji's vivid phrase: 'More is unnecessary if less is enough.' ... All of us familiar with the history of No First Use recall NATO's rejection of the Soviet offer. The propagandistic idea mocked the logic of deterrence. Had NATO agreed to No First Use, conventional force imbalance in Europe might have been exploited to the detriment of peace. Conventional imbalance has been exploited in South Asia on more than one occasion in the past. The whole purpose of Pakistan's decision to acquire nuclear capability has been to deter aggression by a more powerful state. To declare that the capability will not be used is to invite exploitation of conventional disparity. A state that declares it will not make first use of nuclear weapons implies it reserves the option to make first use of conventional weapons. That is a recipe for war. We have therefore proclaimed a manifestly more logical policy - No First Use of Force, nuclear or conventional. This declaration conforming to established principles of international law can best ensure elimination of war. ..." Speech by Senator Biden 'Non-Proliferation: a Battle We All Must Win', Speech by Democratic Senator Joseph Biden, June 19. "I will not say that it's a delight to speak on non-proliferation. Frankly, the potential for destruction posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction does more to keep me up at night than any other threat to world security. My perspective comes from the experience of a quarter century on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Over those years, I think I have learned four lessons about non-proliferation: 1. Proliferation is almost inevitably an uncomfortable
issue; Why is proliferation always an uncomfortable issue? Because it is an irritant in our relations with countries. It almost always pulls us away from closer relations, be they with Russia, China, India and Pakistan, or elsewhere. Regional specialists bemoan our fixation on protecting the world from weapons of mass destruction. But, as the old bumper sticker used to say, 'one nuclear bomb can really spoil your day.' And so can a chemical or biological weapon. Precisely because proliferation is an uncomfortable issue, we must institutionalize it. That is the only way to ensure this issue a seat at the table when foreign policy decisions are made. That's why we have a Bureau for Non-Proliferation in the State Department. That's also why Senator Helms and I created a separate Bureau for Verification and Compliance, with authority to analyze compliance with non-proliferation regimes. Why is proliferation such a hard issue? Why is my second lesson the need for persistence? Because demand breeds supply - just as with narcotics. Countries that want weapons of mass destruction are pretty desperate. They pay good money for what they need. They buy from many suppliers, use front companies, and pursue multiple paths of development. We can slowdown their efforts, raise the price of proliferation, and interdict some sales. Those are worthy pursuits, even essential ones. But stemming the supply only buys us time. For lasting success in non-proliferation, we must also affect the demand side of the equation. That brings me to my third lesson, the need for positive inducements. In East Asia, the inducement has been a close security relationship with the United States. In three former Soviet states, it was world acceptance and assistance. In South America, it was intensive and extended efforts to reduce regional rivalries. In South Africa, it was the world's blessing on a new regime. Are there positive inducements that would make a difference for North Korea? For Iran? For India and Pakistan? There may be. ... Just as we use crop substitution in the fight against international narcotics, so must we offer a decent life to those who forego proliferation. There can be no doubt as to who must take the lead in these matters. No other country comes close to the United States in its ability to offer economic or security incentives in return for foreswearing or giving up weapons of mass destruction. How must we lead? One way is by remaining engaged in the peaceful resolution of conflict. One reason...that we cannot walk away from the Middle East conflict is that another war there could involve weapons of mass destruction. The same is true in South Asia. We must encourage India, Pakistan, and the countries that support them to search for new approaches to security in the region. We must also find a way to promote non-proliferation in South Asia without relying upon ineffective sanctions. It might help, of course, if we would show leadership in the field of arms control, which is so closely tied to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. There is no excuse for our failure to ratify the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty. There are legitimate concerns regarding Stockpile Stewardship and verification capabilities. But we must address those concerns as proposed by General John Shalikashvili - and then ratify the treaty. Were we to do that, I have no doubt that we could then convince India and Pakistan to do the same. ... There is also no excuse for choosing a missile defense that leads China to vastly increase its nuclear forces, with a ripple effect on India and Pakistan. Our desire for a national missile defense is understandable, but that does not make it prudent to deploy a mediocre defense or to needlessly abrogate the ABM Treaty. I don't want to turn this into a speech on national missile defense. My concerns are well known. So is my belief that it may be possible to craft a defense - and an amended ABM Treaty - so as not to threaten Russia or China's nuclear deterrent capabilities. My point today is that our actions on missile defense may well affect our non-proliferation efforts. To succeed in non-proliferation, we need the cooperation of both Russia and China. Any rational missile defense policy will take that need into account. Another area in which positive incentives and US leadership are crucial is in helping Russia to meet its arms control obligations, safeguard its sensitive materials, find new careers for tens of thousands of weapons experts, and protect against improper exports of weapons of mass destruction materials or technology. These programs are of tremendous benefit to our national security. How strange it is, then, that the Administration cut these valuable non-proliferation programs in next year's budget. ... The Administration is reviewing our assistance to Russia. That's fine. We should be more efficient, getting more of the funds to the Russians (and others) who need it. We should improve our ability to ensure that our assistance is used properly. We should also coordinate our many programs, which is why Senator Hagel and I introduced a bill mandating an interagency committee for that purpose. When all that is done, however, we need a much greater effort, rather than budget cuts. As Howard Baker and Lloyd Cutler made clear in testimony to the Foreign Relations Committee, the last thing we want is for Russia to become the world's shopping center for sensitive materials. Is there good work that we could do, with more funding? You bet there is! The Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program, in the Department of Energy, has a growing 'waiting list' of good projects to fund, with US firms willing to more than match our assistance. Unless we increase the budget for this program, it will stagnate. Congress may restore the 8% budget cut that the Administration imposed on this program. But we should double the funding for these projects - and also for the International Science and Technology Centers program, in the State Department. Another program that should be doubled is the Materials Protection, Control and Accounting program in the Energy Department. This program safeguards Russia's fissile material. Russia has over a thousand metric tons of highly enriched uranium, plus 150 metric tons of plutonium. I'm told that's enough to make 42 thousand nuclear weapons. That's a lot of material to protect. Securing all this material won't be easy. Some old-school Russians see this as a plot to spy on them. But the truth is, we offer improved security at minimal risk to Russia's nuclear weapons secrets. President Putin should tell his new Minister of Atomic Energy [Alexander Rumyantsev] - who has worked with US programs and knows they are workable - to let us help safeguard all of MINATOM's stocks of fissile material. ... Other countries do contribute to existing programs in Russia. Too often, however, funds are tied to projects that will benefit the contributors economically. I understand the urge to profit from foreign assistance. But if we support only projects with an economic payback, we could fail to secure our security objective. We must keep non-proliferation as our major funding criterion. Another area in which we must all work together is to stem the proliferation threat posed by North Korea. Not just the United States, but also Russia, China, Europe and Japan must persuade North Korea to reach a verifiable agreement to end its long-range missile production - and its sales of such missiles, materials or technology - in return for a reasonable international assistance package. ... Other countries also have a role to play in the imposition and enforcement of international sanctions. The history of unilateral sanctions is hardly encouraging. But when the world stands firm, sanctions can succeed. The trouble, of course, is that it hurts a country to impose sanctions. We get back to that first lesson: proliferation is an uncomfortable issue. It is uncomfortable for other countries, just as it is for the United States. ... Non-proliferation is like the labors of Sisyphus, and it gets harder as we get older. But remember how frightened we were a generation ago. Recall the predictions of a nuclear holocaust, and of 20 or 30 nuclear weapon states by the year 2000? Non-proliferation works. It isn't fun; it isn't easy; it isn't quick - but it works. ..." Speech by Richard Lugar 'A Tool For the New US-Russian Strategic Relationship', Speech by Republican Senator Richard Lugar, June 19. "On May 1, at the National Defense University, President Bush shared his thoughts on the need to fundamentally change the parameters of strategic deterrence. I share the President's view that the US needs to develop new concepts of deterrence that rely on both offensive and defensive forces to ensure the safety and security of the American people in the future. Deterrence can no longer be based solely on the threat of nuclear retaliation. Agreements between the US and Russia on missile defense and continued offensive arms reductions are important goals, but they are only part of the solution. Missile defense is not a silver bullet that, by itself, can adequately protect the United States and its allies from the enhanced threats posed by ballistic missile proliferation and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. But it is an important component that gives added credibility to the other elements of US strategy as well as a means to protect the American people if our non-proliferation and diplomatic efforts prove less than perfect. Equally important, agreements and unilateral declarations on reductions of offensive arms are only successful if they are fully implemented by both sides and can be verified. Only then will security and stability be enhanced. Defense in Depth I approach the response to these threats to American security through the prism of a 'defense in depth'. There are four main lines of defense against weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile threats. Individually, each is insufficient; together, they help to form the policy fabric of an integrated defense-in-depth. The first is prevention and entails activities at the source such as the Nunn-Lugar/Cooperative Threat Reduction program that has deactivated over 5,500 nuclear warheads and [engaged in] efforts to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction and associated knowledge. The second is deterrence and interdiction and involves efforts to stem the flow of illicit trade in these weapons and materials at foreign and domestic borders. The third line of defense is crisis and consequence management and involves greater efforts at domestic preparedness such as the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici program, which has supplied more than 100 American cities with the training to deal with the consequences, should such threats turn into hostile acts. The fourth line of defense must include limited missile defenses against the growing ballistic missile capabilities of so-called rogue states. Together, all four lines help form the policy fabric of an integrated defense in depth. The Review In addition to announcing his intentions to pursue a dialogue with Russia on missile defense and continued offensive arms reductions, President Bush requested a comprehensive review of US policy towards Russia and our cooperative non-proliferation programs. In other words, as the President commences diplomatic discussions on the fourth line of defense, the Administration is reviewing the other three lines to ensure they are credible, efficient, and effective. I applaud this initiative because our challenge is to find the right balance between planning for the threats of the future and meeting those that are here and now! As my partner, Sam Nunn, noted recently: 'A limited missile defense has a place in a comprehensive, integrated plan of nuclear defense, but it should be seen for what it is - a last line of defense. Our first line of defense is diplomacy, intelligence and cooperation among nations, including Russia.' Secondly, it is imperative that our debates over and funding for limited missile defenses be embedded in a revised and more all-encompassing non-proliferation strategy designed to reinvigorate US efforts to prevent countries from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery in the first place. Enhanced export controls, arms control regimes and regional security alliances still have a role to play if employed selectively. Most importantly, the Administration must ensure that programs and projects that compose our first and second lines of defense are managed effectively and funded properly. We must continue to place a priority on redressing the instability of the former Soviet arsenal by expanding joint approaches to eliminating weapons of mass destruction in Russia and in other countries all over the world. The Administration should also determine how funding can be increased to accelerate non-proliferation efforts. The Bush administration should use its non-proliferation review to develop a comprehensive plan that sets mutual goals for securing the Russian arsenal and prescribes a step-by-step time frame for achieving those goals. Today, we spend less than one percent of our annual defense budget on non-proliferation efforts. Let me say that again, the US spends less than 1% of our defense budget on the first line of defense against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. This is unacceptable. It is far more effective and much cheaper to eliminate threats at their source than attempting to deter or defend against them later. This is not to say that other lines of defense don't have a critical role. Rather, at this point in time there is no better US investment in combating this threat than the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program. The Nunn-Lugar Program At a cost of less than two-tenths of one percent of the annual US defense budget, the Nunn-Lugar program has facilitated the destruction of 423 ballistic missiles, 383 ballistic missile launchers, 85 bombers, 483 long-range nuclear air-launched cruise missiles, 352 submarine missile launchers, 209 submarine launched ballistic missiles, and 19 strategic missile submarines. It also has sealed 194 nuclear test tunnels. Most notably, 5,504 warheads that were on strategic systems aimed at the United States have been deactivated. When the Soviet Union collapsed, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan became the third, fourth, and eighth largest nuclear powers in the world. Without Nunn-Lugar, they would still have thousands of nuclear weapons. Instead, all three countries are nuclear weapons-free. To put this into perspective, Nunn-Lugar has dismantled more nuclear weaponry than the countries of Great Britain, France, and China currently possess in their stockpiles and arsenals combined. ... Despite the success of Nunn-Lugar, the threat to US national security from proliferation remains. Nunn-Lugar alone is insufficient to safeguard American security. But absent significant progress in the other lines of defense, it will remain the most efficient and cost-effective response to the threat. During his recent campaign, President George W. Bush underscored the importance of these efforts. He said: 'I will ask the Congress to increase substantially our assistance to dismantle as many of Russia's weapons as possible as quickly as possible.' ... Lower Offensive Numbers As President Bush explained in his recent speech, he is 'committed to achieving a credible deterrent with the lowest possible number of nuclear weapons consistent with our national security needs...' His goal is to move quickly to reduce nuclear forces. As a means of accomplishing these goals, the Administration has indicated a willingness to explore a unilateral but parallel method of reductions as opposed to seeking to expand the more traditional bilateral arms control process. There are good reasons for pursuing a unilateral but parallel strategy. It is more flexible and better suited for faster action. Protracted negotiations would keep many weapons on station longer than is necessary. To be sure, a unilateral but parallel process is not perfect. But its strengths may make it a better approach than the more traditional ones in the current strategic environment. That is not to say that such a strategy does not have its drawbacks. It does. The lack of some degree of irreversibility and agreed-upon verification regime make it a less than a perfect solution. But I believe some of these weaknesses can be overcome by utilizing other tools. For example, I am convinced that Nunn-Lugar and other non-proliferation programs can play a critical role in overcoming the inherent limitations of a unilateral but parallel approach to offensive force reductions. Let us not forget, Russians will face many of the same challenges under a unilateral but parallel process as they do under current treaty frameworks. They cannot afford to dismantle their weapons systems. Currently, Nunn-Lugar is the means by which this task is accomplished. Absent an unexpected economic revival in Russia, the need for dismantlement assistance will continue. But Nunn-Lugar could also prove useful in providing verification in a unilateral but parallel arms reduction process. Through the Nunn-Lugar program, the United States could maintain a window of observation into Russian dismantlement, as well as serve as a venue to provide Russia with an understanding and view of American reductions. It would not be capable of completely replacing a treaty verification regime, but it would be tremendously valuable tool. In addition to the utilization of national technical means, Pentagon contract inspection and acceptance visits as well as audit and examination visits could provide an effective verification tool. Anyone who has witnessed the contractual negotiating process involved in undertaking and implementing a Nunn-Lugar project as well as the role of American firms in managing such projects on site and the auditing practices to ensure proper utilization of US funds, can attest that the inspection and verification procedures associated with the program are every bit as stringent and intrusive as similar measures under an arms control regime. Chemical Weapons Elimination ... Despite the tremendous progress Nunn-Lugar has achieved and the real prospects for additional contributions in the future, there are areas that require additional attention and support. In my opinion, chemical weapons elimination in Russia is at the top of this list. The United States has agreed to assist Russia in the elimination of its chemical weapons arsenal. Specifically, the Pentagon will construct a chemical weapons elimination facility at Shchuchye near Chelyabinsk. In December, I visited the Russian facility there and toured the site of the proposed Nunn-Lugar destruction facility. Located nearly a thousand miles from Moscow, it is home to a staggering two million chemical artillery shells and warheads. Shchuchye houses 50 percent of the former Soviet modern ground-launched chemical weapons arsenal. The weapons varied from compact 85 mm chemical artillery shells to much larger warheads carried on 'SCUD' missiles. These modern, ground-delivered munitions - filled with sarin, soman, and VX - are in excellent, ready to-use condition and, for the most part, are small and easily transportable. Critics of US involvement argue that the weapons stored at Shchuchye pose no more than an environmental threat to the local Russian population. Nothing could be further from the truth. The size and lethality of the weapons I observed are clearly a threat. A Russian major and I demonstrated the proliferation threat posed by these weapons by easily fitting an 85 mm shell, filled with VX, into an ordinary briefcase. Room was available for at least two more shells. One briefcase alone, could carry enough agent to kill thousands of Americans. Under the Chemical Weapons Convention, Russia has declared a stockpile of 40,000 metric tons of chemical weapons. These munitions have been collected and stored in seven sites across Russia. But not one has been destroyed primarily because of Russian budget shortfalls. The proposed US facility would be capable of destroying 800 metric tons of weaponized agents each year. The Pentagon has tried unsuccessfully over the last several years to launch this project. The Senate has supported these efforts, but the House of Representatives has objected. In an attempt to find a compromise the Senate adopted a plan that required specific conditions to be met prior to the release of US funds for the project. Despite the fact that the House refused to accept this proposal, the Senate's efforts have triggered considerable action in Russia. First, Russia increased funding for chemical weapons elimination six-fold to over $100 million and is completing installation of the infrastructure necessary for facility operations. Secondly, US efforts to attract additional international assistance from other nations have proven successful. Thus far Italy, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the European Union and Canada have pledged to provide assistance. Others have indicated interest in contributing to the cause. Each nation has indicated that its contribution would be contingent on continued US leadership in the project. In addition to Shchuchye, many foreign governments are actively supporting CW destruction efforts at other locations in Russia. Finally, Moscow has agreed to consolidate the weaponry stored at seven sites into three primary or central elimination sites; this is an abandonment of its previous position which cited Russian domestic law as forbidding the transportation or movement of chemical weapons and agent in Russia. As a result the Nunn-Lugar destruction facility will be impelled to not only destroy the weapons stored at Shchuchye but those at other storage locations as well. It is time to utilize the window of opportunity to destroy these dangerous weapons. It is imperative for Americans, Russians, and the world that Russia's vast stores of chemical weapons do not end up in the hands of rogue nations or terrorists. We are losing precious time to eliminate these dangerous weapons. Securing the necessary authorization and appropriations for the construction of the destruction facility is my highest priority this year. ..." © 2001 The Acronym Institute. |