Disarmament DiplomacyIssue No. 58, June 2001News ReviewConcern Over Russia Nuclear Waste Policy On June 6, the Russian Duma approved legislation allowing nuclear waste to be imported into the country for storage. Three separate bills were required to trigger overall approval. They were passed by 266 votes to 117, 243 votes to 125, and 250 votes to 125. Despite grave environmental, security and proliferation concerns surrounding the move, the persuading factor appears to have been the revenue and employment reportedly at stake. The Ministry of Atomic Energy has been publicly predicting that 22,000 tons of spent nuclear fuel, imported over a 10-year period, could generate earnings of $20 billion. Grigory Yavlinsky, leader of the Liberal bloc in the Duma, claimed that the overwhelming majority of the public were adamantly opposed to the move. Yavlinsky made a passionate address to deputies: "The vote today can make history. One hundred million Russian citizens are against it and only 500 people are for - 300 members sitting here and 200 bureaucrats who will be getting the money." A letter to the Duma from the Russian Academy of Sciences, released to the public on the say of the vote, warned: "mass imports of spent nuclear fuel mean unavoidable, catastrophic consequences for ecology which will threaten the lives of Russians for centuries to come." To the applause of numerous environmental, anti-nuclear and non-proliferation groups, the Bush administration reacted to the vote with prompt and deep alarm. A June 6 State Department statement observed: "The intent of the Duma legislation is to change Russia's ability to import irradiated foreign power reactor fuel, much of which contains US-origin nuclear material. US law and our bilateral agreements provide that the US must give its consent to any retransfer of such material. For Russia to import irradiated fuel containing US-origin material would require a Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreement with the United States, something it does not now have. In considering whether in the future to grant consent for retransfer, the US would want to consider several factors. For instance, the US would want to be assured that the transfer was for eventual disposal, and not for reprocessing, in order to avoid increases in civil stockpiles of separated plutonium. The US would need to be assured that the planned transportation, storage, and disposition of the fuel complied with appropriate standards of safety and security. An especially important factor would be the nature of Russia's nuclear cooperation with third parties." On June 9, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Alexander Yakovenko sought to assure Washington of the probity and prudence of any importation programme. His comments, however, seemed directly to defend the possible reprocessing of the imported material: "Russia has developed modern technologies for SNF [spent nuclear fuel] storage and reprocessing that come up to international nuclear and environmental safety requirements, of which the US knows very well. Such activity with respect to the handling of SNF has been successfully practiced for decades in a number of countries, in particular in France and Great Britain. We believe that the importation of foreign SNF into Russia would be a weighty contribution to reinforcing the global regime for nuclear non-proliferation because this would facilitate the withdrawal from international commerce of fissile materials potentially suitable for the manufacture of nuclear weapons. ... We hope for Washington, having carefully reviewed the situation, to come to see the need to support Russia's plans in this field. For our part we are prepared for a constructive dialogue with US officials." On May 25, Valentin B. Ivanov, the Deputy Russian Atomic Energy Minister, predicted that an importation scheme would remain viable even if the US opted out: "[W]e understand that without an agreement with the United States, it is impossible to use the spent fuel [from many states]... [w]e [also] know that approximately 10% of spent fuel exists outside the US umbrella, and we have received information from some governments that they will start negotiations with us if we get this legislation." Notes: on June 13, President Bush issued a statement extending an Executive Order, introduced by President Clinton in June 2000, prohibiting creditors seizing assets related to Russian sales of uranium to the United States. Under a 1993 agreement, Russia is committed to sell 500 metric tons of weapons-grade uranium to the US for conversion for use as fuel in commercial reactors. The Executive Order was issued by President Clinton when the Russian government announced a suspension of the sales, fearing the proceeds or assets involved may be targetted by a number of its creditors. President Bush's renewal statement noted: "It remains a major national security goal of the United States to ensure that fissile material removed from Russian nuclear weapons...is dedicated to peaceful uses, subject to transparency measures, and protected from diversion to activities of proliferation concern. The accumulation of a large volume of weapons-usable fissile material in the territory of the Russian Federation continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States. For this reason, I have determined it is necessary to maintain in force these emergency authorities beyond June 21, 2001." Reports: Russia sees payoff in storing nuclear waste from around the world, New York Times, May 26; Russia votes to accept spent foreign nuclear fuel, Reuters, June 6; Russia nuclear waste bill advances, Associated Press, June 6; Text - State Department on Russia's plan to import nuclear waste, Washington File, June 7; Environmentalists praise US position, Associated Press, June 8; Comments by Alexander Yakovenko, Official Spokesman of Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russian Foreign Ministry transcript, June 9; Bush extends order on Russia uranium sales, Reuters, June 13; Bush extends Russian uranium order, Associated Press, June 13. © 2001 The Acronym Institute. |