Disarmament Diplomacy

Documents & Sources

UK Arguments on Missile Defence

• Article by Foreign Secretary Jack Straw
• Reply by Malcolm Savidge MP
• Briefing for Labour Parliamentarians

Article by Foreign Secretary Jack Straw

'Countdown to a Sensible Defence,' by Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, Tribune (http://www.tribune.atfreeweb.com), July 27, 2001.

"Four questions for the next pub quiz: (A) Which was the first country to be subjected to missile attacks? (B) Which is the only country which currently has a functioning strategic anti-ballistic missile system? (C) Which international treaty allows the deployment of missile defences with a range of less than 3,500 kilometres? (D) Which country proposed in February 2001 the development of non-strategic ballistic missile defences? Answers: (A) The United Kingdom. (B) Russia - the system protects Moscow and is permitted under the ABMT. The United States had an option under the ABMT to do likewise but did not proceed. (C) The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty updated by the US and Russia in 1997. (D) Russia.

I confess that I came fairly fresh to the debate on missile defence when I was appointed Foreign Secretary. If these four questions had been posed to me when I was Home Secretary, I might have guessed the answer to (A), but I would have had no chance with (B) or (C) or (D). I know much more now.

What is fascinating about this issue is that it is not a black and white issue where a simplistic 'let us not have anything to do with the idea' would serve the interests of Britain. This country's experience, as the first victim of missile attacks, should underline the necessity for nations to consider and where necessary put in place missile defences. I was born the year after the Second World War, but I can still recall the absolute horror with which older friends and relations recounted their transfixed terror of the Nazis' V2 rockets which they launched against this country in the closing months of the war - much worse, they said, even than the blitz, or V1 raids.

Why? - Because with bombers and the V1 doodlebugs there was some warning, and some chance of fighting back. With the V2, there was no warning, no chance, no defence. It came straight out of the sky. If the V2 had been introduced earlier, the result of the war might have been different.

The result of our experience should at least give pause for thought as the US, its allies and now Russia, all start constructively to consider the role which defences against ballistic nuclear missiles might play in making the planet a safer place.

Russia is no longer an enemy. However, a threat could emerge from other states such as Iraq and North Korea. Other countries are developing worrying capabilities such as Iran and Libya. Such countries are actively engaged in developing their own ballistic missile systems and weapons of mass destruction. They are devoting substantial resources to this. We have to work on the basis that they are doing so for a purpose - with the aim of influencing others by threatening their use and, in extremis, of using them.

It is no good arguing that 'rogue' states could always resort to terrorist bombings or biological warfare instead. They could, but that does not answer the question about what more responsible states should do to reduce the risk posed by these states, and others, from missile attack.

It was considerations of this kind which probably led Russia to make its proposals for Europe to develop non-strategic missile [defence] systems in collaboration with Russia. True, such systems would not be outside the 1972 ABMT as it stands. But the principle remains the same. And the only key differences between a 'non-strategic system' and a 'strategic system' boil down to its range. Although these 'theatre' missile defences are primarily designed to protect deployed forces, they could be used to protect countries with a relatively small geographical area - Japan, or parts of Southern Europe, for example. Should those countries with large land masses be prohibited from taking steps to protect their populations?

The British government has warmly welcomed George Bush's initiative last weekend [in Genoa] with Vladimir Putin and Russia's positive response. There are many considerations which have to be included in the equation, including what type of technology will be employed, and the effect of missile defence on those states that are developing nuclear weapons and delivery systems (though it is hard to argue that such an effect should be malign). And it is surely right for Britain to engage freely in these consultations rather than jumping to a hasty and ill-judged conclusion against them.

There is a fifth pub question. Who opposed MAD...in the Cold War and prefer it now to missile defence? The answer is, some of those who say we should have nothing to do with missile defence. It's not a very convincing position."

Reply by Malcolm Savidge MP

'From Star Wars to Apocalypse Now,' by Malcolm Savidge, Labour Member of Parliament, Tribune, August 17, 2001.

Note: Malcolm Savidge MP, writing here in a personal capacity, is convenor of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Global Security and Non-Proliferation.

"The most worrying thing about Jack Straw's article...was not its patronising tone, nor even its attempt to trivialise the grave question of Star Wars to the level of a pub quiz. It was that it possibly signals an attempt by the Labour leadership to use the parliamentary recess to railroad through a crucial policy change without proper discussion in the party. A deeply disappointing e-mail briefing sent to MPs from the Foreign Secretary's office the following week seemed to confirm that impression.

The push for this change does not come from the Ministry of Defence which, looking ahead 30 years, rates the risk from 'rogue' state rockets as 'very low.' Nor does it come from the armed forces. Present and previous chiefs of the defence staff have expressed their doubts about Star Wars. Even less does it come from Labour Party Policy Forums.

Despite folksy references to V2 rockets in the Second World War, the origin of the rhetoric used by Straw and his office is not British at all. It is taken from the far right of the Republican Party in the United States. According to these extremists, the US is in imminent danger of nuclear missile attack from rogue states. This is based on a North Korean rocket test conducted in 1998. The rocket was too short-ranged to reach the US; the test failed and has never been repeated. Unpleasant and untrustworthy as North Korea is, it is increasingly prepared to participate in negotiations on the whole issue.

Despite the opportunities for diplomacy and the ability of the US to threaten every other state with nuclear annihilation, George Bush's administration claims the need to have a multi-layered land, sea, air and space-based system of weapons to defend itself against this threat. This would involve total abandonment of the Anti- Ballistic Missile Treaty, which as recently as last year Britain, the US and all parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty gave a commitment to 'preserving and strengthening as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions in offensive weapons.'

At Genoa, Bush indicated a readiness to discuss this issue with Russia, but his government then indicated that its negotiating position would be agreed total devaluation of the Treaty or unilaterally breaching it. Bush's officials pay lip service to arms control and nuclear disarmament, but simultaneously are seeking to block or breach most major treaties. They claim Star Wars is purely defensive, but elsewhere talk of achieving 'full spectrum dominance' or speculate (in euphemistic terms) of being enabled to risk nuclear war with China. Star Wars is liable to encourage Russia and China to further nuclear arms racing. By destabilising either country and undermining non-proliferation negotiations, it may encourage the spread of weapons to states and terrorist groups. Missile defence could also massively increase the possibilities for accidental nuclear conflict.

Such concerns led the Foreign Affairs Select Committee to recommend that the British Government should encourage its US allies to seek other ways of reducing the threat they perceive. So far, 276 MPs have signed my motion supporting that conclusion, including 216 of 412 members of the Parliamentary Labour Party. This is a massive majority, since only backbenchers can sign. The leaders of seventeen major trade unions have expressed opposition to Star Wars and that concern is reflected in Constituency Labour Parties.

Labour's opponents caricature the party as led by a small coterie of cronies, with a shallow short-term agenda and contemptuous disregard for the PLP [Parliamentary Labour Party], the party outside parliament and Labour's enduring principles. We all need to work together to prove how wrong that distortion is. The whole party must convey to the leadership the strength of feeling on this issue, not least through this year's conference. In doing so, we will be reflecting the views of the British people. A MORI opinion poll shows that 70% of the British public believes Star Wars will encourage arms racing and 72% believes that involvement of Britain's early warning systems will increase the risk of this country becoming a target.

The chief of the defence staff, Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, has warned of the immense expense of buying into the dubious technology of Star Wars. It could prove costly in a far more terrible sense. If it provokes a return to the arms race, then there is the risk that, at some point in the future, disaster or even catastrophe could occur. Applying 'worst case' analysis, it is possible that a major nuclear war could destroy much of human life. The environmental aftermath - nuclear winter, radiation, disease - could endanger the rest. That would be a terrible betrayal of all past generations. It would be an terrible betrayal of the future generations which should have been to come. It would be the ultimate betrayal."

Briefing for Labour Parliamentarians

Briefing on missile defence, circulated from the Office of the Foreign Secretary to Labour Parliamentarians, August 1, 2001.

Notes: on August 10, the Daily Telegraph ('Blair "assures US of quiet support' on missile shield') quoted an unnamed "senior US official" as stating: "Tony Blair has told us his political situation within the Labour Party is very difficult and he needs to deal with the Left. But he has said that, ultimately, it will not be a big issue. Britain will support us." The official added: "Some in Europe look at these treaties as if they are big blocks of stone, but in reality they are no more secure than the interests of the countries [concerned]..." On August 13, an article in The Times ('Former Minister fights missile plan') quoted Labour MP Peter Kilfoyle, former Minister of State in the Ministry of Defence (MoD), as predicting a stormy debate on the missile defence issue when the Party convenes for its annual conference in October. In Mr. Kilfoyle's view: "If we cannot express our views at conference we might as well pack up and go home. There is a lot of debate...on what issue the conference should reassert their rights over the leadership, but I believe this is the one."

For the full text of the briefing for Labour Parliamentarians, see the Global Network Against Weapons and Nuclear Power in Space, (http://www.space4peace.org) and the British American Security Information Council (http://www.basicint.org).

"Key points

• Missile defence is not new. It exists already - Moscow, for example, is protected by an anti-missile defence system allowed by the 1972 ABMT.
• Russia and the United States have already amended the 1972 ABMT Treaty by an additional protocol in 1997 which allows both countries to develop and deploy theatre missile defences.
• The threat of proliferation is real. Many states have acquired a missile capability over the past two decades. More worrying still is that a small but growing band of states - almost all of them non-democratic - have acquired long-range ballistic missiles. All of these states are also developing weapons of mass destruction - nuclear, chemical and biological.
• Missile defence is not an alternative to our wider non-proliferation effort, but part of it. Proliferators are not irrational. All our non-proliferation instruments - the multilateral treaties, national and international export controls, interception/disruption operations etc are ultimately aimed at affecting the cost/benefit calculation that all proliferators must make, however crudely. Effective missile defence can do the same, by reducing the likely benefit of developing WMD-armed missiles (or by raising the cost, through the need to build more, or more sophisticated, systems). It therefore complements, not replaces, the other tools in the non-proliferation toolbox.
• We are actively promoting a draft International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC) which comprises principles, commitments and confidence building measures on ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles. This would be the first international norm on ballistic missiles. The EU committed itself at Gothenburg to seeking to launch the ICOC formally in the course of 2002.
• We are also very active in addressing the drivers of most missile proliferation: i.e. regional insecurity and tension. To that extent, all the UK's efforts to address India/Pakistan problems, to support the Middle East Peace Process, and to encourage rapprochement on the Korean Peninsula are part of our wider counter-proliferation work.
• Following their meeting in Genoa on July 22 Presidents Bush and Putin are engaged in a wide-ranging series of discussions, which will extend into the autumn covering both offensive and defensive weapons systems. Both leaders have already said that they are looking forward to substantial cuts in their respective nuclear arsenals.
• At the end of July the US Secretary of State Colin Powell visited Beijing for wide ranging talks with the Chinese leadership. China agreed to hold a dialogue of experts on Chinese missile technology exports which have been a major source of concern. Following the talks Secretary Powell stressed that he wanted to convey President Bush's desire 'to develop constructive, forward-looking relations with the People's Republic of China'."

© 2001 The Acronym Institute.