Disarmament Diplomacy

Issue No. 64, May - June 2002

News Review

Prospects for US-North Korea Talks Pushed Forward as Clouds Gather

On April 5 - ten months after President Bush announced he was prepared to resume discussions with North Korea on non-proliferation and security issues - South Korean envoy Lim Dong-won told a nationally televised press conference in Seoul that North Korean President Kim Jong-il "has expressed willingness to open dialogue with the United States and will accept a US envoy's visit to the North." In addition, Pyongyang had stated its intent to "fully revive the North-South rapprochement". The groundwork for this apparently decisive breakthrough was laid by a visit to Pyongyang in late March by Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri, conveying messages of friendship from South Korean President Kim Dae-jung. By mid-April, however, no definite plans for US-North Korean meetings had been announced, and relations between the two sides remained tense in the extreme. Indeed, it may be that a growing fear of major conflict in the region is both energising and destabilising efforts to return to the days of bumpy but significant progress animating the final months of the Clinton administration.

On April 12, Lim Dong-won, addressing the Cheju Peace Forum conference in Cheju City, South Korea, revealed that, during his successful mission to Pyongyang in early April, he had presented President Kim Jong-il with a "very long and detailed letter" from his own President outlining the grave dangers of continued stalemate. According to the envoy: "In the letter, President Kim first of all emphasised that Chairman Kim must accept and understand that the global strategy of the United States has fundamentally changed... He went on to point out that when diplomatic efforts at non-proliferation fail, then the United States is prepared to resort to military means of counter-proliferation, and that Chairman Kim must fully, and clearly, understand that North Korea is also included in the possible targets for such military efforts by the United States. ... Kim [Jong-il] made it clear that he will pursue dialogue with the United States. They know that dialogue and cooperation are the only way to guarantee their very survival. ... I came to the conclusion he had the right understanding of the risks associated with counter-proliferation".

On April 11, a spokesperson for the North Korean Foreign Ministry was quoted by the state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) in Pyongyang as observing that the "the environment has not yet been created" in which the two sides could "have the dialogue on an equal footing". The spokesperson added that a resumption of talks was "necessary" and would be "resumed any time when conditions are created." Asked to respond to these comments, Lim Dong-won observed: "You have to differentiate between real policy and proclaimed policy. This is proclaimed policy..."

The Cheju Peace Conference forum was also attended by US Ambassador to South Korea, Thomas Hubbard, who told delegates (April 13) that the US and its allies in the region were "encouraging the DPRK to make the responsible choice in terms of its future relations, and to do so with a sense of urgency... We are cautiously optimistic. Only time will tell whether the North is truly ready to move toward better relations..." Hubbard also addressed the question, given the "urgency" of the issue, of how much would be allowed to elapse before a verdict could be delivered and direct action taken as necessary: "[President has said that we will] not permit the world's most dangerous nations to threaten us with the world's most dangerous weapons. That is not a threat - it is a statement of fact. It is important for all, including those in Pyongyang, to understand it in that way - to understand, as well, the new context in which we view the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction and proliferation in the aftermath of September 11."

Former US Ambassador to South Korea Donald Greg visited Pyongyang from April 6-9. Speaking in Seoul on his return, Gregg stated simply (April 10): "I got the impression that North Korea seeks good relations with the United States". Gregg added: "There is an opportunity, if we take it, to move the Northeast Asian region off our list of major military concerns. ... [Although there is] a lot of nostalgia in the North for the Clinton administration...they have to come to grips with the fact that they are now dealing with a nation at war". On April 11. Ambassador Jack Pritchard, US Special Envoy on Korean Affairs, told reporters he was hopeful he would soon be able to make a visit to Pyongyang. Such a meeting would be the most senior contact between the two states since President Bush broke off discussions in January 2001 in order to conduct a six-month policy review.

North Korea has also announced (April 3) it's preparedness to resume discussions with the Korean Peninsular Energy Corporation (KEDO), the organisation established following the 1994 US-North Korea Agreed Framework to oversee the construction of proliferation-resistant light-water nuclear reactors (LWRs) in North Korea. The move was welcomed on April in a statement from the US-Japan-South Korea Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG), meeting in Tokyo: "The three delegations took note of North Korea's decision to resume consultations with KEDO and expressed their support for continued implementation of the 1994 Agreed framework including construction for the LWR project. They urged North Korea to take measures necessary for carrying out the Agreed Framework, including full cooperation with the IAEA."

The Bush administration approaches the Agreed Framework - long criticised by a significant portion of the Republican Party in Congress - in a sprit of undisguised unease. On April 1, Presidential Determination No. 2002-12 recommitted the US to the project, though only by the procedure of waiving requirements for its continuance - by issuing, in effect, an unclean bill of health. The Determination reads:

"Pursuant to the authority vested in me by...the Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Act 2002...I hereby determine that it is vital to the national security interests of the United states to furnish up to $95 million in funds made available under the heading 'Non-Proliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining and Related Programs' of that Act, for assistance to KEDO, and, therefore, I waive the requirement in section 565(b) to certify that:

(1) The parties of the Agreed Framework have taken and continue to take demonstrable steps to implement the Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsular;

(2) North Korea is complying with all provisions of the agreed Framework; and

(3) The United States is continuing to make significant progress on eliminating the North Korean ballistic missile threat, including further missile tests and its ballistic missile exports."

On March 30, White House press secretary Ari Fleischer argued that non-certification would send "a strong message to North Korea that they need to comply with their international obligations and agreements. The United States is complying, and this is a message to North Korea that it's important for them to do so as well."

The US's major concern is North Korea's refusal to allow the IAEA to fully verify the amount and status of its fissile materials. While the Agency has been allowed to verify the non-production of fissile materials in the country since 1994, North Korea argues that full inspections are conditional on progress on implementing the Agreed Framework - progress which, in Pyongyang's view, has been seriously and deliberately retarded by Washington. On March 18, Agency Director General Mohamed ElBaradei noted: "The IAEA continues to be unable to verify the correctness and completeness of the initial declaration by North Korea of nuclear material subject to safeguards in accordance with its NPT safeguards agreement with the IAEA." ElBaradei made clear the scale of the task involved in making up for the lost time: "The work required to verify that all nuclear materials subject to safeguards in North Korea have been declared and placed under safeguards will take three to four years, provided that IAEA receives full cooperation from Pyongyang."

Media reports suggested that important voices in the Bush administration view non-certification as an important step toward withdrawal from the entire Framework. According to an unnamed senior official (March 29): "The battle remains to be fought [on abandoning the Framework] but that's why the shift in the certification question this year is so important... It was a transitional move away from saying, 'everything is fine'." Another anonymous official observed: "It's saying, 'be on notice'. You've got a year to go. ... If they don't allow the IAEA the kind of access they need, then it's clear they have will have broken the Agreed Framework and the responsibility for that is unambiguously theirs... You might as well say flatly, 'you're in breach of the agreement and it's over'." On March 30, Chang Sun-sun, South Korea's senior representative in KEDO, expressed a mix of concern and confidence at prospects for implementing the Agreement: "Nobody wants to be the first one to run away... [A collapse of the Framework] would have enormous impact on the overall peace and security of the Korean Peninsular. ... They [the North Korean leadership] want to see some progress for themselves... When the concrete pours in August, I think it might have some impact on their way of thinking."

Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 5, General Thomas A, Schwartz, Commander-in-Chief of US forces in Korea (USFK), presented a generally bleak summary of current and likely developments in the region:

"North Korea initially responded to the events of 9/11 with 'deep regret' and some condemnation of the acts. In addition, Pyongyang publicly rejected terrorism and the support of terrorist organisations, and signed two anti-terrorism treaties and announced plans to sign five more. However, Pyongyang criticised the American military actions in Afghanistan and elsewhere. ... North Korea has responded negatively toward President Bush's recent State of the Union address... Although we welcome and hope for more direct North-South dialogue, we watch with caution as the military threat from North Korea continues to remain high, both in conventional capability and weapons of mass destruction. ... In 2002, we expect North Korea to continue diplomatic outreach strategies designed to garner much needed economic aid and assistance. However, in 2002, three critical events will influence...political-military affairs on the peninsular. First, changes in regional politics will take place with elections [in South Korea]... Secondly, pressure will intensify on the DPRK to start cooperating with the IAEA, so as to avoid unacceptable delays in the delivery of essential nuclear components necessary to build two light-water reactors... And third, while North Korea has said that it will continue a moratorium on missile launches until 2003, it has not made a commitment to extend beyond that time. These three events form a potential nexus for increased tension... These key events are centred around...IAEA inspections of reprocessing facilities in the North..."

Reports: Text - Schwartz tells Senate Panel US, ROK ready for North Korea, Washington File, March 6; US offers $1.2 billion in Aegis defenses to S. Korea, Reuters, March 18; White House Report, 3/20, Washington File, March 20; Bush puts aside N. Korea misgivings, Associated Press, March 20; US, S. Korea stage military exercise, Associated Press, March 20; US and South Korea to stage biggest anti-North drills, Agence France Presse, March 20; N. Korea not following nuclear pact, US to say, Washington Post, March 20; North Korea - Bush will refuse to certify compliance, officials say, Global Security Newswire, March 22; Bush hard-liners see end of N. Korea accord, Reuters, March 29; Megawati - N. Korea open to new talks, Associated Press, March 30; Megawati says N. Korea positive on South's talks call, Reuters, March 30; N. Korea reactor project on course, Washington Post, March 30; South Korean envoy on peace mission to North Korea amid hopes of breakthrough, Associated Press, April 2; N. Korea to resume talks with US, Associated Press, April 3; Text - White House approves non-proliferation funds for Korea, Washington File, April 3; S. Korea envoy says North agrees to renew US talks, Reuters, April 5; US reacts cautiously to N. Korea dialogue report, Reuters, April 6; Envoy - North Korea agrees to restart dialogue with Washington and Seoul, Associated Press, April 6; Text - US, S. Korea, Japan welcome N. Korea's willingness to talk, Washington File, April 9; Envoy says North Korea keen on US ties, Reuters, April 10; North Korea agrees to receive American envoy to renew talks, New York Times, April 11; N. Korea unready for US talks, Associated Press, April 11; US envoy in S. Korea, eyes North contacts, Reuters, April 11; South Korea tells North it could be US military target, Reuters, April 12; US 'cautiously optimistic' on N. Korea talks - envoy, Reuters, April 13.

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