Disarmament Diplomacy

Issue No. 64, May - June 2002

Opinion & Analysis

The US Nuclear Posture Review:
Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose

By Jack Mendelsohn

Last January, the Bush administration presented the classified conclusions of its Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) to the Congress¹ and in early March the text was leaked to the press.² At the time of its initial public briefing, the NPR was subjected to a good deal of press and expert criticism, focussed primarily on the details of the proposed "sizing" of the US nuclear force, the blurring of the distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons, and the hint of an unrequited desire to resume nuclear weapons testing. Once the classified version became available, the critics' list of concerns expanded to include the NPR's listing of potential security contingencies and target countries and the apparent willingness of the United States to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states. This paper considers these concerns in turn, weighing their separate and collective impact on efforts to strengthen the international arms control and non-proliferation regime.

1. The Sizing of the Force

The NPR sets forth the administration's goal of reducing the "operationally deployed" strategic US nuclear warheads - those weapons that are available immediately or within a matter of days - to 1,700-2,200 warheads by 2012. The "operationally deployed" definition would replace the current counting rule approach used in the Strategic Arms Reduction (START) agreements where, in order to facilitate verification and compliance, missile and bomber delivery systems are assigned a fixed number of warheads whether or not that is the actual operational loading.³

In a statement worthy of George Orwell, Under Secretary of Defense Douglas Feith referred to the new US operationally deployed approach to sizing the arsenal as "truth in advertising", noting that the US "will no longer count 'phantom warheads' that could be deployed but are not."⁴ What Under Secretary Feith neglected to point out is that the United States in large part intends to reach its first reduction threshold - 3,800 warheads by the end of Fiscal Year (FY) 2007 - by "downloading"⁵ its existing forces of land-based Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) and heavy bombers.⁶ Removing warheads while maintaining existing platforms with empty spaces on board - creating another type of 'phantom warhead' - will leave the United States with a significant capability to 'breakout' and reconstitute its strike forces, as Feith did acknowledge, "within weeks or months." Thus, despite its claim to "truth in advertising", the Bush administration's plan for strategic nuclear force reductions leaves quite a few of its own "phantom warheads" lying around.

In all, the proposed US reductions would result in about 3,000 START-accountable warheads being removed from the operational forces by FY 07. However, at least 1,600 empty spaces would then be available for 'upload' in the operational ICBM and SLBM missile forces, while an unknown but substantial number of additional weapons could also be redeployed in the bomber force. Reductions below 3,800 warheads would take place in the 2007-2012 period - in the administration of another President - and in a manner yet to be determined.

2. Creating the Responsive Force

As is to be expected, the operationally deployed nuclear forces envisioned under the NPR are intended to deter and respond to immediate and unexpected contingencies. Potential contingencies would be met by a "responsive" force of warheads in the strategic active stockpile, many of which would have been placed there after being downloaded from existing delivery systems. Again according to Under Secretary Feith, the weapons in the strategic active stockpile would "give the United States a responsive capability to adjust the number of operationally deployed nuclear weapons should the international security environment change and warrant such action."

The administration claims the size of the responsive force has not yet been determined, but an educated guess would put it at over 2,000 strategic warheads by FY 07.⁷ The overall strategic "active"⁸ stockpile would then be some 5,800 warheads.⁹ There will also be an "inactive" stockpile of nuclear weapons that can be transitioned to the active stockpile if necessary. The future size of that stockpile has not yet been determined but it is currently estimated to be almost 3,000 weapons.¹⁰

The upside of the administration's approach in the NPR to strategic force reductions is its willingness to reduce deployed forces to approximately the levels previously agreed to for START III.¹¹ The main downsides of the "operationally deployed" approach are threefold:

• The very real US reconstitution capability. This is of serious concern to the Russians since, for economic reasons, they will be obliged to drastically reduce their strategic nuclear delivery vehicle force, and thus will not be able to maintain anywhere near the same number of empty spaces for warheads as the United States. Retired Russian Major-General Vladimir Dvorkin has said that the Bush administration has ignored Russian complaints about US plans to stockpile nuclear weapons for a responsive force. Because Russia plans to cut its delivery systems below US levels with or without a nuclear arms agreement with Washington, in a crisis it would not be possible for Russia to re-deploy anywhere near the same number of weapons as the United States¹²;
• The incentive for Russia to maintain a large non-deployed strategic arsenal as a "hedge" against unforeseen changes in the strategic environment (in their case, involving a challenge from the United States). One of the supreme ironies of the post-Cold War period is that non-deployed Russian weapons now pose a greater threat than deployed ones. The US proposal would encourage the Russians to increase the size of their non-deployed arsenal, the least secure portion of their strategic nuclear forces; and
• The stress on a "responsive" force that undercuts the principle of "irreversibility" and complicates achieving any stable arms control settlement. In the negotiations for a legally binding document to 'codify' the unilateral strategic force reductions announced at the Crawford presidential summit last November, the United States has apparently proposed two escape clauses. One is the usual six-month "supreme national interests" withdrawal provision. The other is a 45-day "notice of intention to exceed" the upper level of deployed warheads (likely to be 2,200). Reportedly, the United States would like to be able to invoke this provision without disrupting other aspects of the document.

3. The New Triad

One of the policy changes introduced by the NPR is the shift from "a traditional threat-based approach to a capabilities-based approach." According to the Review, US nuclear force size formerly reflected a response to a specific threat, viz., the Soviet Union, and emphasized nuclear weapons, had limited flexibility and placed constraints on missile defences.

According to the new intellectual underpinnings for strategic policy, the nuclear force capabilities required are not country-specific but are designed to respond to "multiple contingencies and new threats in a changing environment." Such a contingency "might include a sudden regime change by which an existing nuclear arsenal comes into the hands of a new, hostile leadership group, or an opponent's surprise unveiling of WMD capabilities."

To implement this new approach, the Defense Department has adopted a 'New Triad'. The older triad was composed of three legs: the air-, land- and sea-based strategic delivery systems - ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers - which were developed and deployed during the Cold War. One leg of the New Triad combines these delivery systems with non-nuclear strike capabilities, including precision-guided munitions. The other two legs are ballistic missile defences and a revitalized and responsive defence infrastructure (in particular, the nuclear weapons production complex).

After decades of debate, the US notice of withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in December of last year cleared the way for active missile defences to become a part of strategic policy. The NPR, however, is actually rather restrained in its projections for when and how effectively missile defences will actually become part of a New Triad, noting only that "several near-term and mid-term options [2003-2008] that could provide an emergency missile defense capability are under consideration." These options include:

• a single airborne laser for boost-phase intercept "that may be available for limited operations;"
• a "rudimentary" ground-based mid-course intercept system that "could be available" in Alaska against long-range threats; and
• a sea-based Aegis system that "could be available to provide rudimentary" mid-course intercepts against short- to medium-range threats. [Emphases added]

In effect, the missile defence leg of the New Triad is likely to remain rather weak for some time and will certainly complicate further offensive force reductions with Russia and, in the more distant future, with China and other nuclear-armed states. The most optimistic prediction for the deployment of any element of a missile defence - a handful of ground-based mid-course interceptors in Alaska - is now 2004. But even that date - coinciding with a US presidential election and certain to be heralded as fulfilling a campaign pledge - may still not be realistic given the usual and unavoidable delays characteristic of high-tech defence programs.¹³

4. Blurring the Nuclear/Conventional Distinction

Perhaps of more immediate policy concern than missile defences is that the New Triad postulates a continuum between precision-guided non-nuclear munitions and nuclear weapons. There are two grave dangers inherent in this approach:

• Establishing a conventional/nuclear weapons continuum obscures the fact that there are qualitative differences - such as radiation effects or political, legal or moral inhibitions¹⁴ - not just quantitative ones that distinguish precision-guided conventional munitions from low-yield nuclear weapons. This is part and parcel of the long-term effort to make the use of nuclear weapons seem more acceptable and/or credible in other than a deterrent or retaliatory mode; and
• Elevating long-range precision strike conventional weapons to a strategic role¹⁵ in a putative continuum with nuclear weapons also makes it easier to claim "gaps" exist that requiring new, more accurate, smaller-yield, specialized (preferably nuclear) weapons. These gaps, as described by the NPR, include holding at risk "hard and deeply buried targets..., mobile and re-locatable targets..., [and] chemical or biological agents," as well as a need for smaller yield weapons to limit collateral damage.

In a later section of the Review dealing with the Department of Energy, which is responsible for the US nuclear weapons production complex, the NPR urges examining three new types of warheads: possible "modifications to existing weapons to provide additional yield flexibility in the stockpile; improved earth penetrating weapons (EPWs) to counter the increased use by potential adversaries of hardened and deeply buried facilities; and warheads that reduce collateral damage."

5. Two Treaties Down, One to Go

As noted, late last year President Bush announced the intention of the United States to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, the only existing strategic defensive forces agreement. START II, the most recent (1993) strategic offensive forces agreement, is a dead letter, the NPR noting that "the Russian resolution of ratification, adopted in 2000, contains unacceptable provisions contrary to the new strategic framework and establishment of the New Triad." Among other conditions, the Russian ratification legislation would require the US to remain in full compliance with the ABM Treaty. The 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is the other major nuclear arms control agreement that is strongly opposed - but not yet formally renounced - by the Bush administration.¹⁶

The NPR buffets the CTBT severely but does not quite overturn it. It claims that the United States is making every effort to maintain the stockpile without additional testing. At the same time, the NPR warns that "this may not be possible for the indefinite future" and builds the case for the eventual resumption of testing by cautioning ominously that "some problems due to ageing and manufacturing defects have already been identified."¹⁷ Meanwhile, to strengthen the case, the NPR proposes increased reliance on the stockpile to supply the responsive force for potential contingencies. The NPR also identifies limitations in the current nuclear force that will require new capabilities. These include "defeating both hard and deeply buried targets with a more effective earth penetrator (heavier casing and lower yield) as well as chemical and biological agents (by thermal, chemical or radiological neutralization)". (Emphasis added.)

Finally, the NPR urges revitalisation of the entire nuclear infrastructure, "in particular the production complex," so that it will be able, "if directed, to design, develop, manufacture, and certify new warheads in response to new national requirements, and maintain readiness to resume underground nuclear testing if required." The NPR goes on to argue that the United States should improve its test readiness posture "from its current two to three year period to something substantially better." The administration has indicated it would like the Department of Energy to be able to resume testing within 12 to 18 months from the time it is directed to do so.¹⁸

6. Targeting Non-Nuclear Nations

When portions of the classified version of the NPR were leaked to the press, critical comment focussed on the discussion in the document of the "immediate, potential or unexpected" security contingencies that set the "requirements for nuclear strike capabilities." Immediate contingencies wherein US nuclear weapons may be called upon to play a role were named as including "an Iraqi attack on Israel or its neighbors, a North Korean attack on South Korea or a military confrontation over the straits of Taiwan."

The document then singles out five countries that could be involved in "immediate, potential or unexpected" contingencies: North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria and Libya. North Korea and Iraq are characterised as "chronic military concerns." All five are considered to "sponsor or harbor terrorists, and all have active WMD and missile programs."

In addition, the NPR lists China as a country that could be involved in an "immediate or potential" contingency and, while a nuclear strike contingency involving Russia "is not expected," Russian nuclear forces and programs "remain a concern." Carrying forward the arguments of the Clinton administration for it's 'hedge' force, the NPR cautions that in "the event that US relations with Russia significantly worsen in the future, the United States may need to revise its nuclear force levels and posture."

Keeping open the option to use nuclear weapons in other than a deterrent or retaliatory role is not new. Since at least the Gulf War and during the Clinton administration¹⁹, the United States has embraced a dual and contradictory policy on nuclear weapons use. The President, through the Secretary of State, declared in 1978 and reaffirmed in 1995 in connection with the review and extension of the 1970 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), that the United States - joined by the other four declared nuclear powers - would not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states party to the NPT unless they are allied with a nuclear state in an attack against the United States or its allies.²⁰

The National Security Council (NSC) and the Defense Department, on the other hand, believing that deterrence is strengthened by ambiguity, have for some time taken the position that "no options are ruled out" in response to an attack by any weapon of mass destruction. In 1996, NSC official Robert Bell, in conjunction with the US signature of the Protocols to the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (ANWFZ) Treaty, announced that US adherence "will not limit options available to the United States in response to an attack by an ANWFZ party using weapons of mass destruction." In late 1998, Walter Slocombe, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, stated that retaining the option to use nuclear weapons against an attack with chemical and/or biological weapons "is simply an issue of making sure that we continue to maintain a high level of uncertainty or high level of concern, if you will, at what the potential aggressor would face if he used [CBW] or indeed took other aggressive acts..."²¹

The latest round in this policy tango occurred earlier this year when in February Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton called into question the utility of and administration support for the US pledge not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states.²² Questioned about Bolton's comments, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher reiterated the most recent version of the negative security commitment (1995) and then added: "We will do whatever is necessary to deter the use of WMD against the United States, its allies, and its interests. If a WMD is used against the United States or its allies, we will not rule out any specific type of military response."²³

7. What's It Mean, Rummy?

Four conclusions can be drawn from the policies and arguments put forward in the NPR:

• First, that the United States over the next decade is committed only to essentially unilateral and largely reversible nuclear force reductions;
• Second, that the effort continues to make nuclear weapons more credible as war-fighting instruments and thus more likely to be used in conventional crisis situations;
• Third, that the second Bush administration, like the first, believes that if the United States is going to rely on nuclear weapons for deterrence, retaliation and war-fighting then nuclear weapons design and testing must resume; and
• Finally, that the NPR marks the two-thirds point on the way to clearing the strategic arms control landscape of all except self-imposed constraints on US nuclear forces.

If those conclusions drawn from the NPR accurately summarize the main trends in US security policy for the medium-term, then fasten your seat-belts, we're in for a rocky decade.²⁴

Notes and References

1. The public briefing by J.D. Crouch, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy on January 9, and the very useful slides illustrating the findings, are available at http://www.defenselink.mil.

2. Twenty-one pages of excerpts from the original report are available at http://www.globalsecurity.org. Unreferenced citations, in both the main text and endnotes, are taken either from this or the preceding document.

3. The START counting-figure, assigning a fixed number of warheads to a delivery system whether or not that is the actual operational loading, is usually close to the maximum the system is capable of carrying. In the case of ICBMs and SLBMs, the counting rules usually overcount the actual number of deployed weapons. In the case of long-range bombers, counting rules have traditionally undercounted the actual number.

4. Douglas Feith, testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, February 14, 2002.

5. All current US strategic missiles are designed to carry multiple warheads (3 to 10 depending on the system). "Downloading" means removing some of the multiple warheads from the dispensing platform (often called a "bus").

6. According to the NPR, the force reductions between now and FY-07 will be accomplished by: retiring the 50 Peacekeeper (MX) ICBMs but maintaining the silos "for future options" (a reduction of 500 warheads); downloading Minuteman III missiles from 3 warheads to 1 (a reduction of 700 warheads); removing 4 Trident submarines from strategic service and converting them to conventional cruise missile carriers (a reduction of 768 warheads); exempting 2 Trident submarines in overhaul (a reduction of 384 warheads); downloading the missiles on the remaining 12 Trident submarines from 8 warheads to 5 or 6 (a reduction of about 600 warheads); downloading weapons from B-52 and B-2 bombers (which in some cases can carry up to 20 bombs or cruise missiles); and eliminating the capability to return the B-1 bomber from a conventional to a nuclear role.

7. This educated guess is deduced from the sum of the 1,600 empty spaces available on downloaded systems, plus 200+ spares and 200+ systems in overhaul. For "conceptual" nuclear force tables for 2002, 2006 and 2012, see 'Faking Nuclear Restraint: The Bush Administration's Secret Plan for Strengthening US Nuclear Forces', Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) Backgrounder, February 13, 2002 (http://www.nrdc.org).

8. The "active stockpile is a weapon which is available, fully ready to be deployed and used." The inactive stockpile "consists of those weapons that are not fielded with limited-life components (e.g. tritium, batteries, neutron generators, etc.)."

9. The current active stockpile is "almost 8,000" including an estimated 1,200 non-strategic warheads.

10. For a discussion and an accounting of US nuclear forces in 2002, see the NRDC Nuclear Notebook in Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 2002, pp. 70-75.

11. The framework envisaged for START III - set out by Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton in Helsinki in 1997 - anticipated reductions to 2,000-2,500 warheads. The Bush administration will take five years longer to reach approximately the same level than the timeline set out at Helsinki.

12. 'Race Is On To Clinch Arms Cuts Pact', Moscow Times, April 24, 2002.

13. 'America's BMD Stumbles', Jane's Defence Weekly, May 1, 2002.

14. In an ironic but unintended mirror-image description of how nuclear weapons use by the United States would be perceived by the rest of the world, Under Secretary Feith noted in his February 14 testimony that September 11 illustrates that the United States "now confront[s] enemies who are eager to inflict mass destruction on innocent civilians here and abroad without regard for the possible cost." [Emphases added.]

15. The NPR notes, correctly, that "accurate and timely targeting information can increase...the possibilities for non-nuclear strike capabilities to substitute for nuclear weapons."

16. Under Secretary of State John Bolton, who is responsible for arms control and proliferation issues, has reportedly asked Department of State lawyers to examine the possibility of the United States withdrawing its signature from the CTBT.

17. The NPR cites as a major challenge over the next two decades the need to refurbish and extend the life of at least seven types of nuclear warheads: the B61-3, -4, -7, -10, -11 and B83-0, -1 for the B-2 and the non-strategic bomber force; W76 and W88 for the SLBM force; W78 and W87 for the ICBM force; and the W80-0, -1 for the ALCM and SLCM forces.

18. If the Bush administration renounced the CTBT today the US could probably not test a nuclear device until after the next presidential election. The current official specification for the amount of time to achieve test-readiness is 24-36 months.

19. In 1994, for example, in the first and only Annual Report submitted by Defense Secretary Les Aspin, the Pentagon was arguing that the role of US nuclear weapons in "deterring or responding to...non-nuclear threats" - i.e. chemical and biological weapons - "must be considered".

20. This commitment not to use nuclear weapons is called a 'negative security assurance.'

21. See this author's "NATO's Nuclear Weapons: The Rationale for No First Use," Arms Control Today, July/August, 1999.

22. John Bolton, interview and news article in Arms Control Today, March 2002. The interview was conducted on February 11, 2002.

23. Richard Boucher, February 22, 2002. See also Disarmament Diplomacy No. 63 (March/April 2002).

24. With due apologies to Bette Davis.

Jack Mendelsohn, a retired State Department official, served in the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, at the US Mission to NATO and as a member of the US SALT II and START I Delegations.

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