Disarmament Diplomacy

Issue No. 67, October - November 2002

News Review

US Unveils New National Security Strategy

On September 20, President Bush submitted to Congress the text of the long-awaited and widely-trailed 'National Security Strategy of the United States'. As reported in the last issue, the controversial heart of the new Strategy is a doctrine of 'pre-emptive' or 'strike-first' military action to counter proven, emerging or potential threats to US national security in an age of international, and potentially mass-destructive, terrorism. The administration is claiming both that the Strategy represents a significant reformulation of US policy to adapt to the post-Cold War - and more specifically post-9/11 - security environment, and that military pre-emption as an important component of US foreign policy is not the new or disturbing departure claimed by critics.

The basic rationale for what might be termed 'pre-emptive policing' - or 'anticipatory self-defence', in a common phrase of administration officials - is set out forcefully in the introduction to the Strategy:

"Defending our Nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of the Federal Government. Today, that task has changed dramatically. Enemies in the past needed great armies and great industrial capabilities to endanger America. Now, shadowy networks of individuals can bring great chaos and suffering to our shores for less than it costs to purchase a single tank. Terrorists are organized to penetrate open societies and to turn the power of modern technologies against us. To defeat this threat we must make use of every tool in our arsenal - from better homeland defenses and law enforcement to intelligence and cutting off terrorist financing. The war against terrorists of global reach is a global enterprise of uncertain duration. America will help nations that need our assistance in combating terror. And America will hold to account nations that are compromised by terror - because the allies of terror are the enemies of civilization. The United States and countries cooperating with us must not allow the terrorists to develop new home bases. Together, we will seek to deny them sanctuary at every turn. The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing so with determination. The United States will not allow these efforts to succeed. We will build defenses against ballistic missiles and other means of delivery. We will cooperate with other nations to deny, contain, and curtail our enemies' efforts to acquire dangerous technologies. And, as a matter of common sense and self-defense, America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed. We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best. So we must be prepared to defeat our enemies' plans, using the best intelligence and proceeding with deliberation. History will judge harshly those who saw this coming danger but failed to act. In the new world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action."

The introduction also stresses the importance of not confusing a commitment to possible pre-emptive actions with a fundamentally unilateralist stance: "We are...guided by the conviction that no nation can build a safer, better world alone. Alliances and multilateral institutions can multiply the strength of freedom-loving nations. The United States is committed to lasting institutions like the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the Organization of American States, and NATO as well as other long-standing alliances. Coalitions of the willing can augment these permanent institutions. In all cases, international obligations are to be taken seriously. They are not to be undertaken symbolically to rally support for an ideal without furthering its attainment."

Within the context of this general commitment to multilateralism, however, the Strategy articulates "a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests".

With regard to the fight against international terrorism, the Strategy pledges to "disrupt and destroy terrorist organizations by:

• direct and continuous action using all the elements of national and international power. Our immediate focus will be those terrorist organizations of global reach and any terrorist or state sponsor of terrorism which attempts to gain or use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or their precursors;
• defending the United States, the American people, and our interests at home and abroad by identifying and destroying the threat before it reaches our borders. While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting pre-emptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country; and
• denying further sponsorship, support, and sanctuary to terrorists by convincing or compelling states to accept their sovereign responsibilities."

The fifth section of the Strategy - 'Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction' - sets out at length the realities and demands behind the sporting cliché, quoted favourably in the text, "our best defense is a good offense". The section begins with a lucid exposition of guiding assumptions:

"With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, our security environment has undergone profound transformation. ... [N]ew deadly challenges have emerged from rogue states and terrorists. None of these contemporary threats rival the sheer destructive power that was arrayed against us by the Soviet Union. However, the nature and motivations of these new adversaries, their determination to obtain destructive powers hitherto available only to the world's strongest states, and the greater likelihood that they will use weapons of mass destruction against us, make today's security environment more complex and dangerous. In the 1990s we witnessed the emergence of a small number of rogue states... At the time of the Gulf War, we acquired irrefutable proof that Iraq's designs were not limited to the chemical weapons it had used against Iran and its own people, but also extended to the acquisition of nuclear weapons and biological agents. In the past decade North Korea has become the world's principal purveyor of ballistic missiles, and has tested increasingly capable missiles while developing its own WMD arsenal. Other rogue regimes seek nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons as well. These states' pursuit of, and global trade in, such weapons has become a looming threat to all nations. We must be prepared to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction against the United States and our allies and friends. Our response must take full advantage of strengthened alliances, the establishment of new partnerships with former adversaries, innovation in the use of military forces, modern technologies, including the development of an effective missile defense system, and increased emphasis on intelligence collection and analysis."

A winning game-plan, or "comprehensive strategy to combat WMD", is then set out, containing three main elements: "Proactive counterproliferation efforts", "Strengthened non-proliferation efforts to prevent rogue states and terrorists from acquiring the materials, technologies and expertise necessary for weapons of mass destruction", and "Effective consequence management to respond to the effects of WMD use, whether by terrorists or hostile states". The section concludes with a defence of both the strategic necessity and international legality of self-defensive pre-emption:

"It has taken almost a decade for us to comprehend the true nature of this new threat. Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past. The inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today's threats, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries' choice of weapons, do not permit that option. We cannot let our enemies strike first. ... Traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents; whose so-called soldiers seek martyrdom in death and whose most potent protection is statelessness. The overlap between states that sponsor terror and those that pursue WMD compels us to action. For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that present an imminent danger of attack. Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy of pre-emption on the existence of an imminent threat - most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack. We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries. Rogue states and terrorists do not seek to attack us using conventional means. They know such attacks would fail. Instead, they rely on acts of terrorism and, potentially, the use of weapons of mass destruction - weapons that can be easily concealed and delivered covertly and without warning. ... The United States has long maintained the option of pre-emptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction - and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act pre-emptively. The United States will not use force in all cases to pre-empt emerging threats, nor should nations use pre-emption as a pretext for aggression. Yet in an age where the enemies of civilization openly and actively seek the world's most destructive technologies, the United States cannot remain idle while dangers gather. ... The purpose of our actions will always be to eliminate a specific threat to the United States or our allies and friends. The reasons for our actions will be clear, the force measured, and the cause just."

An unnamed 'senior administration official' briefed reporters on the new Strategy on September 20. Many of the questions revolved around perhaps the three most obvious areas of unease raised by the document: 1) its apparent supremacism and overt militarism; 2) its ill-defined scope; 3) the utility of pre-emption to other states as a pretext for war. Discussion of these themes included the following exchanges:

"Question: 'Isn't it possible that...some people will see it in different parts of the world, and even at home, as the US determination to do what it wishes, when it believes it is right, and others are wrong, and a US determination to remain so far ahead of anybody else that they could never catch up, in the military sense?'

Senior Administration Official: 'The section on the military quite clearly states that the United States wants to dissuade military competition, and believes that it should remain very strong, but remaining strong in the service of a balance of power that favors freedom. That means that the balance of power that favors freedom should not be maintained by American military power alone. In fact, we would welcome states that share our values, like, for instance, the Europeans, devoting more resources to the military side... What we shouldn't want is a military adversary who does not share those values to rise and start to equal the United States again in military power in the way that the Soviet Union was able to challenge American power, and therefore keep half of Europe in darkness and oppression for 50 years. And so this is not a statement that the United States wants to alone be militarily so superior to everyone, it says that since we believe that the...purpose of American military power is to defend this balance of power that favors freedom, we will not allow an adversarial military power to arise.' ...

Question: 'Are there other countries now on the globe...that the doctrine of pre-emption would apply to, now or potentially in the foreseeable future?'

Senior Administration Official: 'I think it's hard to answer the question hypothetically. You really ought to try a lot of other means. There are states with which we have serious disagreements, where we have concerns about their programs, where we are working diplomatically to try to deal with those situations. An example might be North Korea, where we're working with Japan and South Korea to try to deal with the threat posed by North Korean nuclear programs and missile proliferation. So there are other ways to go about this. It's something that one would never want to use lightly... But there will be cases when you have no other option but to use military force to prevent an attack against you.' ...

Question: 'What's to stop other nations, like India or Russia, from taking this language on pre-emption and using it to justify their actions in Kashmir or Chechnya?'

Senior Administration Official: 'Well, I've said that this is a fairly narrow band of problems to which it should be applied... [L]et's take the case of India and Pakistan. There are major efforts underway with India and Pakistan, led by the United States with Great Britain, to find a diplomatic solution to the problem... With the Russian issue with Chechnya, there's an underlying political situation here that can be resolved, and needs to be resolved. I don't think anybody would argue that we've got an underlying political situation with al Qaeda that can be resolved or needs to be resolved. And so you may be left with no other option if there are not other ways to deal with the problem. Of course, people can appropriate any argument. But the fact is it isn't going to be considered a legitimate argument if it is clearly a cover for naked aggression. And that is a judgment that I think the world community will easily make in a case where there's either an underlying political dispute that could be resolved, or diplomatic efforts are underway, or where there are other means by which to resolve the conflict.'"

Notwithstanding these assurances and qualifications, the Strategy has attracted considerable domestic and global criticism, generally offered in the context of the debate over possible US-led military action against Iraq (see above). Alexander Yakovenko, chief official spokesperson for the Russian Foreign Ministry, responded diplomatically (September 24) when pressed for the Kremlin's reaction:

"Question: 'What can you say with regard to the National Security Strategy published in the United States, which has caused a lot of comments in the world, including some very critical ones? In particular, they draw attention to the fact that George W. Bush's administration is reinterpreting the ways of ensuring security by replacing the traditional containment policy with a concept of the preventive use of force. What can be the answer of the Russian side to the approaches declared by the US administration?'

Yakovenko: 'The answer...is actually our entire diplomatic work in the UN and at other multilateral forums. We have been constantly saying that the threats and challenges arising for security and stability at this complex stretch of world development should be countered by a coordinated position of the international community, whether it is about the combating of international terrorism, the non-proliferation of WMDs or [the] comprehensive settlement of the Iraqi problem. The most important thing us that an endeavour be made to work out effective political solutions based on the Charter of the United Nations and international law which would take into account the lawful interests of all members of the world community. In the era of globalisation, to put stakes on unilateral steps is not very promising. We believe many states share this, our principle stand, and that it is being heeded by the USA too. Regarding the chapter of the Strategy on relations with Russia, it contains some important statements, in particular that along with the persistent difficulties in approaches to individual problems, the scope of coordination and productive cooperation is widening between our countries. For its part, the Russian side is ready for joint work with the USA on the search of solutions to topical world problems on the basis of international consensus and generally recognised legal criteria."

Less politely, former senior US State Department official and arms control negotiator Jack Mendelsohn spoke scathingly of the document's treatment of non-proliferation issues (September 23): "Their counterproliferation strategy, as far as I can tell, looks like 'bomb Iraq, and we're not sure what to do about North Korea'."

Both before and after the release of the document, US officials were expressing some surprise at the furore generated by the administration's explicit advocacy of pre-emptive military action. On September 7, a senior administration official told reporters: "The idea that you would like to hit them before they hit you goes back a very, very long way... One has to ask, is it [pre-emptive action] a higher priority than to wait to be attacked and let, potentially, thousands - or, with weapons of mass destruction, hundreds of thousands - of Americans die because you didn't want to hit them before they hit you?" Asked about "pre-emption as opposed to reaction" at a press conference in Warsaw on September 24, Secretary Rumsfeld stated: "I think that's a semantic problem. You know, was President Kennedy in the Cuban missile crisis acting pre-emptively? Did he take an anticipatory self-defence [measure] by not waiting until Soviet missiles were in Cuba and fired at the United States...[and instead deciding] to go out, engage in what most people would characterise as an act of war by imposing a blockade which they euphemistically called a 'quarantine' and put the country in a very tense crisis with respect to the risk of the use of nuclear weapons? I would characterise that as not waiting." In a speech to Manhattan Institute on October 1, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice - arguing that "9/11 crystallized our vulnerability" and "threw into sharp relief the nature of the threats we face today" - insisted: "Pre-emption is not a new concept. There has never been a moral or legal concept that a country wait to be attacked before it can address existential threats. As [former Secretary of State] George Shultz recently wrote, 'If there is a rattlesnake in the yard, you don't wait for it to strike before you take action in self-defense.' The United States has long affirmed the right to anticipatory self-defense - from the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 to the crisis on the Korean peninsular in 1994."

On September 18, the US Congressional Research Service (CRS) released a report by national security analyst Richard F. Grimmett on 'US Use of Pre-Emptive Military Force'. Grimmett argues that the US may indeed be standing on the verge of new territory in terms of the context and rationale of military action:

"In recent months the question of the possible use of 'pre-emptive' military force by the United States to defend its security has been raised by President Bush and members of his administration, including possible use of such force against Iraq. This analysis reviews the historical record regarding the uses of US military force in a 'pre-emptive' manner. ... For purposes of this analysis we consider a 'pre-emptive' use of military force to be the taking of military action by the United States against another nation so as to prevent or mitigate a presumed military attack or use of force by that nation against the United States. ... The historical record indicates that the United States has never, to date, engaged in a 'pre-emptive' military attack against another nation. Nor has the United States ever attacked another nation militarily prior to its first having been attacked or prior to US citizens or interests first having been attacked, with the singular exception of the Spanish-American War. ... The final case [in the record], the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, represents a threat situation which some may argue had elements more parallel to those presented by Iraq today - but it was resolved without a 'pre-emptive' military attack by the United States."

Related material on Acronym website:

• US National Security Strategy, September 20

Reports: Rumsfeld pushing for more aggressive US pursuit of terrorists, Associated Press, August 6; Bush aide - Iraq strike would not weaken terror war, Reuters, September 7; Cheney defends pre-emptive doctrine, Associated Press, September 9; US use of preemptive military force, by Richard F. Grimmett, Congressional Research Report, released September 18, http://www.loc.gov/crsinfo; Text - Bush sends new National Security Strategy to Congress, Washington File, September 20; Transcript - National Security Strategy seeks to defend peace, prosperity, Washington File, September 20; US response - pre-emption enters US counterproliferation strategy, Global Security Newswire, September 23; Remarks by Alexander Yakovenko, official spokesman of the Russian Foreign Ministry, September 24, 2002, Russian Foreign Ministry transcript; Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, news conference in Poland, September 24, US Department of Defense transcript; Pre-emptive strike would be unprecedented, report says, Global Security Newswire, October 1; Text - September 11th attacks 'crystallized our vulnerability,' Rice says, Washington File, October 2.

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