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News Review Special Edition

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International Developments, February 1 - April 1, 2003

Duma Postpones Ratification of Moscow Treaty on Eve of US-Led War in Iraq

Hopes for prompt ratification of the May 2002 US-Russia Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) - also known as the Moscow Treaty - have been dashed by consternation in Moscow over the US-led invasion of Iraq. The treaty - specifying an upper limit of operationally-deployed strategic nuclear warheads of 2,200-1,700 per side by the end of 2012 - was ratified by the US Senate on March 6. On March 13, a week before the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Defence Committee of the Lower House of Parliament, the Duma, recommended acceptance of the accord by the end of the month. According to Committee Chair General Andrei Nikolayev: "This document should have been ratified in a stable situation - it is all the more necessary to ratify it in today's unstable situation. ... This treaty is necessary for Russia, it allows Russia to build its strategic forces as it deems necessary through 2012". On March 18, however, with war clearly looming, the Duma Council, the body responsible for agreeing the legislative agenda, decided to postpone the ratification vote for an indefinite period. According to Sergei Shishkaryov, Deputy Chair of the International Affairs Committee: "We are standing on the verge of the Third World War and the consequences of the beginning of military action are to a large extent unpredictable... After yesterday's statement by the President of the United States [setting Saddam Hussein and his sons a 48-hour deadline to leave Iraq], and in conditions of massive pressure by the US administration on the world community, a decision to postpone the ratification was taken... We consider ratification very important, but now this step is not justified. Everything will depend on how the situation in Iraq develops..." Visiting Prague, Duma Speaker Gennady Seleznyov told reporters (March 18): "In the event of an American strike on Iraq, the fate of the entire treaty will be in question."

The ratification process requires approval from both Houses of Parliament. Sergei Mironov, the speaker of the Upper House, the Federation Council, expressed his regret at the Duma's move, insisting (March 18) that the "treaty plays an important strategic role for both Russia and the United States" and should be promptly enacted. Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov addressed the Federation Council on the Iraq crisis on March 26. Answering media questions after his speech, Ivanov conceded: "Maybe now is not the right moment psychologically to bring this document up for ratification. If we wait for some time, and concentrate all our efforts on ending the war, then at a more quiet moment we can quickly deal with the issue."

As many deputies and officials doubtless reflected, the postponement decision contains an eerie echo. In December 1998, the Duma was reportedly within days of ratifying the Strategic Arms Reduction (START) II Treaty when Operation Desert Fox - a four-day US and UK aerial bombardment of Iraqi military facilities - led to a delay stretching until Russia's heavily-qualified approval of the treaty in April 2000. (See 'START vote delayed over Iraq', Disarmament Diplomacy No. 33, December 1998/January 1999.)

The US Senate's ratification of the Moscow Treaty was an entirely different matter, completed in rapid time with a 95-0 vote on March 6. Despite this overwhelming show of support, however, many Democrats expressed reservations about the agreement's lack of verification procedures and its failure to require the destruction or dismantlement of a single warhead or delivery system. Partisan divisions were clearly visible in the close defeat of two proposed amendments to the ratification motion. The first, requiring Senate approval of any US decision to withdraw from the treaty, was lost by 50 votes to 44; the second, requiring annual intelligence reports to the Senate on treaty compliance, was rejected by 50 votes to 45. The Republicans narrowly control the 100-seat Senate with 51 seats.

Speaking during the ratification debate, Democratic Senator Byron Dorgan called the treaty "not much better than nothing"; his colleague John Kerry described it as "as flimsy a treaty as the Senate has ever considered". Joseph Biden, the senior Democrat on the Foreign Relations Committee, recorded his "many reservations" about the agreement, while adding that the "reason I'm for this treaty...[is that] failure to ratify...would be read as bad faith". Carl Levin, the senior Democrat on the Armed Services Committee, managed to describe the accord as "a modest, positive step".

In an article entitled 'Moscow Treaty is Full of Holes', published in the Boston Globe on March 5, Senator Kerry concisely summarised the unease felt by many in his Party:

"President Bush claims that his Moscow Treaty 'will liquidate the legacy of the Cold War' by eliminating thousands of nuclear arms left over from a bygone era when the United States and Russia faced each other across the nuclear divide. In reality, it does no such thing. The treaty does not reduce the actual number of nuclear forces - it leaves these weapons and their lethal materials stockpiled across Russia in constant danger of falling to terrorists or rogue nations intent on doing great harm to the United States. Bush is correct that our relationship with Russia should not be driven by Cold War anxieties. But this hollow treaty misses an opportunity to address proliferation and lost or loose nuclear weapons. Despite its stated goal of reducing the number of US and Russian deployed strategic nuclear warheads, the Moscow Treaty is missing the essential components of a strong, enforceable, and meaningful agreement. It does not require the destruction of missile launchers or the dismantlement of nuclear warheads. It does not address the tactical nuclear weapons so sought after by terrorists. It does not contain verification provisions. The treaty's most dangerous weakness is the rejection of Ronald Reagan's doctrine of 'trust but verify.' ... The central problem with the treaty is that it could increase the opportunities for nuclear theft and terrorism by expanding Russian stockpiles of nuclear materials. ... If the war on terrorism is to be fought on all fronts, we should seek verifiable reductions in Russia's nuclear arsenal and ensure the dismantlement and destruction of its nuclear weapons and the secure storage of nuclear materials. ... A new diplomatic effort should be undertaken to fill the holes in the Moscow Treaty. The United States and Russia should agree upon transparency measures, data exchanges, on-site inspections, and eventually eliminating excess strategic nuclear warheads and their delivery systems."

On March 7, President Bush hailed the ratification decision: "This historic agreement will reduce the nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia to their lowest levels in decades. The treaty will benefit both our peoples and contribute to a more secure world. The Moscow Treaty helps lay to rest the legacies of Cold War competition and suspicion, and marks a fundamentally new era in relations between the United States and Russia. The strategic offensive reductions codified and made binding under international law in this treaty are essential steps toward achieving greater political, economic, and security cooperation between our two countries." On March 6, Senator Richard Lugar, Republican Chair of the Foreign Relations Committee, described the treaty as "a tremendous accomplishment that deserves the full support of the Senate and the Russian Duma. I believe this treaty is an important step toward a safer world". Lugar added: "I remember well visiting the START I and START II treaty negotiations. The US and the Soviet Union faced off against each other across conference tables for years. They produced multi-volume treaties and verification annexes that described in minute detail the requirements mandated by the treaties. The Moscow Treaty recognizes that the US-Russian relationship has turned the corner. Our countries are no longer mortal enemies engaged in a worldwide Cold War. Our agreements need not be based on mutual suspicion or an adversarial relationship. We are partners in the war against terrorism and we continue to build a strong military and security partnership. The Moscow Treaty reflects the changing nature of our relationship."

Welcoming the Senate's decision, a Russian Foreign Ministry statement (March 7) described the treaty as "a landmark agreement in the field of real and radical nuclear disarmament and a weighty and practical expression of the new relations of strategic partnership between the Russian Federation and the United States of America." The statement continued: "In the current not easy international situation the treaty serves as an example of a legal, political solution of the most complex and acute security problems through the cooperation and collective efforts of great powers in the interests of the entire world community. The Russian side is confident that after the ratification of the Moscow Treaty by the Federal Assembly of Russia and its entry into force it will become an important factor of strategic stability and global security in the international relations of the 21st century."

Related material on Acronym website:

Reports: Moscow Treaty is full of holes, by Senator John F. Kerry, Boston Globe, March 5; Lugar leads Senate ratification of the Moscow Treaty, Press Release from the Office of Senator Richard Lugar, March 6, http://lugar.senate.gov; President Bush commends Senate for action on Moscow Treaty, Statement by the President, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, March 7; US Senate unanimously approves Moscow Treaty, Washington File, March 7; Senate Oks US-Russia deal to cut arms, Associated Press, March 7; US Senate approves Moscow Treaty, Global Security Newswire, March 7; Senate backs US-Russian nuclear pact, Washington Post, March 7; Concerning US Senate ratification of the Russian-American Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, Russian Foreign Ministry Statement, Document 551-07-03-2003, March 7; Senate approves Treaty of Moscow, Council for a Livable World Press Release, March 10; Defense committee in Russia's Duma recommends ratification of Bush-Putin arms treaty, Associated Press, March 13; Ratification of US-Russia nuclear weapons treaty put off because of Iraq, Associated Press, March 18; Russia delays ratifying US arms pact over Iraq, Reuters, March 18; Duma postpones treaty vote, citing Iraq war, Global Security Newswire, March 18; Russia's Ivanov backs arms treaty delay, Associated Press, March 26.

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