Text Only | Disarmament Diplomacy | Disarmament Documentation | ACRONYM Reports

News Review Special Edition

Back to the Contents of News Review Special Edition

International Developments, April 1 - May 10, 2003

Conflicting Signals, Confusing Claims in North Korea Nuclear Crisis

Summary and Background

The period under review saw signs of diplomatic progress in work to establish a framework for resolving the crisis over North Korea's nuclear programme. In Beijing in late April, Chinese, North Korean and US officials met to discuss options for reversing the vertiginous rise in regional and international tensions triggered by North Korea's apparent admission - to a US delegation visiting Pyongyang in October 2002 - of clandestine efforts to enrich uranium for military purposes. The admission - still unconfirmed, while never explicitly refuted, by North Korea - seemingly signalled the irreparable collapse of the October 1994 Agreed Framework between Washington and Pyongyang, envisioning the replacement of North Korea's graphite-moderated nuclear reactors, capable of producing weapons-grade materials, with proliferation-resistant light water reactors (LWRs). Consequently, the multilateral organisation charged with implementing the Framework - the Korean Peninsular Energy Development Corporation (KEDO) - decided, largely at the insistence of a Bush administration enraged by Pyongyang's duplicity, in November 2002 to suspend shipments of heavy fuel oil to North Korea, previously provided as compensation for the suspension of power generation at the plutonium-producing reactor complex at Yongbyon. North Korea - regarding the move as proof of Washington's aggressive intent - reacted furiously, expelling International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitors from Yongbyon (December 2002) and announcing its withdrawal from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on January 10 this year.

As detailed in recent issues, legal and political controversy swirls around the status and timing of the withdrawal announcement; without doubt, however, it marked the opening of a dangerous new phase in the dispute. On February 12, the IAEA referred the matter to the UN Security Council, which a week later gingerly passed it on to a panel of experts. The Council again met, again without decision on a course of action, on April 9. The tentativeness of the deliberations in New York reflected the difficulty of mounting a defence of the NPT regime while not provoking - for example by imposing sanctions - even more aggressive and escalatory steps from North Korea, most obviously reprocessing the spent nuclear fuel rods previously kept under IAEA observation at Yongbyon. The Council was also confronted with the need to stimulate dialogue between the two main parties while reconciling Washington's insistence on a multilateral format for any talks with Pyongyang's exclusive focus on bilateral discussions. It was this logjam that the Chinese offer to host a meeting between the sides was designed to break. As seen below, the extent of the breakthrough represented by the Beijing meeting is hard to gauge, not least because of a further swirl of allegation, rumour, allusion and insinuation emerging from the talks, leaving outside observers - and even, apparently, inside participants - with different impressions and versions of what had been said, claimed and argued.

Despite the confusion, and notwithstanding the moderate progress, seen in April and early May, the fundamental strategic positions of the US and North Korea seem to have remained remarkably firm. For Pyongyang, concern over US hostile intent - an underlying agenda of 'regime change' - seems real enough, made more real by the US military victory in Iraq, and assuagable only by the conclusion of a formal, legally-binding bilateral non-aggression pact. For Washington, North Korea's evident determination to convert fears over its nuclear programme into large-scale economic and political benefits - an underlying agenda explaining the state's inveterate habits of cheating and brinkmanship - can only be broken by sending a clear message (dramatically clarified by Operation Iraqi Freedom) that there are no gains, only losses, on offer from such an approach. On this reading, the very prize sought by North Korea - guarantees of its security - would constitute the sign of weakness and lack of resolve most feared by the United States. If this knot of irreconcilable political perception could be untied or severed, the clouds of confusion surrounding the facts and realities of the issue may also disperse; if the knot remains, the gloom and uncertainty - and potential for disastrous miscalculation - may only increase.

Note: please see Rebecca Johnson's report in this edition of Disarmament Diplomacy for details and analysis of the extensive treatment of the Iran issue at the NPT Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meeting in Geneva (April 28-May 9).

Chronology

April 12: as reported briefly in the last issue, a statement from the North Korean Foreign Ministry suggests a new flexibility regarding the format of talks with the US. The statement, carried by the official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) in Pyongyang, reads in full: "In order to seek a peaceful solution to the nuclear issue, the DPRK [Democratic People's Republic of Korea, North Korea's formal title] and the United States - the parties responsible for it - should start direct talks. As the DPRK is not a signatory to the NPT, there is no ground whatsoever to internationalise the nuclear issue, and any attempt to do so would make its solution quite impossible. The outcome of the meeting of the UNSC held on April 9 clearly indicated that the nuclear issue is a matter to be settled between the DPRK and the US. The DPRK's call for direct talks is aimed to confirm whether the US has a political willingness to drop its hostile policy towards the DPRK or not. It is possible to solve the issue if the US sincerely approaches the dialogue. The US asserts [the need for] a 'multilateral framework', to be participated in by countries around the DPRK, but their Korea policy and stand of desiring a peaceful settlement of the nuclear issue are clear, by and large. What matters is the US. If the US is ready to make a bold switchover in its Korea policy for a settlement of the nuclear issue, the DPRK will not stick to any particular dialogue format. The solution to the issue depends on what is the real intention of the US." By coincidence or not, the statement was issued the day after comments by Liu Jianchao, a spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, suggesting Beijing's backing for "any position" agreeable to both sides: "China will continue to make unremitting efforts to ensure the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsular... On the dialogue among relevant parties, the position of the Chinese government is that dialogue between the United States and the DPRK should be resumed at an early date and is the most effective and beneficial way to solve the problem... [However,] China has all along maintained that it would support any position that is conducive to maintaining peace and stability on the Korean peninsular - but any proposal should have the consent of the parties involved..."

April 13: US President George W. Bush reacts positively to the North Korean statement - "We have made it clear that we think that the best way to deal with their proliferation is through a multinational forum. It looks like that might be coming to fruition; that's very good news." The President adds: "I think that people have got to know that we are serious about stopping the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and that each situation requires a different approach. We are making good progress in North Korea. Everybody knows our position, which is that we expect there to be a nuclear-weapons-free Peninsular. The good news is that it's a position shared by the Chinese, by the South [Koreans], by...the Japanese. ... We've got common interests, and working together I am very hopeful we'll be able to achieve those interests diplomatically." US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld stresses the enormity of the issues at stake: "The United States is attempting to see if there isn't a way to deal with this problem from a diplomatic standpoint. It's a terrible risk to the world... if North Korea does, in fact, go through with the reprocessing of nuclear materials and ends up with sufficient materials to make six or eight more weapons in three or four or five months. That would not be a good thing. If they started selling that material to countries around the world, and we ended up with a large increase in the number of nuclear powers in the world, that's not a happy place." Rumsfeld's mention of 'more' weapons reflects the official US intelligence estimate that North Korea may already have assembled one or two explosive nuclear devices, armed with fissile material produced before the 1994 suspension of operations at Yongbyon. Other countries regard this dire US assessment with some scepticism. On April 10, for example, South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun is quoted by the Washington Post as noting, referring to the 1-or-2 bomb estimate: "[T]here is no clear evidence... I don't think it is well-grounded information..."

April 14: Ra Jong-yil, National Security Adviser to President Roh, is quoted by the Yonhap news agency as speculating - "I think the Iraq War might have promoted a change in the international political landscape. North Korea appears to be a little bit [more] flexible and softer in its approach." An official statement from President Roh's office states: "The government considers this [April 12 North Korean statement] as an indication that North Korea will accept multilateral talks on resolving its nuclear issue... North Korea appears to be creating a favourable atmosphere...while complying with efforts by our government and the international community to solve the nuclear issue through dialogue..."

April 15: US Secretary of State Colin Powell tells reporters that "there has been some overall improvement, I think, in the prospects for dialogue with North Korea... The North Koreans indicated...that the forum was not as important as a dialogue beginning, and so we are following up on that statement in diplomatic channels..." Powell adds: "The one thing that is absolutely clear is that, at whatever level it starts and with whatever attendance, it has to ultimately encompass the views and thoughts of all the neighbours in the region..." Senior South Korean Foreign Ministry official Shim Yoon-Joe signals Seoul's willingness to sit out the first round of talks: "Our position is that the most important thing is to hold the talks as soon as possible..." In an interview published in the Munhwa Ilbo newspaper in Seoul, South Korean President Roh predicts: "Eventually, North Korea will give up its nuclear programmes and missiles while other countries work together to secure safety and provide economic aid for North Korea [enabling it] to take part in the international community..." KEDO Executive Director Charles Kartman, speaking to reporters in Seoul, refers to North Korea's April 12 mention of a 'bold switchover' in US policy, observing: "Someone, I would imagine, has convinced that this [non-bilateral] format will permit that to happen..." Asked about the future of KEDO and the Agreed Framework, Kartman notes: "We would ordinarily be well along now in the project and we are still working...on the schedule we have communicated to the North Koreans... But we do that in the knowledge that the Agreed Framework is under challenge, to put it mildly, and that some decisions need to be reached. ... The energy problem is central to any plan to rehabilitate the North Korean economy... My somewhat biased advice to them [members of KEDO's Executive Board, the US, Japan, South Korea and the European Union] is: be very careful not to throw the baby out with the bathwater..."

April 16: American and South Korean officials make the first announcement of the format to be taken by the first round of talks - trilateral China-DPRK-US discussions in Beijing. White House spokesperson Sean McCormack tells reporters: "I think that, at our urging, China, at a very senior level, pressed the North Koreans to agree to multilateral talks, as did South Korea... You should look at these as initial discussions. We don't anticipate an immediate breakthrough, but we're looking for progress..." In consultations in recent days with Tokyo and Seoul, McCormack adds, "we all agreed that we would continue to press for Japan's and South Korea's early inclusion in talks as one of our top priorities - and possibly Russia in the future". South Korean Foreign Minister Yoon Young-kwan, while maintaining that "it will be hard to achieve concrete results without South Korean participation", states: "We decided to support the talks because it is of paramount importance that talks begin to lay the foundation for a peaceful solution to this problem..." According to reports, Yoon adds that the trilateral format had first been proposed by China in mid-March; North Korean agreement had not been decisively signalled until the release of the April 12 Foreign Ministry statement. In Tokyo, Cabinet Secretary Fukuda remarks: "We are confident that this will develop into multinational talks including Japan..." A UN spokesperson described Secretary-General Kofi Annan as "encouraged by what he hopes is the beginning of the process that would resolve diplomatically the current crisis". The spokesperson continued: "The Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy, Maurice F. Strong, will continue to lend their full support to this process, while concentrating on humanitarian and longer-term development needs of the DPRK."

April 17: responding to negative domestic reaction to news of the Beijing arrangement, a statement from the office of South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun observes - "Many people seem disappointed and feel their pride hurt because we will not participate in the talks. The most important thing is the talks' outcome." US reservations about the arrangement are expressed by an unnamed senior administration official, quoted in the Washington Post: "We decided to go ahead with it because China had taken such a major role in setting it up. After months of telling them that they had to do more, they finally came up with this. It wasn't perfect, but it represented much more substantial involvement by them than anything they had done before." The air of slight unreality about the plan is alluded to by a senior Japanese official, quoted in the same report: "Everybody knows this is a sort of 'appearance' [of multilateral talk]... We all know that the key thing will be the direct discussion between the United States and North Korea." In Moscow, a Foreign Ministry statement notes that "Russia had closely coordinated its actions with the PRC [People's Republic of China] and always stressed that we would welcome any format of talks and any agreement that would lead to a peaceful settlement". Yonhap quotes an unnamed South Korean government official suggesting the trilateral format would not long be persevered with: "Washington has pledged not to proceed with the three-way dialogue if we are not allowed to take part in substantial discussions... We are determined to take part in the multilateral dialogue and the United States shares our position."

April 18: remarks by a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesperson throw the projected talks into doubt, suggesting as they seem to - in a clumsy English translation provided by KCNA - that reprocessing at Yongbyon has been proceeding apace: "We are successfully reprocessing more than 8,000 spent fuel rods at the final phase, as we sent interim information to the US and other countries concerned early in March after resuming our nuclear activities from December last year". Within hours, a US official was casting doubt on the story, telling Agence France Presse: "We have no information to indicate that North Korea has begun reprocessing the rods." Yonhap quotes a similarly sceptical South Korean official: "If the North had done so, the international community could have known it immediately." South Korea pointed out that the Korean language version of the DPRK spokesperson's remarks had referred to the country having prepared its nuclear facilities "to the point of reprocessing fuel rods".

April 21: KCNA reissues its English translation of the controversial April 18 remarks. In the new version, the Foreign Ministry spokesperson describes North Korea as "successfully going forward to reprocess" the fuel rods, clearly suggesting the threshold to actual plutonium extraction had not yet been crossed. US State Department spokesperson Richard Boucher declares that the talks will go ahead. Boucher again stresses US determination to seek a prompt broadening of the talks process: "North Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons is a matter of great concern to the entire international community, and especially to countries in the region, all of whom are interested in participating directly in the talks. We believe that inclusion of others in multilateral talks - South Korea and Japan, above all - would be essential for reaching agreement on substantive issues."

April 22: The Australian newspaper reports that the Pentagon "has produced detailed plans to bomb North Korea's nuclear plant at Yongbyon if the Communist rogue state goes ahead with reprocessing". Reacting to the report, Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer seeks to calm nerves: "That's the military's job, to draw up contingency plans, but the American administration strategy, as the President explained to me three weeks ago, is to ensure that there is a successful diplomatic solution here... We are just on the threshold of entering the first round of talks...and there isn't about to be a bombing campaign." Remarks in Washington by US Secretary of State Powell suggest that reprocessing might not be a 'red line' for the Bush administration: "[T]he United States has such economic, political, diplomatic and military power that we are not going to be intimidated by a small number of nuclear weapons held by a particular regime... I don't know what they might or might not do - but the one thing they won't do is intimidate us. ... And it should dawn on them that they can have plutonium programmes, and they can have enriched uranium programmes, and not one of those programmes feeds one North Korean child... There is no future in sitting there on a stockpile of nuclear weapons that we can contain or we can deter or we can do whatever might be required..." The same day, General Leon LaPorte, head of America's 37,000-strong force in South Korea, tells the Korea Freedom League in Seoul: "Today, the current military demarcation line between North and South Korea is the most heavily-armed in the world and it remains an arena for potential confrontation... North Korea poses many threats to global stability... Adding to the increased tensions is the fact that North Korea has not shown sincere attempts to address these threats to peace with the international community..."

April 23: the tripartite talks open in the Chinese capital. The three delegations are led by James Kelly, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, the senior American official at the disastrous October 2002 bilateral talks in Pyongyang; Li Gun, the Deputy Director of the American Affairs Bureau of the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and Fu Ying, Director General for Asian Affairs at the Chinese Foreign Ministry. In Washington, State Department spokesperson Boucher reminds reporters to keep their expectations low: "This is an initial set of meetings, as we've said. I'm not looking to report progress, frankly..." Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov causes a mystified stir by remarking: "It is probable that, as early as tomorrow, there will be a catastrophic development of events..."

April 24: reports quote unnamed US officials claiming that the head of the North Korean delegation, Li Gun, had told Assistant Secretary Kelly, during an informal break during the opening day of the talks, that Pyongyang indeed possessed a number of nuclear weapons. One official tells Reuters: "They said what we always knew - that do have [nuclear weapons]. That doesn't shock us. We've been saying that. Now they said it..." According to the Washington Post, another official paraphrased Li as telling Kelly: "We can't dismantle them - it's up to you whether we do a physical demonstration or transfer them." US sources also claimed that, during a formal session on April 23, Li suggested North Korea was indeed close to completing the reprocessing of the fuel rods at Yongbyon. President Bush reacts angrily, telling Tom Brokaw of NBC news: "See, they're back to the old blackmail game. One of our goals and objectives must be to strengthen the non-proliferation regimes and get the whole world focussed on proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or the materials for weapons of mass destruction, and North Korea is making my case, that we've got to come together." The President adds: "It's another reason, by the way, for us to also advance the missile defence systems, because the missile defence system will make it less likely that a nuclear country could blackmail us, or Japan, or any one of our friends..." Secretary of State Powell warns: "The North Koreans should not leave the meetings in Beijing...with the slightest impression that the United States will be intimidated by bellicose statements or by threats or actions they think...might force us to make a concession." A North Korean statement, released by KCNA as news broke of the rumoured comments by Li Gun, contained stern warnings of its own: "The situation on the Korean peninsular is so tense that a war may break out at any moment due to the US moves. The Iraqi war launched by the US despite the international community's unanimous opposition teaches all sovereign states the lesson that...only a strong physical deterrent force [will be enough] to protect the sovereignty of the country... The inspection and disarmament forced by the US upon an independent state in violation of its sovereignty and its right to existence...are only aimed to justify and legalise aggression and war. ... The DPRK-US talks should, therefore, discuss and settle the issue of the US renunciation of its hostile intention and policy towards the DPRK before talking about the 'verification' and the dismantlement of physical deterrent force."

April 25: the talks conclude without a joint statement or indication of future meetings, trilateral or otherwise. In Washington, White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer describes the talks as "useful", explaining: "We were able to express our position directly to the North Koreans in a multilateral forum, and our position is unequivocal, that it's important for North Korea to proceed with the irrevocable dismantling of its nuclear weapons program... [The President] has said, and he continues to believe, even having watched what took place this week, that the solution to this will be achieved through diplomacy. And diplomacy is a process. It takes time. Even an issue that is as serious as North Korea having nuclear weapons, it is an issue that takes time to deal with... The North Korean way of dialogue is often to engage in as bad a behaviour as they could possibly engage in, with the expectation that the world will reward them for ceasing their bad behaviour. That has been their previous actions. And the President has made clear that the United States will not reward bad behaviour." With regard to the latest North Korean admissions, Fleischer adds the administration planned to take "a good, hard at what North Korea had to say to see if it's consistent with facts, and to see what the implications are, because North Korea has a rather unique way of having discussions." A North Korean Foreign Ministry statement notes, without giving details, that at "the talks, the DPRK set forth a new bold proposal to clear up bilateral concerns of the DPRK and the US - the parties concerned with the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula - at the same time. The US, however, repeated its old assertion that the DPRK should 'scrap its nuclear program before dialogue' without advancing any new proposal at the talks. And it persistently avoided the discussion on the essential issues to be discussed between both sides." A dry summary of proceedings is provided by the Chinese Foreign Ministry: "[T]he talks began on [April] 23rd. China, the DPRK and the United States held two rounds of talks, during which all sides fully expounded on their stances and views on the DPRK's nuclear issue, and expressed their aspirations and ideas for a peaceful settlement of the issue. A small group session was held on [the] 24th, during which in-depth discussions were held on issues each side was concerned about. On the morning of [the] 25th, Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing met with the DPRK and US delegations respectively. During the talks, China had all along stressed that the Korean Peninsula should be nuclear-free and that the nuclear issue should be resolved peacefully. China's goal is very clear, which is to maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. China will continue to work to this end."

In Moscow, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Losyukov, remarking dourly that "it will be difficult to find a comprehensive solution due to the fact that the parties' positions are diametrically opposed", expresses the hope that "North Korea and the United States will patiently continue the search for a negotiated solution that will bring North Korea back in line with the non-proliferation regime while ensuring its sovereignty and economic development interests..."

Reports quote multiple US sources claiming that North Korea notified the State Department on March 31 of the commencement of reprocessing at Yongbyon. According to one official, the Department had regarded the provision of the information as "posturing" and initially elected not to pass it on to other agencies, including the Pentagon and the National Security Council (NSC). Reports also quoted State Department spokesperson Boucher, however, as insisting that the information was "shared appropriately with other agencies of the US government". Such a view was not reflected in the anonymous comment of another senior official, quoted in the Washington Post two days later: "I think heads will roll over this... North Korea for the first time ever [on March 31] officially communicated to the US government that they were reprocessing. That that information was not shared is very disturbing... The interagency process is poisoned over this." The Post report suggested that the North Korean communication had not been, in Boucher's words, "shared appropriately" with some other interested US government agencies until as late as April 18.

April 28/29: details emerge of the "bold proposal" mentioned in North Korea's Foreign Ministry statement of April 25. The proposal - presumably so-described to echo the self-described "bold approach" of the Bush administration prior to the October crisis - reportedly offers a complete termination and dismantlement of the North Korean nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programmes in return for equally far-reaching movement by Washington on security assurances, economic assistance and political normalisation. The offer is outlined to western diplomats at a Chinese Foreign Ministry briefing in Beijing. After listening to the presentation, one diplomat comments: "The Chinese seemed to think this was a significant offer... The briefing certainly gave us the impression that North Korea came to the table with a pretty significant offer." As news spreads, US Secretary of State Powell (April 28) confirms that North Korea "did put forward a plan that would ultimately deal with their nuclear capability and their missile activities - but they, of course, expect something considerable in return... The North Koreans acknowledged a number of things that they were doing, and in effect said these are now up for further discussion..." Powell adds that one thing Pyongyang had not explicitly referred to was a willingness to conduct a nuclear test: "They never used the word 'test'. They said that it is the kind of capability that one can display in one way or another". Also speaking on April 28, a US State Department official complains to Reuters that proposal was bold enough in that it "basically listed everything they have ever asked for... There was an element to the talks of attempts to threaten and intimidate, and elements of wanting to buy a Rolex..." Department spokesperson Boucher (April 28) insists: "We're not going to pay for elimination of nuclear weapons programmes that never should have been there in the first place". The next day, Powell describes the gambit as "a proposal that is not going to take us in the direction we need to go. But nevertheless, we will study it..."

Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Liu Jianchao tells reporters (April 29) he cannot confirm the US assertion that Pyongyang now admitted to possessing nuclear weapons: "According to my knowledge, the DPRK has not made such a statement... China does not have any inside information on whether North Korea has gone nuclear..."

Three days of Cabinet-level talks between South and North Korea in Seoul conclude (April 29) with a joint statement pledging that the two sides "will thoroughly consult each other's position on the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsular [in order] to resolve this issue peacefully through dialogue". On April 28, however, Kim Ryong-song, the head of the North Korean delegation, insisted that the "nuclear issue is a matter to be discussed only between North Korea and the United States". The same day, a South Korean government statement notes: "The Northern side reiterated that the nuclear issue is a matter between the North and the United States. But they said they wanted to resolve the matter peacefully."

April 30: a North Korean Foreign Ministry statement delivered on state-run television denounces as a "mean trick" the US claim that Pyongyang had "made a bomb-like statement at the [Beijing] talks". "The reality," the Ministry continues, "requires the DPRK to deter the escalating US moves to stifle the DPRK with physical force - compels it to opt for possessing a necessary deterrent force and put it into practice". An earlier government commentary, carried on KCNA, remarks: "The US, which possesses the biggest number of nuclear weapons in the world, and poses a constant threat to other sovereign countries with them, should scrap its nuclear programme before such a small country as the DPRK does."

South Korean Foreign Minister Yoon Young-kwan, referring to "a four-stage step-by-step proposal" set out by the North at the Beijing talks, stresses that "we must stop North Korea from possessing nuclear weapons by all means". President Roh tells a lunch meeting of government employees in Seoul: "North Korea's admission is a card they have put down on the table with an element of game tactics in North Korea-US negotiations..."

In London, UK Foreign Office Minister Bill Rammell holds talks with Choe Su Hon, Vice Foreign Minister of North Korea. In a statement, Rammell notes: "The meeting with Mr. Choe was a valuable opportunity to impress upon the DPRK the serious concerns the UK, and the international community, have about their nuclear weapons programme - and to stress that their actions in the last few months have been totally in the wrong direction. I told Mr. Choe that DPRK attendance at the talks in Beijing was a very positive step forward. But I stressed that the DPRK must go further and engage fully with the international community and demonstrate their commitment to disarm. I very much hope multilateral talks resume. As is often the case with North Korea, it [the meeting today] was a case of three steps forward and two steps back. Mr. Choe stressed North Korea's commitment to a diplomatic solution, which I welcomed. He also clarified the DPRK's position - that North Korea would dismantle its nuclear facilities and admit international inspectors if its security concerns were fully met. But Mr. Choe didn't clarify whether or not DPRK had nuclear weapons. That remains a very serious concern."

May 1: the New York Times reports that the White House has ordered an investigation of the possibility that North Korea could have commenced reprocessing at Yongbyon without detection by US intelligence agencies. The paper quotes a senior administration official as stating: "We think they are bluffing - but we felt it necessary to go back and review every possibility, in the off chance that we missed something." Referring to Pyongyang's apparent boast, Secretary Powell (April 30) remarks: "The North Koreans, in very typical, bellicose fashion, accused us of everything imaginable and then said, 'we reprocessed all the fuel rods that were in storage'." Powell concedes: "Our intelligence community still cannot give us any validation or confirmation of what North Korea has said at various times and at various places with respect to reprocessing."

May 5: the New York Times reports a shift in US priorities from deterring North Korean reprocessing to preventing the export of nuclear weapons material. The report suggests that the new approach was outlined during a meeting between President Bush and Australian Prime Minister John Howard at the President's ranch in Crawford, Texas, on May 3. During the discussions, the paper quotes a US official as remarking, the "President said that the central worry is not what they've got, but where it goes". The official added that the President is "very pragmatic about it, and the reality is that we probably won't know the extent of what they are producing, so the whole focus is on keeping the plutonium from going further." Responding to the report, White House spokesperson Scott McClellan comments: "Our policy remains the same - that the United States, as well as the international community, is concerned about North Korea possessing nuclear weapons and transferring nuclear materials to others." Secretary Powell also insists: "We do not want to see North Korea have a nuclear capability... We will continue to work with friends in the region...to have a solid front in making it clear to North Korea that it would be in their best interests to remove and eliminate all programmes and facilities that they have that would lead to the development of nuclear weapons."

May 7/8: updating reporters on the investigation into the reprocessing controversy, White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer declares (May 7) - "I think it's fair to say the experts have come to no hard conclusions; they have come to no hard conclusions, which tells you something right there." Reuters (May 7) quotes a US official referring to "some slight increases of activity" at the Yongbyon reprocessing facility in recent days. The quote continues: "There was another indicator that briefly suggested that something might be going on, but that indicator stopped happening as well. Is there some slight indication that something might be happening? Yes. Is it probable that they have started up entirely? No." A May 8 report in the New York Times claims the White House received an intelligence assessment in mid-April concluding that North Korea may have already begun extracting small quantities of plutonium from the Yongbyon fuel rods. The article quotes a senior official as warning: "It means we don't have forever to solve this problem." Quoted in the Washington Times (May 7), a senior US official repeated the claim that the head of the North Korean delegation in Beijing, Li Gun, had told Assistant Secretary Kelly that Pyongyang was in a position to "export nuclear weapons, add to its current arsenal, or test a nuclear device". On May 8, the Sankei Shimbun newspaper in Japan claimed to publish a direct quote from Li to Kelly: "We already possess two nuclear bombs... In order to construct further nuclear weapons, we have already begun fuel reprocessing to acquire the necessary plutonium... Our country will use any means to show our nuclear weapons capability."

Selected Comment

White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer, April 29: "They [North Korea] took the aid [on offer under the Agreed Framework], they ran with the aid, and then they developed a nuclear weapons [programme] anyway... What we seek us North Korea's irrevocable and verifiable dismantlement of its nuclear weapons programme. We will not provide them with inducements for doing what they always said they were going to do."

US Senator Dianne Feinstein (Democrat), speech in the Senate, April 10: "If the United States does not exercise leadership and seek a pragmatic approach to engaging North Korea - pragmatism that comes not from weakness but from strength - we run the risk of disrupting strategic stability in the Asia-Pacific region - the most vital political, military and economic region for the United States in the 21st century - and undermining our international credibility and global nuclear non-proliferation efforts. ... [T]he administration's justification for being concerned about Iraq - that it is a brutal dictatorship that may threaten instability in the region and may provide WMD to terrorists - is quickly becoming a reality with North Korea. ... I strongly believe that the United States must signal its willingness to engage in immediate US-North Korean negotiations to dismantle North Korea's nuclear programme in return for US security assurances to North Korea, economic assistance and normalized relations. In fact, as some experts have suggested, bilateral negotiations themselves could be premised on a North Korean commitment not to reprocess the Yongbyon reactor fuel rods into plutonium during the discussions."

South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun, May 1: "I instructed my secretaries and ministers not to upset the table by trying to put our foot in the [April] meeting [in Beijing]... What is important is not whether we are present at the talks or not, but whether our interests are guaranteed. From the beginning, I said it would be fine if we could not take part in the talks... [Critics advocating] hawkish options fail to give thoughts to any bad scenario [that might arise] or to come up with measures how to avoid it..."

South Korean Foreign Minister Yoon Young-kwan, May 7: "One gets a sense of peril watching the debate among moderates and hardliners among US policymakers..."

South Korean Defence Minister Cho Young-gil, letter to senior military officials, published in the official Defense Daily newspaper, May 7: "We should strengthen our surveillance of the enemy and our vigilance while shaping up our operations and other military plans... [I]f North Korea's aim is achieving nuclear weapons...the possibility of a diplomatic resolution could inevitably be limited."

Kim Jung-roh, Deputy Spokesperson at South Korea's Unification Ministry, interview in the Washington Post, April 11: "As the Iraq War is coming to an end faster than expected, North Korea has less options to take... I'm sure they are very much terrified...petrified by the Iraq War."

Han Sung-joo, South Korean Foreign Minister during the nuclear crisis of 1993/94, April 18: "It took 19 months [to reach agreement] ten years ago. I would be very surprised to find any agreement or solution in the next month or so. ... We still don't know whether North Korea wants to become a nuclear state and all it's doing is trying to buy time...of if they would like to make a deal... When we think of the importance and urgency of the issue, the shape of the table and who sits there initially would not be as important as how it proceeds from here..."

Shigeru Ishiba, Director General of the Japanese Defence Agency, April 27: "It will be a big miscalculation if it [North Korea] is reckoning that remarks it has nuclear weapons will lead to maintenance of its regime... The United States and China will never accept North Korea possessing nuclear weapons. That's why China's involvement in the talks take on a meaning..."

Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov, April 10: "If one talks frankly about a link between the crisis in Iraq and on the Korean Peninsular, then in my view there clearly is one..."

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov, April 11: "[The North Korea crisis] is continuing to worsen and approach the red line, making an uncontrollable reaction possible... We have been forced to think about preventive means to defend our interests and - why hide it? - to defend our population bordering Korean territory in the event of a serious conflict in that region..."

Singapore Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong, speaking in Washington, May 7: "[A]fter America's victory in Iraq, Pyongyang seems to be reconsidering its position... I believe that the clear demonstration of resolve and capability in Iraq has made a diplomatic solution to North Korea more likely..."

Former UK Ambassador to North Korea James Hoare, April 22: "Will the North Koreans cheat? I suspect they probably will. Frightened people usually do."

Related material on Acronym website:

Reports: Russia says N. Korea may ignore UN on nuclear crisis, Reuters, April 10; Russia takes extra defense steps amid growing N. Korea tensions, Agence France Presse, April 11; North Korea - South Korean leader says nuclear evidence lacking, Global Security Newswire, April 11; Premier says China will make efforts to end N. Korea nuke row, Agence France Presse, April 11; Spokesman for DPRK Foreign Ministry on peaceful solution to nuclear issue, Korean Central News Agency (KCNA, http://www.kcna.co.jp), April 12; N. Korea shifts on nuclear talks, US interested, Reuters, April 12; Bush says talks possible on N. Korea nuclear arms, Reuters, April 13; Bush sees progress toward multilateral talks on North Korea nuclear crisis, Agence France Presse, April 14; North Korean nuke talks offer hailed, linked to Iraq war, Agence France Presse, April 14; KEDO chief sees N. Korea talks in two weeks, Reuters, April 15; South Korea wants talks soon to resolve nuclear crisis, Agence France Presse, April 15; Powell sees better chance for talks with N. Korea, Reuters, April 15; Text - Senator Feinstein calls for direct talks with North Korea, Washington File, April 15; US, North Korea to begin nuclear talks, Associated Press, April 16; North Korea to hold nuclear talks with US, China, Reuters, April 16; Secretary-General welcomes Beijing talks involving United States, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, China, UN Press Release SG/SM/8670, April 16; Beijing's help led to talks, Washington Post, April 17; US will abandon nuclear talks if South Korea shut out - source, Agence France Presse, April 17; Powell welcomes N. Korea nuclear talks, Associated Press, April 17; S. Korean president defends nuclear talks, Associated Press, April 17; Concerning reports on possible Korean-problem talks in Beijing, Russian Foreign Ministry Statement, Document 927-17-04-2003, April 17; Spokesman for DPRK Foreign Ministry on expected DPRK-US talks, KCNA, April 18; S. Korea envoy sees arduous US talks with North, Reuters, April 18; N. Korea talks in Beijing jeopardized by fuel rod announcement - US official, Agence France Presse, April 18; US has no indication North Korea reprocessing fuel rods - senior official, Agence France Presse, April 18; S. Korea, Japan want talks over N. Korea nuclear crisis to go ahead - Seoul, Agence France Presse, April 19; Talks with North Korea begin April 23, Boucher says, Washington File, April 23; Koreas agree to hold Cabinet-level talks, Associated Press, April 21; N. Korea 'corrects' nuclear reprocessing statement, Reuters, April 21; US general in S. Korea sees North threat, Reuters, April 22; US plan to bomb North Korea, The Australian, April 22; US draws up plan to bomb North Korea's nuclear plant, Agence France Presse, April 22; Powell says nuclear N. Korea would not intimidate US, Reuters, April 22; 'Catastrophic' events imminent regarding North Korea - Russia, Agence France Presse, April 23; US clamps information blackout on North Korea talks, Agence France Presse, April 23; KCNA urges US to approach DPRK-US talks from sincere stand, KCNA, April 24; N. Korea urges end to 'hostile' US policy in talks, Reuters, April 24; North Korea admits it has nuclear weapons - sources, Reuters, April 24; Pyongyang declares nuclear weapons - talks end, Global Security Newswire, April 24; Pyongyang threatens to export nuclear weapons - claims fuel rod reprocessing nearly complete, Global Security Newswire, April 25; Excerpt - Bush says proliferation controls must be strengthened, Washington File, April 25; Excerpt - Powell says Beijing talks show united opposition to nuclear Korea, Washington File, April 25; Talks in Beijing on North Korea useful, White House says, Washington File, April 25; DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman on US attitude toward DPRK-US talks, KCNA, April 25; N. Korea says offered 'bold new proposal' at talks, Reuters, April 25; Talks end after N. Korea claims to have nuclear bomb, Reuters, April 25; The Beijing talks between China, the DPRK and the United States concluded, April 25, 2003, Chinese Foreign Ministry statement, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn; Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao on the Beijing talks between China, DPRK and the United States, April 25, 2003, Chinese Foreign Ministry statement; US to take 'good, hard look' at North Korean nuclear claims, Agence France Presse, April 25; US had advance word of N. Korea nuclear claim, Reuters, April 25; Russia urges North Korea, US to continue non-proliferation talks, Agence France Presse, April 25; Two Koreas begin high-level nuclear talks, Associated Press, April 27; Japan says nuclear threat no help to North Korea, Reuters, April 27; US officials spar over N. Korea, Washington Post, April 27; N. Korea said to offer to scrap nuclear program, Reuters, April 28; N. Korea not discussing nukes with South, Associated Press, April 28; China says N. Korea has never admitted having nuclear weapons, Agence France Presse, April 29; Nuclear talks useless without US move - North Korea, Agence France Presse, April 29; Koreas agree to resolve nuclear crisis, Associated Press, April 29; South Korea fails to persuade North to scrap nuclear drive, Agence France Presse, April 29; China puts North Korea talks in brighter light, Washington Post, April 29; Details emerge of North Korean proposal, Global Security Newswire, April 29; Powell sees no progress from N. Korean proposal, Reuters, April 29; US says it will not make concessions to N. Korea, Reuters, April 29; N. Korea talks tough on atomic weapons, Reuters, April 30; Rammell urges North Korea to engage fully with the international community on the nuclear issue, UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office (http://www.fco.gov.uk), April 30; North Korea prompts US to investigate nuclear boast, New York Times, May 1; US checking N. Korea's plutonium claim, Associated Press, May 1; South Korean president calls for keeping up talks with North, Agence France Presse, May 2; North Korea threatens to scupper nuclear dialogue with US, Agence France Presse, May 5; Bush shifts focus to nuclear sales by North Korea, New York Times, May 5; US denies shift in North Korea policy, Agence France Presse, May 5; N. Korea told US it will export nuclear arms - report, Reuters, May 7; S. Korea says will push US dialogue with N. Korea, Reuters, May 7; 'No hard conclusions' on reported North Korean reprocessing - White House, Agence France Presse, May 7; Activity increased at N. Korea nuclear plant - US, Reuters, May 7; US suspects North Korea moved ahead on weapons, New York Times, May 8; Official - US photo shows N. Korea nukes, Associated Press, May 8; Singapore PM says N. Korea deal more likely, Reuters, May 8; North Korea admitted to owning two nuclear bombs, Agence France Presse, May 9.

Back to the top of page