News Review Special Edition

Back to the Contents of News Review Special Edition

International Developments, April 1 - May 10, 2003

Moscow Treaty on Hold over Iraq as US Pushes New Thinking on Nuclear Weapons

As reported in the last issue, on March 18 the lower house of the Russian parliament, the Duma, postponed consideration of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) signed by Presidents Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush in Moscow in May 2002. The Treaty - known most commonly as the Moscow Treaty - sets a maximum range of 1,700-2,200 operationally-deployed strategic nuclear warheads per side by December 31, 2012. The accord has been much criticised by Russian parliamentarians - and by many Democrats in the US Congress - for failing to include any verification provisions or mandate the destruction of any warheads or delivery systems. The Duma's postponement decision, however, was motivated not by unease at the treaty's scant provisions but rather by concern at the political impact of the then-imminent US-led invasion of Iraq. The US Senate had ratified the Treaty without opposition (95-0) on March 6 - with sceptical Democrats arguing that the measure at least provided a platform for further, much-needed agreements - and both houses of the Russian parliament, the Duma and the Federation Council, were reportedly within days of following suit when the UN weapons inspections process in Iraq collapsed.

On April 5, President Putin told reporters that the war in Iraq "creates a certain unfavourable background for further work in the ratification on this agreement." Putin insisted, though, that "the Russian Federation is interested in this document being ratified. I have already said, and want to stress it once again - we shall be working with the deputies of [both houses of] the Federal Assembly, and I hope we shall arrive at ratification." The day before, the Speaker of the Duma, Gennady Seleznyov, argued that "this is not the time to discuss the ratification", warning that such a debate could develop into "a large political rally" against US policy in Iraq and elsewhere. On April 8 Dimitry Rogozin, chair of the Duma's International Affairs Committee, told reporters he expected the House to debate ratification "as soon as the situation regarding the post-conflict settlement in Iraq is normalised". On May 5, Rogozin declared that "preparations for considering ratification...are in full swing". Reports suggested May 16 as Rogozin's preferred date for the opening of the debate. (Note: in the event - see next issue and our website - the Duma ratified the Treaty, by 294 votes to 134, on May 14.)

Arguments over the merits of the Moscow Treaty, in both Russia and the US, reflect a broader debate over the direction of American nuclear weapons doctrine and policy. As summarised in recent issues of Disarmament Diplomacy, the Bush administration is expressing an interest in exploring options allowing for the development - and possibly the testing - of new nuclear warheads designed to discharge specific battlefield functions. The Department of Energy is already examining ways of modifying two existing warheads - the B61 and the B83 - to perform a role popularly known as 'bunker busting': destroying otherwise invulnerable, deeply-buried and heavily-reinforced facilities housing weapons of mass destruction or forming part of an adversary's WMD command-and-control infrastructure. Known as the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP), the explosive yield of such a new system - which US officials suggest would not require testing - could be very high, although its supporters maintain that any radioactive contamination would be largely contained underground. In addition, the Departments of Energy and Defense are pressing Congress to lift a prohibition - the Spratt-Furse Amendment, in place since 1993 - on research and development (R&D) into low-yield nuclear weapons, also known as 'mini-nukes'. 'Low-yield' is defined in the legislation as 5 kilotons of TNT or less; as a yardstick, the Little Boy bomb dropped on Hiroshima produced a yield of around 15 kilotons. Presumably, final development and certification of any new low-yield warhead would require testing.

Testifying before a Senate Armed Services Committee subcommittee on April 9, Linton Brooks, the Acting Administrator of the Energy Department's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), described the low-yield R&D prohibition as an "arbitrary intellectual restraint" which had had "a chilling effect" on US nuclear weapon design work. (Note: on May 8, the Senate Armed Services Committee voted to lift the ban. See next issue and our website for coverage and reaction.)

Brooks also told the Senators that an Energy Department study, completed last year, had concluded that the current period of time required to prepare the nation's underground test site in Nevada for a resumption of testing - should the President decide to terminate the unilateral US moratorium declared in 1993 - should be shortened from 24-36 months (as stipulated in a 1993 order issued by President Clinton) to 18 months. Reducing the preparation time to this degree, Brooks added, would take approximately three years.

On April 25, making the obvious connection between the low-yield and testing issues, Nikolai Voloshin, head of the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry's Department of Nuclear Ammunition Development and Testing, commented: "Where did this talk come from to do away with the five-kiloton threshold? ... The idea is being circulated to do lower yield charges - I question the thought of using such low-yield weapons, which means that nuclear weapons cease to be a deterrent and become combat weapons... We are very concerned about why the US has not yet ratified the CTBT..."

Voloshin was speaking to the Global Security Newswire during an international security conference in Albuquerque, New Mexico, hosted by the Sandia National Laboratories. On April 23, the conference heard a speech on US nuclear weapons policy by Linton Brooks, based on the premise that, principally because of the impact of 9/11 and the threat of international WMD-terrorism, "arms control is largely the agenda of the past". The address summarised the significant shift in American nuclear posture since President Bush came to power: "The administration has re-conceptualized the strategic triad so that, commensurate with our commitments under the Moscow Treaty, we will be able to maintain a deterrent that is effective, and responsive to today's security environment. During the Cold War, conceptualizing the Triad as ICBMs [land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles], SLBMs [submarine-launched ballistic missiles], and strategic bombers made perfect sense; in today's era, the Triad needed to be broadened and re-oriented, in order to pose a credible deterrent. The administration has done that - we now plan in terms of offensive strike forces, which includes not only our strategic offensive deterrent but precision strike forces; defenses, both active and passive; and the revitalization of the nuclear weapons infrastructure - including, of course, NNSA assets. This approach permits the United States to maintain a credible and responsive deterrent, as we reduce our operationally deployed strategic offensive forces to between 1,700 and 2,200."

By contrast, as detailed by Rebecca Johnson elsewhere in this issue, US delegates attending a two-week meeting of NPT states parties in Geneva (April 28-May 9) were keen to downplay the radical nature of the New Triad. On May 5, a fact sheet issued by the delegation offered five key reassurances: (1) the "US is reducing reliance on nuclear weapons" and "placing more emphasis on conventional deterrence and missile defense"; (2) the "US is not developing, testing or producing any nuclear warheads and has not done so in more than a decade"; (3) there "is no current requirement for a new nuclear warhead - the President has not directed such an action"; (4) the "US maintains its moratorium on nuclear testing" and "has no plans to conduct nuclear tests"; (5), the US does "not target any countries with nuclear weapons - there has been no change in US negative security assurances policy toward NPT parties". Addressing the meeting on May 1, Sherwood McGinnis, the deputy US representative to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, cast the New Triad in a positive arms control light: "The policy adopted last year by President Bush calls for a reduced reliance on nuclear weapons. The 'New Triad' will reduce our dependence on nuclear weapons for deterrence through the strengthening of conventional forces, the addition of missile defenses, and other measures. We are not developing new nuclear weapons. The United States has no current requirement for a new nuclear warhead. The United States has not lowered the threshold for nuclear weapons use. There is no change in US negative security assurance policy. The administration continues to maintain its current moratorium on nuclear explosive testing. Senior administration officials have reaffirmed these positions many times in the face of mistaken media reports. We regret that some NPT parties raise questions about US nuclear policies on the basis of erroneous reports and without checking the facts."

Notes: in Geneva on May 1, Professor Joseph Rotblat received the Linus Pauling Centennial Award for Science, Peace or Health. Rotblat, a nuclear physicist who resigned from the US atomic bomb project in World War II in protest at plans to use the new weapon against Japan, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1995 together with the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, of which he is now Emeritus President. Accepting the Pauling Prize, Rotblat voiced consternation at current trends in US nuclear policy: "The Bush administration makes nuclear weapons a tool with which to keep peace in the world... The new Nuclear Posture Review [January 2002] spells out a strategy which incorporates nuclear capability in conventional war strategy... Nuclear weapons have now become a standard part of military strategy to be used in a conflict just like any other high explosive. This is a dangerous shift in the whole rationale for nuclear weapons."

On April 30, the Energy Department announced that the contract for managing the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) would be opened to competition in 2005, upon expiry of the current agreement with the University of California (UC), the operators of the facility on behalf of the US government since 1943. The decision follows a series of management difficulties and security lapses at the laboratory - now occupying a 43-square mile area of northern New Mexico, employing over 7,500 personnel and enjoying a budget in FY 2003 of over $2 billion - widely blamed on the University's administrative practices and procedures. The University, which acknowledges past defects, seems determined to retain the contract after 2005. UC President Richard C. Atkinson told reporters (April 30) that his "instinct continues to be to compete - and to compete hard... We believe, with every fibre of our institutional being, that continued UC management is in the absolute best interests of the nation's security..." The DOE's announcement followed a report on the future of the lab by Deputy Energy Secretary Kyle McSlarrow and NNSA Acting Administrator Linton Brooks. The study, submitted to Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham on April 26, detailed widespread and serious malpractices - and even criminal activity, including fraud and theft - stemming from a lax and unbusinesslike culture built up over many years. On April 29, Abraham wrote to McSlarrow and Brooks to thank them for their report and endorse their recommendations. Abraham wrote: "The management of the nuclear weapons complex is my most important responsibility... Under the university's stewardship, the science at Los Alamos has consistently been of the highest calibre. But it is important that business services be as good as the science. In approving your recommendations, it is my intention to make it clear that, in dealing with nuclear weapons and materials, only the highest standards of performance are acceptable."

On April 22, LANL announced it had "successfully made the first nuclear weapons pit in 14 years that meets specifications for use in the US stockpile". A laboratory press release continued: "The six-year effort at Los Alamos' plutonium processing facility restores the nation's ability to make nuclear weapons, a capability the United States lost when the Rocky Flats Plant near Boulder, Colo., shut down in June 1989. ... 'The Laboratory has delivered on a major commitment to the Department of Energy's Nuclear Security Administration, Congress and the taxpayers,' said Pete Nanos, Los Alamos' interim director. A pit is the fissile core of a nuclear weapon's physics package. The newly made pit, called Qual-1 because it was built with fully qualified processes, is for the W88 warhead, which is carried on the Trident II D5 Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile, a cornerstone of the US nuclear deterrent. 'Our next challenge is to carry out the required experiments, analyses and computer modeling so we can certify that this newly manufactured pit will perform reliably in the stockpile, without conducting underground nuclear tests,' Nanos said. ... Los Alamos has committed to complete the certification process and to have the ability to deliver a pit to the military that meets all stockpile requirements by 2007. Los Alamos will make roughly half a dozen pits a year from now until 2007 to ensure certification is completed successfully and to put into place the capacity to begin making 10 stockpile pits a year by 2007. ... More than 700 Laboratory staff and contractors have been involved in the effort that culminated in Qual-1, many working overtime. ... The total cost of the manufacturing program to date is roughly $350 million; the total project cost for the manufacturing and certification program, beginning with the new baseline, is estimated at $1.5 billion."

Related material on Acronym website:

• Speech by Linton Brooks, April 23,

Reports: Wrong time for Russia to discuss US treaty ratification - speaker, Agence France Presse, April 4; In further bid to mend US ties, Putin promises to ratify nuclear accord, Agence France Presse, April 5; Replies by Russian President Vladimir Putin to journalists' questions when visiting Space Forces Headquarters, Moscow, April 5, 2003, Russian Foreign Ministry transcript; Putin urges US arms pact backing, BBC News Online, April 5; Duma to resume Moscow Treaty ratification this spring, Global Security Newswire, April 9; Hill told US favors more nonnuclear weapons, Washington Post, April 9; US seeks shortened nuclear test readiness, modified nuclear weapons, Global Security Newswire, April 9; US to bolster its nuclear test readiness, Agence France Presse, April 9; Los Alamos restores US ability to make nuclear weapons, LANL Press Release (http://www.lanl.org), April 22; Text - Brooks outlines measures to combat future WMD proliferation, Washington File, April 23; Bush administration ready to strike first to keep US safe, Global Security Newswire, April 24; US 'bunker buster' development worries Russia, Global Security Newswire, April 25; US taking bids to run Los Alamos lab, Associated Press, April 30; DOE to compete Los Alamos National Laboratory management and operations contract upon completion of current University of California contract in 2005, US Department of Energy Press Release R-03-091, April 30; Former nuclear weapons designer wins award for non-proliferation efforts, Global Security Newswire, May 1; Energy Department to invite bids to manage Los Alamos labs, New York Times, May 1; Energy will open Los Alamos leadership to competition, Global Security Newswire, May 1; Transcript - US official points to progress on nuclear disarmament, Washington File, May 5; Fact Sheet - Moscow Treaty nuclear cuts tops list of US NPT support, Washington File, May 5; US concerned over Iran nuclear program, Associated Press, May 5; Senior US, Russian officials to discuss Moscow Treaty ratification, Global Security Newswire, May 5; Panel votes to end low-yield nukes ban, Associated Press, May 9; Russia's lower hose Oks US arms deal, Associated Press.

Back to the top of page

© 2003 The Acronym Institute.