Text Only | Disarmament Diplomacy | Disarmament Documentation | ACRONYM Reports
back to the acronym home page
Calendar
UN/CD
NPT/IAEA
UK
NATO
US
Space/BMD
CTBT
BWC
CWC
WMD Possessors
About Acronym
Links
Glossary
Disarmament Diplomacy No. 72, Cover design by Paul Aston

Disarmament Diplomacy

Issue No. 72, August - September 2003

Opinion & Analysis

The First Biennial Meeting of States on Small Arms: Building Momentum for Global Action

By Peter Batchelor

Introduction

This article provides an analysis of the First Biennial Meeting of States (hereafter, BMS) to consider the implementation of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (hereafter, the Programme of Action), held at United Nations Headquarters in New York from July 7-11, 2003.1 The BMS was part of the follow up to the Programme of Action, agreed by consensus at the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (hereafter, the Conference), held in New York in July 2001.2

The BMS was the first opportunity since the Conference for states, international and regional organisations, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to exchange information and report on the implementation of the Programme of Action at national, regional and international levels. The meeting was intended as a 'stock-taking' exercise, an opportunity to share information and experiences about implementing the Programme of Action. It had no mandate to take decisions, and was not intended to re-open debates, or negotiations, about the Programme of Action, particularly on those issues (e.g. civilian possession, transfers to non-state actors) around which consensus could not be reached two years ago.

The BMS was an important event, in both symbolic and practical terms. The fact that the meeting took place, and was well attended by both governmental and non-governmental representatives, indicates how important the issue of small arms has become for the international community. In itself, the meeting played an important role in building consensus and momentum for global action on the small arms issue, and in identifying in concrete terms what has already been achieved, and what still needs to be done to fully implement the Programme of Action. In this regard it was a clear success, and will thus provide a useful basis for the second BMS, scheduled to take place in 2005, and the Review Conference due to take place in 2006. Despite progress made at the meeting, however, the global illicit trade in small arms and light weapons has not been eradicated, and much still needs to be done, at national, regional and international levels, to fully implement the Programme of Action.

I. An Overview Of The Meeting

The meeting3 was opened on July 7 by the newly-appointed UN Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, Nobuyasu Abe of Japan, who delivered a message from Secretary-General Kofi Annan. In his message, the Secretary-General said it was difficult to overstate the importance of implementing the Programme of Action. Noting that half a million people a year were killed by those weapons, he added: "Less quantifiable, but no less palpable, are the wider consequences of small arms proliferation in terms of conflict fuelled, peacekeepers threatened, aid denied, respect for law undermined, and development stunted".

Mr. Abe also conducted the election of the chairperson of the meeting, Ambassador Kuniko Inoguchi, the Permanent Representative of Japan to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva. Ambassador Inoguchi had been approved as chair-designate of the BMS during informal consultations with Member States on October 18, 2002 in New York held by the President of the Conference in 2001, Ambassador Camilo Reyes Rodriguez of Colombia. Between October 2002 and the BMS in July 2003, Ambassador Inoguchi held an exhaustive series of open-ended consultations in Geneva, New York and elsewhere with representatives of states, international organisations and NGOs to help with her own preparations for the meeting, to rally support for the BMS, and to ensure that all governmental, intergovernmental and non-governmental participants were clear about its purpose.

In her opening remarks, Ambassador Inoguchi stated that the BMS would provide an opportunity to identify appropriate strategies to address obstacles in implementing the Programme of Action over the past two years, and to strengthen partnerships for action that had been set up through a variety of international assistance and cooperation initiatives and translate the Programme of Action into concrete, effective and robust deeds in the field.

The following 15 countries (three from each of the five regional groups) were elected members of the Bureau for the BMS: Canada, Democratic Republic of Congo, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovenia, and Uganda.

The governmental presence at the meeting was fairly significant, although there were slightly fewer delegations than at the Conference in 2001. Despite the fact that only 138 states (down from 169 states in 2001) formally participated in the meeting, many delegations included high-level representatives such as Ministers, Deputy Ministers, Permanent Representatives and/or Ambassadors.4 Many delegations were quite large (for example, the United States had 18 members, Canada and the United Kingdom each had 14 members, Germany, Kenya and Singapore each had 10 members), and included representatives from different government departments and/or agencies. The level of participation, and the size of delegations, indicates the importance that many states now attach to the small arms issue.

Permanent observer missions, UN agencies - e.g. the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the World Health Organisation (WHO), the UN Women's Fund (UNIFEM), the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), and the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) - regional organisations - e.g. the African Union (AU), Pacific Islands Forum, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the League of Arab States, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the Andean Community - and international organisations - e.g. the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) - were also well represented at the meeting.

The NGO community also had a highly visible presence at the meeting. According to the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA), 172 NGOs were accredited to the meeting (up from 119 in 2001), and more than 280 NGO representatives were in attendance. The rules of procedure adopted for the Conference in 2001 (A/CONF.192/L.1) were applied mutatis mutandis to the BMS. Unlike at the Conference in 2001, all sessions of the BMS were held in plenary, and thus open to accredited NGOs. NGOs were also allowed to collect documents from the conference room, and display their material on tables at the entrance to the conference room. A noteworthy practice, which occurred during the Conference in 2001 and was repeated during the BMS, was the presence of NGO representatives on a number of national delegations (e.g. Canada, Chile, Germany, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States).

In addition to the formal sessions of the meeting, many states also organised a series of side events - often in partnership with NGOs - on a variety of topics (e.g. export controls, brokering, capacity building). For example, Mali, Canada, Switzerland and the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (based in Geneva) launched a new publication - Putting People First - which provides a human security perspective on the availability and misuse of small arms.

A particularly important NGO event, held on the first day of the meeting, was the launch of a report - Implementing the Programme of Action 2003: Action by States and Civil Society - produced by the 'Biting the Bullet' project (International Alert, Saferworld and the University of Bradford) in collaboration with the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA). This report provides a review of progress towards implementation of the Programme of Action, drawing on data gathered for 156 countries. It states that progress towards the implementation of the Programme of Action can be judged as modestly positive, and that the "glass has been slightly filled".5

The report notes that there have been examples of encouraging developments over the last two years in many regions of the world - for example, "in numerous countries where existing controls and measures were lacking or weak..., at least some initial steps have been taken towards establishing mechanisms and developing national plans for implementing the Programme of Action". However, the report also notes that there are a number of recurring weaknesses, such as "in many countries there is still little co-operation on small arms and light weapons controls across government, or between government and national and regional stakeholders, including civil society groups"; and "in many countries, awareness in government of the key commitments in the Programme of Action and related regional agreements appears not to extend far beyond those directly involved in their negotiation".

The number of governmental and/or NGO side events on the margins of the BMS which took place in and around Conference Room 4 in UN Headquarters was highly significant. These events provided evidence of the enthusiasm and momentum that has built up on the small arms issue over the last few years. They were successfully used to present new information and research, initiatives and perspectives on the small arms issue, which has matured significantly since the Conference in 2001. They also provided many useful opportunities for formal and informal interactions between representatives from governments, international organisations and NGOs, thus serving to strengthen partnerships between NGOs, and between NGOs and governments.

The BMS consisted of ten sessions, organised to reflect the structure of the Programme of Action. The first five sessions of the meeting were allocated to reports on the national implementation of the Programme of Action. The sixth session was a special session to hear statements from representatives of NGOs and civil society. The seventh session was allocated to global and regional implementation of the Programme of Action, and statements from regional and international organisations, as well as various UN agencies. The eighth and ninth sessions were allocated to thematic discussions within the framework of consideration of the issues of implementation, international co-operation and assistance (from Section III of the Programme of Action). The tenth and final session was used for largely administrative purposes, including the adoption of the Report of the meeting.

In the sessions on national implementation, 103 states (on behalf of 142 states) made national statements, in which they described the activities, lessons learned, and challenges associated with the implementation of the Programme of Action at a national level. The number of states making such statements was significant, given that only 61 states had submitted national reports to the Department for Disarmament Affairs prior to the meeting (as of June 26, 2003).6 During the conference itself, 98 national reports were distributed as conference room papers (A/CONF.192/BMS/2003/CRP.1 to 98).

In its sixth session on July 9, the meeting heard statements from NGOs, including representatives from IANSA, the umbrella organisation representing more than 500 NGOs working in 100 countries, and the World Forum on the Future of Sport Shooting Activities (WFSA). The presentations from IANSA members focused on a variety of themes, and highlighted the role that civil society organisations have played, and will continue to play, in the implementation of the Programme of Action.7 The presentations from WFSA members focused on the organisation's activities in recent years, such as workshops on various topics (e.g. marking), and reiterated the organisation's view that, because the matter of private lawful firearm ownership was primarily a question of culture, tradition and history, the Programme of Action should only focus on weapons of war.

II. The Content Of The Meeting

As noted, the BMS was intended as stocktaking, retrospective exercise, in which states, international organisations and NGOs could share information and experiences about the successes, and challenges, associated with the implementation of the Programme of Action. Most states adopted this perspective (with varying degrees of enthusiasm), and simply provided in their national reports and/or statements (with varying degrees of detail and completeness) a retrospective account of their implementation of the Programme of Action.

Some states, however, decided to adopt a more forward-looking perspective and tried to use the meeting as a forum for re-opening debates on issues that had not been sufficiently resolved during the Conference in 2001, and for putting down 'markers' on issues that might be 'reconsidered' (i.e. renegotiated) during the 2006 Review Conference. For example, Canada, in its national statement, proposed that the BMS should take "the first steps towards considering ways in which we might amend and improve the Programme of Action". The Netherlands, in its national statement, noted that the BMS was important "to enable us to better understand what would be needed to improve the [Programme of Action] in 2006".

These two perspectives contributed to an underlying tension present throughout the whole meeting, which re-emerged quite forcefully in the last session on Friday July 11 when Ambassador Inoguchi presented her Chairperson's summary, the content of which proved to be highly controversial.

Not surprisingly, perhaps, many national statements consisted largely of formulaic recitations of national implementation (or compliance) activities, reassertions of unchanged policy positions, and /or exercises in self-justification, or even self-promotion. Echoes of language used two years ago were loud and frequent. The United States, for example, reiterated that the mandate of the Conference in 2001, and thus the appropriate focus of the BMS, concerned the 'illicit trade', and that the issue of lawful (private) gun ownership was not a legitimate topic of debate. This was similar to the language used by John Bolton, the US Under-Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, at the July 2001 Conference when he stated that the US could not, and would not, support any measures that might prohibit civilian possession of small arms.

Some delegations also referred to issues that were included in the Programme of Action (e.g. export controls, brokering), but which, due to a lack of consensus at the Conference, were 'watered down' in the final text. Some states further noted that certain issues needed to be revisited, and perhaps certain provisions of the Programme of Action strengthened, at the Review Conference in three years time.

In general, most national statements mentioned the creation of National Focal Points for coordinating implementation activities (as of July 21, 2003 at least 99 countries have designated such focal points), and/or the creation of national co-ordinating agencies, or commissions. Most countries also mentioned the issue of domestic legislation, covering issues such as production, transfers (import, export, transit), ownership and possession, the importance of building capacities in law enforcement and customs, weapons collection and destruction, and the need for regional co-operation in combating the illicit trade in small arms. There were also significant references to terrorism and small arms in many of the national statements.

Some issues, not included in the final text of the Programme of Action because of opposition from countries such as the United States, were also mentioned in national statements. For example, a number of states from different regions (e.g. Botswana, Yemen, Uruguay, Thailand, Bangladesh) mentioned the issue of civilian possession, and how they had put in place new, or revised, legislation to deal specifically with this matter. Specifically, Canada mentioned the idea of limiting civilian ownership of military-style small arms and light weapons.

A number of countries mentioned the issue of transfers to non-state actors. India noted that the failure to agree on preventing arms sales to non-state actors in the Programme of Action was disappointing, and that this issue should be seriously addressed in preparing for the 2006 Review Conference. Switzerland stated that there was a need to revisit this topic, for example by examining how national export criteria could be worded so they were also relevant for transfers to non-state actors, and to what extent the current provisions of international law might restrict the supply of weapons to non-state organisations and individuals.

Most of the key issues contained in the Programme of Action (e.g. marking and tracing, stockpile management) were mentioned by states in their national statements. However, the thematic discussions, which took place during the eighth and ninth sessions, focused on a smaller number of issues, which Ambassador Inoguchi grouped together in six 'clusters'. Prior to the meeting, Ambassador Inoguchi had circulated to all states a provisional list of issues, drawn from the Programme of Action (and from her reading of national reports already submitted to DDA), which formed the basis of the thematic discussions during the BMS.

The first cluster focused on the issues of weapons collection and destruction, stockpile management, and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DD&R). The second cluster focused on the issues of capacity-building, resource mobilisation and institution-building. The third cluster focused on the issue of marking and tracing, particularly the recommendations from the Group of Governmental Experts, established to determine the feasibility of developing an international instrument to enable states to identify and trace, in a timely and reliable manner, illicit small arms and light weapons. The report of the Group was circulated at the BMS, and will be submitted by the Secretary-General to the fifty-eighth session of the General Assembly in the autumn of 2003. A large number of delegations welcomed the report of the Group, and expressed the hope that negotiations on an international instrument would begin as soon as possible. The fourth cluster focused on the issue of linkages (including terrorism, organised crime and trafficking in drugs and precious minerals). The fifth cluster focused on the issues of import/export controls and illicit brokering. The sixth cluster focused on issues such as human development, public awareness and culture of peace, children, women and the elderly.

Unfortunately, there was insufficient time to deal adequately with all of the issues in the six clusters in the two sessions allocated to thematic discussions. Despite Ambassador Inoguchi's stated desire to have an interactive discussion, most states simply presented scripted or pre-prepared statements on the various issues.

A noteworthy feature of the thematic discussions was the number of interventions from officials in government departments outside foreign ministries (e.g. defence, police, customs). Naturally enough, most of the interventions reflected national perspectives and priorities, highlighting both past and present initiatives on a range of issues (e.g. weapons collection and destruction, stockpile management, marking and tracing), while at the same time identifying various issues (e.g. DD&R, linkages, illicit brokering, human development) requiring further attention. A common refrain from many developing countries, notably countries in the African Group, was the need for international co-operation and assistance, both financial and technical, to help countries to implement the Programme of Action.

III. The Chairperson's Summary

Despite severe time constraints, the meeting was able to accomplish all of its required business and, during the tenth session on Friday afternoon, July 11, approved the report of the conference, as orally amended. The report of the BMS (A/CONF.192/BMS/2003/1) is purely a procedural document, and provides largely an administrative record of the meeting. The list of initiatives undertaken at the regional and sub-regional levels to address the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, which was originally intended to be part of the report, was in the end not included as part of the final report of the meeting, but circulated as a conference room paper (A/CONF.192/BMS/2003/CRP.99).

The Chairperson's Summary (see Appendix) proved to be highly controversial. In retrospect, the decision to produce such a statement was probably not a good idea, given the many sensitivities associated with the small arms issue and the fact that any summary would by its very nature be selective, and therefore liable to give rise to controversy.

Based on her reading of the national reports submitted before the BMS, and her assessment of the first few days of the meeting, Ambassador Inoguchi produced a first draft of her summary by Thursday, July 10, distributing it to members of the Bureau for comment. Some Bureau members in turn shared the first draft of the summary with other delegations.

The text attracted some criticism in terms of its content, particularly with respect to a section on 'the way forward'. Based on feedback from Bureau members (and indirectly from other delegations), the summary was significantly amended, including the deletion of the section on 'the way forward', and presented to all delegations towards the end of the final session on the afternoon of July 11. Despite not having had much time to consider the summary, many delegations raised various concerns about the purpose and the content of the summary. The two most serious criticisms were that the summary went beyond the mandate of the meeting, and that it was not an accurate reflection of the discussions during the meeting.

In the end, it was decided not to include the summary as part of the main text of the report of the meeting, but rather as an annex. Thus, the official report (paragraph 16) states that the summary, "without prejudice to national positions of Member States, is the sole responsibility of the Chairperson of the meeting, and does not cover all issues discussed". This paragraph, together with the text's relegation to the annex of the report proper, means that the summary will have little, or no, lasting value beyond the meeting.

IV. Conclusion

How does one assess the practical and political outcome of a gathering such as the BMS, a reporting and information-exchange exercise rather than a negotiating session?

The main positive outcome of the BMS was the meeting itself. The high level of participation and engagement from governments, intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations, and the large number of side events, reflected the energy, enthusiasm, commitment and momentum that has built up on the small arms issue in the last few years.

The most significant negative factor affecting the outcome of the meeting was time. Five days on 'UN-time' was simply not enough to deal with the extensive formal component of the agenda - national statements, presentations from NGOs, regional and international organisations, etc - let alone the thematic discussions, which ended up being very rushed, and consequently rather unsatisfactory. The fact that the side events often competed with each other, and with parts of the formal meeting, created a frustrating dilemma for many governmental and non-governmental representatives unable to be in two places at the same time.

Ambassador Inoguchi, in a press conference just prior to the conclusion of the meeting on July 11, reviewed some of the main issues discussed during the meeting. She stated that the meeting had given states an opportunity to recount experiences and lessons learned in pursuit of eradicating the illicit small arms trade. She also noted that the meeting had helped to generate momentum on the small arms issue, with, for example, over 90 countries reporting they now had domestic laws penalising the illicit manufacture, possession and trade in such weapons.

The controversy surrounding the Chairperson's Summary is quite important to an assessment of the outcome of the meeting. If the summary had been included in the body of the report of the meeting, it might have played a significant role in the next BMS in 2005; now, however, it is likely that the summary will receive much less official recognition in the preparations for the next BMS in 2005. This is certainly a less than desirable outcome of the meeting.

Despite the problems surrounding the Chairperson's Summary, most governmental and non-governmental participants judged the meeting as an overall success. IANSA noted that implementation of the Programme of Action was still disappointing, given that less than half of all UN member states submitted national reports to DDA (although this is more than have previously done so), and that much more concrete action was needed in the years ahead. However, it also highlighted the fact that the meeting had produced a number of significant outcomes, had helped to place the issue of small arms proliferation and misuse firmly on the agendas of national governments and international organisations, and generated momentum for governmental action to reduce the health and humanitarian impacts of small arms on people around the world.8

Meetings such as the BMS are often viewed as less important than negotiating sessions. But this meeting was significant for at least three reasons: it was an important confidence-building measure for states on an issue that until recently was regarded as a highly sensitive 'national security' issue; it helped to sustain, and build, momentum for global action on the topic; and, last but by no means least, it reaffirmed the importance of partnerships between governments, international organisations and civil society for the effective implementation of the Programme of Action. Viewed from this perspective, the meeting was eminently worthwhile, and should provide a good foundation for the next BMS in 2005, and for continuing global action on the small arms issue. On the basis of what occurred in New York during the BMS, it appears that the small arms issue, especially in comparison with other multilateral disarmament processes (e.g. nuclear, biological), is alive and well, and building momentum.

While the BMS can thus be judged a success, it is nonetheless very difficult to assess, on the basis of national reports and/or statements, whether the Programme of Action is actually having any tangible impact on preventing, combating and eradicating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects, or whether the safety and security of individuals and communities has yet improved as a result of this international agreement. From this perspective, the BMS can best be characterised as an essential yet still modest step in dealing in concrete terms with the global scourge of small arms.

Notes and References

1. The dates of the meeting were intended to coincide with Small Arms Destruction Day, July 9, which was first observed during the Conference in July 2001.

2. For a summary and analysis of the 2001 Conference, see Peter Batchelor, 'The 2001 UN Conference on Small Arms: a First Step?', Disarmament Diplomacy No. 60, September 2001, pp. 4-8.

3. For official coverage of the BMS, see the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs, http://disarmament.un.org/cab/salw-2003.html. For selected documentation and statements, see the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy, http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0307/doc03.htm. The full texts of most national statements from the BMS, and the 2001 Conference, are available from the Small Arms Survey in the searchable database on government documents and statements, http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/databases.htm.

4. See UN Document A/CONF.192.BMS/2003/INF.1 for an official list of governmental and intergovernmental participants at the BMS, as of 8 July 2003.

5. For the full text version of the Biting the Bullet report, see the website of IANSA, http://www.iansa.org/documents/report/bandw/mono.pdf.

6. See http://disarmament.un.org/cab/salw-nationalreports.html for details of national reports submitted to the Department for Disarmament Affairs.

7. See http://www.iansa.org/un/ngo_presentations.htm for the full texts of the IANSA presentations.

8. See http://www.iansa.org/media/bms_finalpr110703.htm for the full text of the IANSA press release on the last day of the BMS.

Peter Batchelor is Project Director of the Small Arms Survey project (http://www.smallarmssurvey.org) at the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva. The views expressed in this article are the personal views of the author, and should not be interpreted as representing the views of the Small Arms Survey project, or the Graduate Institute of International Studies.

Appendix: Chairperson's Summary, July 11

Introduction

1. The United Nations First Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the Programme of Action was held amid an increased awareness of the disastrous human consequences of the use of illicit small arms in combination with sophisticated advances in the field of information and transport technologies. This added a greater sense of urgency to, and created a more supportive global climate for implementing the Programme of Action.

2. The Meeting offered states the opportunity to recount their experiences in coping with the problem of illicit trade in small arms and light weapons, to gather momentum to invigorate both political will and professional competence to combat the problem, and to chart a course to provide a better, safer, more peaceful and less tragic world for the generations to come.

3. The problem of illicit trade in small arms and light weapons is multidimensional. The achievement of progress in tackling this problem requires a comprehensive and inclusive approach in all its thematic aspects, incorporating national, regional and global dimensions and ensuring that cross-cutting elements such as ownership, partnership, assistance and cooperation underlie these endeavours. No state alone can prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. But no state is alone in this struggle, for the Programme of Action provides a framework for both national and collective action.

4. At least 500,000 people die every year as a result of the use of small arms and light weapons. Of the estimated 4 million war-related deaths during the 1990's, 90% of those killed were civilians, and 80% of those were women and children, mostly victims of the misuse of small arms and light weapons. In addition, tens of millions more people have lost their livelihoods, homes and families because of the indiscriminate and pervasive use of these weapons.

5. The first ever-United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects in 2001 represented a milestone achievement in multilateralism. Through the consensus adoption of the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, member states expressed their collective determination to establish and follow-up on a set of universal norms to eradicate the truly global scourge of the uncontrolled proliferation and misuse of illicit small arms.

6. In the past, the origins, end-users and modalities of illicit arms traffic were known, in countries able to gather this kind of information, almost exclusively by national, regional and international agencies dealing with law enforcement, crime prevention, customs, revenue services and the intelligence community. Exchange of national experiences in monitoring, controlling and preventing illicit arms traffic remained confined mostly to specialists allocated to specific situations and, in very limited circumstances, when affecting issues of national security. The policy implications of broader issues arising from illicit trade in small arms were dispersed within national security agencies assigned to arms control.

7. Within barely two years of the adoption of the Programme of Action, there has been progress made across the world in public disclosures about the origins, destinations, modus operandi and profiling of groups engaged in illicit arms trade. Intelligence agencies, police authorities, border patrol officials, customs and revenue services are seen as participating more often in public debates and media coverage of specific acts of illicit arms transfers. In its monitoring of trends and developments since the UN Conference in 2001, the UN Secretariat and the UN bodies' members of CASA (the Coordinating Action on Small Arms) have observed a more than doubling of research and analyses of such key questions as:

  • The sources of illicit weapons procurement,
  • The supply routes for illicit weapons in transit,
  • The networks and practices of illicit brokerage,
  • The estimates of weapons lost in transit or diversion, and
  • The surveillance techniques for monitoring trans-boundary movement of goods.

Implementation of the PoA on Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons

The States participating in this Meeting reported back on the following national, regional and international measures to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects.

National

8. The primary focus of the First Biennial Meeting of States was on the implementation of the Programme of Action at the national level. Member states treated the week-long meeting as an opportunity for early stocktaking of their collective efforts. This task was facilitated by voluntary submission of national reports by more than 80 member states in response to General Assembly resolution 56/24 V.

9. In the two years since the adoption of the Programme of Action, 97 member states have designated national points of contact to act as a liaison with other states on its implementation. A similar number of states have established national coordinating agencies for an inter-departmental and interagency approach to deal with the broader issues arising from the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons.

10. An important element in moving forward against the illicit trade in small arms was noted as the existence of credible and adequate national legislation, and many countries reported on their implementation of new or amended legislation. The dissemination by internet and other means, as well as the intention of countries to share national legislation, was welcomed by states looking to expand, strengthen and improve upon their own legislation. As of now, over 90 countries have domestic laws to govern illicit manufacture, possession and trade in weapons. A similar number is estimated to have ratified, signed or acceded to one or more of the emerging international conventions on more stringent regulations.

11. Taken together, the national experiences on the implementation of the Programme of Action revealed a much higher state of preparedness to prevent future illicit transfer and misuse. The following progress has been made over the past years:

  • Enhanced recognition of a people-centered aspect of the SALW issue;
  • Improvement of institutions and capacity building to tackle the issue of SALW;
  • Enhanced measures for import/export control;
  • Enhanced public awareness and resource mobilization through a number of seminars and workshops; and
  • Tightened measures against terrorism and organized crime.

12. The outcome of national efforts to recover weapons already in illicit circulation yielded divergent results for quantifying the impact of the PoA, in part due to its limited implementation period since 2001, partly because of the absence of a clearer picture of legal arms transfers and partly due to the virtual non-existence of reliable baseline data for affected countries regarding:

  • Illegal acquisition from national armories and other sources;
  • Willful possession in violation of national regulations;
  • Wrongful use of legally or illegally possessed weapons in contravention of national and international humanitarian law and norms and customary practices;
  • Illicit transfers in breach of internationally and regionally imposed embargoes and agreements.

Regional

13. Since the adoption of the UN Programme of Action in 2001, there has been a growing need emerging for the development of a regional perspective to combat the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. Consequently, regional initiatives have begun to take shape, with regional organizations taking a comprehensive approach in dealing with issues of mutual concern, including ways and means to combat terrorism, transnational crime and trafficking in drugs.

14. After the summit of the African Union held in Algeria in July 1999, which later led to the Bamako Declaration, a Programme of Action was adopted by the African Union High Level and Inter-governmental Meeting on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in Africa held in Algeria from September 11 to 14, 2002, calling for associated measures such as strengthening border controls, and combating illegal import, export and stockpiling of the SALW, ammunitions and explosives in order to restrict access to terrorist networks in Africa. The Plan of Action also enhanced co-operation between sub-regional organizations such as SADC and ECOWAS.

15. The Nairobi Secretariat has organized a number of Workshops and Conferences as part of its campaign in sub-regional awareness. It is also organizing a workshop/meeting with civil society in August 2003. The Secretariat is working with the Sub-Regional Police Chief Organization to have the Eastern African Police Chiefs Co-operation Organization (EAPCCO) Protocol on Small Arms signed. This comprehensive Protocol seeks to harmonize legislation on small arms across the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa. The Secretariat, in conjunction with the EAPCCO, is also developing a training manual/curriculum for law enforcement officers in the sub-region.

16. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) signed a Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and Other Related Materials in 2001 which spells out a framework of regional and international cooperation among SADC Member States and with international cooperating partners. SADC has established a point of contact at the SADC Secretariat and a Public Security Sub-Committee that brings together Customs, Police, Immigration and all other agencies responsible for border control. A Technical Committee on Small Arms has also been established whereby member states share best practices, agree on mutual assistance on management of stockpiles, security and safety measures and cost-effective methods of destruction of surplus firearms. It works with the Southern Africa Regional Police Chief Co-operation Organization (SARPCCO) as well as various civil society organizations, such as the Institute for Strategic Studies (ISS) and SaferAfrica. SADC envisages introducing the concept of Demobilization, Disarmament, Reintegration and Development (DDRD) and to convene a regional workshop on the issue.

17. Programme of Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED) of the UNDP in Africa has taken various actions to help implement the ECOWAS moratorium on the importation, exportation and manufacture of SALW in the sub-region. The PCASED is a main implementation arm of the moratorium. In order to ensure effective implementation of the moratorium, coordination among the national commissions is important, particularly in the formulation of regulations concerning import and export of weapons, as well as general legislation relating to firearms. Importance of financial resources to ensure the moratorium's full implementation was also stressed.

18. ASEAN has dealt with the issue of illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in the context of the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime. Combating trafficking in small arms is one of the important components of the Work Programme of the ASEAN Plan of Action which was approved in May 2002 by the ASEAN senior officials meeting on transnational crime and endorsed by the special ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Terrorism.

19. The Pacific Islands Forum Regional Security Committee has developed measures for a common regional approach to weapons control, reflected in the Honiara Initiative and the Nadi Declaration, in response to regional problems such as the availability of old stocks, lack of infrastructure for weapons accountancy and stockpile management, and incomplete legislation for licensing and registration. The Pacific Islands Forum has made great progress in developing model legislation, with the model Weapons Control Bill to be tabled at the Pacific Island Forum Leaders meeting in August 2003. In March 2003, the Small Arms Survey released the most comprehensive report on SALW in the Pacific Island region, entitled "Small Arms and the Pacific," which demonstrated the positive and proactive role of NGOs in enhancing Government understanding.

20. In December 2002, the member states of MERCOSUR and its Associated States, established a Working Group on Firearms and Ammunitions, currently dealing with the harmonization and standardization of information exchange to improve and facilitate tracing, as well as the need to include in national legislation the judicial figures included in the Inter-American Convention Against the Manufacture and the Illicit Trade of Firearms, Ammunitions, Explosives and Other Related Materials. The latter, approved by the Organization of American States, has been ratified by the majority of its member states.

21. In November 1997, 29 member states of the Organization of American States signed the legally binding Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials, one of its objectives being to promote and facilitate cooporation and exchange of information and experience based on states' common concerns. The agreement entered into force on July 1, 1998, following its 10th ratification. The Convention, when viewed in the context of the OAS multilateral evaluation process, provides a self-supporting mechanism for the monitoring of the performance of all member states in the implementation of the priorities of the Convention, as well as opportunities for technical and other forms of support to these states. This is of particular importance for the smaller member states of the Caribbean sub-region.

22. A regional programme has been developing in Central America under the auspices of the Central American Integration System (SICA) in order to cut down the figures on crime, violence and the availability of small arms and light weapons as a follow up to the Programme of Action. Another regional initiative, the Central American Project to Prevent and Combat the Illicit Trade on Small Arms and Light Weapons, was approved by the Central American Security Commission on June 6, 2003.

23. The "Andean Plan for the Prevention, Combat and Eradication of the Illicit Trade of Small Arms and Light Weapons, in all its aspects" is a binding agreement, adopted on 25 June 2003 on the basis of the "Lima's Commitment", in which Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of Defense of the Andean Countries established their commitment to eradicate the illicit trade of firearms, ammunitions, explosives and other materials.

24. League of Arab States stressed the need to increase the participation of civil society and NGOs in the effort to combat illicit trade of SALW. Initiatives it has taken in its endeavor to control SALW include:

  • collecting information on SALW in the Arab region and measures taken in support of the PoA;
  • abiding by United Nations resolutions banning the import of SALW to areas of conflict;
  • coordinating with the Secretariat in preparing for a workshop on SALW to be held in Cairo in December 2003.

25. The ICRC has continued to underline the human cost of the illicit trade in SALW and raise awareness of existing international rules and responsibilities related to weapons. It has provided assistance and protection to populations affected by armed violence.

26. The EAPC of NATO established the ad hoc Working Group on SALW which provides a framework for dialogue and information exchange among participating States, as well as technical cooperation through Trust Funds in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) framework. EAPC has also cooperated with South Eastern Europe and Caucasus states in weapons destruction.

27. Implementation of the OSCE Document helps states fulfill their commitments under the Programme of Action. The major activities of the OSCE are as follows:

  • information exchange on national legislation, marking systems, manufacture control, export and brokering policies, destruction techniques and stockpile management;
  • capacity building activities through training and workshops on SALW control, including border security, in the five Central Asian republics;
  • the development of eight OSCE Best Practice Guides and the decision to compile them into a Handbook; and
  • cooperation with the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the UN and related organs, UNDP, the Stability Pact, and the South Eastern Europe Small Arms Clearinghouse (SEESAC).

28. It was stated that subscribing states to the Wassenaar Arrangement have contributed to the adoption of "best practice guidelines" for exports on small arms and light weapons and on a "statement of understanding" on arms brokering activities.

International

29. At the international level, the implementation of the Programme of Action received further impetus from the Presidential Statement of the Security Council of 21 August 2001 (PRST/2002/30) and the Secretary General's Report to the Security Council of 20 September 2002. Stricter scrutiny of arms trafficking in violation of sanctions including arms embargoes, transparency of linkages between illicit arms trade and illicit exploitation of natural resources and a call for providing technical and financial support to the Interpol Weapons and Explosives Tracking System were among the recommendations by the Secretary-General, along with an emphasis on developing long term strategies to halt illicit arms trafficking as a measure of conflict prevention and peace building. General Assembly Resolution, A/ 57/ L. 79, adopted a week prior to the First Biennial Meeting to follow-up on the implementation of the Programme of Action, urges member states to control illicit arms trafficking, also as a measure of conflict prevention.

30. The United Nations Coordinating Action on Small Arms (CASA) mechanism has facilitated and participated in regional and sub-regional meetings in Africa, Asia and the Pacific, Europe, and Latin America and the Caribbean to enable Member States and other stakeholders to take stock of the status of implementation of the PoA. It mentioned that the following factors have continued to constrain efforts to curb the proliferation of illicit SALW - high demand of SALW in crisis areas, lack of adequate institutions, insufficient international knowledge of the specific dynamics of the illicit trade in SALW, inadequate national capacity in the worst affected countries, and the lack of gender sensitivity in international and national efforts to collect and destroy small arms. The following actions were suggested to partially address these limitations:

  • enhancing the capacity of local authorities and communities in crisis or post-conflict situations to control illegal weapons and their traffickers, and building confidence across religious or ethnic lines;
  • conducting systematic action-orientated research on the dynamics of the illicit trade in SALW; and
  • support for relevant national capacity should be closely linked with wider support for justice and security sector reform.

31. UN agencies such as UNHCR, UNICEF and UNIFEM have recognized that programmes for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration should focus, not only on former combatants, but also on their dependents. These agencies have supported programmes to assist such individuals.

32. UNDP mentioned that a key challenge remained the effective integration of small arms issues in development programming, since tackling small arms brings tremendous value to development. Regarding efforts to collect and dispose of illicit small arms and light weapons, the UNDP stated that their field experience suggests that it is of fundamental importance to capture and harness the power of communities so that they are better able to address their own concerns. Too often, small arms control needs are identified, plans and strategies drafted and resources mobilized in isolation from and ignorance of the local partner's ability to fulfill their responsibilities. Thus windows of opportunity are being opened with great fanfare, only to be slammed shut as implementation grinds to a halt.

33. DDA, DPA and DPKO noted that the issues of tracing, brokering, import and export controls, and law enforcement were at the core of the illicit small arms problem. Regarding tracing, the Secretary-General established in 2002 a group of 23 governmental experts to study the feasibility of developing an international instrument on tracing illicit small arms and light weapons. Under the chairmanship of Ambassador Rakesh Sood of India, the group concluded that it was feasible to develop such an instrument.

34. Regarding brokering, it is widely accepted that progress in addressing the question of illicit brokering depends largely on the level of international cooperation, particularly in information sharing, compliance, and law enforcement. Current discussions on import and export issues indicate that states need to agree on guidelines for authorizing exports, imports and transit of small arms and light weapons. Consensus needs to be built on what criteria should be applied by states when assessing transfer applications. In this connection, the issue of end-user certificates deserves special consideration by states.

35. A large number of developing countries directly affected by the problem of small arms and light weapons indicated, in their national reports, that current levels of international and regional assistance were inadequate.

36. WHO stressed that, just as it is important to collect and destroy illicit small arms and light weapons, it is equally important to understand and prevent violence as a social phenomenon. Violence within communities has consistently been shown to be a major, and often the major, driver of demand for weapons. Preventing violence is therefore the most direct way of driving down demand for small arms.

37. Underlining the relevance of research, UNIDIR stressed the importance of including those affected in the decision-making process for programmes on weapons for development. Referring to strategies to address the demand for small arms and light weapons, UNIDIR insisted that "bottom-up peace-building" could not work without "top-down peacemaking", just as "top-down peacemaking" had no chance of success without the long-term slow process of "bottom-up peace-building".

38. It was also mentioned that the process of reporting had been found to promote implementation. The need to report had created an incentive for accomplishment. The deeper effect, however, had been achieved in the building of capacity for the implementation process.

International Assistance and Cooperation for the Implementation of the Programme of Action: a Thematic Discussion

39. The critical role of international assistance and cooperation emerged as a cross cutting element in the First Biennial Meeting's discussion of national, regional and global efforts to implement the Programme of Action. Member states shared success stories, acknowledged obstacles and looked ahead to strengthen partnerships to:

  • Enact and apply regulations and legislation in order to close identified loopholes;
  • Actively contribute to initiatives to foster international cooperation and develop common standards; and
  • Provide training, financial and technical assistance to countries affected by the widespread illicit accumulation of small arms and light weapons.

40. The Chair was requested to suggest follow-up measures to complement those parts of the Programme of Action that needed to be strengthened. Calling upon member states to take collective action to meet a challenge which no state could or should face alone, the Chair proposed a thematic discussion that was held around the following thematic clusters:

i. Weapons collection and destruction; Stockpile management; Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants

ii. Capacity building; Resource mobilization; Institution building

iii. Marking and tracing

iv. Linkages (terrorism, organized crime, trafficking in drugs and precious minerals)

v. Import/export control; Illicit brokering

vi. Human development; Public awareness and culture of peace; Children, women and elderly

Weapons collection and destruction/stockpile management/DDR

41. Out of an estimated total of over 4 million weapons collected and disposed of during the last decade worldwide, almost half were collected and disposed of in the last two years. Since July 2001, nearly 50 member states have implemented some form of weapons collection, surplus disposal, confiscation, voluntary surrender and induced retrieval. Regional alliances and bilateral donors have contributed over 50 million dollars, excluding logistical and technical support, for national programmes of weapons collection and disposal in the last two years.

42. Two striking trends have emerged from weapons collection since the adoption of the PoA as compared with earlier internationally assisted actions to collect weapons. First, weapons are being collected from much broader and varied groups than the former combatants at the end of protracted conflicts within the framework of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. Second, countries resorting to physical destruction of weapons have at their disposal several recent compilations of best practices for cost effective and ecologically safe methods of weapons disposal, including the UN Destruction Handbook of Small Arms and Light Weapons and the OSCE Best Practice Guide.

43. Successful national programmes of weapons collection were a combination of agreed regulatory, legislative and administrative processes, time bound amnesty, bi-party or multiparty consensus on geographical units and core groups for weapons retrieval, constituency-based advocacy for voluntary surrender, cooperation between federal, provincial, local and traditional authorities, transparency, concrete community-based incentives and stockpile management. "Weapons for Development" programmes in affected countries are one concrete example of development strategies by which donor countries are comprehensively providing assistance to conflict-prone countries. Under this programme, weapons are collected in exchange for development projects, such as the construction of schools, roads and wells. Media coverage and NGO cooperation ensures widespread coverage of such programmes.

44. The inclusion of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants into civil society is an integral part of ceasefire and peace agreements and the Security Council is encouraged to consider, on a case-by-case basis, the inclusion, where applicable, of relevant DDR provisions in the mandates and budgets of UN peacekeeping operations.

45. There is a growing awareness among both affected countries and donor governments that future programmes for weapons collection would attain more lasting results by covering a sub-region rather than a single country. Cross boundary movement of weapons over largely unpatrolled and permeable borders is particularly rampant in Africa, where the use of small arms near border areas leads to wider tensions among neighboring countries and communities. Many delegations welcomed the establishment of the Regional Clearinghouse (SEESAC), set up by the UNDP and the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe in 2002, to promote weapons collection and to create a safe environment for sustainable development. The EU mentioned its joint action on combating the accumulation of SALW which was recently amended so as to include ammunition destruction.

46. In the area of stockpile management, the diversion of legitimate stocks is estimated as one of the main avenues for acquiring illicit weapons, and the improvement of physical security of armouries, complemented by effective stockpile management practices, is an area in which assistance and transparency to develop confidence-building is needed. The responsibility of governments in leading by example with regard to armoury security standards was highlighted. Donor states in the South Pacific outlined their assistance to Pacific Island states in this field, and efforts have been taken by states in the region to conclude a model legislation for a regional approach to weapons control.

47. For affected countries sharing permeable frontiers, information sharing of existing national inventories could possibly offer a way of tackling cross boundary trafficking in weapons illicitly procured through pilferage of inadequately guarded stocks. For regions still locked in tense and hostile relationships, however, such a collective sharing of security information is not yet an immediate possibility.

Capacity building/Resource mobilization/Institution building

48. Typically, the countries affected most severely are among those with the least resources to build up their capacity to effectively deal with the misuse of illicitly available weapons. It was pointed out that no amount of legislative and administrative reform is enough to build affected countries' capacity for controlling illicit weapons proliferation without an enhanced capability for law enforcement and conformity to global norms.

49. In a number of fact-finding missions undertaken under the auspices of CASA to ascertain concrete ways of implementing the PoA, a recurring conclusion was affected countries' limited capability for law enforcement. Insufficiently equipped border patrol units for cross boundary surveillance, inadequately staffed customs, police and law enforcement agencies, poorly paid services for high risk operation of identification and apprehension of illicit weapon owners and corrupt practices of winking at pilferage from unrecorded arms inventories are among the better known hurdles to capacity building.

50. The international donor community has been very forthcoming in assisting those national projects of affected countries that provide them with ascertainable product delivery, such as weapons collection, disposal and stockpile management. Training of trainers, provision of expertise and equipment, data collection and information sharing, awareness raising and consensus building among governments and civil societies are also considered to be an integral part of national capacity building. Donors were encouraged to avoid insufficiently coordinated and overlapping assistance.

51. For affected countries, acquiring the tools of capacity building is becoming an integral element in their implementation of the PoA. Enhancing preparedness to deter inadvertent or induced involvement of marginalized sectors into illicit arms trafficking is but one instance of the nature of capacity building that could make a real time impact on simultaneously reducing the numbers, carriers, avenues and risks of the misuse of weapons in illicit circulation.

52. Governments are primarily responsible for providing necessary resources for dealing with the problem of SALW. If available resources are insufficient, a detailed assessment of needs and required funds may provide a useful basis for further action. In this way, individual initiatives and contributions can be supplemented by pooling resources. At the same time, it is necessary to ensure that the support of the international community matches assistance needs. It was encouraging to see that several countries made spontaneous offers to enter into partnerships during the Meeting. Countries are encouraged to make use of such opportunities to enhance cooperation and capacity building.

53. Taking into account preparatory work underway to enhance the capacity building of affected countries and the initial need assessments by the UN Secretariat, more focused assistance would facilitate ongoing collective initiatives on three inter-related issues:

  • Security sector reform;
  • Closing loopholes in cross boundary cooperation for extradition and trial of illicit arms traffickers; and
  • Exchange of national experiences in coordination of police, revenue services, border patrols and intelligence to apprehend and deal with transnational activities in illicit arms trafficking.

54. "The African Conference on the Implementation of the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms: Needs and Partnerships" was held in Pretoria, South Africa, from March 18 to 21 2002. The Conference reviewed the commitments made in the PoA and those compatible elements of the 2000 Bamako Declaration, and examined how national, sub-regional and international undertakings in the implementation of the PoA can be supported by OECD and by African countries. The Conference emphasized that different partnerships should be developed between countries in the region, among partner countries and those in the affected regions, and between governments and civil society.

Marking and tracing

55. Tracing the trajectory of an arms transaction to the point of diversion is an important tool in identifying and penalizing illicit arms transactions. Although its scope is limited to commercial transactions, the Firearms Protocol, adopted on June 8, 2001, has made a significant contribution to establishing effective tracing mechanisms for marking and tracing weapons. Interpol can contribute to extending assistance in identifying and tracing firearms.

56. Acting upon a specific recommendation in the PoA, the General Assembly in its resolution 56/ 24 of 24 December 2001 requested the Secretary-General to undertake a study of the feasibility of developing an international instrument to enable states to identify and trace, in a timely and reliable manner, illicit small arms and light weapons. Based on this resolution, a United National Group of Governmental Experts was established and has completed its work.

57. Concurrently, Switzerland and France have been moving forward the process of creating international tracing standards by arranging seminars, funding a study and producing a Working Paper containing elements for possible inclusion in a tracing instrument.

58. The PoA commits member states to acquiring and sharing the capabilities for tracing the origins of weapons in transit for illicit transfers, tracking their chains of supply and monitoring their movement from the point of manufacturer to end-user. Information sharing and cooperation between states, including the dissemination of information on arms transfers, was noted as an important element in addressing the need for marking and tracing on a regional and global level

59. The implementation of electronic inventories to facilitate stockpile management, security and record keeping, and advanced tracing systems such as the Integrated Ballistic Identification System, have enhanced tracing abilities of states. Budget constraints have led some states to request funding in order to implement such mechanisms.

Linkages with terrorism, organized crime and trade in contraband goods

60. The lack of borders in international crime trends have seen an alarming rise in terrorist activities over recent years, compelling states to effectively strengthen international cooperation in this area. To prevent terrorist and other criminal organizations from acquiring small arms and light weapons, states are encouraged to develop a common approach, including the establishment of norms and standards, in order to fight terrorism and organized crime. The intensification of the campaign against trafficking and smuggling, including intelligence sharing, has been an important measure undertaken in this area which merits further strengthening.

61. Reliance upon same or similar pipelines for smuggling contraband goods, financial support through money laundering and barter deals for swapping weapons and precious commodities or illegal drugs are well known linkages of terrorism, organized crime and illicit arms traffic. The importance of control over re-exports, international cooperation in eradicating close links between precious minerals and the illicit trade in SALW, and the eradication of root causes including widespread poverty and internal conflict as a primary means to addressing the eradication of illicit SALW in regional, national and international circles was noted.

62. Since the General Assembly declared terror as an act of organized crime after September 2001, a vast majority of member states have ratified all the 12 UN Conventions and Protocols on terrorism. The number of global and regional agreements against money laundering has now reached over fifty. Trading in contraband goods with countries under UN embargoes has been subjected to the investigation of international inquiry commissions more frequently in the last decade than ever before.

Import/export control/illicit brokering

63. The PoA committed member states to adopt adequate laws and administrative procedures to exercise effective control over the export, import, transit and retransfer of small arms and light weapons. The risk of diversion into illegal trade would constitute a particularly important criterion in export authorization at the point of origin. Authentic end user certificates and the strict adherence to United Nations Security Council arms embargoes would ensure compliance with trade regulations at the destination point. The need for continued strengthening of monitoring mechanisms for arms embargoes was noted by some states as one means of reducing the risk of such diversion.

64. In their national reports, 57 of the 98 states reported that they already had export-import control laws in place prior to 2001 and 21 either adopted or revised such laws after 2001 or are in the process of adopting them. End-user certificate requirements were being met by 27 countries prior to 2001, another 12 have introduced such a system since 2001 and the rest would need assistance not only in developing import legislation but also the capacity to implement it.

65. The ECOWAS Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Small Arms and Light Weapons in West Africa constitutes an important regional mechanism for a coordinated and sustainable approach in controlling the illicit trade in small arms in the region. Enhanced information exchange and collaboration between customs officials and police through reinforced Interpol capacity was noted by many states as continuing measures to combat the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons.

66. Registration and licensing of brokering activities and penalties for illicit transactions constitute integral measures in the Programme of Action's commitment to tighter controls over illicit arms trafficking. Regulations on brokering, however, remain to be implemented in most countries, with domestic regulations covering brokers and/or brokering activities existing in only about 16 countries. Any measures in this regard should be in line with specific circumstances in each country.

67. The international context of illegal arms trade requires adequate national legislation to be complemented by a regional and global approach. The EU adopted a common position on brokering on 23 June 2003, requiring member states to reflect its guidelines in existing or future legislations to effectively control broker activities, which it is hoped will provide a useful model for other states. In another regional initiative, satisfaction was expressed with the potential development by the Organization of American States of model brokering regulations for the Western Hemisphere.

68. The need to control weapons originating from unauthorized manufacturers was a key concern raised, as these weapons are circulated within a closed circuit which has no way of being tracked by official means. The importance of controlling Man Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) was also mentioned. National control over the manufacture of weapons is instigated in a number of countries to enforce a strict control over transfers.

Human development/Public awareness and culture of peace/Children, women and elderly

69. Illegally owned and illicitly acquired small arms and light weapons are claiming a life a minute, mostly of an un-armed civilian. In 21 countries across the globe, 300,000 child soldiers have engaged in combat. Some of the poorest regions in the world are spending twice as much on dealing with violence resulting from petty criminality than on their combined allocations for health and education. There is hardly a country vulnerable to recurring violence where the pervading climate of insecurity has not discouraged the global private sector from making greater investment with Africa as a region accounting for less than 3% of the worldwide venture capital.

70. Through in-depth research and analyses of the scope, magnitude and dynamics of illicit arms trafficking, expanding outreach into affected countries and advocacy of community based activities for halting and reversing the tide of illegal arms accumulations, NGOs have become active partners in a growing international coalition for public participation in achieving the objectives of the Programme of Action.

71. Increased global efforts to promote public awareness of the direct and indirect consequences of the uncontrolled proliferation of small arms and light weapons through illicit arms trafficking have led to the decrease in demand for such weapons. Any active measures to reduce citizens' demand for small arms, however, must be matched by an increase in security provided by the state as a basis for sustainable capacity.

72. In the gathering momentum to launch a well conceived global advocacy campaign to halt and reverse uncontrolled arms transfers or misuse through illicit arms trafficking, there is a pronounced emphasis on direct involvement of those sectors of civil society that were hitherto seen only as primary victims of violence by small arms and light weapons: children, women and the elderly.

73. Initiatives for community based policing, programmes to address gender-specific violence, projects of local empowerment and capacity building, education in non-violent approaches to conflict resolution seek to create more weapons-free spaces for human development. This is an area in which both the organized and the informal sectors of civil society are becoming pivotal instruments of advocacy for societal change though non-violent means.

74. This year's focus of the Human Security Network was on children in armed conflict including child soldiers. It adopted the Child Rights Training Curriculum with the aim of facilitating the training of civil and military personnel participating in conflict-zones, including the problem of small arms and their effects on children. Its work plan highlights the significance of international humanitarian law to protect children from small arms violence. The declaration of child-soldier free zones was suggested as a measure to combat the increasing role of children in warfare using small arms and light weapons. The publication of the Human Security Network, "Putting People First: Human Security Perspectives on the Availability and Misuse of Small Arms", deals with this approach, highlighting the human dimension of the small arms challenge. The network also published a new manual, "Understanding human rights" to assist worldwide human rights education efforts.

© 2003 The Acronym Institute.