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Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Meeting, Paris, September 3-4

Third Meeting of the eleven participating states of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) - Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom, United States - Paris, September 3-4, 2003.

• I. Statement of Interdiction Principles
• II. Press Statement
• III. White House Statement

I. Statement of Interdiction Principles

'Statement of Interdiction Principles', declaration issued by the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), Paris, September 4; The White House.

The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a response to the growing challenge posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials worldwide. The PSI builds on efforts by the international community to prevent proliferation of such items, including existing treaties and regimes. It is consistent with and a step in the implementation of the United Nations Security Council Presidential Statement of January 1992, which states that the proliferation of all WMD constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and underlines the need for member states of the UN to prevent proliferation. The PSI is also consistent with recent statements of the G-8 and the European Union, establishing that more coherent and concerted efforts are needed to prevent the proliferation of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials. PSI participants are deeply concerned about this threat and of the danger that these items could fall into the hands of terrorists, and are committed to working together to stop the flow of these items to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern.

The PSI seeks to involve in some capacity all states that have a stake in nonproliferation and the ability and willingness to take steps to stop the flow of such items at sea, in the air, or on land. The PSI also seeks cooperation from any state whose vessels, flags, ports, territorial waters, airspace, or land might be used for proliferation purposes by states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. The increasingly aggressive efforts by proliferators to stand outside or to circumvent existing nonproliferation norms, and to profit from such trade, requires new and stronger actions by the international community. We look forward to working with all concerned states on measures they are able and willing to take in support of the PSI, as outlined in the following set of "Interdiction Principles".

Interdiction Principles for the Proliferation Security Initiative:

PSI participants are committed to the following interdiction principles to establish a more coordinated and effective basis through which to impede and stop shipments of WMD, delivery systems, and related materials flowing to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern, consistent with national legal authorities and relevant international law and frameworks, including the United Nations Security Council. They call on all states concerned with this threat to international peace and security to join in similarly committing to:

1) Undertake effective measures, either alone or in concert with other states, for interdicting the transfer or transport of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. "States or non-state actors of proliferation concern" generally refers to those countries or entities that the PSI participants involved establish should be subject to interdiction activities because they are engaged in proliferation through: (1) efforts to develop or acquire chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems; or (2) transfers (either selling, receiving, or facilitating) of WMD, their delivery systems, or related materials.

2) Adopt streamlined procedures for rapid exchange of relevant information concerning suspected proliferation activity, protecting the confidential character of classified information provided by other states as part of this initiative, dedicate appropriate resources and efforts to interdiction operations and capabilities, and maximize coordination among participants in interdiction efforts.

3) Review and work to strengthen their relevant national legal authorities where necessary to accomplish these objectives, and work to strengthen when necessary relevant international laws and frameworks in appropriate ways to support these commitments.

4) Take specific actions in support of interdiction efforts regarding cargoes of WMD, their delivery systems, or related materials, to the extent their national legal authorities permit and consistent with their obligations under international law and frameworks, to include:

a) Not to transport or assist in the transport of any such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern, and not to allow any persons subject to their jurisdiction to do so.

b) At their own initiative, or at the request and good cause shown by another state, to take action to board and search any vessel flying their flag in their internal waters or territorial seas, or areas beyond the territorial seas of any other state, that is reasonably suspected of transporting such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concerns, and to seize such cargoes that are identified.

c) To seriously consider providing consent under the appropriate circumstances to the boarding and searching of its own flag vessels by other states, and to the seizure of such WMD-related cargoes in such vessels that may be identified by such states.

d) To take appropriate actions to (1) stop and/or search in their internal waters, territorial seas, or contiguous zones (when declared) vessels that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern and to seize such cargoes that are identified; and (2) enforce conditions on vessels entering or leaving their ports, internal waters, or territorial seas that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes, such as requiring that such vessels be subject to boarding, search, and seizure of such cargoes prior to entry.

e) At their own initiative or upon the request and good cause shown by another state, to (a) require aircraft that are reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern and that are transiting their airspace to land for inspection and seize any such cargoes that are identified; and/or (b) deny aircraft reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes transit rights through their airspace in advance of such flights.

f) If their ports, airfields, or other facilities are used as transshipment points for shipment of such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern, to inspect vessels, aircraft, or other modes of transport reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes, and to seize such cargoes that are identified.

Source: http://www.whitehouse.gov, September 4.

II. Press Statement

'Meeting of the Proliferation Security Initiative, Press statement released under the responsibility of the Chair, Paris, September 4'; French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Participants in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) met in on 3rd and 4th September under French chairmanship. This informal meeting was third of its kind, after Madrid on 12 June and Brisbane (Australia) on 9-10 July. Representatives of 11 countries took part: Germany, Australia, Spain, United States, France, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and the United Kingdom.

The PSI is an initiative to develop political commitments and practical cooperation to help impede and stop the flow of WMD, their systems and related materials to and from states and non-State actors of concern. It is a dynamic process. Participants affirmed that the PSI is consistent with and a step in the implementation of the UN Security Council Presidential statement of 31 January 1992, which states that the proliferation of all WMD constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and underlines the need to prevent proliferation. It is also in line with the Kananaskis and Evian G8 Summit declarations as well as recent EU statements, establishing that more coherent and concerted efforts are needed to prevent the proliferation of WMD, their delivery systems and related materials.

They pointed out that this initiative is consistent with international law, as well as national legal authorities. The Chair recalled the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council, under the UN Charter, for the maintenance of international peace and security.

It [the PSI] is part of the overall effort in support of non-proliferation which is a pillar of collective security and strategic stability. It can contribute among other tools to the full implementation of and compliance with commitments under this regime, in particular multilateral non-proliferation agreements. It can also help to reduce the risk of WMD falling into the hands of terrorists.

Participants reaffirmed their commitment not to play any role themselves in proliferation activities and to take effective measures, either individually or in cooperation with partners, to stop them.

Participants reviewed a broad range of political, legal, practical, technical and operational aspects, with a view to paving the way for early concrete outcomes. They agreed on a "Statement of interdiction principles ". It is released today in a spirit of transparency. The "Statement of interdiction principles" identifies concrete actions to collectively or individually interdict shipments of WMD, their delivery systems and related materials.

Participants expressed the hope that all countries which share their non-proliferation concerns and objectives, in particular coastal and transshipment States, flag States and other partners in the international community, will support this initiative. They expressed their willingness to engage in outreach activities, by rapidly opening dialogue with other countries and seeking their views and comments. They stand ready to review and take into account inputs which would enhance their proposed efforts.

Participants also considered practical steps to improve and enhance interdiction activities, including sharing of information among partners, and confirmed the organisation of maritime, air and ground interdiction training exercises in the coming months, aimed at enhancing existing capabilities for implementation of the PSI.

They decided to meet again in October in London to review the progress of the initiative.

Source: http://www.france.diplomatie.fr/actu/article.gb.asp?ART=36865

III. White House Statement

'Principles for the Proliferation Security Initiative', Statement by the Press Secretary, The White House, September 4.

The United States welcomes the announcement today in Paris of the Statement of Interdiction Principles for the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). The 11 nations currently participating in this initiative, which President Bush announced in Krakow on May 31, 2003, have made significant strides in shaping a new environment to combat trafficking to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials. The commitment of the countries currently participating - Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States - emphasizes the need for proactive measures to combat the threat from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The PSI principles are fully consistent with national legal authorities, and with relevant international law and frameworks.

The PSI is a broad international partnership of countries which, using their own laws and resources, will coordinate their actions to halt shipments of dangerous technologies to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern - at sea, in the air, and on land. The PSI will reinforce, not replace, other nonproliferation mechanisms. Cooperative and coordinated efforts by participating countries will give strength and substance to the broad political consensus against proliferation and help address an increasingly important challenge to international security. The United States is encouraged that all participants have agreed in Paris to abide by these Principles. We support the expansion of PSI to all responsible nations willing to accept the Principles, and will seek the involvement in PSI of such countries.

Source: http://www.whitehouse.gov

For further information on the PSI, see http://www.ProliferationNews.org, http://www.ceip.org, http://www.GlobalSecurityInstitute.org, http://cns.miis.edu

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© 2003 The Acronym Institute.