Disarmament DiplomacyIssue No. 77, May/June 2004
LIBYA, IRAQ AND IRAN: UPDATES AND ANALYSES
Libya: the first real case of deproliferation in the Middle East?Dany Shoham of the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar Ilan University, Israel, here gives his detailed analysis of Libya's WMD programmes and the unsurprising but significant revelations that have accompanied the decision to give them up.
Following its announced renunciation of its WMD programmes in December 2003, Libya has submitted complete initial declarations to the OPCW and IAEA, and the corresponding inspection regimes have now been applied. These confirmed what had generally been assumed, namely that Libya had managed to manufacture chemical weapons (CW) in industrial quantities but was not yet capable of producing nuclear weapons. They also answered questions about its biological weapons (BW) capabilities, about which much less had been previously known.
This study attempts to comprehend the essence of this exceptional shift in Libyan policy, and to compare the nature and level of the different WMD capabilities that Libya has now revealed with what the world thought it had. It also looks into the wider various implications of the Libyan action to the tangled Middle-Eastern arena of WMD de-proliferation.
As uncovered and declared, the CW stockpile consists of approximately:
No filled munitions have been declared or found.
In March 2004, the OPCW inspectors verified through continuous on-site monitoring the complete destruction of Libya's entire declared stockpile of unfilled munitions. Libya has provided an outline for destruction of mustard and all production facilities with the final destruction to be completed by April 2007. Although Libya can seek expertise and financial support from other Chemical Weapon Convention (CWC) member states, it is expected to pay for the disposal itself. Which techniques are used to implement such disposal - incineration and/or neutralisation - will take into account levels of required expertise and environmental pollution.3
Libyan past preparedness to manufacture nerve agents was addressed by the Head of OPCW, Rogelio Pfirter, in March 2004: "I think they were pretty close to producing nerve gases. I'm not sure they were in a position to produce them, but we need to look more thoroughly into the declaration for that."
Closer scrutiny of the documents provided by Libya should also shed more light on the status of the country's CW production, but it is believed that the programme has been dormant for some time. Pfirter added that "The actual production of chemical agents was inactivated sometime in the early 1990s. But in as much as there were CW, there were the bombs to deploy them. I would say the programme should be considered to be alive. But the bombs were destroyed in the last few days. So the immediate danger has in a way been diminished".4
Generally, the above detailed findings, declarations and remarks were rather unsurprising. It is fairly compatible with the following data known previously, namely:
Procured precursor chemicals (obtained mainly from West European and Far-Eastern firms):
Those chemicals are used for the production of mustard and nerve gases. Pynacolyl alcohol is a straightforward precursor for synthesizing soman, a notably advanced nerve agent. Iran reportedly provided Libya with extraneous CW supplies, which were possibly those used against Chad.
The Rabta complex5 was founded in the 1980s as a so-called 'Technology Center' by an Iraqi specialist, Dr. Ihsan Barbouty, an architect by profession, with large European-based companies, already serving the Iraqi CW programme. Rabta included a war gases production plant, camouflaged as a pharmaceutical project and built by Dr. Urgen Hipenstil Imhauzen, a German chemist owning the firm Imhauzen Chemei. In addition, a CW munitions factory was built at the Rabta compound, separate from the chemical warfare agent plant. Japanese firms assisted with its construction. US officials learned that Japan Steel Works was building Rabta's metalworking plant. The facility housed precision machines capable of turning out artillery shells plus aerial bombs, as well as corrosion-resistant containers for chemical warfare agents.
In 1994, another underground wing was constructed in the Rabta compound, intended to develop and manufacture CW. This time, the main project constructor was a German mechanical engineer, Roland Franz Berger, who had been living in Libya since 1973. It is believed that tens of tonnes of sulphur mustard were produced in that facility, before it was converted, ostensibly, for civilian purposes. In 1990, American and German intelligence sources claimed that Libya had synthesised approximately 30 tons of mustard gas at Rabta.6
Later, two additional facilities, located in Sebha and Tarhunah, were constructed, believed to contain further installations for the Libyan CW programme. The site of Sebha was picked because it already housed strategic installations for the development and production of ballistic missiles. The Tarhunah facility reportedly aroused an intensive political confrontation with Tripoli, though the reasons for this have not yet been fully deciphered.7
The Rabta chemical facility is now described as an "inactivated chemical warfare agent plant", while the two uncovered "CW storage facilities" are probably located in or close to two of the three compounds mentioned. The mustard stock found in Libya was manufactured at the Rabta chemical factory, and the aerial bombs in the Rabta metalworking plant. The mustard, the bombs and the precursor chemicals (some of which were already utilised for mustard production) were housed in the identified storage sites.
There are some incompatibilities - possibly now insignificant - regarding other chemical warfare agents included within the Libyan CW programme (beyond mustard manufacturing). Libya was thought to have carried out research to produce two nerve agents, sarin and soman.8 Another nerve gas, tabun, and another blistering agent, lewisite, have been mentioned elsewhere.9 According to a Russian source, Libya has manufactured mustard gas, sarin, and phosgene.10
Libya declared the existence of a past research programme to develop and produce BW, and the procurement of dual-purpose biological essentials. Apparently, no specific BW facilities were explored following the declaration. Those British and American specialists who were invited to Libya found no concrete evidence of an ongoing BW-related effort. The team was given access to medical and pharmacological scientists and facilities, and Libyans were questioned about equipment and research that could be applied to biological warfare. But the Libyans denied that their BW programme had ever reached an operational state.11
Earlier reports had indicated that during the 1980s and 1990s Libya attempted to establish a BW infrastructure in the form of some masked projects, the main location apparently being at Taminhint (a small town northwest of Sebha in south central Libya).12 Those masked biological projects included, chiefly: general health laboratories, a health research center; and a microbiological research center. Several supporting facilities have been involved: an institute of technology; Brack Biotechnology Research Centre, Tajoura; Tripoli and al-Fattah universities.
Also, during the 1990s, a secret project, code-named "Ibn-Hayan", aimed to produce bombs and warheads filled with anthrax and botulinum toxin. It was led by top Iraqi BW experts, who had left Iraq due to the UN inspections, and had been allowed by Saddam Hussein to assist Libya. The project was directly linked to the Libyan presidency bureau and a number of organisations, including universities and laboratories attached to the ministries of agriculture and health, were engaged in making ostensibly innocent purchases of dual-use diagnostic and laboratory materials. Reportedly, mobile equipment designed to produce biological warfare agents through the maintenance of a constant sterile environment, were purchased, primarily from China, India and Serbia.
US officials have noted that Libya was especially interested in advancing its BW programmes. Assistant Secretary of State Carl Ford said there was evidence of Cuban exports of dual-use BW technology to Libya and other countries in the Middle-East. Besides, several Indian and Pakistani specialists were apparently helping the Libyan biological effort to bring about some tangible advance. It is not known whether progress was achieved, but the US Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, John Bolton, accused Libya of operating a clandestine BW programme, and Russian intelligence indicated that Libya has been "engaged in initial testing in the area of BW".14
On the whole, it is fairly clear that concerted efforts were made to develop and implement a BW programme and that for certain periods this was a high priority. While it seems to have been less productive than expected, there is a lack of published information on that subject, in particular on the Ibn-Hayan project, so more revelations might still emerge.
In recent meetings with the IAEA, Libyan officials explained that Libya had imported natural uranium, centrifuges and conversion equipment, and constructed pilot-scale centrifuge facilities. According to the Libyan representative to the IAEA, these centrifuge facilities have since been dismantled. He stated that his country's enrichment programme "was at an early stage of development and no industrial scale facility has been built, nor any enriched uranium produced." However, upon inspection by several teams of UK and US intelligence officers, one officer noted, "They had centrifuges turning and were making enriched uranium... This was a serious programme, and one that was not bought off the shelf."15 So, what underlies this intriguing discrepancy?
The most significant nuclear facility in Libya is Tajoura Nuclear Research Center (TNRC). Established in 1982 with the help of the USSR so as to "solve problems of economic significance to the country via peaceful application of atomic energy", its heart of activities is the Soviet-designed 10MW IRT pool-type research reactor, used for isotope production and nuclear research. In addition to this reactor, TNRC houses a "critical facility", which presumably includes a critical assembly, a neutron generator complex, and a TM4-A Tokamak fusion reactor. Other facilities at TNRC include radiochemical laboratories, complete with equipment for the production of isotopes, and nuclear metallurgy laboratory.
Additional notable installations, though of secondary importance, include a Russian 50-to-100 kV electron microscope, a US Instron device for measuring material stress, a physical research facility, which is comprised of laboratories for nuclear physics, solid-state physics, neutron physics, material sciences and engineering, radiation biophysics, mass spectrometry, activation analysis, and physical research using the neutron generator.16 Further to its research laboratories, TNRC is equipped with support facilities, such as electronic workshops, machine shops and test laboratories. Most installations are well maintained.
Beginning in the 1980s and lasting throughout the 1990s, Libya managed, very gradually, to build pilot-scale centrifuge facilities and to experiment with uranium enrichment technologies. A quantum leap occurred in 1997 when, following a meeting between Pakistan's top nuclear scientist, Abdul Qadeer Khan, and Libyan officials, partly processed uranium was shipped directly to Libya by means of a global nuclear trading network headed by Khan.17
Many deliveries of nuclear components to Libya followed. Middlemen and engineers in Turkey, Germany, Switzerland and Britain, as well as Kazakhstan, Dubai and Malaysia, were also closely involved in the clandestine effort. In 2001, for example, a shipment carried on a Pakistani airplane provided Libya's secret programme with an enriched uranium (hexafluoride) fuel stock, as well as the designs and equipment to make a nuclear bomb. A number of complete high-speed stainless steel centrifuges were also flown to Libya direct from Pakistan over the course of the next year. The centrifuges were possibly P-1 models, based on a design stolen by Khan from his former Anglo-Dutch employers, URENCO, in 1975.
A further major undertaking, called Project Machine Shop 1001, aimed to build a manufacturing plant in Libya capable of making centrifuge components that could not be obtained from outside the country. Peter Griffin, a British engineer who first began working with Khan in the early 1980s, provided the plan for Machine Shop 1001 and a lathe. Machines for the workshop came from companies in Spain and Italy. Griffin also arranged for seven or eight Libyan technicians to go to Spain for training in operating some of the machines. A Spanish company had supplied sophisticated tools that were needed for the repair and maintenance of nuclear centrifuges. A Turkish company supplied aluminium castings, and another electrical cabinets and voltage regulators.18 In parallel, two tonnes of raw uranium (hexafluoride), intended for enrichment in Libya and perhaps for use in a single nuclear warhead, were supplied by North Korea.19
Lately, the most critical components were shipped out of Tripoli to the US, including more then 4,000 advanced centrifuges and the drawings Khan sold. Thanks to this technology, though still far from a fully operational state, the Libyan nuclear programme was more advanced than previously thought. As late as 2003, in parallel to the Libyan-American-British discussions, Libya and Egypt exchanged nuclear (and missile) technologies.20 Once again, this shows that the IAEA's basic safeguards regime required under Article III of the NPT was far from adequate.
Libya's patterns of proliferation
Technologically, in terms of genuine domestic capabilities, Libya is the most backward state in the Middle East. Yet, unlike any other Arab country, it had strong bonds and strategic cooperation with several WMD possessors in the Middle East and beyond - namely Iraq (until recently), Iran, Syria, Egypt, Sudan and Pakistan. As a result - and in conjunction with additional, chiefly European techno-scientific contributions - Libya's WMD programme may be read to have constituted a singular, unique melting pot of multiple CBW essentials. Without this, since Libya's own input was slight, it is unlikely that it could have developed any significant WMD programme.
Libya's patterns of proliferation are not of recent origin. Twenty years after gaining independence, Libya acceded to the 1925 Geneva Protocol in 1971, while its powerful neighbour, Egypt was engaged in a serious programme to develop CBW. Tripoli acceded to the BWC in 1982, even as it held open its BW options, though it did not appear at that time to have ambitions to acquire its own CBW. Its ratification of the BWC only took place in 2002, consequent on problems arising from the unsolved anthrax letters in the United States. When the CWC was concluded in 1992, Tripoli dragged its feet over joining - thereby retaining solidarity with Syria and Egypt against Israel and keeping its options open.21
Disregarding his treaty obligations, Gadafy decided to acquire WMD despite progress being slower than he wanted. Libya's high dependence on foreign technological support and other geopolitical drives and considerations made it possible for the West to constrain efforts to attain WMD capabilities. Nevertheless, thanks to the indifference displayed by a lot of Western European suppliers, as well as increasing help from Eastern and Muslim states, Libya was able to make significant progress.
Libya's change of policy appeared to have begun in 1990, when it forwarded a letter to the president of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, calling for "the adoption of far-reaching measures for the elimination of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and the destruction of the stockpiles of these weapons in order to protect mankind from their dangers and preclude any possibility of their use."22 Yet, in reality, Libya's own WMD endeavours did not decrease at all. Moreover, since 2001, Libya made intensive use of its secret services to try to obtain advanced technical information on the development of WMD.23
The US and UK regarded Gadafy as unbalanced and a permanent adversary, against whom they adopted an informal WMD counter-proliferation regime (though the British Department for Trade and Industry (DTI) turned a blind eye as companies like Peter Griffin's Gulf Technical Industries (GTI) continued to supply proliferation-sensitive equipment and technologies). Other important technology suppliers like Germany, Italy, Japan and Thailand were rather reluctant to participate, preferring to ignore the ongoing interplay between their private companies and Libya. Libya's backwardness provided a good pretext for preserving that interplay, which the Libyans disguised through essential, gigantic civilian projects.
Libya, for its part, continued to demand the "dismantling of the WMD that the Israelis have... Otherwise, the Arabs will have the right to possess those weapons",24 while hypocritically denying that it was trying to obtain WMD. Libyan Foreign Ministry official Hasuna al-Shawish called on US Undersecretary of State John Bolton to provide evidence for his claim that Libya was seeking WMD.
The Libyan Shift: claims, justifications and reactions
The most recent shift - or drift - in Libyan policy began in October 2001, when Musa Kusa, director of Libya's external intelligence, arrived in London for talks with MI6, the British secret intelligence service, and members of the CIA.26
Surreptitious, high level diplomatic and intelligence interactions continued, leading to a series of exploratory visits to various Libyan installations supposedly involved in WMD acquisition. In August 2003, for the first time Gadafy publicly announced that he was willing to allow international biological and chemical inspectors to visit Libyan sites.27 Visits commenced in October 2003, just a few weeks after US and British intelligence services discovered that a freighter bound for Libya was hauling thousands of parts for specific centrifuges - a key component for producing nuclear weapons. Whether the interception of the cargo, worth tens of millions of dollars, was a consequence or a cardinal factor in Libya's decision to give up its deadliest weapons programmes, has yet to be determined.28 There is some speculation that it was subsequent US threats, rather than the lengthy British and American diplomacy vaunted by Tony Blair, which really sparked Gadafy to abandon his WMD ambitions.29
Further visits to Libyan WMD-related facilities were undertaken in December 2003, lasting for four weeks. The head of Libyan intelligence and Gadafy's own son, Saif Aleslam, were the main Libyan figures engaging with M16 and the CIA during this period. According to a US source, "The Libyans were quite open. They provided access to facilities. They provided substantial documentation about their programmes. And we were able to take samples, photographs and other evidence."30
This act of deproliferation attracted enormous attention worldwide. The motives and incentives for Gadafy's move were subject to a variety of interpretations, ranging from Libya's innate goodness to rumours that Gadafy had been diagnosed with throat cancer and had two years to live.31
The Libyan regime offered different explanations. Prime Minister Shokri Ghanem contended that deproliferation "is in the interests of the Libyan people and in the interest of the whole world community".32 He later added: "WMD are very costly. It's better that we concentrate on our economic development".33 Gadafy himself, in an exclusive interview with CNN, acknowledged that his country "had certain WMD programmes and machines", and yet that "we have not these weapons", adding that the programmes he is prepared to dismantle "would have been for peaceful purposes - but nevertheless we decided to get rid of them completely". It was also reported that the war in Iraq might have played a role in Gadafy's decision to dismantle his country's WMD programmes.34
Gadafy also called on other states to follow his dramatic example, by admitting involvement in banned weapons programmes, if they were to prevent "tragedy" from striking their nations.35 A few days later, Libya's Foreign Minister, Abdel Rahman Shalgam, maintained at a news conference, "We didn't arrive to the point of weaponisation".36 He then asserted that the Libyan step was a completely voluntary decision by the Libyan Popular Congress (parliament).37
Despite claiming Libya's deproliferation as a success, some in the US and Britain sounded notes of caution. Whilst promising, "As Libya takes tangible steps to address our concerns the US will in turn take reciprocal tangible steps to recognise Libya's progress," President Bush added that the US had "serious concerns" about Libyan policies and actions, including its pursuit of WMD.38 State Department deputy spokesman Adam Ereli said "It is a long process. We need to make sure that there is follow through on the Libyan commitments."39
In Britain, the Conservative Party's Foreign Affairs Spokesman, Michael Ancram, asked: "Do you really believe that with all the evidence of irrationality, dishonesty and totalitarianism, Gadafy can genuinely be trusted on this occasion?"40 A senior Western diplomat said Libya still has to "show how serious it is. The real issue is whether the Libyans are prepared to have the kind of inspection regime that the US and Britain think is needed."41
Others were sceptical or looked for underlying motivations: "By pretending to eliminate WMD he does not possess, Gadafy has given a huge political bonus to Bush and Blair, a way for them to evade censure for shamelessly lying to their nations into the Iraq war."42 Also: "By amazing coincidence, Gadafy's first message to Britain occurred just days before the invasion of Iraq. And his final capitulation to US-British terms occurred just five days after Saddam Hussein was fished out of a rat-hole."43 Some even suggested that Libya's new disarmament overtures might be but a smokescreen for easier access to foreign technology.44
It is likely that heterogeneous cluster of factors - political, diplomatic, strategic and personal - initiated and fuelled Libya's change of policy. Firstly, there was a desire to avoid another military confrontation with the US, which might now be sparked by Libya's pursuit of WMD as well as its support for terrorism. Gadafy had seen what happened to Saddam. Gadafy himself felt under threat from fundamentalist Islamic groups in Libya and wanted allies. Iran had come under increasing pressure over its nuclear programme and had agreed to sign the IAEA's Additional Protocol and undergo intrusive nuclear inspections. Libya's increasing need for economic recovery meant that US sanctions needed to be lifted. One may argue about the relative weight of each of those factors, yet all are likely to be contributory.
Conversely, the very multiplicity of causes may be indicative of incoherence and irrationality in the decisionmaking. Perhaps the answer boils down to Gadafy's personal realisation that Libya urgently needs substantial injections of technological equipment and know-how for its oil industry and oil-related economy. Having just celebrated his 34th anniversary in office, Gadafy perhaps wishes to revive some sense of political and economic dynamism in order to reinvigorate his hold on power, particularly against domestic Islamist opposition. Only a friendly US can help him achieve these crucial goals.45
It looks as if Libya hid its change of approach even from its Middle Eastern allies, such as Syria and Iran. Likewise, the US and UK hid their contacts from NATO and Israel. Israel's head of military intelligence commented that "the contacts were extremely classified and in that case the US did not cooperate with us. To my best knowledge only five people in the US were involved".46 As Prime Minister Sharon pointed at Libya's accelerated approach toward nuclear weapons, the US responded: "We handle this, and you should keep a low profile."47 That attitude turned out to be expedient.
Libya's willingness to totally abandon its WMD programmes may make it a pioneer model in the Middle East. Conceivably, it may propel a Middle-Eastern chain-reaction of WMD deproliferation. Moreover, Libya announced it "will not deal in any military goods or services with states which Libya considers to be of serious weapons of mass destruction proliferation concern."48
One potential problematic question concerning the new situation - assuming that all the relevant WMD facilities and related assets have been uncovered - is whether their conversion is reversible and, if so, whether any future military-oriented reutilisation would be detectable? Although the Libyan move appears genuine those issues should still be addressed.
On the evening of September 11 2001, Gadafy, said "Irrespective of the conflict with America, it is a human duty to show sympathy with the American people and be with them in these horrifying and awesome events which are bound to awaken human conscience... a heartfelt expression of sorrow, signalling that our two countries had reached a common recognition of the need to eliminate the dangers of international extremism and terrorism. While America's relations with most Arab nations teeter between tense and cautiously cooperative, Libya and the United States are coming closer together. Libya has moved steadily in recent years to eliminate the antagonism that has long divided us."49
As Western interest in the prospects for stability along the southern shore of the Mediterranean in general has increased, it has become fashionable among foreign and security policy elites and publics in Europe to refer to a new arc of crisis in the south.50
At the same time, Tripoli's African-oriented approach needs to be taken into account. Libya's recent accession to the CWC may undermine any efficacy the one-time Arab League policy opposing that treaty had retained. Gadafy has spent most of the last decade transforming his 'pariah state' into a political and economic leader in Africa, both above and below the Sahara. His desire to be a leader of the continent seems to have won out over any dedication to the remnants of Arab unity. The Pelindaba Treaty for an African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone was regarded as an important unifier in the wake of South Africa's renunciation of its nuclear weapon programme in the early 1990s. Two-thirds of African states have already joined the CWC. Although many African signatories have yet to ratify, there are only three non-signatory states besides Libya on the African continent (Angola, Somalia, and Sao Tome and Principe).51 The desire to consolidate his African-oriented approach should not therefore be underestimated as a factor in Gadafy's political shift and renunciation of weapons of mass destruction.52
Many questions about Libya's WMD programmes persist. What was the nature of and progress made within the Libyan Ibn-Hayan BW project? What is the essence of the Libyan-Pakistani-Iranian nuclear triangular? And what was the fate of the Iraqi chemical-biological-nuclear assets, which in part endured mostly intact, until 2002? If Libya is really prepared to come clean about all aspects of its WMD programmes, answers to these questions should not be long in coming, and may provide further insights into the mechanisms and motivations of WMD proliferation.
1. David Ruppe, Global Security Newswire, Wednesday, April 14, 2004
2. Hans de Vreij, 'Libya comes clean', Radio Netherlands Wereldomroep, March 5, 2004
3. Chris Schneidmiller, Experts Say Much Work Needed To Finish Libyan Disarmament, Global Security Newswire, Tuesday, March 23, 2004 issue.
4. Libya comes clear, by Hans de Vreij, Radio Netherlands Wereldomroep, March 5, 2004
5. Burck, G.M. & Flowerree, C.C., International Handbook on Chemical Weapons Proliferation, (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991).
6. Joshua Sinai, "Libya's Pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction," The Nonproliferation Review, 4, (Spring-Summer 1997), p. 94.
7. John Hart, Libyan WMD Proliferation: Motivated to Defy America, University of Michigan Political Science, 472, Professor Raymond Tanter Press, December 10, 1997
8. Jonathan Marcus, 'Libya destroys chemical weapons', BBC News - world edition, March 4, 2004.
9. Joshua Sinai, "Libya's Pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction," The Nonproliferation Review, 4, (Spring-Summer 1997), p. 94.
10. Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service, A New Challenge After the Cold War: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, March 1993, p. 100.
11. Libyan Biological Warfare, Global Security.org, January 18, 2004
12. John Hart, Libyan WMD Proliferation: Motivated to Defy America University of Michigan Political Science 472, Professor Raymond Tanter Press, December 10, 1997.
13. Jenni Rissanen, Acrimonious Opening for BWC Review Conference, BWC Review Conference Bulletin, (Acronym Institute, November 19, 2001), http:// www.acronym.org.uk/bwc/revcon1.htm.
14. Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service, A New Challenge After the Cold War: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 1993, p. 100.
15. Exposing Libya and the emerging axis of evil: Pakistan-Libya-Iran, December 27, 2003, FirstWatch International (FWI), a private WMD proliferation research group in Monterey, California (http://www.firstwatchint.org/) .
16. Exposing Libya and the emerging axis of evil: Pakistan-Libya-Iran, December 27, 2003, FirstWatch International (FWI), a private WMD proliferation research group in Monterey, California (http://www.firstwatchint.org/) .
17. Raymond Bonner and Craig S. Smith, 'Tripoli had all parts for nuclear bomb', The New York Times, March 17, 2004
19. The New York Times, May 24, 2004
20. UPI, March 31, 2004 (UPI)
21. Shoham, D., "The Islamic Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat"; In: The Strategic Threat of Islam; New Leaf Press, USA; D. Bukai (ed.); in press
22.Letter to the President of the CD dated 16 February 1990; CD/970, February 20, 1990
23. CIA: Libya, Syria, Sudan eye weapons of mass destruction Posted: 7:36 PM (Manila Time) January. 8, 2003 By Maxim Kniazkov Agence France-Presse
24. Al-Jazirah (Libya), March 25, 2002
25. Global Security Newswire, April 19, 2002.
26. Musa has been suspected of masterminding the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103, the worst terrorist mass murder in British history. Nick Pelham, 'Libyan linked to Lockerbie welcome in UK War on Terrorism' The Observer, October 7, 2001.
27. An interview with ABC's This Week with George Stephanopoulus, August 4, 2003
28. Washington Post, January 1, 2004
29. The Daily Telegraph, January 18, 2004
30. Washington Post, December 21, 2003
31. The Scotsman, December 22, 2003
32. Associated Press, December 23, 2003
33. BBC, December 31, 2003
34. 'Gadhafi: Iraq war may have influenced WMD decision', CNN.com, December 23, 2003
35. The Telegraph, December 24, 2003
36. Associated Press, December28, 2003
37. Agence France Presse, January 6, 2004
38. Associated Press, January, 7 2004
39. The Australian, December 30, 2003
40. The Guardian, January 6, 2004
41. The Daily Telegraph, January 8, 2004
42. The Winnipeg Sun, January 12, 2004
43. CalPundit, CALPUN, Posted by Kevin Drum, December 23, 2003
44. Exposing Libya and the emerging axis of evil: Pakistan-Libya-Iran, December 27, 2003, FirstWatch International (FWI), a private WMD proliferation research group in Monterey, California (http://www.firstwatchint.org/).
45. Qaddafi's Christmas Gift: What's Behind Libya's Decision to Renounce WMD? Yehudit Ronen, Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Department of Political Science, Bar-Ilan University
46. 'They would torture your soul' (Hebrew), Yediot Akharonot (Israel), April 11, 2004
47. Ha'aretz (Israel), December 22, 2003.
48. Mike Nartker, 'Libya Ends Military Trade With Countries of "Proliferation Concern"', Global Security Newswire, May 14, 2004
49. Saif Aleslam al-Qaddafi, Libyan American relations, Middle East Policy, vol. X, no. 1, Spring 2003
50. Lesser, I. O., Security in North Africa: Internal and External Challenges, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, CA. NTIS Technical Report AD-A282 352/4, 1993.
51. Pamela Mills, 'Preventing chemical warfare and terrorism: the CWC and the Middle-East', Disarmament Diplomacy, July/August 2002, pp. 25-33).
52. Ronen, Yehudit, "Libya's Diplomatic Success in Africa: The Reemergence of Qaddafi on the International Stage" [60-74]. Diplomacy and Statecraft, December 2002 (Vol.13, No.4).
© 2004 The Acronym Institute.