Disarmament Diplomacy

Kerry or Bush:
What Future for US Security Policy?

John Isaacs

One simple way to describe a foreign and national security policy under Senator John Kerry is by saying what it is not: it will not be a Bush national security policy.

If John Kerry is elected President, some dominant tenets of George W. Bush's foreign and national security policies will disappear:

• Gone will be the emphasis on American unilateral assertion of its military power abroad with scant regard to the views of its friends and allies,
• Gone will be the disregard for international treaties that the United States had helped construct and maintain and that had produced the framework on which much of the world, including the United States, is dependent, and
• Gone will be the messianic promotion of American-style democracy around the world.

For most of the rest of the world, it will be like the proverbial individual who stops hitting his or her head continuously against a brick wall: it's going to feel much better - irrespective of the alternatives.

In fact, we know far more about a Kerry national security policy than a Bush second term policy. Kerry has spoken often during the campaign about his international agenda, and has a 20-year Senate record to examine. On the other hand, President Bush has revealed little about his second term agenda, either domestic or foreign. We can't even be sure if the neo-conservatives who dominated the first Bush administration will return in full force or if, since the neo-con policies have largely been discredited, Republican internationalists and pragmatists will return to power.

Kerry's international experience

Senator Kerry has served on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee since he entered the Senate in 1985. He has a broad command of international issues, is aware of past history of cooperation with other countries and has met with many nations' leaders. This depth of knowledge sets him apart from the last two American Presidents, George W. Bush and Bill Clinton.

Clinton came to the presidency with little foreign policy background, and pledged from the beginning to focus on domestic issues ("It's the economy stupid"). When he became engaged on an international issue - NATO enlargement or trade, for example - the Clinton administration tended to be successful. In areas where Clinton paid less attention - ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, for example - his efforts failed.

Bush entered office with little international experience, but appointed a team of experienced international policymakers. Key national security officials such as Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of State Colin Powell and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice were important influences on the direction of policy. However, when these officials disagree on an issue, such as how to deal with North Korean nuclear aspirations, Bush has not been sufficiently experienced to drive the government to an effective decision.

Senator Kerry's international experience means he can hit the ground running. We can expect early action on festering international crises such as broken alliances, the floundering Iraq war effort, the nuclear crises in Iran and North Korea, and the conflict in the Middle East. Some deadlines will force early decisions, including the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference scheduled at the United Nations in May 2005.

Moreover, Kerry has sufficient confidence in his judgment to be able to listen to a range of different views, but squash bureaucratic turf wars and unconstructive disagreements. In some ways, Kerry's policymaking process is likely to wind up similar to that of George Herbert Walker Bush, the father of the present president. Bush I had extensive international experience; working with Secretary of State James Baker and National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, he was quick and nimble in dealing with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war.

A Kerry term would mean a return to a broad consensus on the direction of American national security policy shared by both American political parties. This is the realistic and pragmatic view shared by most analysts, including officials of the Bush I administration, such as Scowcroft, Baker and Laurence Eagleburger. Certainly, Kerry's national security and foreign policy platform underlines how different he would be from the approach of Bush II and the neo-conservatives.

Rebuilding alliances and working with the United Nations

During the campaign for president, Kerry has repeatedly contrasted his foreign policy vision with that of President Bush, criticising the incumbent for weakening international alliances, undermining cooperation with the United Nations and rejecting or undermining important international treaties.

Although then-Governor Bush suggested in his first campaign for President that the United States needed to speak softly internationally, his policies have been quite the opposite. Particularly since September 11, 2001, the Bush national security policy has been dominated by the neo-conservative ideology - a credo that the United States:

- Is the paramount economic, military and political power and should use its strength to create its vision of order in the world, with a liberal dose of preemptive (or preventative) military power to enforce US positions;

- Will go it alone if most other countries disagree with its policy direction;

- Will disengage from entangling international agreements, institutions and rules that only constrain American power;

- Will aggressively promote US-style democracy, around the world, particularly in the Middle East;

- Will insist that rules, treaties, laws and norms that apply to other countries do not necessarily apply to the United States, on issues ranging from torture to preemption without a warranting immediate threat.¹

The neo-conservative doctrine drove the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. As a result, old alliances have been shaken and the United Nations undermined. Deeply sceptical of US motives, few countries have wanted to help the United States in Iraq, either during the active combat operations or the rebuilding process. US popularity has sunk to new lows across the globe.

By contrast, Kerry has spoken often of collaboration with allies, the strengthening of alliances, and cooperation with the United Nations. He has argued that alliances have served the United States well during the cold war and now. He suggests that close cooperative relations with other countries are needed today to confront common problems, including the scourge of terrorism. He declared "I will replace the Bush years of isolation with a new era of alliances - because while the Cold War has ended, our need for allies to confront and overcome a different array of dangers and challenges is as great or greater than ever."² Within his first one hundred days in office, Kerry has pledged, he will "go to the United Nations and travel to our traditional allies to affirm that the United States has rejoined the community of nations." ³

As President, Kerry could be depended on to work more cooperatively with the United Nations than Bush, who initially pushed that institution aside, only to seek UN help when his reconstruction of Iraq faltered. Kerry has stated that he will "treat the UN as a full partner - not only in the war on terror, but in combating other common enemies like AIDS and global poverty."⁴

Nothing has angered allies or isolated the United States more than George Bush's preemptive war doctrine, which he enunciated in a major West Point speech in 2002 and then implemented in what was really a preventive war in Iraq. Kerry, on the other hand, has said that preemption should be a last resort.

Another irritant to alliance relations is President Bush's announcement on August 16, 2004 that the United States intends to withdraw some 70,000 troops from overseas bases over the next decade, primarily from Germany, Japan and South Korea. Kerry, responding two days later, told a 'Veterans of Foreign Wars' convention that he disagrees with this decision: "Nobody wants to bring troops home more than those of us who have fought in foreign wars. But it needs to be done at the right time and in a sensible way. This is not that time or that way."⁵

While taking steps to facilitate peace and mutual understanding, Kerry also finds it important to address those countries that do not cooperate with the greater goals of establishing regional peace and preventing terrorism. With this in mind, Kerry wants to deal more sternly with the Saudi government regarding its role in financing terrorist groups and its support of extremist clerics. Kerry is concerned that "America has lost its voice when talking about the policies and practices of some governments in the Persian Gulf" due to our dependence on oil from the Middle East.⁶ He remarked in his speech to the National Democratic Convention in July: "I want an America that relies on its own ingenuity and innovation - not the Saudi royal family."⁷ If elected, Kerry plans to speak up and "name and shame" banks and countries that finance terror.⁸

Where Bush administration jibes - not least the "axis of evil" State of the Union speech and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's "Old Europe" remark - have damaged relations with other nations, Kerry is unlikely to resort to such inflammatory rhetoric, campaign statements notwithstanding.

Opposite directions in nuclear policy

The Bush administration turned the clock back on post cold war nuclear policy in many ways, taking steps aimed toward building a new generation of nuclear weapons, resuming nuclear weapons explosive testing and using nuclear weapons in future conflicts:

• It has requested funds for research into a nuclear weapon to dig deeply into the earth, formally called a Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator and frequently labelled a nuclear bunker buster, plus $9 million for "advanced concept initiatives" that could include work on new small-yield nuclear weapons.
• It has sought to reduce the amount of time it takes to carry out a technically significant nuclear test explosion from the current 24 - 36 months to 18 months.
• It proposed to build what is called the Modern Pit Facility - a $4 billion plant where new pits for nuclear weapons will be fabricated. (A pit, made of plutonium, triggers the nuclear explosion in modern thermonuclear weapons.) This facility, when completed, would be able to produce 125 ? 450 plutonium pits per year.
• Its 2001 Nuclear Posture Review suggested possible first use of nuclear weapons against countries without nuclear weapons (Syria, Libya, Iraq, Iran) and in other non-nuclear situations, such as a North Korean attack on South Korea or a confrontation with China over Taiwan.
• Its 2002 National Security Presidential Directive, known as NSPD-17, made explicit a previously ambiguous policy that the United States may use nuclear weapons in response to the use of chemical or biological weapons against our forces.
• The administration has openly stated its opposition to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and refused to ask the Senate to reconsider its ratification, rejected by a Republican majority in 1999. Some administration officials have also proposed that the United States withdraw its signature from the treaty.

All this suggests that if Bush is re-elected, he is likely to approve production of a new generation of nuclear weapons and quite possibly a return to nuclear explosive testing. The universal norm against nuclear testing and the test ban treaty would be seriously jeopardised. A new nuclear arms race could be generated that bestowed increased value to nuclear weapons and made them more desirable to others.

Based on Senator Kerry's long record in the Senate and statements on the campaign trail, a Kerry administration would move in the opposite direction. In a June 2004 campaign speech, Kerry stated that, "As President, I will stop this administration's programme to develop a whole generation of bunker?busting nuclear bombs. This is a weapon we don't need. And it undermines our credibility in persuading other nations. What kind of message does it send when we're asking other countries not to develop nuclear weapons, but developing new ones ourselves?"⁹

Concerning nuclear nonproliferation policies, the Bush administration initially sought to cut the Cooperative Threat Reduction Programme (the so-called Nunn-Lugar programme) for securing and dismantling Russian nuclear weapons and materials, but was forced to see common sense and restore the funding. It has recently endorsed a lengthy global clean-out of potential bomb-making material. But Bush II never made nonproliferation policy a high priority - except to use Iraq's non-existent weapons of mass destruction as pretext to invade that country - and he thus missed an important opportunity to strengthen US security.

Kerry, on the other hand has indicated that non-proliferation will be a key national security priority. Kerry believes that as the United States seeks to reduce the international threat of nuclear weapons, it too must reduce its excess stocks and prevent the future development of such weapons. To facilitate timely reductions in nuclear weapons, Kerry pledges to eliminate bureaucratic obstacles to the US?Russian arms reductions schedules. In a June 1 speech, he spoke of launching a new mission "to prevent the world's deadliest weapons from falling into the world's most dangerous hands."¹⁰

Kerry pledged "to lock up and safeguard nuclear weapons material so terrorists can never acquire it."¹¹ He promised to expand the scope of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction programme and increase its funding. While current plans will require thirteen more years to secure potential bomb material in the former Soviet Union, Kerry would speed up the programme to finish in four years.¹²

The Bush administration has recently torpedoed the hope of getting fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) talks underway in Geneva, by rejecting the possibility of a multilateral verification arrangement, therefore nullifying the agreed negotiating mandate. By contrast, Kerry would do his best to get FMCT negotiations going again: "America must lead an international coalition to halt, and then verifiably ban, all production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium for use in nuclear weapons."¹³

Verification is a key word here. The Bush administration flatly rejects verification agreements that could open US facilities to foreign inspectors. In addition to its recent decision to reject inspections in relation to the FMCT, it wrecked agreement on the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) verification protocol in 2001, after six years of negotiations.

Kerry, perhaps remembering the old Ronald Reagan line of "Trust But Verify", believes in tough verification as a vital component of nonproliferation policy, as illustrated by the following: "We need to strengthen enforcement and verification. We must make rigorous inspection protocols mandatory, and refocus the mission of the International Atomic Energy Agency to stop the spread of nuclear weapons material."¹⁴ Kerry has also spoken of the need to "strengthen the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to close the loophole that lets countries develop nuclear weapons capabilities under the guise of a peaceful, civilian nuclear power programme."¹⁵

This is a far cry from the Bush administration, which has consistently made clear its disdain for international treaties. It abandoned the Kyoto Protocol on Global Warming, the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, the International Criminal Court and international efforts to strengthen the BWC with a verification protocol. One of its proudest achievements was the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) with Russia in 2002, which reduces deployed strategic nuclear weapons over the next decade. Typically, this was more a three-page political handshake than an enforceable treaty, with no provisions for dismantling weapons taken out of deployment, no verification, and with important details left to be filled in at a later date.

Kerry, who fought for ratification of the CTBT in the late 1990s, would have no aversion to bold treaties. Indeed, in 2003, Kerry returned from the campaign trail to offer an amendment in the Senate to strengthen SORT. If elected, Kerry is expected to explore renewing the effort to ratify the CTBT, which he regards as "a critical component of broader US strategy on nuclear nonproliferation."¹⁶

What is not clear, however, is whether a Kerry administration would spend precious political capital to win the Senate's approval of the CTBT. Even if Kerry wins and the Senate returns to Democratic control, ratification will be an extremely difficult undertaking. Senate approval would require a two-thirds majority, or 67 of the 100 Senators. Thus, no matter who controls the Senate, Kerry will still need at least 20 Republicans to vote for the treaty. There is no indication that opposition to the CTBT within the Republican Party has waned. Moreover, most Senate votes on nuclear weapons issues during the past four years have produced solid Republican support for Bush nuclear policies.

For years, Indiana Senator Richard Lugar (R) and former Georgia Senator Sam Nunn (D) pressed Bush to appoint a high-level official to coordinate the numerous proliferation programmes scattered among many agencies. Kerry has listened and plans to appoint a "National Coordinator for Nuclear Terrorism and Counterproliferation."¹⁷

Under Kerry, there would be a major change in American policy toward missile defence. Later this year, President Bush is expected to declare operational a rudimentary system sited at Fort Greely, Alaska. He recently lauded the Fort Greely deployment: "It's the beginning of a missile defence system that was envisioned by Ronald Reagan, a system necessary to protect us against the threats of the 21st century... I think those who oppose this ballistic missile system really don't understand the threats of the 21st century. They're living in the past."¹⁸ The Bush administration rejects controls on weapons in outer space and advocates the development of space?based weapons as a means of improving the capacity of ballistic missile defence. On the other hand, Kerry supports a ban on space weapons.¹⁹ If elected to a second term, President Bush can be expected to continue and expand the national first stage of missile defence, while exploring new versions of missile defences on land, at sea, in the air and in space: "We want to continue to perfect this system."²⁰

The response from the Kerry campaign to the President's August speech touting missile defence was sharp. Rand Beers, a former National Security Council staffer who has become one of Kerry's top national security advisors, declared: "Despite this administration's near obsession with missile defence, the greatest threat facing our homeland comes from terrorists who would do us harm. In the months preceding 9/11 George W. Bush and his closest advisors were preoccupied with missile defense and their misunderstanding about the threats we face continues to this day."²¹

Kerry opposes deployment of an untested system that is uncertain to work. In his criticism of the notion of a missile shield, he declared that the United States "cannot afford to spend billions to deploy an unproven missile defense system."²² Furthermore, Kerry views missile defence as "the wrong priority in the war on terror."²³ He has talked about cutting unspecified billions of dollars from missile defence to pay for his proposals to modernise the military.²⁴ Thus if elected, it is likely that Kerry would continue research and testing but reduce the funding and abandon some of the more "far out" space-based programmes. Whether he would return the one missile defence site at Fort Greely to being a test site and take it off operational status is not clear.

Dealing with potential nuclear states

Senator Kerry has asserted that the "[Bush] administration has been fixated on Iraq while the nuclear dangers from North Korea have multiplied."²⁵ He argued that the United States has "essentially negotiated over the shape of the table while the North Koreans allegedly have made enough new fuel to make six to nine nuclear bombs."²⁶

While the Bush administration focused on Iraq, which no longer had a credible nuclear weapons programme, it paid less attention to festering nuclear crises in North Korea and Iran. At the onset of the crisis in North Korea, Bush refused bilateral negotiations with the isolated regime and also rebuffed suggestions for aid and other incentives that could have encouraged North Korea to give up its nuclear programme. In part, the administration was paralysed by in-fighting between the Departments of State and Defense. More recently, the Bush administration has relaxed its position on the use of incentives and engaged in side talks directly with North Korea during the six-power talks aimed at resolving the crisis.

While continuing to support the six-party talks with North Korea, Kerry believes that "all options must remain on the table" to accomplish the elimination of their nuclear programme. A Kerry Administration would support the use of incentives to bring about the end of the North Korean nuclear programme and would engage in direct bilateral negotiations with the regime as a means for realising this objective. Kerry has stated that, "we must be prepared to talk directly to North Korea. This problem is too urgent to allow China, or others at the table, to speak for us."²⁷

With regard to Iran, Kerry has castigated the Bush team for looking in the wrong direction: "While we have been preoccupied in Iraq, next door in Iran, a nuclear programme has been reportedly moving ahead."²⁸ Bush has refused to directly engage Iran and demands UN Security Council sanctions. The Kerry position is clear: "Let me say it plainly: a nuclear armed Iran is unacceptable."²⁹ To forestall that result, Kerry would emphasise the use of diplomacy and cooperation with the European Union and IAEA, and would also attempt to engage directly with Iran. While Senator Kerry supports UN Security Council action as a last resort, he proposes organising a group of states to "call Iran's bluff" and exert pressure in the present.³⁰ This group of states would offer Iran nuclear fuel for peaceful energy production and take back the spent fuel so that it could not be reprocessed and used to build nuclear weapons. While it is not clear if such an approach would persuade Iran to forego its nuclear aspirations, Kerry is clearly determined to try to resolve the crisis first with the tools of diplomacy.

Where Bush and Kerry Agree

There are some critical areas in which there may be little difference between the two candidates. Iraq is the most notable example, and one that remains at the heart of the race for the presidency. In October 2002, Kerry voted in favour of President Bush's request for authorisation to use force in Iraq. In August 2004, Kerry reaffirmed that, despite the absence of weapons of mass destruction, he would vote the same way today. "Giving Bush the authority he sought was appropriate and is authority I would have wanted as president," Kerry said Thursday in an interview with USA Today. "He didn't use the authority correctly."³¹

Kerry's criticisms therefore centre not on the decision to go to war, but on how Bush has carried out the war. He points to Bush's refusal to continue international inspections, his inability to secure international support for the war in the United Nations and his alienation of allies in the run-up to the war. He also points to the failure of the administration to plan for the peace. On May 27, 2004, Kerry argued that "they looked to force before exhausting diplomacy. They bullied when they should have persuaded. They have gone it alone when they should have assembled a team."³²

Despite his reservations, Kerry is not prepared to withdraw US troops from Iraq any time soon. He has argued: "Having gone to war, we cannot afford to fail at peace."³³ He has suggested that a failed state in Iraq "inevitably would become a haven for terrorists and a destabilising force in the Middle East."³⁴ On this issue, Kerry's view is similar to Bush's. Those parallel views illustrate the quagmire for either president: difficult to stay and difficult to leave. Kerry hopes to win greater international assistance for the Iraqi rebuilding process, however. "We need help from others. Getting that help will require not only convincing our friends and allies that we share an interest in preventing failure but also giving them a meaningful voice and role in Iraqi affairs."³⁵ Kerry's plan includes mobilising NATO to help stabilise Iraq, overhauling the training programmes to build Iraqi security forces, giving allies access to the multibillion-dollar reconstruction projects, organising a regional conference with Iraq's neighbours to secure pledges to respect Iraq's borders and to refrain from interfering in Iraq's internal affairs, and seeking an international high commissioner to coordinate economic assistance.³⁶ It is not clear if this additional help will be forthcoming, or if it is just wishful thinking.

On the conflict between Israel and Palestine, there is little difference between the two candidates -with one major exception. Both candidates are strongly committed to the security of Israel. Neither candidate has uttered criticism of Israel's leader, Ariel Sharon, the expansion of the settlements or the building of the enormous wall between Israel and Palestine. However, Bush has left the security situation in the Middle East to fester and has made little attempt to engage the Muslim world.

Bill Clinton, another strong friend of Israel, came very close to producing a Middle East peace settlement. Kerry has argued for a strong American hand in the peace process and that America must place higher priority on the creation of an enduring peace between Israel and its neighbours. Kerry has stated that he plans to appoint a Presidential Ambassador to the Peace Process who will "work day to day" to facilitate peace.³⁷

Another issue where there is not much difference between Kerry and Bush is the size of the military budget, which has grown to about $475 billion annually, including the cost of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. It will be difficult for either candidate to bring about major reductions in the military budget while fears of terrorism remain strong and US troops continue to fight in Iraq and Afghanistan. Kerry's few specific proposals in this field include adding 40,000 troops to the active duty Army to deal with personnel shortages, streamlining weapons programmes, doubling special forces, and investing in new technologies for our armed forces.³⁸ Bush is likely to continue the status quo, slowly working for transformation of the military to meet the challenges of the 21st Century while still purchasing Cold War weapons.

Bush second term policy

As indicated above, there are many more clues from which to gauge the likely direction of Senator Kerry's national security policy than a second term Bush policy. Through late August, the president and his team have spent the campaign touting their achievements during the first four years and criticising Senator Kerry's approach to policy, without saying much about the future. It is widely expected that many of the top Bush people - Powell, Rumsfeld and Rice, to name three - will not serve in a second term, or at least not in the same positions. It is not clear who will replace them. Some of the second tier individuals such as Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith have proved so controversial that they could probably not be confirmed by the Senate to cabinet-level positions.

The major question for a second Bush term is whether the neo-conservatives who have dominated Bush policy direction since before the September 11 attacks have been so discredited by their failures over Iraq that their influence fades. That is, will Bush's disaster in Iraq lead to a return of the Republican internationalists symbolised by Brent Scowcroft, Laurence Eagleburger and Jim Baker? There is another school of thought, however, that the neo-cons will be back in full force, because they have the ears - and the hearts - of President Bush and Vice President Cheney. There has already been talk of threats to send in US military forces to deal with a recalcitrant Syria or Iran.

This author's belief is that the neo-cons will retreat to think tanks and thunder their criticisms of new policies, but they will not dominate a second Bush term in the way they did in the first. The Bush administration is highly political. A re-election plank based in part on success in transforming Iraq has turned into one of the greatest international blunders in US history and has jeopardised the president's re-election chances. The political strategists who are critical to Bush's success may decide that the neo-cons have had their turn and have failed. But of course, this is only conjecture!

Conclusion

Much of the rest of the world and many in the United States have been deeply disturbed by the direction of US national security policy over the past four years. As a result, there has been increasing tension between the United States and many other governments, and much more vociferous international antipathy towards American policies than at any other time in the past.

Should John Kerry be elected President, there will be a dramatically new tone to American security policy that will be more cooperative, more internationalist, and more diplomatic. There will be less inclination to jab at other countries. These changes will not ensure that a Kerry foreign policy will be successful. There are major problems that defy easy solution no matter who is president. Solving the Iranian and North Korean conundrums will be challenging. Senator Kerry has said nothing about how to reconcile the increasing American ties with Pakistan given that country's dismal human rights record. Moreover, there will be severe US budgetary problems that will make major new expenditures abroad difficult. Finally, as many Democratic presidents have found on foreign policy issues, Congress will be in a position to block or overturn at least some Kerry initiatives, limiting his flexibility and forcing him to work closely with those less internationalist than he is.

Some decisions can be made easily and early in a new Kerry Administration. Some policy actions will take a year or more to develop and implement. In any event, it is likely to take six months or more before most of the new policymakers have been nominated, approved and take office.

Should President Bush return to office, the policy direction of the country is less obvious. The President has begun to modify some of his harsher practices, and has found he needed to work more closely with the United Nations in the transition from American occupation to self-rule in Iraq. Whether that was a decision taken in desperation months before the American election that will be reversed in 2005 or whether Bush has taken on the lessons and will be prepared to modify his policies in his second term is less than clear. What is clear, is that the ultimate direction of American foreign policy will be in the hands of undecided voters in a few key states who may have little interest in international issues at all.

Notes

1. Based in part on G. John Ikenberry, "The End of the Neo-Conservative Moment", Survival, Spring 2004, pp.8 - 10

2. Sen. John Kerry, "Making America Secure Again: Setting the Right Course for Foreign Policy", address to Council on Foreign Relations, New York, NY, December 3, 2003

3. Sen. John Kerry, "Making America Secure Again: Setting the Right Course for Foreign Policy", address to Council on Foreign Relations, New York, NY, December 3, 2003.

4. Ibid.

5. Sen. John Kerry, untitled speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars 105th Annual Convention, August 18, 2004.

6. Sen. John Kerry, "Security and Strength for a New World", speech in Seattle, Washington, May 27, 2004.

7. Sen. John Kerry, speech to the 2004 National Democratic Convention, July 29, 2004.

8. Sen. John Kerry, "Fighting a Comprehensive War on Terrorism", speech at University of California at Los Angeles, February 27, 2004

9. Sen. John Kerry, "New Strategies to Meet New Threats", speech in West Palm Beach, Florida, June 1, 2004.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. Sen. John Kerry, US Senate Congressional Record, October 12, 1999.

17. Sen. John Kerry, "New Strategies to Meet New Threats", speech in West Palm Beach, Florida, June 1, 2004.

18. President George W. Bush, speech at Boeing Company, Ridley Park, Pennsylvania, August 17, 2004.

19. "Responses from Presidential Candidates to Six Critical National Security Questions", Council for a Livable World, December 10, 2003.

20. President George W. Bush, speech at Boeing Company, Ridley Park, Pennsylvania, August 17, 2004.

21. Press release by Kerry campaign, August 17, 2004.

22. Sen. John Kerry, "Strengthening Our Military", speech in Independence, Missouri, June 3, 2004.

23. Ibid.

24. Chicago Tribune, June 4, 2004

25. Sen. John Kerry, "New Strategies to Meet New Threats", speech in West Palm Beach, Florida, June 1, 2004.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

31. "On Iraq, 'The President Broke His Word,' USA Today, 22 July 22, 2004.

32. Sen. John Kerry, "Security and Strength for a New World", speech in Seattle, Washington, May 27, 2004.

33. "Winning the Peace In Iraq", Kerry web site, http://www.johnkerry.com/issues/national_security/iraq.html

34. Ibid.

35. Sen. John Kerry, "A Realistic Path in Iraq", Op-Ed in Washington Post, July 4, 2004.

36. Ibid.

37. Sen. John Kerry, "Making American Secure Again: Setting the Right Course for Foreign Policy", address to Council on Foreign Relations", December 3, 2003

38. "A New Military To Meet New Threats", Kerry fact sheet on web site, http://www.johnkerry.com/issues/national_security/newthreats.html

John Isaacs is president and executive director of Council for a Livable World, a Washington, D.C.-based arms control advocacy organisation. He has been involved in American politics and lobbying Congress for over 25 years. Special thanks for research assistance to Frances Hartwell.

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