 Disarmament Diplomacy
Issue No. 78, July/August 2004
In the News
Deep Divisions over Iraq at NATO's Istanbul Summit
Report from Nicola Butler
The recent summit of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
(NATO), held in Istanbul June 28-29, was dominated by divisions
over Iraq, with the Allies able to agree only the most limited
assistance in the form of training for Iraqi security forces.
Whilst the United States and France clashed over whether NATO
training could take place inside or outside Iraq, the summit itself
was blown off the front pages of the world press by the transfer of
Iraqi sovereignty, which had been brought forward for security
reasons, thereby coinciding with the first day of the NATO summit
on June 28.
NATO is keen to play down past disputes on Iraq. The official
summit media guide refers only to an "intense debate" within the
Alliance in February 2003 (when France, Germany and Belgium blocked
Alliance deployment of missile batteries to Turkey for use in
conjunction with the war on Iraq). It has been impossible, however,
for the allies to brush past divisions completely under the carpet.
With President Chirac describing the US-led invasion of Iraq as
"profoundly mistaken" in his summit press conference, UK Prime
Minister Tony Blair was forced to acknowledge, "there's no point in
thinking - we haven't overcome the disagreement there was about
whether the conflict was justified - I mean, there's no point in us
standing here and saying, all the previous disagreements have
disappeared. They haven't."1
The damage done by the Bush administration's approach towards
allies in the run up to the war with Iraq is still very apparent,
with many NATO allies now unwilling to agree to any substantive
proposal that could aid the Bush's chances of re-election in
November.
As a result, despite the agreement of UN Security Council
Resolution 1546 on Iraq on June 8 and the handover of power to the
Iraqi interim administration, the NATO summit was able to agree on
only the most minimalist proposals concerning Iraq. A short
statement from the summit confirmed that NATO would: continue to
"support" a Polish-led multinational division in south-central
Iraq; offer assistance to the Iraqi government with training of its
security forces; and consider further proposals to "support the
nascent Iraqi security institutions in response to the request of
the Iraqi Interim Government and in accordance with UNSCR
1546".2 Even this limited agreement contained areas of
contention, with France insisting that it would only help with
training outside Iraq.
NATO's Istanbul summit consisted of four main meetings: the
North Atlantic Council (NATO's highest decision-making body,
attended by heads of state and government from each of the 26
Alliance member countries); the NATO-Russia Council (which met only
at the level of foreign ministers, since President Putin stayed
away, reflecting ongoing tension between NATO and Russia over
enlargement and adaptation of the Conventional Forces in Europe
Treaty); the NATO-Ukraine Commission; and the European-Atlantic
Partnership Council (46 countries including many former Eastern
bloc and former Soviet states).
In addition to the statement on Iraq, the summit resulted in a
number of agreements3 including: the expansion of the
NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in
Afghanistan (where NATO is currently facing significant overstretch
as its forces struggle to impose security in the run up to
elections); agreement to conclude the SFOR operation (the
peacekeeping mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina will shortly be
taken over by the EU); and an initiative to expand NATO cooperation
with countries in the Middle East (the Istanbul Cooperation
Initiative).
NATO also reaffirmed its "open door" policy to new members, and
particularly encouraged Albania, Croatia and the former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia "to continue the reforms necessary to
progress towards NATO membership".4 As noted above,
relations with Russia continue to be strained over NATO enlargement
and entry into force of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE)
Treaty, which remains stalled. Speaking after the NATO-Russia
Council meeting, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov
said that NATO enlargement had resulted in "the strengthening of
the military presence around Russian borders" in the territory of
new member states. He called for, "extra confidence-building
measures, measures of mutual control, [and] measures for preventing
dangerous military activity."5 The Russian Duma has
recently ratified the adapted CFE Treaty, however NATO allies
remain unwilling to ratify the adapted Treaty until Russia has
withdrawn its military forces from Georgia and Moldova.
No NATO flag in Iraq
Iraq is the issue that has dominated political discussions and
debate within NATO in recent years. Whilst there were clearly
divisions in the 1990s, when most NATO allies refused to
participate in US-UK sorties to enforce "no fly zones" over Iraq,
problems came to a head in an unprecedented manner in early 2003
when the Bush administration made it clear that it intended to
proceed with military action against Iraq with or without the
support of NATO allies.
With US military forces under increasing pressure in Iraq in the
past year and the withdrawal of Spanish troops, the Bush
administration has been intensifying pressure on its allies around
the world to provide greater support and to provide troops. Calls
from the United States for the Alliance to play an "enhanced role"
in Iraq have been a major feature of NATO meetings in the run up to
the Istanbul summit. What this enhanced role might involve was left
unspecified as the Bush administration tried to negotiate with its
reluctant allies.
NATO currently plays a very limited role in Iraq, providing
"support" for Poland, which is leading a multinational division in
south central Iraq. Clearly what the US would have liked from NATO
is greater support on the ground in Iraq, including provision of
more troops by allied countries, especially those that are
currently un-represented, and for NATO to take over
"responsibility" for some operations in Iraq, thereby relieving
pressure on the United States. One US proposal would have been for
NATO to take over responsibility for the Polish-led division.
Although 17 NATO allies have provided troops for Iraq, some of
the countries with the strongest military forces in Europe such as
France, Germany and, since the change of government, Spain, do not
have troops on the ground, and have refused to commit troops in the
absence of explicit UN authorisation.
Back in December 2003, US Secretary of State Colin Powell
attempted to defer allies' concerns about the lack of an explicit
UN mandate for Coalition military operations in Iraq, arguing that
the previous UN Security Council Resolution 1511, provided "ample
additional authority beyond the original authority in 1483 for any
other contributions that individual nations or any alliance might
wish to make."6 As negotiations got underway in the run
up to the Istanbul summit, it quickly became clear that this would
not be sufficient to engage France, which has led opposition within
NATO to Alliance participation in the US-led coalition. France's
position, articulated at the highest level, has been to insist on
the need for a further UN Security Council Resolution on Iraq and
for Iraq to have a "fully sovereign and independent government" at
the earliest opportunity.
Whilst Democrat Presidential candidate Senator John Kerry has
made "persuading NATO to accept Iraq as an alliance mission, with
more troops from NATO and its partners"7 one of his key
policies on Iraq, White House spokesperson Scott McClellan was
unable to offer any clear strategy for the Bush administration in
the run-up to the summit. McClellan told the press that although
the White House was "continuing to move forward... to broaden the
international support", he could not "speculate about what future
role NATO may or may not play, because those discussions are really
just getting underway".8
The Bush administration had hoped that the unanimous agreement
of UN Security Council Resolution 1546 on Iraq and the transfer of
sovereignty to the Iraqi interim administration, would help pave
the way to more provision of allied troops on the ground. US
officials reasoned that it would be much harder for France to
resist supporting a UN-endorsed operation and that it would be
difficult to refuse a request for assistance from the new Iraqi
interim authority, but this has not turned out to be the case.
Despite progress on the UN resolution, President Bush was forced
to lower expectations for the summit, claiming that he didn't
actually "expect any additional troop commitments out of
NATO".9 In early June the most that Bush was able to
call for was that NATO allies would "at least continue the role
that now exists, and hopefully expand it somewhat". Speaking at the
G8 Summit in Sea Island, Georgia, Bush told the media, "I do think
NATO ought to stay involved, and I think we have a good chance of
getting that done."10
The response from President Chirac, however, was not only to
continue to rule out any French troops for the Iraq operation, but
to oppose any significant NATO-led operation in Iraq. Chirac did
express satisfaction with negotiations on Resolution 1546, in
particular the emphasis that it puts on sovereignty and
independence of the Iraqi interim government, and he welcomed the
"open-mindedness" of US diplomats in negotiating the resolution.
These positive words were in stark contrast with the Bush
administration's approach to Security Council members preceding the
outset of the war in Spring 2003, and reflected the difficulties in
Iraq that had come to bog down Bush policy in the region. Chirac,
however, brushed aside calls from President Bush and UK Prime
Minister Tony Blair for an expanded NATO role, saying "I don't
believe it is NATO's vocation to intervene in Iraq and, moreover, I
don't have the feeling it would be opportune or even necessarily
understood."11
In the days running up to the summit, the debate on what
contribution NATO could make on Iraq was limited to an offer of
assistance with training Iraqi security forces - with both the
United States and France claiming victory on the Iraq issue within
NATO. President Bush said he "appreciated" NATO's decision to offer
assistance of this nature, whilst President Chirac emphasised that
this agreement was in line with France's position that, "one of the
necessary conditions for the rapid restoration of Iraqi sovereignty
is obviously for the Iraqi authorities to be able to have military
and police forces without which there's no sovereignty in a modern
State." This was one of the points that French diplomats had
pressed during negotiations on UNSCR 1546 and "some while ago
France signalled her agreement to help train the Iraqi
police".12
Even within this limited area, however, discord remained, with
Chirac insisting that France would only help with training
"outside" Iraq and proposing the NATO Defence College in Rome as a
possible location. Asked if France would oppose "NATO going into
Iraq, a NATO flag flying in Baghdad," Chirac responded: "France
won't have to oppose that since it's not part of the mission
entrusted to NATO and so won't happen... this debate has taken
place. Any NATO action, any trace, if I can put it like that, of
NATO on Iraqi soil was considered inappropriate and to my mind
justly."13
Towards a new strategic mission?
In the run up to the summit, the Bush administration set out
ambitious objectives for a new NATO with "new partners, new
members, new military capabilities, and a new strategic
mission".14 As US Ambassador to NATO R. Nicholas Burns
put it, "NATO's mandate is still to defend Europe and North
America. But we don't believe we can do that by sitting in Western
Europe, or Central Europe, or North America. We have to deploy our
conceptual attention and our military forces east and south. NATO's
future, we believe, is east, and is south. It's in the Greater
Middle East."15
It is clear that NATO's thinking concerning its current mission
is in a period of transition to reflect the policies of the current
US administration. The communiqués and declarations agreed
at the Istanbul summit barely refer to the Alliance's Strategic
Concept negotiated in 1999 under the Clinton administration,
although this is still meant to be the guiding NATO strategy
document. Previous NATO communiqué language recognising the
"primary responsibility of the United Nations Security Council for
the maintenance of international peace and security"16
and committing the Alliance to "seek the peaceful resolution of
disputes as set out in the Charter of the United
Nations"17 is absent from the 2004 summit
agreements.
Although NATO issued an Istanbul Declaration on "Our security in
a new era" at the summit reaffirming NATO's commitment to
collective defence and the transatlantic link, these areas are far
less prominent than previously. In the late 1990s, NATO was
preoccupied with extending its mission to include "non-article V"
missions such as the NATO interventions in the Balkans. In
contrast, the Istanbul Declaration of 2004 highlights "terrorism
and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction" as the
potential threats to North America and Europe and states that the
Alliance is transforming its military capabilities to "meet these
security challenges".18
According to the Istanbul Declaration NATO is now "engaged in
fighting terrorism, strengthening security and building stability
in many regions in the world... We are determined to address
effectively the threats to our territory, forces and populations
from wherever they may come."19 The summit agreements
could be used to enable NATO to significantly extend its role and
capabilities, in line with Bush administration thinking, beyond
defence of allied territory to include intervention well beyond the
Alliance's traditional transatlantic area.
In the event summit agreements concerning the "greater Middle
East" were fairly low key, but they do underline an increasing NATO
(and US) interest in the Middle East (as opposed to NATO's
activities of the 1990s, which were essentially limited to within
Europe). NATO's summit communiqué invited participants in
the Alliance's "Mediterranean Dialogue"20 to establish a
more ambitious and expanded partnership, including "enhancing the
existing political dialogue, achieving interoperability, developing
defence reform and contributing to the fight against
terrorism."21 The summit also agreed an "Istanbul
Cooperation Initiative" aimed at developing "mutually beneficial
bilateral relationships" particularly in the defence and security
sphere with countries in the Middle East region, to complement
other international efforts such as the Quartet Road Map for
settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.22
No Nuclear Reductions
In the run up to the Istanbul summit there appeared to be some
prospect that NATO might announce long overdue reductions to the
remaining US nuclear forces deployed in Europe for the purpose of
NATO nuclear sharing. There have been a number of press reports
that US nuclear weapons have already been withdrawn from the US
base at Araxos in Greece, but there has been no official
confirmation.
In March 2004 a briefing of NATO's Supreme Headquarters Allied
Powers Europe (SHAPE) reportedly stated that NATO's Supreme Allied
Commander General Jones had told a Belgian Senate Committee that,
"the United States will significantly reduce its nuclear weapons in
Europe... The reduction will be significant. Good news is on the
way."23 However, this SHAPE briefing was subsequently
removed from NATO's website, suggesting that somebody objected.
Nonetheless, in a plenary meeting of the Belgian parliament on
April 1, 2004, Belgian Foreign Minister Louis Michel stated, "in
the first place, there was a meeting concerning NATO. In the second
I can confirm that the USA is withdrawing part of its nuclear
weapons arsenal from Europe. In the third place defence policy
planning does not assume any changes for the air force base in
Kleine Brogel [the US nuclear base in Belgium]."24
Notwithstanding these tantalising snippets, the NATO summit
documents were completely silent on the subject of NATO nuclear
weapons in Europe, although a fact sheet on NATO nuclear forces
issued prior to the summit reiterated some of the most
controversial language from NATO's 1999 Strategic Concept which had
confirmed that the "presence of US nuclear forces based in Europe
and committed to NATO provides an essential political and military
link between the European and North American members of the
Alliance." The fact sheet continues, "the participation of
non-nuclear countries in the Alliance nuclear posture demonstrates
Alliance solidarity, the common commitment of its member countries
to maintaining their security, and the widespread sharing among
them of burdens and risks."25
A second fact sheet on NATO's position on nuclear
non-proliferation and disarmament also attempts to rebut
allegations that have been made at a number of nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Preparatory Committee meetings that
NATO's nuclear sharing arrangements might be in breach of Articles
I and II of the NPT. The fact sheet states, "The Alliance's
arrangements for basing U.S. nuclear gravity bombs in Europe are in
compliance with the NPT. When the Treaty was negotiated, these
arrangements were already in place. Their nature was made clear to
key delegations and subsequently made public. They were not
challenged."26 This statement appears to confirm
assertions made by non-governmental organisations that some of the
delegations involved in negotiating the NPT were not informed of
issues concerning NATO nuclear sharing at the time, only
"subsequently", making it impossible for these delegations to have
challenged them. The non-proliferation fact sheet also sets out
NATO's view of the 1996 Advisory Opinion of the International Court
of Justice, noting that, "the Court could not conclude definitively
(7:7 vote) whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be
lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence." The
fact sheet then concludes, "Allies are convinced that the role of
nuclear weapons in NATO's strategy fully conforms with
international law."27
Although NATO members agreed at the Alliance's 1999 Washington
Summit "to consider options for confidence and security building
measures (CSBMs), verification, non-proliferation and arms control
and disarmament, in the light of overall strategic developments and
the reduced salience of nuclear weapons", it is clear that this
so-called "paragraph 32" review has resulted in no significant
change in NATO nuclear posture. Although the review followed an
initiative from Germany for NATO to adopt a No-First-Use policy,
the 2004 fact sheets appears instead to set out NATO's opposition
to such a posture. The fact sheet states, "The Alliance does not
determine in advance how it would react to aggression. It leaves
this question open, to be decided as and when such a situation
materialized."28
Given the Bush administration's stance on nuclear
non-proliferation and disarmament, the Istanbul summit itself was
able to agree only the most minimal position on nuclear
non-proliferation. Met perhaps with a degree of scepticism on the
part of some NATO members (in view of the failure of NATO
nuclear-weapon states to implement their own disarmament
commitments under the NPT), the summit communiqué states,
"we stress the importance of all states abiding by, and fully
implementing, their arms control, disarmament, and
non-proliferation commitments... we underline our commitment to
reinforcing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the cornerstone
of non-proliferation and disarmament, and ensuring the full
compliance with it by all states Party to the
Treaty."29
The two fact sheets on NATO nuclear policy repeat many of the
claims that the nuclear-weapon states have made at past NPT review
meetings, outlining the reductions in their nuclear forces since
the end of the Cold War, but no mention is made of implementing the
Plan of Action (Thirteen Steps) on Nuclear Disarmament, agreed at
the 2000 NPT Review Conference. It seems unlikely that this will be
sufficient to convince non-nuclear weapon states at next year's NPT
Review Conference that the NATO nuclear weapon states are
fulfilling their commitments under Article VI.
Transformation or Irrelevance
Although the Istanbul Declaration emphasises the need for
"unity" and the "indivisibility of Allied security", it is clear
from the war with Iraq that the Bush administration is willing to
take action with or without NATO. But the row over NATO involvement
in Iraq has done permanent damage to the relation of some NATO
members with the Bush administration, and it remains to be seen
whether this will extend to future US governments. Many allies are
now reluctant to do anything that might enhance the standing of
George Bush in the run up to the US Presidential election and they
therefore remain unwilling to make any significant contribution to
a NATO operation in Iraq.
Following the summit, a small NATO team comprising 50 officers
and non-commissioned officers (NCOs), led by Major General Carel
Hilderink of the Netherlands has arrived in Iraq, but once again,
not all NATO countries are represented. Despite the united front
displayed to the world's media at the Istanbul summit, the failure
of the summit to agree any substantial NATO presence in Iraq is a
major embarrassment for the Bush administration.
Bush is clearly pushing for NATO to move away from its previous
collective defence mission towards a era in which the role of the
Alliance is to provide political and military backing for US
foreign policy objectives, potentially well beyond NATO's own
borders and without the need for any UN Security Council
resolutions. However, the experience of Iraq should provide ample
warning of the dangers of unilateral action, the consequences of
ignoring traditional allies in favour of ad hoc coalitions of the
willing, and the problems caused by embarking on military
operations without international legitimacy.
Notes
1. 'President Bush Discusses Early
Transfer of Iraqi Sovereignty', The White House, June 28,
2004.
2. 'Statement on Iraq', NATO Press
Release, June 28, 2004.
3. Istanbul summit documents are available
on the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy website at http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs.
4. 'Istanbul Summit Communiqué',
NATO Press Release, June 28, 2004.
5. 'Transcript of Remarks by Minister of
Foreign Affairs of Russia Sergey Lavrov at Press Conference
Following Russia-NATO Council Session,' Istanbul, June 28, 2004, http://www.russianembassy.org.
6. 'Press Conference by U.S. Secretary of
State, Colin Powell following the meeting of the North Atlantic
Council at the level of NATO Foreign Ministers', NATO HQ, December
4, 2003.
7. 'Security and Strength for a New
World', Remarks of John Kerry, May 27, 2004.
8. 'Press Gaggle by Scott McClellan',
White House, May 27, 2004.
9. 'President Bush Discusses the Iraqi
Interim Government', White House, June 1, 2004.
10. 'President Bush, Prime Minister Blair
Discuss Iraq at G8 Summit', White House, June 9, 2004.
11. 'Excerpts from President Chirac's
Press Briefing', G8 Summit, Sea Island, Georgia, June 9,
2004.
12. 'NATO Summit Press Conference given by
M. Jacques Chirac, President of the Republic', Excerpts, Istanbul,
June 28, 2004.
13. Ibid.
14. See Nicola Butler, 'NATO'S Future: To
the Greater Middle East and Beyond?', Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue No. 75,
January/February 2004.
15. 'Burns Outlines NATO's Future in the
Greater Middle East', U.S. Ambassador to NATO Nicholas Burns in
Prague, Washington File, October 19, 2003.
16. 'Washington Summit Communiqué',
NATO Press Release, April 24, 1999.
17. 'The Alliance's Strategic Concept',
NATO Press Release, April 24, 1999.
18. 'The Istanbul Declaration: Our
security in a new era', NATO Press Release, June 28,
2004.
19. Ibid.
20. The participants in NATO's
Mediterranean Dialogue are all non-NATO members in the Middle East
and North Africa: currently Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan,
Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia.
21. 'Istanbul Summit Communiqué',
NATO Press Release, June 28, 2004.
22. Ibid.
23. Information received from Karel
Koster, AMOK, referring to a SHAPE briefing on March 10,
2004.
24. Karel Koster, 'NATO Nuclear Doctrine
and the NPT', BASIC Briefings, June 29, 2004.
25. 'NATO's Nuclear Forces in the New
Security Environment', NATO Issues, June 3, 2004.
26. 'NATO's Positions Regarding Nuclear
Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament and Related
Issues', NATO Issues, June 3, 2004.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. Op Cit, 'Istanbul Summit
Communiqué'.
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The Istanbul Declaration
Our security in a new era Issued by the Heads of State and
Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic
Council in Istanbul on 28 June 2004, NATO Press Release (2004)097
28 June 2004
Issued by the Heads of State and
Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic
Council in Istanbul on 28 June 2004, NATO Press Release (2004)097.
Source: NATO, http://www.nato.int.
We, the Heads of State and Government of
the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, meet today in
Istanbul to renew our commitment to collective defence, and to
address together NATO's response to the security challenges we face
at the beginning of the 21st century.
NATO embodies the vital partnership
between Europe and North America. Our Alliance is founded on the
principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.
Those values, rooted in the principles of the United Nations
Charter and the Washington Treaty, underlie the unique character of
the transatlantic link.
We celebrate NATO's critical role in
fostering the spread of freedom throughout Europe. Today, we
welcome seven new members. Their participation in this Summit
demonstrates that we remain committed to a Europe whole, free and
at peace. We pledge again that our Alliance remains open to all
European democracies, regardless of geography, willing and able to
meet the responsibilities of membership, and whose inclusion would
enhance overall security and stability in Europe.
Collective defence remains the core
purpose of the Alliance. But the threats that NATO faces have
changed substantially. We remain committed to address vigorously
the threats facing our Alliance, taking into account that they
emanate from a far wider area than in the past. They include
terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
North America and Europe face these threats together. NATO is
engaged in fighting terrorism, strengthening security and building
stability in many regions in the world. Now as ever, unity within
the Alliance is essential, and the principle of the indivisibility
of Allied security is fundamental. We are determined to address
effectively the threats to our territory, forces and populations
from wherever they may come.
The Alliance is adapting to meet these
security challenges through its military operations and activities,
its engagement with partners and its continued transformation of
military capabilities.
Today, we have approved a major expansion
of NATO's role in Afghanistan in support of the Afghan Authorities.
We will commit the resources needed to make this mission a
success.
NATO is also leading military operations
in the Balkans and the Mediterranean, and supporting Poland's
leadership of the Multinational Division in Iraq. We have also
issued a separate statement on Iraq.
The decision to end NATO's nine year
mission in Bosnia marks its success in ending the war and keeping
the peace in that country. We welcome the decision of the European
Union to mount a new operation in Bosnia, and look forward to
continued cooperation.
NATO continues to build closer cooperation
on common security concerns with the European Union and with states
in Europe, including Russia, Ukraine and the states of Central Asia
and the Caucasus, as well as with states of the Mediterranean and
the Broader Middle East. Today, we have taken decisions aimed at
strengthening these relationships further in order to cooperate
effectively in addressing the challenges of the 21st
century.
NATO is transforming its military
capabilities in order to adapt to the changing strategic
environment. The new command structure, the NATO Response Force,
and the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear Deference
battalion are progressing. Together, they give NATO much stronger
and faster military capabilities. But transformation is a process,
not an event. We are therefore committed to continued
transformation and to further strengthen our operational
capabilities and procedures so that our forces are more deployable
and usable. To this end, we invite the Secretary General and the
North Atlantic Council in permanent session to take the steps
necessary to ensure that the transformation process is fully
implemented, and to report to us at the next NATO
Summit.
The North Atlantic Alliance has confronted
challenge and change throughout its history, yet has always proved
resilient in adapting to new situations. As we face a new era of
danger and hope, NATO remains our vital multilateral bridge across
the Atlantic, complementing a common political approach with its
military capabilities. We renew our commitment to consult,
deliberate and act together as Allies. We are confident that NATO
will remain our indispensable instrument in defending our freedom
and security.
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Statement on Iraq Issued
by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting
of the North Atlantic Council in Istanbul on 28 June 2004, NATO
Press Release (2004)098, June 28, 2004
Issued by the Heads of State and
Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic
Council in Istanbul on 28 June 2004, NATO Press Release (2004)098.
Source: NATO, http://www.nato.int.
We, the 26 Heads of State and Government
of the nations of the Atlantic Alliance, meeting in Istanbul,
declare our full support for the independence, sovereignty, unity,
and territorial integrity of the Republic of Iraq and for
strengthening of freedom, democracy, human rights, rule of law and
security for all the Iraqi people.
We welcome the unanimous adoption of
Security Council Resolution 1546 under Chapter 7 of the Charter of
the United Nations as an important step towards Iraq's political
transition to democratic government. We pledge our full support for
the effective implementation of UNSCR 1546.
We are united in our support for the Iraqi
people and offer full cooperation to the new sovereign Interim
Government as it seeks to strengthen internal security and prepare
the way to national elections in 2005.
We deplore and call for an immediate end
to all terrorist attacks in Iraq. Terrorist activities in and from
Iraq also threaten the security of its neighbours and the region as
a whole.
We continue to support Poland in its
leadership of the multinational division in south central Iraq. We
also acknowledge the efforts of nations, including many NATO
Allies, in the Multinational Force for Iraq, which is present in
Iraq at the request of the Iraqi government and in accordance with
UNSCR 1546. We fully support the Multinational Force in its mission
to help restore and maintain security, including protection of the
United Nations presence, under its mandate from the Security
Council.
In response to the request of the Iraqi
Interim Government, and in accordance with Resolution 1546 which
requests international and regional organisations to contribute
assistance to the Multinational Force, we have decided today to
offer NATO's assistance to the government of Iraq with the training
of its security forces. We therefore also encourage nations to
contribute to the training of the Iraqi armed forces.
We have asked the North Atlantic Council
to develop on an urgent basis the modalities to implement this
decision with the Iraqi Interim Government.
We have also asked the North Atlantic
Council to consider, as a matter of urgency and on the basis of a
report by the Secretary General, further proposals to support the
nascent Iraqi security institutions in response to the request of
the Iraqi Interim Government and in accordance with UNSCR
1546.
Source: NATO, http://www.nato.int.
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© 2004 The Acronym Institute.
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