 Disarmament Diplomacy
Issue No. 78, July/August 2004
In the News
One step Forward, Two steps Back: Six Party Talks on North
Korea's Nuclear Programme
Report from Nicola Butler
The prospects for future six-party talks on the nuclear
programme of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or
North Korea) are looking worse following a further deterioration in
relations between the United States and North Korea. North Korea
has threatened not to attend a working group meeting of six-party
talks on its nuclear programme and both sides have traded insults,
despite modest progress at the third plenary session of the
talks.
The third plenary session took place in Beijing from June 23 to
26, attended by senior representatives of China, the United States,
North Korea, Japan, South Korea and Russia.1 At the
meeting the United States set out its most detailed proposals to
date, including an indication of incentives that could be offered
to North Korea in exchange for progress on nuclear
disarmament.2
Following the meeting China, as host of the talks, issued a
short Chair's statement (printed in full below) welcoming the
submission of proposals and recommendations by the parties and
reporting an "in principle" agreement to hold a fourth round of
talks by the end of September.
The parties agreed that a lower-level working group should
"convene at the earliest possible date to define the scope,
duration and verification as well as corresponding measures for
first steps for denuclearisation, and as appropriate, make
recommendations to the Fourth Round of the Talks."3
During the third round of talks, both the United States and
North Korea refrained from using antagonistic language and agreed
to study each other's proposals in more detail. The meeting was
followed by a number of short bilateral meetings between US and
North Korean officials, although no substantive progress was
made.
Whilst the third round of talks went further than previous
sessions in setting out the parties' positions, and appeared to
achieve some agreement on procedural issues, there was little
progress on agreeing any issues of substance. Since the talks, the
uneasy diplomatic truce between the United States and North Korea
appears to have broken down, with both parties reasserting their
earlier negotiating positions.
The US unveils "more tangible" proposal
As preparations for the third round of talks began in Beijing,
US Secretary of State Colin Powell said that the US would enter the
talks with a "spirit of flexibility".4 What this turned
out to mean was the unveiling of what an administration official
described as a "more tangible and more specific" proposal at the
talks. It spelled out what North Korea needed to say in any
commitment to disarm and for the first time gave details about what
the North Korean regime could expect to receive as
incentives.5
According to press reports, the US plan includes a proposal put
forward by South Korea at the last round of talks that would allow
Seoul and possibly others to begin providing heavy fuel oil to
North Korea immediately, if DPRK leader Kim Jong Il made a
commitment to dismantle the North Korean nuclear weapons programme.
This provision of fuel is clearly intended as an incentive for
North Korea to begin preparations to disarm.
Once North Korea began to display and secure its materials and
weapons - and these measures had been verified by US intelligence
agencies - the US along with other participants in the six-party
talks would issue provisional security assurances, specifying that
they had "no intention to invade or attack" North Korea. The United
States would prepare a study of North Korea's non-nuclear energy
needs and look at the option of discussions on lifting economic
sanctions and removing North Korea from a US list of state sponsors
of terrorism.
According to US officials quoted in the Washington Post,
North Korea would be given three months to stop and disclose all of
its nuclear activities, including a uranium enrichment programme
(which North Korea denies having), and to begin securing and
destroying nuclear materials under the supervision of international
monitors. Otherwise, the preliminary benefits would be
halted.6
US officials also softened their language during the talks,
refraining from demanding the "complete, verifiable and
irreversible dismantlement" of Pyongyang's nuclear programmes. This
has previously been the key US demand during six-party talks, but
North Korea had claimed that the phrase was "culturally offensive".
Instead US officials asked North Korea to dismantle its programmes
in a "permanent, thorough and transparent manner subject to
effective verification",7 and said that they would
examine North Korea's proposals in more detail.
Differences of scope
North Korean officials also appeared to moderate their language
during the talks, refraining from the usual level of rhetoric and
insults (although they could not resist blaming the United States
for its "hostile policy"). A North Korean Foreign Ministry
spokesperson noted that, "Unlike the previous talks each party
advanced various proposals and ways and had a discussion on them in
a sincere atmosphere at the talks. Some common elements helpful to
making progress in the talks were found there."8
North Korea claimed that agreement was reached on its demands
such as the proposal to take "simultaneous actions on the principle
of 'words for words' and 'action for action'" and that the talks
had discussed mainly the issue of "reward for freeze". However, the
Foreign Ministry spokesperson regretted that the US proposal "only
mentioned phased demands for disarming the DPRK", and he dismissed
the three month time limit for preparations to disarm saying that
it "totally lacked [any] scientific and realistic
nature".9
Whilst the other parties generally gave an upbeat assessment of
the third round of talks, it was clear that significant differences
remained to be bridged. China's Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs
Wang Yi gave a positive assessment, claiming that the talks had
reached "new consensus and made new steps towards
denuclearisation". According to Wang Yi, all parties "agreed that
to implement nuclear freezing and take corresponding measures is
the first step toward nuclear abandonment". However he noted that
the parties still had "quite a few differences, sometimes even
confrontations, with regard to the scope and means of nuclear
abandonment, nuclear freezing and corresponding
measures."10
Russia, which has taken a negative view of prospects for the
talks in the past due to inflexibility of the US negotiating
position, also gave a positive assessment of the third round. A
Foreign Ministry press statement noted that Moscow was "satisfied
with the results of the meeting" and that "given a constructive
approach of all the parties, it is quite possible to achieve the
common objectives on the basis of the already agreed-upon
principles and approaches".11
Japan noted "common ground" in the parties "understandings and
proposals in the sense that focus is given to first steps towards
nuclear dismantlement". However, a Japanese foreign ministry
statement highlighted some clear differences in the parties'
positions "concerning the scope of preliminary measures (whether or
not to include uranium enrichment) and verification procedures".
Japan also identified a more fundamental difference of approach
that, "while the DPRK aims for an agreement on freezing of its
nuclear programmes and compensatory measures, Japan, the US and the
Republic of Korea (ROK) seek an agreement on a framework towards
'dismantlement' of nuclear programs."12
Japan also announced that if the proposed nuclear 'freezing' by
North Korea was defined as a first step towards dismantlement of
its nuclear programs, it would be willing to join in energy
assistance through the Six-Party Talks based on the following
conditions: "(i) that the scope of 'freeze' covers all nuclear
programmes, including the uranium enrichment programme; (ii) that
the DPRK would declare all unclear programmes; and (iii) that
freezing would be adequately verified." Japan also indicated that
economic cooperation with North Korea could only be provided once
its additional concerns about missile and abduction issues had been
"comprehensively resolved".13
Symbolic steps, little substance
During the talks, US and North Korean officials met for a two
and a half hour sidebar discussion - their longest to date.
Afterwards, the United States insisted that these discussions were
not negotiations and were not bilateral, on the grounds that their
content was immediately reported to the other participants.
According to a White House official, North Korean representatives
acknowledged that the United States had made a "constructive
proposal" during this session, but they also hinted at the
possibility of conducting a nuclear test - a threat that was also
made during the first round of six-party talks in August
2003.14
Following the talks a number of symbolic meetings have taken
place, but little of substance has been achieved. On July 2,
Secretary of State Colin Powell met his DPRK counterpart Paek Nam
Sun on the fringes of a regional economic conference in Jakarta -
the highest level meeting between the United States and North Korea
since Washington confronted Pyongyang over its alleged uranium
enrichment programme in October 2002. According to State Department
spokesperson Richard Boucher, this meeting did not include
negotiations, but the discussions were used to "clarify each side's
proposals".15
Three weeks later, the Bush administration sanctioned a visit by
Paek to Capitol Hill where he attended an all-day seminar with
congressional officials, South Korean parliamentarians and Korean
experts, followed by a press conference. Previously the Bush
administration has refused to allow North Korean officials to
travel to Washington.16 Although Paek welcomed the US
administration's attempts to soften language in its recent
proposal, he also said ominously that North Korea found "a lot of
regrettable elements" in the US plan. "We concluded it was a
roadmap to disarm [North Korea] step by step," he
said.17
Flexibility or Repackaging?
As the third round of six-party talks drew to a close, question
marks remained concerning whether the United States had actually
demonstrated a more flexible negotiating position. Some media
reports describe the US proposal to the third round of talks as the
"first sign of real negotiations". However, one senior US
administration official described the proposal merely as a
"repackaging and elaboration of things we have said before" that
was likely to be rejected by the North Koreans.18
Washington continues to refuse to give direct assistance to North
Korea or to engage in bilateral negotiations.
The United States has clearly been under pressure from other
participants in the six-party talks to adopt a more flexible
approach. Russia and China have both directly criticised the Bush
administration's stance, whilst South Korea has also urged a more
conciliatory approach on the issues of economic assistance and
North Korea's disputed uranium programme.
US relations with South Korea have also been affected in recent
months by the US realignment of global forces, including the
withdrawal of around 12,000 troops from South Korea. Whilst this
withdrawal is driven primarily by the overstretch of US forces in
Iraq and Afghanistan than by any reassessment of security on the
Korean peninsula, it has served to strain relations with South
Korea, which has called for the withdrawal to be delayed.
The Bush administration has also been under increasing pressure
to show that it has a viable strategy on North Korea from the John
Kerry campaign, which has particularly criticised the
administration's refusal to deal directly with Pyongyang. On the
campaign trail, Kerry has accused Bush of doing "too little too
late... for eighteen months, we've essentially negotiated over the
shape of the table while the North Koreans allegedly have made
enough new fuel to make six to nine nuclear bombs..." Kerry calls
for the six party talks to be maintained but says that the US "must
also be prepared to talk directly with North Korea... And we must
be prepared to negotiate a comprehensive agreement that addresses
the full range of issues of concern to us and our
allies."19
There is ongoing disagreement within the Bush administration
concerning how to approach the North Korean nuclear problem.
According to the Washington Post, the State Department had
proposed that the United States could offer security assurances to
North Korea at the same time that fuel shipments were started by
South Korea. This proposal was reportedly rejected by President
Bush, following protests by Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld.20
Back to the Future
Following the modest progress made in June and July, relations
between the United States and North Korea have deteriorated in
recent weeks. In late July on a visit to the Far East, US Under
Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John
Bolton entered the fray using language guaranteed to antagonise the
North Koreans. He reportedly ruled out a nuclear freeze as the
first step, reasserting that the US aim was "the complete,
verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear
programmes", and calling on North Korea to follow the Libyan
example.21 This was quickly followed by a statement from
the North Koreans citing statements by "high-ranking officials of
the Bush administration" and denouncing the US proposal to the
third round of talks as a "sham offer" that was "little worthy to
be discussed any longer".22
In mid-August North Korea went further, announcing that it would
not attend working-level talks, intended to take place in advance
of the fourth plenary session. North Korea cited the US stance that
"there can be no reward for the DPRK's freeze of its nuclear
facilities" and the reassertion of the US demand for complete,
verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement.23
China moved quickly to try to repair the damage, downplaying
"inevitable and natural" differences between the parties, stating
its belief that all parties were still "willing to move forward the
process of peace talks", and calling for a "calm, pragmatic and
flexible attitude".24 However, on the campaign trail in
Wisconsin President Bush dropped another rhetorical bombshell,
telling his audience, that as a result of the six-party talks there
were now "five countries saying to the tyrant in North Korea,
disarm, disarm."25 North Korea immediately responded in
kind, accusing Bush of being a "political imbecile bereft of even
elementary morality" and a "tyrant that puts Hitler into the
shade".26
Prospects for the fourth round of six-party talks due to be held
in September now look bleak, with little chance of real progress
this side of the US Presidential election.
Notes
1. The heads of delegations were Mr. Wang
Yi, Vice Foreign Minister of China; Mr. Kim Gye Gwan, Vice Foreign
Minister of DPRK; Ambassador Mitoji Yabunaka, Director-General for
Asian and Oceanian Affairs of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan;
Ambassador Lee Soo-hyuck, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and
Trade of ROK; Ambassador Alexander Alekseyev, Special Envoy of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia; Mr. James A. Kelly,
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, US
Department of State.
2. For details of previous US proposals,
see "'Differences, difficulties and contradictions' at North Korean
nuclear talks", Disarmament Diplomacy
76, (March/April 2004).
3. "Chairman's Statement of the Third
Round of the Six-Party Talks", Russian Ministry for Foreign Affairs
website, June 26, 2004, http://www.russianembassy.org,
reproduced below.
4. "Secretary of State Colin L. Powell,
Remarks to the press with Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, Director-General
of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Washington, DC",
Washington File, June 21, 2004.
5. Philip P. Pan and Glenn Kessler, "U.S.
Revises Proposal at North Korea Nuclear Talks: Fuel Aid, Security
Statement Possible During 3-Month Test", Washington Post,
June 24, 2004.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. "DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on
Six-Party Talks", Korean Central News Agency of the DPRK
(KCNA), June 28, 2004.
9. Ibid.
10. "New Consensus and New Steps, Remarks
on the Third Round of the Beijing Six-Party Talks by Wang Yi, June
26, 2004", China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng.
11. "Concerning Third Round of Six-Party
Talks in Beijing, Russian Foreign Ministry press statement", June
26, 2004, http://www.russianembassy.org.
12. "Third Round of Six-Party Talks
Concerning North Korean Nuclear Issues", Japan Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, June 27, 2004, http://www.mofa.jp.
13. Ibid.
14. Glenn Kessler, "U.S. Meets With N.
Korea Over Nuclear Program", Washington Post, June 25,
2004.
15. Glenn Kessler, "Powell, N. Korean
Diplomat Meet, "Useful" Discussion Held on Nuclear Dismantlement
Proposals", Washington Post, July 2, 2004.
16. Glenn Kessler, "North Korean U.N.
Envoy Visits Capitol Hill, Visit, Which Bush Administration
Approved, May Be First by One of Nation's Top Officials",
Washington Post, July 21, 2004.
17. Ibid.
18. Op Cit, "U.S. Revises Proposal at
North Korea Nuclear Talks: Fuel Aid, Security Statement Possible
During 3-Month Test".
19. "New Strategies to Meet New Threats",
Remarks of Senator John Kerry, June 1, 2004, http://www.johnkerry.com/pressroom/speeches/spc_2004_0601.html.
20. Op Cit, "U.S. Revises Proposal at
North Korea Nuclear Talks: Fuel Aid, Security Statement Possible
During 3-Month Test".
21. "Speedy North Korean Nuclear
Dismantlement Possible, Bolton Says", Washington File, July
23, 2004.
22. "DPRK Foreign Ministry Dismisses U.S.
Proposal", Korean Central News Agency of the DPRK (KCNA),
July 24, 2004.
23. "Spokesman for DPRK Foreign Ministry
on Prospect of Six-Party Talks", Korean Central News Agency of
the DPRK (KCNA), August 16, 2004.
24. "Foreign Ministry Spokesman Kong
Quan's Remarks on the Next Round of the Working Group Meeting of
the Six-Party Talks", August 18, 2004, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng.
25. "President's Remarks at Ask President
Bush Event", August 18, 2004, http://www.whitehouse.gov.
26. "DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman
Blasts Bush's Reckless Remarks", Korean Central News Agency of
the DPRK (KCNA), August 18, 2004.
Chair's Statement of the Third Round of the
Six-Party Talks, June 26, 2004
1. The Third Round of the Six-Party Talks was held in Beijing
among the People's Republic of China (PRC), the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea (DPRK), Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), the
Russian Federation (Russia) and the United States of America (USA)
from June 23 to 26, 2004.
2. The heads of delegations were Mr. Wang Yi, Vice Foreign
Minister of China; Mr. Kim Gye Gwan, Vice Foreign Minister of DPRK;
Ambassador Mitoji Yabunaka, Director-General for Asian and Oceanian
Affairs of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan; Ambassador Lee
Soo-hyuck, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of ROK;
Ambassador Alexander Alekseyev, Special Envoy of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Russia; Mr. James A. Kelly, Assistant Secretary
of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, United States
Department of State.
3. In preparation of the Third Round of the Six-Party Talks, two
sessions of the Working Group were held in Beijing from May 12 to
15 and from June 21 to 22, 2004. The Parties approved the Concept
Paper on the Working Group in the plenary.
4. During the Third Round of the Talks, the Parties had
constructive, pragmatic and substantive discussions. Based on the
consensus reached at the Second Round of the Talks, as reflected in
its Chairman's Statement, they reaffirmed their commitments to the
goal of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and stressed the
need to take first steps toward that goal as soon as possible.
5. The Parties stressed the need for a step-by-step process of
"words for words" and "action for action" in search for a peaceful
solution to the nuclear issue.
6. In this context, proposals, suggestions and recommendations
were put forward by all Parties. The Parties welcomed the
submission of those proposals, suggestions and recommendations, and
noted some common elements, which would provide a useful basis for
future work, while differences among the Parties remained. The
Parties believed that further discussions were needed to expand
their common ground and reduce existing differences.
7. The Parties agreed in principle to hold the Fourth Round of
the Six-Party Talks in Beijing by the end of September 2004, at a
date to be decided through diplomatic channels with due
consideration to the proceedings of the Working Group. The Parties
authorized the Working Group to convene at the earliest possible
date to define the scope, duration and verification as well as
corresponding measures for first steps for denuclearization, and as
appropriate, make recommendations to the Fourth Round of the
Talks.
8. The delegations of the DPRK, Japan, the ROK, Russia and the
USA expressed their appreciations to the Chinese side for its
efforts for the success of the Third Round of the Six-Party
Talks.
Source: Russia Ministry for Foreign Affairs website, http://www.russianembassy.org.
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