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Disarmament DiplomacyIssue No. 81, Winter 2005Keeping Test Ban Hopes Alive: The 2005 CTBT Entry-into-force ConferenceDaryl Kimball Diplomats from a record 120 states gathered September 21-23 in New York to try to breathe new life into the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which bans all nuclear weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosions. While highlighting the steadily-growing support for the treaty, the Conference also underscored how elusive and frustrating its entry into force remains, due to the non-accession of 11 key states, including the United States, China, India, Pakistan, Egypt and Israel, Iran, and North Korea. Despite the relatively high-level effort, which involved foreign ministers from 21 states, leaders of the key hold-out countries have shown no visible signs of shifting their positions. As a result, the long-term prognosis for the CTBT remains as uncertain as ever. The political hurdles facing the treaty today stem in part from the negotiations a decade ago, when a handful of states insisted that a specific set of 44 states possessing nuclear reactors must ratify the treaty before it enters into force. To date, 33 of the 44 states which are listed in Annex 2 of the treaty, have ratified. Recognising that this would make entry into force particularly challenging, other states successfully inserted into Article XIV a provision that allows states that have ratified to convene conferences to seek ways to "facilitate" entry into force. The September 2005 Conference to Facilitate the Entry Into Force of the CTBT was the fourth such meeting since 1999. As the 2005 meeting demonstrated, the conferences remain a valuable, though very limited, mechanism by which CTBT adherents can articulate their strong support for the treaty, discuss measures designed to shift the positions of hold-out states and keep up pressure against renewed nuclear testing. As they did in 2003, the states parties at the 2005 conference adopted a final conference document that includes "measures to promote entry into force" (annexed below). They also reappointed Jaap Ramaker, the Dutch ambassador who had chaired the final year of test ban negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, as Special Representative to advance pro-CTBT diplomatic efforts. But in the face of the United States' stubborn resistance to multilateral agreements that limit its nuclear options and deeply-rooted regional tensions in the Middle East, South Asia, Northeast Asia, the conference itself can do little but help reinforce the global norm against testing and keep long-term CTBT entry-into-force hopes alive. To make more substantial progress in the years ahead, leading CTBT states parties must be more willing to pressure hold-out states at the highest political levels. Grim-Faced OptimismThis year's conference was scheduled to follow the UN Summit of World Leaders to help raise the profile of the CTBT and to increase the number of participating states and level of representation. Official governmental participation was indeed higher than in 2003, but the 2005 conference was for the most part overlooked by UN journalists who were busy reporting on the mixed outcome of the UN Summit, including the absence of any language on advancing nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation goals. By comparison with past conferences, it was notable that only 22 nongovernmental representatives from eight organisations attended. In accordance with the agenda, a representative of the NGOs is invited to deliver a statement at the conclusion of the conference. Jointly written in advance, this was endorsed by 33 organisations (annexed below). In a year which also saw the disappointing Review Conference on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in May, the relatively low NGO turnout might be explained as a product of timing or UN nonproliferation conference fatigue, but should be a cause for concern nonetheless. In his opening address, a weary-looking UN Secretary General Kofi Annan bemoaned the failure of the UN Summit and the NPT Review Conference to reach consensus on steps to strengthen global nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation, including the CTBT. Annan noted that: "For the second time in four months, States could not agree on the way forward on disarmament, nonproliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. This was a significant failure." Though no state said so directly, many delegates at the CTBT conference were still fuming about the United States' position on the CTBT at the NPT Review Conference. As described by others in Disarmament Diplomacy, diplomats from the United States, Egypt, and Iran locked horns and hindered agreement on a final NPT conference document. The United States complicated matters by refusing to recognise the disarmament commitments made by NPT member states at the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences, including the realisation of the CTBT. According to knowledgeable diplomatic sources, Bush administration opposition to the CTBT also prevented the P-5 from issuing a joint statement at the NPT Review Conference. Further underscoring the wide gap in views between the United States and the 176 other signatories of the CTBT, the Bush administration once again boycotted the CTBT conference, as did India and North Korea. Pakistan, which attended the 2003 meeting as an observer, was also absent this time. While many of the 51 national statements described the deteriorating health of the global nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament regime, most avoided direct reference to the policies of the states impeding CTBT entry into force and obstructing consensus on steps to strengthen the regime. To their credit, however, a few delegations joined the NGOs in focusing attention on the need for positive action by the nuclear-weapon states. In one of the toughest statements delivered on the floor, Germany's State Secretary Klaus Scharioth warned: "If the international community is to be successful, it must react appropriately to the twofold challenge of nuclear proliferation risks and the commitment of the nuclear-weapon states to push ahead with disarmament. We are following with concern the lack of progress made in the efforts to strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime and the undeniable risk of the erosion of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty." Sweden's Ambassador Anders Lidén was the only government speaker to say explicitly that "the USA and China, have a special responsibility" as nuclear-weapon state signatories to ratify the CTBT. A handful of other delegations also expressed concern about new weapons research and nuclear use policies that could potentially threaten the global test moratorium. Speaking on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), Malaysia's Minister of Foreign Affairs Syed Hamid Albar reminded the conference that the nuclear-weapon states said at the time of the CTBT negotiations that they would only pursue "steps ... to maintain the safety and reliability of the remaining or existing nuclear weapons" and that the "NAM is deeply concerned that the development of new types of nuclear weapons are being considered". He said the "...NAM is of the view that the development of new types of nuclear weapons is a contravention not only with the undertakings provided by the nuclear-weapon states at the time of the conclusion of the CTBT" but also with Article VI of the NPT. Albar was of course referring to the controversial Bush administration proposal for the "robust nuclear earth penetrator", which would involve the modification of a high-yield gravity bomb to improve US nuclear capabilities. Last year, for the second year in a row, US lawmakers deleted funding for the project, but the Pentagon may once again seek authorisation and funding to finish the research phase of the programme. The majority of the delegates tried to accentuate the positive and steer clear of statements that might offend hold-out states. Conference President and Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer set the tone on the first day when he suggested: "Our priority now must be to put past failures behind and take all the opportunities ahead to strengthen the multilateral nonproliferation regimes. This conference and the period ahead are one such opportunity." Until the next CTBT conference, Australia will serve as the coordinator of efforts to promote entry into force. In dozens of national statements, delegates consistently emphasised the widespread support for the CTBT. They reiterated the value of the CTBT in limiting the development of new types of nuclear weapons and strengthening the NPT, praised the work of the CTBT Preparatory Commission in building up the treaty's global monitoring and verification system, and, some cases, they enumerated their own government's efforts in support of the treaty. In an apparent response to recent non-testing pledges from India, Pakistan, and the United States, Downer, along with many other speakers, also said: "Let me be clear, we welcome the continuing voluntary moratorium of weapons testing, but this cannot be a substitute for entry into force of the permanent legally-binding treaty." Current EffortsUnfortunately, neither the 2005 final conference declaration nor the national addresses provided much in the way of new ideas or commitments to overcome the "past failures" or future challenges to the CTBT. As noted above, the conference reappointed Jaap Ramaker to continue serving as Special Representative to promote entry into force, and invited states to make voluntary financial contributions to these efforts. As part of the official conference documentation, states parties also provided a summary report on bilateral and multilateral efforts to encourage further support for the CTBT. The report reflected that the bulk of the these efforts were undertaken by a core group of states, including: Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Finland, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Russia, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom. Ramaker delivered a briefing to the conference based on his meetings with senior officials in three key non-ratifying states: China, Pakistan and Vietnam. He noted that he was positively received in Beijing, and expressed guarded optimism about the prospects for Vietnam's ratification in the "near future". He said he planned to meet soon with senior Indonesian officials to probe them on the status of their ratification effort, and over the next year or two will "take up contact with all relevant countries in order to explain the wider importance of their early signature and/or ratification". Ramaker reminded the conference that "the appointment of a Special Representative is no magical formula". He added "...[o]ur common objective ... requires a genuine political commitment from all our countries, a commitment ... at the highest political level." The 2005 Final Declaration and measures adopted to promote entry into force, which were negotiated weeks before the conference began, reflected only one substantive addition from the version issued by its predecessor in 2003. As Canada's Foreign Minister Pierre Pettigrew noted in his address, the conference adopted Canada's proposal "to encourage states in the same region to ratify the treaty in a coordinated manner." He noted that in Canada's deliberations with many non-ratifying states, "regional security dynamics are a strong impediment to some", leading them to ask why they should ratify when others in the region refuse to do so. Turning Rhetoric Into RealityIf Australia and the other core "friends of the CTBT" are going to be effective in moving the CTBT closer to entry into force, they will have to step up their collective effort and refine their strategies to encourage signatures and ratifications by the "hard cases". In their statement, the NGOs noted that "Unfortunately, top leaders from even those states most committed to the CTBT also often fail to press their counterparts in the eleven CTBT hold-out states to reconsider their opposition to the treaty or move forward with ratification. We urge such states to exercise much more consistent, top-level diplomacy in support of CTBT entry into force." The regional security problems to which Canada's Foreign Minister alluded were in full display in speeches from delegates of two states that have signed but not yet ratified the CTBT: Egypt and Israel. Amr Aboul Atta of Egypt called on states to fulfil previous pledges to "intensify collective efforts for the establishment of a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the Middle East", and noted the "the importance of Israel's accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under Comprehensive IAEA safeguards". He added that "... we cannot regard the treaty as a secluded legal instrument apart from our common objectives to achieve nuclear disarmament and the universality of non-proliferation. Hence Egypt calls for the achievement of the universality of both the NPT and the CTBT together." Itshak Lederman, Senior Director for CTBT and Special Projects, Israeli Atomic Energy Commission, reiterated his government's active support for the CTBT. But he noted that Israel's ratification of the treaty will continue to be influenced by "the readiness of the verification regime of the Treaty, especially that of the OSI [on-site inspections] and its immunity to abuse", as well as Israel's status in the future policy-making organs of the treaty, "and the adherence to and compliance with the CTBT by states in the Middle East". Israel continues to be frustrated by the current system for representation for states in the Middle East and South Asia and in the Executive Council of the future CTBTO, the latter of which will have decision-making authority relating to on-site inspections. Iran, which signed the CTBT in 1996 and is host to five international monitoring system (IMS) stations, was listed as an official participant in the conference but did not make a formal statement. In his address at the 2003 CTBT conference in Vienna, Iran's Ambassador Pirooz Hosseini had professed Iran's full support for the CTBT. Notwithstanding overtures from a number of states - among them Austria, Germany, Japan, Russia, and Ukraine - India has steadfastly refused to sign the CTBT, offering instead its assurances to continue its post-1998 nuclear test moratorium so long as no other state conducts nuclear testing. Leaders in New Delhi also insist that India will not be the last of the 44 states required for its entry into force. Pakistan has said in the past that it would join the CTBT if India did. As only the NGOs noted at the conference, in July 2005 Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh pledged that India would to live up to the same nonproliferation standards that the five original nuclear weapon states are expected to observe. In my address to the CTBT conference on behalf of the NGOs, I argued that "this implies that India should, in the very least, sign the CTBT, along with Pakistan". Furthermore, if states are truly committed to the CTBT and the nonproliferation system, they should not support India's bid for full nuclear cooperation with the United States and other nuclear suppliers unless and until it signs the CTBT as a first step towards legally-binding limits on its stockpile. Meanwhile, Chinese efforts to ratify the treaty appear to have stalled, even though Ambassador Zhang Yishan repeated the assertion that "the Chinese government has always been active towards the ratification of the Treaty, already submitted the Treaty to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress for approving, and promoted actively for an early ratification". At the 2003 conference, China said its legislature "is performing its due ratification formalities" and "will continue to do its utmost to have the ratification procedure completed ... at an early date". In other fora, Chinese officials have denied that Beijing's decision to ratify is tied to actions by the United States or others, making its foot-dragging all the more confounding. Some China watchers speculate that Beijing is delaying action on the CTBT because the treaty would severely limit its ability to modernise its stockpile with smaller, lighter nuclear warheads - an option it may want to keep open to counter possible future US or Indian strategic capabilities. Among the P-5, China is the only state that continues to increase the overall size of its nuclear and missile arsenal. As the Netherlands' representative to the United Nations, Frank Majoor, observed: "We must be ready to accept that the CTBT may not enter into force for a considerable period of time." Of the states least inclined to ratify at this stage, he acknowledged that "we do not have a single magic formula to convince them to ratify. We must instead try to understand each country's reasons and motivations and see what can be done to overcome their reservations." The Future of the CTBTOAnother challenge for the treaty will be the task of completing the IMS, negotiating facility agreements for remaining monitoring stations, and completing the excruciatingly long negotiations on the operations manual for on-site inspections. With the 2005 retirement of German Ambassador Wolfgang Hoffmann as head of the Provisional Secretariat of the Vienna-based CTBT Organisation, the leadership has transferred to the hands of veteran Hungarian diplomat Tibor Tóth. In his report to the conference, Tóth drew attention to the decision taken by member states following the 2004 Asian tsunami disaster, enabling the CTBTO to make IMS data available on an expedited basis to international organisations involved in early-warning of any future tsunami or other relevant, potentially catastrophic event. Tóth also reminded states parties that the completion of the organisation's work requires member states to maintain their annual financial contributions. However, just two months after the conclusion of the CTBT conference, the US Congress failed to increase US funding for the CTBTO, which the Bush administration reduced by $7.6 million from the United States' latest annual assessment of $22 million. The US contributions amount to nearly a quarter of the CTBTO budget. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said in early 2005 that the cuts were due to overall fiscal constraints and not US opposition to the CTBTO's mission. Senators Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) and Joseph Biden (D-Del.) had successfully won the Senate's support to restore $5 million of the proposed cut, but the House of Representatives did not take similar action. In the end, only $14.4 was appropriated. According to sources in Vienna, the cut will not adversely affect next year's CTBTO work. However, they say that if the US does not compensate for the reduction and for past arrears in the next funding cycle, the cumulative shortfall will have "direct impact" on the ability of the organisation to conduct future programmes. ConclusionThe 2005 CTBT Article XIV conference served as yet another reminder that for the vast majority of states, the treaty is a vital thread in the fabric of the nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament system. Despite the obstacles still facing the CTBT, the treaty is already working to reinforce the de facto global test moratorium. In the absence of a requirement for a new nuclear warhead, a defect in an existing weapon that cannot be addressed without resuming testing, or the belief that clandestine nuclear testing has occurred, the seven states that have conducted nuclear test explosions are not likely going to do so again. Even India and Pakistan have committed themselves to an indefinite continuation of their respective testing moratoria. Nevertheless, the longer it takes to achieve CTBT entry into force, the greater the likelihood that one or another state will someday break the global taboo against nuclear testing. Achieving CTBT entry into force requires a substantial shift in attitudes about the value of the test ban and new nuclear weapons in the White House and the Senate, as well as effecting changes in attitudes and government policy in India, Pakistan, China, Egypt, Iran and Israel. In the two years before the next Article XIV conference and the next US presidential election, CTBT supporters must do more than simply hope for a climate more favourable for the CTBT to emerge. They must help create it. Now is the time to use their considerable political and economic leverage to narrow the list of necessary signatures and ratifications and push for positive action on the treaty by the United States, China and other hold-outs, especially in South Asia and the Middle East. With the exit of the Bush administration at the end of 2008, the next US government will likely undertake a review of its future test ban policy, opening the door for possible reconsideration of the treaty by the Senate. Positive action would become more likely if another significant state, especially China, were finally to ratify. Realising these possibilities, however, will require that the CTBT's strongest supporters do something they have rarely done: rescue the discussion of the CTBT from UN conference rooms and put the treaty's entry into force at the top of their own leaders' agenda for bilateral engagement with the hold out states. Daryl G. Kimball is executive director of the Arms Control Association, which publishes the monthly journal Arms Control Today. He has been working since 1990 to promote a global nuclear test ban in the United States and elsewhere. Conference on Facilitating CTBT Entry into Force, Final DeclarationAfter being adopted by the conference without a vote on September 23, 2005, the Final Declaration and measures to promote the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was annexed to the Report of the Conference, CTBT-ART.XIV/2005/6. 1. We the ratifiers, together with the State Signatories, met in New York from 21-23 September 2005 to promote the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty at the earliest possible date. In accordance with the mandate given to us in Article XIV of the Treaty, we decided by consensus what measures consistent with international law may be undertaken to accelerate the ratification process in order to facilitate the early entry into force of the Treaty, thus ridding the world of nuclear weapon test explosions. 2. We reiterate that the cessation of all nuclear weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosions, by constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons, constitutes an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects. The end to all nuclear weapons testing is, thus, a meaningful step in the realization of a systematic process to achieve nuclear disarmament. 3. The international community is committed to establishing a universal and internationally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty as a major instrument in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The overwhelming support for the Treaty and its early entry into force has been expressed by the United Nations General Assembly and other multilateral and regional organs and initiatives, which have called for signature and ratification of the Treaty as soon as possible, and have urged all States to remain seized of the issue at the highest political level. We reaffirmed the importance of the Treaty and its early entry into force for the practical steps and effective measures for the systematic and progressive efforts towards nuclear disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation which were agreed to by the participating States at international forums dealing with nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. 4. We note that significant progress has been made in signing and ratifying the CTBT which has achieved near universal adherence with signature by 176 States and ratification by 125 States as of today, of which 8 have signed and 21 have ratified since the 2003 Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT. This progress demonstrates the strong determination of the vast majority of States not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under their jurisdiction or control. Of the 44 States listed in Annex 2 of the Treaty whose ratification is required for its entry into force, 41 have signed and of these, 33 have also ratified the Treaty. A list of those States is provided in the Appendix. 5. Despite the progress made and the near universal international support that exists for the Treaty, we note with concern that it has not entered into force nine years after its opening for signature on 24 September 1996. Relevant international developments since the 2003 Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT make entry into force of the Treaty more urgent today than ever before, within the broader framework of multilateral disarmament, arms control and nonproliferation efforts. We renew our strong conviction that entry into force of the CTBT will enhance international peace and security. 6. We call upon all States which have not yet done so, to sign and ratify the Treaty without delay, in particular, those States whose ratification is needed for entry into force. We strongly encourage such Annex 2 States to take individual initiatives to ratify the Treaty. We also commend efforts to create conditions facilitating ratification by such Annex 2 States, including confidence-building measures through which such States could be encouraged to consider, as an option, ratifying the Treaty in a coordinated manner. At the same time, we renew our commitment to work for universal ratification of the Treaty and its early entry into force. 7. We recognize the extensive range of bilateral and joint outreach efforts by signatories and ratifiers to encourage and assist States which have not yet signed and ratified the Treaty to do so, and agreed to intensify our efforts to encourage ratification. We expressed appreciation for the efforts of the Special Representative in promoting entry into force of the Treaty, and agreed that he should continue to support the Article XIV Coordinator. 8. In accordance with the letter and spirit of the Treaty, we reaffirm our firm determination to end nuclear weapon test explosions and any other nuclear explosions. We call upon all States not to carry out such explosions. Continuing and sustained voluntary adherence to a moratorium is of the highest importance, but does not have the same effect as the entry into force of the Treaty, which offers the global community the prospect of a permanent and legally binding commitment to end nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions. We reaffirm our commitment to the Treaty's basic obligations and call on all States to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty pending its entry into force. 9. We reaffirmed our strong belief that it is essential to maintain momentum in building all elements of the verification regime, which will be capable of verifying compliance with the Treaty at its entry into force. The verification regime will be unprecedented in its global reach after entry into force of the Treaty and will thereby ensure confidence that States are maintaining their Treaty commitments. In this context, we will continue to provide the support required to enable the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization to complete all its tasks in the most efficient and cost-effective way including the On- Site Inspection programme and the progressive development and coverage of the International Monitoring System which will be capable of meeting the verification requirements of the Treaty at its entry into force. 10. We agree that in addition to its essential function, the CTBT verification system currently being built up would be capable of bringing scientific and civil benefits, including for tsunami warning systems and possibly other disaster alert systems. We will continue to consider ways to ensure that these benefits can be broadly shared by the international community in conformity with the Treaty. 11. We reaffirm our determination to continue to work towards early entry into force of the Treaty and to this end adopt the following measures. Draft measures to promote the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban TreatyConvinced of the importance of achieving universal adherence to the Treaty, we: (a) Will spare no efforts and use all avenues open to us in conformity with international law to encourage further signature and ratification of the Treaty, and urge all States to sustain the momentum generated by this Conference to remain seized of the issue at the highest political level; (b) Support and encourage bilateral, regional and multilateral initiatives by interested countries and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization to promote the entry into force of the Treaty; (c) Agree that ratifying States will continue the practice of selecting one of their number as a coordinator to promote cooperation, through informal consultations with all interested countries, aimed at promoting further signatures and ratifications; (d) Will maintain a contact list of countries among ratifiers which volunteer to assist the coordinator in various regions in promoting activities enhancing the entry into force of the Treaty; (e) Agree that the Special Representative appointed following the 2003 Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT, will continue to assist the coordinating State in the performance of its function in promoting the entry into force of the Treaty; (f) Recommend that ratifying States will consider establishing a trust fund, financed through voluntary contributions, to support an outreach programme for promoting the Treaty; (g) Encourage the organization of regional seminars in conjunction with other regional meetings in order to increase the awareness of the important role that the Treaty plays; (h) Call upon the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear- Test-Ban Treaty Organization to continue its international cooperation activities and organizing workshops, seminars and training programmes in the legal and technical fields; (i) Call upon the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban-Treaty Organization to continue promoting understanding of the Treaty and demonstrating, on a provisional basis, the benefits of the civil and scientific applications of the verification technologies, inter alia, in such areas as environment, earth science and technology, tsunami warning systems and possibly other disaster alert systems; (j) Recommend that the Provisional Technical Secretariat continue to provide States with legal assistance with respect to the ratification process and implementation measures and, in order to enhance these activities and their visibility, maintain a contact point for the exchange and dissemination of relevant information and documentation; (k) Request the Provisional Technical Secretariat to continue to act as a "focal point" where information about activities undertaken by ratifiers and signatories is collected in order to assist in promoting the entry into force of the Treaty; (l) Encourage cooperation with non-governmental organizations and other elements of civil society to raise awareness of and support for the Treaty and its objectives, as well as the need for its early entry into force... B1. States listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty which have signed and ratified the Treaty Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland B2. States listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty which have signed but not ratified the Treaty China, Colombia, Egypt, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Indonesia, Israel, United States of America, Viet Nam. B3. States listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty which have not signed the Treaty Democratic People's Republic of Korea, India, Pakistan. Source: United Nations, http://www.un.org. NGO Statement on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) for the Fourth Article XIV Conference on Accelerating Entry-Into-ForceDelivered by Daryl Kimball, Executive Director of the Arms Control Association, September 22, 2005. Mr. Chairperson, Distinguished Delegates, and Colleagues, 1. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty has been a centrepiece of the international disarmament and non-proliferation agenda since the 1950s. It is essential to recall that the 1996 CTBT is largely the product of decades of hard work, dedication, and advocacy by NGOs, scientific experts, and millions of ordinary people around the world. They have long understood that ending nuclear testing is essential for three powerful reasons: to impede the development of new types of nuclear warheads and reduce dangerous nuclear arms competition; to obstruct the emergence of new nuclear powers; and to prevent further devastation of human health and the global environment. 2. Nine years ago, states gathered here at the United Nations to endorse and open the treaty for signature. In light of ongoing tensions between nuclear weapons states and would-be nuclear weapons states, illicit nuclear trading, and efforts by the nuclear weapon states to improve their nuclear weapon capabilities, the CTBT is more important than ever. Its entry into force is overdue. 3. Over the past several years, CTBT member states have made significant strides in moving closer to fulfilling the treaty's difficult entry into force requirements and the CTBTO Preparatory Commission is well on its way to completing the sophisticated and ambitious monitoring system that will verify compliance. Despite such progress and widespread public support for the treaty, inaction and opposition by a few states have delayed its full implementation. There remains much to be done at this conference and beyond to ensure that the CTBT is not tossed aside at the whim of a few states. 4. We, the NGOs attending this fourth Article XIV Conference, represent millions of people around the world who continue to support a permanent, complete, and verifiable ban on nuclear weapons test explosions. We call upon each of the CTBT Ratifying States in attendance to step up their efforts to win the necessary signatures and ratifications for entry into force of the treaty. In particular, we urge the eleven remaining Annex II states that have either not signed or ratified the treaty to do so without further delay. We also urge you to: a) support efforts to ensure the continuation of the global nuclear test moratorium; b) help advance the completion and augmentation of the treaty's monitoring and verification system; and c) seek changes to nuclear weapons policies that threaten to undermine the norm against testing. 5a. We welcome the steady support for the CTBT as demonstrated by numerous statements made by individual governments and regional groupings at this conference, at the 2000 and 2005 NPT Review Conferences, the United Nations General Assembly, and elsewhere. The ratification of the treaty by three nuclear weapon states France, Russia, and the United Kingdom is especially important. We also note the strong support for the treaty expressed by the European Union, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the Organization of American States (despite objections raised by the United States). 5b. We also welcome the statement issued in September of 2004, by over 40 Foreign Ministers in support of the Treaty, as well as recent statements from Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi and the Mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on the 60th anniversary of the first atomic bombings, which call for CTBT entry into force. Such statements are essential to the maintenance of the test ban norm and pressure on hold-out states to sign and/or ratify the treaty. 5c. Although these statements and activities are important, they are not sufficient. Some states that express their support for the CTBT such as China, Colombia, Egypt, and Indonesia have themselves not yet ratified the treaty. Unfortunately, top leaders from other states committed to the CTBT also often fail to press their counterparts in the eleven CTBT hold-out states to reconsider their opposition to the treaty or move forward with ratification. We urge such states to exercise much more consistent, top-level diplomacy in support of CTBT entry into force. 6. You must be sure to communicate that entry into force is not simply needed for the treaty's sake. Rather, the CTBT is vital because it directly contributes to national and international security. 6a. As has been noted at this conference, the CTBT is a critical building block in the architecture of the global nuclear nonproliferation system. The de facto global nuclear test moratorium and CTBT's entry into force are crucial barriers to help prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to additional states and are essential to the future viability of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). They are the first two of the 13 practical steps for systematic and progressive nuclear disarmament that were unanimously adopted in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. In fact, the nuclear weapon states' commitment to the CTBT was vital in securing the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995. 6b. We urge states to consider how the CTBT might contribute to nuclear risk reduction in regions of tension. Recently, concerns have been expressed that North Korea might conduct a nuclear test explosion to demonstrate its claims of a nuclear weapon capability. There are doubts about Iran's claim that its nuclear program is entirely for peaceful purposes. Though the government of Israel does not acknowledge that it possesses nuclear weapons, it is widely known that it does. And despite recent peace talks, the India-Pakistan nuclear rivalry continues. If all or some of these states were to formally join the CTBT, it would contribute to the credibility of their peaceful intentions and build confidence and reduce tensions with their neighbours. 7. The CTBT is also an essential step towards nuclear disarmament because it helps to discourage dangerous nuclear competition and block new nuclear threats from emerging. However, it must be recognised that technological advances in nuclear weapons research and development mean that a ban on nuclear test explosions by itself cannot prevent qualitative improvements of existing nuclear arsenals. Efforts to improve nuclear arsenals and to make nuclear weapons more useable in warfare will jeopardise the test ban and non-proliferation regimes. We call on all states possessing nuclear weapons to halt all qualitative improvements in their nuclear armaments, whether or not these improvements require test explosions. 7a. In this context, we are deeply concerned that the current U.S. administration is seeking funding for a controversial program of research on a new generation of high-yield earth-penetrating nuclear warheads, as well as new types of so-called "replacement" warheads. While the current U.S. administration claims that these efforts will not lead to the resumption of nuclear weapons testing, it is possible that if the warheads are extensively reworked, technical uncertainties may arise that lead some in the U.S. nuclear, military, or political establishment to press for the resumption of nuclear testing. Furthermore, the development, production, or testing of such weapons by the United States or any state is likely to lead to a dangerous nuclear action-reaction cycle that would not only undermine the test ban, but international security as a whole, likely serving as a catalyst for a new nuclear arms race. 8. The CTBT also reduces uncertainties in an increasingly uncertain world. The CTBT establishes a far-reaching global monitoring, verification, and compliance system that has already and will continue to build confidence that no state can defy the non-testing norm and escape detection. A series of independent studies, including a 2002 U.S. National Academy of Sciences report, have all concluded that the system is capable of detecting nuclear explosions in all environments with a high degree of confidence, thereby deterring potential treaty violators. We commend the PrepCom and Provisional Technical Secretariat for their work in establishing the International Monitoring System and International Data Centre, which are already proving their capabilities beyond expectations. We support efforts to promote the civil and scientific applications of the CTBT verification technology as a means of recouping costs and expanding the range of CTBT stakeholders. 8a. We are deeply troubled that some states continue to delay full construction of the CTBT's verification system and the finalization of the on-site inspection (OSI) arrangements for the Treaty by not paying their dues, not participating in relevant discussions, or by adopting unreasonable positions in those negotiations. We call on all Signatory States to provide the political, financial, and technical support necessary for the earliest feasible implementation of all elements of the CTBT's verification system. 8b. Until the treaty enters into force, nuclear weapon states should implement confidence-building processes, including transparency measures at their sites, to build confidence that they are not currently engaged in prohibited activities. We urge the United States and Russia in particular to reinvigorate discussion on mutual confidence-building measures at their respective test sites. We also call on China, India, Pakistan, Russia and the United States to pursue initiatives to increase transparency at their test sites to dispel any concerns about ongoing activities at those sites, including subcritical tests. 9. On this 60th anniversary year of the first nuclear test explosion, it is important to recall the devastating effects of nuclear weapons testing on human health and the environment and the importance of the CTBT in preventing such damage in the future. 9a. Since 1945, seven countries have conducted 2,051 nuclear test explosions. Most of these tests were conducted at U.S. test sites in Nevada and the Marshall Islands, the Soviet Union's test sites in Kazakhstan and Novaya Zemlya, France's test site on the Polynesian atolls of Fangataufa and Moruroa, China's Lop Nor test site, and in Algeria and Australia. Most of the test sites are in the lands of indigenous peoples and far from the capitals of the testing governments. The 528 atmospheric tests delivered radioactive materials that produced approximately 430,000 additional cancer fatalities by the year 2000, according to a 1990 report by the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War. The U.S. National Cancer Institute estimated in a 1997 report that the 90 dirtiest U.S. tests could cause 7,500-75,000 additional cases of thyroid cancer. 9b. While underground nuclear blasts pose a smaller radioactive hazard than atmospheric tests, there has been widespread venting from underground explosions, especially at the Semipalatinsk test site in Kazakhstan. The United States has acknowledged that 433 of its 824 underground tests released radioactive material into the atmosphere. In addition, underground nuclear blasts leave a legacy of radioactive contamination, which eventually might leak into the surrounding environment. 10. For all of these reasons, the states participating at this conference must train their attention and future efforts on achieving the signatures and ratification of those states that are required by Article XIV to effect entry into force. Despite overwhelming international support for the CTBT and the many ways it contributes to our security, eleven key states have not yet signed and/or ratified. 10a. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea, India, and Pakistan must sign and ratify the CTBT. China, Colombia, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, the United States, and Viet Nam should ratify, without further delay. The longer these states wait to join the Treaty, the greater the chance that some nation may begin testing and set off a dangerous international action-reaction cycle of military and nuclear confrontation. 10b. We are particularly dismayed with the policies of the Bush administration, which is not even seeking Senate approval for ratification, and that of China, which to our knowledge has failed to take any further action toward ratification since the last Article XIV conference. First, although the U.S. remains a signatory, the current U.S. administration has actively opposed endorsement of CTBT entry into force by other states at the UNGA, the NPT Review Conference, the Organization of American States, and the recently concluded Millennium + Five Summit. The Bush administration has also unilaterally declared its intent not to contribute financially or to participate in non-IMS activities of the Preparatory Commission of the CTBTO, including preparations for on-site inspections. Delegates at this conference must realize that while the Bush administration's active opposition to the treaty is damaging to the prospects for entry into force, it is not for the Bush administration alone to decide the fate of the treaty, which remains on the calendar of the U.S. Senate and which may be reconsidered by the next U.S. administration. We therefore urge the governments represented at this conference to actively urge -- at the highest level -- the U.S. administration to join the list of responsible and civilized states and reconsider its opposition to the treaty. 10c. Second, we are disappointed that progress on ratification in China has ground to a halt. There does not appear to be any domestic political obstacle in the way, and we therefore respectfully urge China to complete ratification before the end of this year. In the absence of such action, China owes the other CTBT member states a detailed explanation for its continued delay and a timetable for its ratification process. 10d. Given the series of crises with grave nuclear overtones that have shaken the South Asian sub-continent since the 1998 nuclear explosions, it should be self-evident that another round of tit-for-tat testing would adversely affect regional and international security. More so than any other region in the world, South Asia needs a nuclear-test-ban. We urge leaders in India and Pakistan to embrace the CTBT as a sign of their mutual desire to move back from the brink and to cultivate peaceful relations. 10e. We welcome the bilateral statements that express both nation's continued support for their voluntary nuclear test moratoria and Indian Prime Minister Singh's comments that India seeks to live up to the same nonproliferation standards that the five original nuclear weapon states are expected to observe. We would note that this implies that India should, in the very least, sign the CTBT, along with Pakistan. 11. Entry-into-force of the CTBT is within reach. But as a result of the actions of a few of states, the viability of a verifiable, comprehensive ban on nuclear tests - and the future of the NPT itself - is in jeopardy. No single government should be allowed to stand in the way of the historical opportunity to permanently end the scourge of nuclear testing, an indispensable step towards eliminating nuclear weapon threats and preventing nuclear war. 12a. People the world over have been part of the coalition working for a comprehensive nuclear test ban and an end to the arms race. While the concerns of this statement focus on technical and political aspects of nuclear testing, there is a moral and ethical value imperative for achieving CTBT entry into force. If our generation and that of our children are to thrive in a more just, equitable, environmentally sustainable, and free society, we must seize every opportunity to halt the proliferation of the world's most deadly weapons and accelerate progress toward their elimination. 12b. We do not accept, nor should any of you in this chamber, that any state or group of states should hold the world hostage to fear and the potential for destruction with the continued capacity of nuclear weapons. While we believe that the CTBT will eventually enter into force, we are concerned that the lack of political will on the part of many governments, the arrogant opposition of the few, and the persistent illusion of the utility of nuclear weapons will delay the CTBT even longer. 13. Finally, we wish to express our gratitude for the important contributions of Ambassador Wolfgang Hoffman to the CTBT Preparatory Commission. We extend our best wishes and offer our support for Ambassador Tibor Tóth, the new Executive Secretary. We also applaud the decision to appoint Ambassador Jaap Ramaker as an emissary for the treaty. 14. We, NGO supporters of the CTBT, stand ready to contribute to the effort to secure CTBT entry into force. This presentation was prepared and supported by NGOs who have worked for a comprehensive test-ban treaty for many years, in many countries, and in many ways. Thank you. NGO Statement endorsed by: Abolition 2000, New York © 2005 The Acronym Institute. |