Disarmament Diplomacy
Issue No. 87, Spring 2008
Editorial
Time to Outlaw the Use of Nuclear Weapons
Rebecca Johnson
Is nuclear disarmament finally catching on? It appears so, when
even the leaders of nuclear weapon states extol the vision of a
world free of nuclear weapons. From Stanford to Yale, London to
Oslo, there is talk of "Reykjavik Revisited" and a palpable buzz
about reaching "a tipping point", where disarmament becomes
respectable and achievable. But is the message reaching Washington
and Beijing, Moscow, Delhi or Islamabad?
At several recent meetings, including the Oslo Conference on
"Achieving the Vision of a World Free of Nuclear Weapons", Britain
was frequently singled out for praise, with much appreciation of
the government's plans to become a 'disarmament laboratory', as
described by UK Defence Secretary Des Browne in a speech to the
Conference on Disarmament on February 5.
This laudable idea was taken up in Margaret Beckett's speech to
the Carnegie Endowment Nonproliferation Conference last year and is
now being carried forward by the UK Government. We fully support
British plans to use the expertise in nuclear weapons laboratories
to contribute to disarmament verification and bring the nuclear
weapon states' labs together in a P-5 technical conference. Yet it
is hard to ignore that these UK initiatives have poured forth after
the government's deeply unpopular decision to procure a further
generation of Trident nuclear weapons - a decision that cost the
Labour Party its majority in Scotland. So we need to ask if all the
talk will lead to disarmament actions, or is this just
'public diplomacy' - a PR strategy designed to persuade and placate
rather than to do?
In his CD speech, Mr Browne slipped in the caveat that "the
international community" has not "completely stopped proliferation"
and the security architecture is not yet "strong enough to permit
immediate unilateral disarmament by any recognized nuclear weapon
state". Such claims that the correct conditions (total security,
general and complete disarmament or foolproof verification) have
not been obtained are familiarly used to let the nuclear powers off
the hook. The challenges of multilateral nuclear disarmament cannot
be a reason or justification for unilaterally committing to the
next generation of nuclear weapons for another 50 years.
The nuclear powers are not passive bystanders in international
developments. As George Shultz and the other Wall Street
Journal signatories recognized, governments and people have to
take responsibility and do their part to develop the security
conditions and build a world free of nuclear weapons.
Evoking the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons while
spending billions on equipping nuclear labs to make the warheads of
the future smacks of hypocrisy.
Browne also said, "the international community needs a
transparent, sustainable and credible plan for multilateral nuclear
disarmament". Yes of course, but each of the nuclear weapon
possessors should first develop credible plans for accomplishing
the elimination of its own arsenals. While verified reductions in
numbers of weapons must undoubtedly be part of such plans, the real
tipping point will come when the weapon states show that there is
no role for nuclear weapons in their doctrines and policies.
The 2006 Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, chaired by Dr
Hans Blix and comprising 14 high level representatives from key
countries, characterised all WMD as "weapons of terror" and
employed the concept of "outlawing" nuclear weapons. It stated:
"Weapons of mass destruction cannot be uninvented. But they can
be outlawed, as biological and chemical weapons have been, and
their use made unthinkable. Compliance, verification and
enforcement rules can, with the requisite will, be effectively
applied. And with that will, even the eventual elimination of
nuclear weapons is not beyond the world's reach."
It is more practical to design and implement a regime that would
successfully ban and contain sophisticated nuclear technologies
than to try to prevent terrorist acquisition or 'break-out' under
the confused mixed messages of the current nonproliferation regime.
The practical steps of verified disablement, dismantlement and
irreversible denuclearization will take time, and those countries
still possessing nuclear weapons will need to keep them safe
pending total elimination. Therefore, as a first step, it is not
the possession but the use of nuclear weapons that must be
outlawed. This would not eliminate the dangers overnight, but would
have major impact in taking nuclear weapons off the lustrous list
of objects of political status and desire. They would then truly be
treated as weapons of terror that no sane or civilized person would
want or be able to use. Those clinging to nuclear deterrence need
to wake up to the 21st century. A more effective deterrent against
the use of nuclear weapons is to make it a crime against humanity.
Even despots fear being held personally accountable and subjected
to public trial and punishment.
Many have already achieved the vision of a world free of
nuclear weapons. To move towards accomplishing the reality of that
world, we now need to outlaw the use of nuclear weapons for
all.
Back to the top of page
© 2008 The Acronym Institute.
|