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Rebecca Johnson
Is nuclear disarmament finally catching on? It appears so, when even the leaders of nuclear weapon states extol the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. From Stanford to Yale, London to Oslo, there is talk of "Reykjavik Revisited" and a palpable buzz about reaching "a tipping point", where disarmament becomes respectable and achievable. But is the message reaching Washington and Beijing, Moscow, Delhi or Islamabad?
At several recent meetings, including the Oslo Conference on "Achieving the Vision of a World Free of Nuclear Weapons", Britain was frequently singled out for praise, with much appreciation of the government's plans to become a 'disarmament laboratory', as described by UK Defence Secretary Des Browne in a speech to the Conference on Disarmament on February 5.
This laudable idea was taken up in Margaret Beckett's speech to the Carnegie Endowment Nonproliferation Conference last year and is now being carried forward by the UK Government. We fully support British plans to use the expertise in nuclear weapons laboratories to contribute to disarmament verification and bring the nuclear weapon states' labs together in a P-5 technical conference. Yet it is hard to ignore that these UK initiatives have poured forth after the government's deeply unpopular decision to procure a further generation of Trident nuclear weapons - a decision that cost the Labour Party its majority in Scotland. So we need to ask if all the talk will lead to disarmament actions, or is this just 'public diplomacy' - a PR strategy designed to persuade and placate rather than to do?
In his CD speech, Mr Browne slipped in the caveat that "the international community" has not "completely stopped proliferation" and the security architecture is not yet "strong enough to permit immediate unilateral disarmament by any recognized nuclear weapon state". Such claims that the correct conditions (total security, general and complete disarmament or foolproof verification) have not been obtained are familiarly used to let the nuclear powers off the hook. The challenges of multilateral nuclear disarmament cannot be a reason or justification for unilaterally committing to the next generation of nuclear weapons for another 50 years.
The nuclear powers are not passive bystanders in international developments. As George Shultz and the other Wall Street Journal signatories recognized, governments and people have to take responsibility and do their part to develop the security conditions and build a world free of nuclear weapons. Evoking the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons while spending billions on equipping nuclear labs to make the warheads of the future smacks of hypocrisy.
Browne also said, "the international community needs a transparent, sustainable and credible plan for multilateral nuclear disarmament". Yes of course, but each of the nuclear weapon possessors should first develop credible plans for accomplishing the elimination of its own arsenals. While verified reductions in numbers of weapons must undoubtedly be part of such plans, the real tipping point will come when the weapon states show that there is no role for nuclear weapons in their doctrines and policies.
The 2006 Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, chaired by Dr Hans Blix and comprising 14 high level representatives from key countries, characterised all WMD as "weapons of terror" and employed the concept of "outlawing" nuclear weapons. It stated: "Weapons of mass destruction cannot be uninvented. But they can be outlawed, as biological and chemical weapons have been, and their use made unthinkable. Compliance, verification and enforcement rules can, with the requisite will, be effectively applied. And with that will, even the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons is not beyond the world's reach."
It is more practical to design and implement a regime that would successfully ban and contain sophisticated nuclear technologies than to try to prevent terrorist acquisition or 'break-out' under the confused mixed messages of the current nonproliferation regime. The practical steps of verified disablement, dismantlement and irreversible denuclearization will take time, and those countries still possessing nuclear weapons will need to keep them safe pending total elimination. Therefore, as a first step, it is not the possession but the use of nuclear weapons that must be outlawed. This would not eliminate the dangers overnight, but would have major impact in taking nuclear weapons off the lustrous list of objects of political status and desire. They would then truly be treated as weapons of terror that no sane or civilized person would want or be able to use. Those clinging to nuclear deterrence need to wake up to the 21st century. A more effective deterrent against the use of nuclear weapons is to make it a crime against humanity. Even despots fear being held personally accountable and subjected to public trial and punishment.
Many have already achieved the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. To move towards accomplishing the reality of that world, we now need to outlaw the use of nuclear weapons for all.
© 2008 The Acronym Institute.