Disarmament Diplomacy

Reaching a Tipping Point:
Strengthening BWC Confidence-Building Measures

Filippa Lentzos

The December 2008 Meeting of States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) saw an unexpected, but very welcome, increase in the attention given to the treaty's Confidence-Building Measures (CBM). This meeting took place in Geneva from 1-5 December 2008, and forms part of the BWC's current intersessional process. As discussed in a separate report on the Experts Meeting in this issue of Disarmament Diplomacy, [1] the current intersessional process was established by the BWC's Sixth Review Conference in 2006, and is set to run from 2006 until the Seventh Review Conference in 2011. It comprises two different sets of annual meetings; a Meeting of Experts (MX) is held in the summer and a Meeting of States Parties (MSP) follows this in the winter. Each year's meeting covers set topics as mandated by the Sixth Review Conference. It is notable that CBMs do not feature in the current intersessional work programme. Instead, the Sixth Review Conference agreed that they merit further and comprehensive attention at the Seventh Review Conference. However, even though CBMs are not an explicit topic on the formal agenda, the intersessional process provides an ideal opportunity to address CBMs on the margins.

The December 2008 Meeting of States Parties saw two side events dedicated to CBMs. The first of these, jointly hosted by Switzerland and the Geneva Forum, launched the final report of a Swiss study that focussed on the kind and quality of the information exchanged by states parties on their CBM returns.[2] The second side event, jointly hosted by France and UNIDIR, provided a panel discussion on ways to increase the participation of states parties in CBM mechanisms.[3]

In addition to these two events, there were also discussions of CBMs in the formal meeting itself. References were made to CBMs by several states parties in their general statements at the outset of the meeting, and a number of states parties used the discussion of the Implementation Support Unit (ISU) report as an opportunity to address CBM concerns. The European Union not only raised its concerns, but also announced concrete measures to address participation in the CBM mechanism through its new Joint Action.[4]

This article reports on key aspects of the CBM discussions in the 2008 Expert's Meeting and reflects on what can helpfully be done at this stage to strengthen the mechanism and prepare for 2011.

The Role and Challenges of CBMs

The BWC aims to ensure that biological weapons are not used for hostile purposes or in armed conflict. To date, the exchange of information through CBMs is the central means by which states can be transparent about their activities and programmes. The CBMs thus offer states an opportunity to reduce the occurrence of potential ambiguities, doubts or suspicions about their compliance.

Developing out of the crisis of confidence among states parties that had resulted from the unresolved allegations of non-compliance, rapid developments in science and technology and other pressures in the early 1980s, CBMs were agreed at the Second Review Conference in 1986, elaborated at a meeting of scientific and technical experts in 1987, and modified and considerably expanded at the Third Review Conference in 1991. They have not been modified since, although the Sixth Review Conference agreed on various improvements to the mechanisms for submission and distribution.

The CBMs consist of seven measures (A-G) that are to be submitted using agreed forms to the ISU no later than 15 April each year. Information to be exchanged includes: national biodefence programmes, relevant research centres and laboratories, vaccine production facilities, and outbreaks of infectious disease. In accordance with the decision of the Sixth Review Conference, the ISU is responsible for compiling and distributing the CBM returns to states parties. The CBM returns are not publicly available (unless a state party specifically requests that its return be made public) and no collective analysis of the submitted data is carried out.

In the absence of other verification mechanisms, the CBMs continue to remain the only tool available to establish transparency and trust between states party to the BWC. Yet they suffer from a number of shortcomings. Key amongst these are the low levels of participation by states parties and the poor quality of the information exchanged by those states that do participate.

Currently, the BWC has 162 states parties and 13 signatories.[5] In 2008, only 61 CBM submissions were made[6] . Over the last twenty years, CBM submissions over the last twenty years have fluctuated between a low of 30 in 1987 and a high of 65 in 2007.[7] Annual CBM submissions are thus made by substantially less than half, and often less than a third, of states party to the BWC.[8]

This relative lack of participation in the CBM mechanism is compounded by inconsistency, where some states submit returns in some years, but not in others. For example, 11 states parties which submitted CBMs in 2007 have not yet done so in 2008.[9] There is a wide perception that updating information annually takes a small effort once a state has already taken the effort to collate and submit previous returns. As was noted a number of times during the December discussions, it is not immediately obvious why a state party that has made previous returns or even a first return would not simply update its information in following years.

The CBM mechanism not only faces low and inconsistent participation, it is also challenged by incomplete submissions where only some of the seven forms are submitted. A notably bad year was 1991, for example, in which approximately half of the CBM returns submitted were incomplete.[10] In other years somewhere between 15-25% of submissions are incomplete.[11] Where forms are submitted, they are sometimes only partially filled out, or filled out with information that provides little transparency about national programmes and activities related to the BWC.[12] Additionally, there is concern that some of the questions asked on the forms, and the way in which they are currently asked, might be hampering the quality of the information exchanged.[13]

During the CBM discussions at the December meeting a general consensus seemed to form that it is crucial to address both the low levels of participation by states parties and the poor quality of the information exchanged in order to strengthen the CBM mechanism and increase confidence in the Convention.

Towards Universalization

The regular exchange of data on current activities strengthens the regime of compliance by enhancing the transparency of national patterns of normal activity. Complete, accurate and annual declarations are of the utmost importance so that information can be compared over time and deviations from the norm can be identified. The lack of participation in the current CBMs is therefore particularly unfortunate as the mechanism will only command limited confidence until more states parties honour their commitments and submit declarations. Indeed, ignoring the mechanism weakens the concept of CBMs and may ultimately reduce, rather than build, confidence among states.

So why is it that the majority of states parties are not participating? Very little work has so far been done on investigating this and a key research priority leading up to the Seventh Review Conference should be to explore systematically what impediments stand in the way of states parties submitting accurate, consistent and complete CBMs.

In the meantime, it may be helpful to look at analogous work on compliance and non-compliance with regulations in other fields, where substantial empirical work has already been done. One such field is organizational theory which focuses on how people - as individuals or as groups - act within organizations. In its literature on corporate responses to regulation it identifies four characterizations: amoral profit-seekers, political citizens, principled disagreers, and the incompetent. Each of these categories is accompanied by an explanation of why firms may or may not participate in regulatory regimes at different times and in different ways.

The first of the characterizations portrays corporations as 'amoral profit-seekers' whose actions are motivated by rational calculations of costs and opportunities.[14] These amoral calculators will comply with regulations if the anticipated legal penalties of not complying exceed the costs of complying. Similarly, other research has shown that corporations will also comply if the risks of non-compliance are so great that they involve the destruction of the entire site, as in the case of oil refineries and chemical works for example,[15] or if they have substantial incentives to comply, as in the case of metal recovery works preventing the emission of valuable metals to the atmosphere.[16] On the other hand, if the anticipated legal penalties of not complying are less than the costs of complying, firms are less motivated to comply.[17] The 'amoral profit-seeker' category can be extended to viewing firms as more general 'value maximizers'. More recent work on the impact of adverse publicity on corporations suggests that firms are not only motivated by maximizing profits and making money, but also by maintaining a good reputation.[18] A desire to earn approval and the respect of others can also be a motivation for compliance.[19]

But organizational theory also shows that, while some corporations at some times act as if they are amoral calculators or value maximizers, it is not necessary to act this way, and in fact most corporations at most times do not behave like this.[20] Some researchers go so far as to suggest that amoral calculators, or 'bad apples', only make up about 20% of the average population of regulated enterprises in most regulatory programmes.[21] The model of the firm as a value maximizer - of profits or of reputation - clearly does not go far enough in explaining corporate responses to regulation. And it certainly does not go far enough in explaining state party responses to CBM participation.

Organizational theory also suggests that in addition to value maximizing, many firms are motivated by social responsibility.[22] Corporate actors are often concerned to do what is right, to be faithful to their identity as a law abiding entity, and to sustain a self-concept of social responsibility.[23] Indeed, the sense of social responsibility may even be stronger than economic considerations, and there are many variants of elevating social responsibility above economic costs. For example, such obligations could include: the responsibility to obey the law whatever the cost, the responsibility to scientific integrity for pharmaceutical industry scientists, the responsibility to patients for nurses working for a nursing home corporation, the responsibility to professional ethics for company lawyers, or the responsibility of a coal mining executive who says he has never put profits ahead of the lives of his workers.[24] This then is the corporation as a 'political citizen', ordinarily inclined to comply with the law, partly because of a belief in the rule of law, partly as a matter of long-term self-interest.[25] Their compliance depends, however, on an acceptance of the law as legitimate and fairly administered. The law must be perceived as necessary and as consistently interpreted and applied by regulators.[26]

The opposite of the 'political citizens' is the 'principled disagreer'.[27] Corporations - or states parties - may have their own strongly held views regarding appropriate policies, and sometimes they violate rules and regulations from a principled position of disagreement, perhaps because they find them arbitrary, ill-conceived, conflicting with other regulations or simply unreasonable.

Sometimes corporations that are disposed to be law-abiding violate the law because of ignorance, managerial incompetence, misunderstanding of the law, or improper attention to regulatory requirements.[28] A 1975 study on major corporate scandals involving breach of duty is illustrative.[29] It showed that a substantial number of the organizational misconduct cases resulted from managers not being told of or not adequately monitoring 'short-cuts' taken by subordinates. Indeed, sometimes bad news and any illegal remedial action were actively hidden from superiors. Organizational misconduct also resulted from the production department not understanding the law in the same way as the general counsel's office did, and from the quality control or safety testing engineers not being given adequate authority to insist on attention to their concerns.

Other studies have shown that specialization and division of labour might result in employees being unaware of their illegality because their actions are part of a chain of actions by invisible others; each individual act is legitimate, but together all the acts constitute a violation of which some if not all individual participants may be ignorant.[30] Such observations have led to organizational theory's fourth characterization of corporations as 'incompetent' in the way they respond to regulation.

Of course this overview does not provide a comprehensive guide to corporate responses to regulation, or an explanation of state party non-participation in the CBM mechanism. But it does provide useful starting points for identifying possible reasons for states' non-compliance, as well as helping to determine what sorts of remedies might be appropriate. If, for example, a state party's non-participation results from ignorance, incompetence or a lack of resources there is a lot that can be done to help. In relation to the BWC, a number of suggestions were made during the discussions at the Meeting of States Parties, including: developing a 'how to' guide for completing and submitting CBMs for the first time; raising awareness and assisting states parties to put in place national points of contact; providing technical assistance to states parties to complete their CBMs; encouraging non-participating states parties to take up offers of assistance, for instance from the ISU or through the EU Joint Action; and hosting workshops between 'active CBMers' and 'hesitant CBMers' (defined as states parties that have only submitted CBMs once or twice) to encourage more regular submissions

Alternatively, if a state party's non-participation results from a lack of interest in openness and from principled disagreement with the CBM mechanism, then there might be less that can be done to increase participation. In discussions during the December Meeting, though it was commonly thought that only a few states parties were in this category, the discussants generally considered that understanding the underlying reasons for non-participation was of the utmost importance in formulating appropriate and more nuanced strategies for universalization of CBM submissions.

Content Revision

It was also widely agreed at the December Meeting of States Parties that efforts to increase participation in the CBM mechanism must go hand in hand with efforts to enhance the quality of the information exchanged. Not only should complete submissions be encouraged, but more clarity should be provided about when the terms "nothing to declare" and "nothing new to declare" can be used. The majority of states consistently note nothing or nothing new to declare on the forms they submit, which means little information is actually exchanged in practice. If we look at Form A Part 2 on national biodefence programmes, which is often considered the most relevant to the CBM mechanism - we see that in every year, since the forms were modified following the Third Review Conference in 1991, less than half of the states parties submitting the form indicate that they have something to declare.[31] Typically this means that information is only exchanged on some ten or twenty biodefence programmes on a regular basis.

A balance needs to found between requesting too much information, unnecessarily burdening a state party, and requesting too little information and so not providing any genuine confidence. Nonetheless, it was repeatedly noted at the Meeting that for states parties submitting CBMs for the first time, a little information goes a long way (and this can then be added to over time).

In parallel with encouraging more complete submissions and increased information exchange, there was much discussion at the Meeting of States Parties about revising the questions asked on the forms and modernizing the reporting process. Most experts seemed to agree that more detailed or more intrusive questions would not be feasible. Asking for more detailed information might make states less inclined to participate, or result in less information being submitted than at present. There was also general agreement that the CBM questions cannot be slimmed down beyond what is currently asked. Yet, while the level of detail asked for on the CBM forms was generally considered appropriate, many felt that a review was needed of the particular questions asked and how they were asked. That is, there was a widespread view that the CBM forms need not request more information, but that some of the questions on the forms should be differently worded or given a slightly different focus.

Continuing to focus on Form A Part 2, ideas were put forward for clarifying some of the language in the questions, for example: Who is to be counted as military and who is to be counted as civilian? Is it necessary to list the specific biological agents that are being worked with, or do risk-group indications suffice? Does the "total number of personnel" refer to person-years or to the number of employees working at the facility?

When put under the spotlight in this way, the meeting found that a number of the questions could helpfully be modified to provide more meaningful answers. For instance, it could be more useful to request information on: the proportion of the defence budget spent on biodefence instead of the biodefence budget figure on its own; the distribution of scientists according to disciplines rather than merely the disciplines represented; the number of facilities dealing with highly dangerous pathogens and the number of personnel involved rather than the square-meters of high containment laboratories; and the capacity in which the military is involved rather than just whether it is involved in the biodefence programme.

Finally, there were also some questions not currently asked that it was thought would significantly increase the level of transparency provided by the CBMs. These included questions on: whether aerosol testing is carried out, the number and species of animals used in biodefence research per year, the proportion of open-source to internal/ restricted publications at a facility, non-funded military involvement in the biodefence programme, the percentage of subcontracting going to foreign institutions, and the scale of clinical trials related to the biodefence programme.

It was also generally agreed that the reporting process needed to be modernized. Most encouraged the development of forms for electronic submission and a user-friendly, web-based information management system. It was felt that standardized forms and a simpler submission process would increase the likelihood of more states participating, and would make it easier to analyse CBMs. Many urged the adoption of tick boxes and pull-down menus to simplify data entry and to improve the visibility of key data, as well as help functions and indicators to signal where to go next or where data still needs to be filled in.

Priorities in Moving Forward

How do we move forward to 2011 and prepare for a substantial and effective discussion on CBMs at the Seventh Review Conference?

A universalization strategy has already been identified and efforts are underway by the ISU, the European Union and individual states parties to increase participation. At one of the side event discussions during the December meeting, one participant asked what number of states parties have to participate in the CBM mechanism in order to reach the tipping point at which the mechanism provides sufficient transparency and enough confidence that there is no development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of biological and toxin agents in contravention of the Convention.[32] That same participant then suggested an answer that many seemed to agree with: around 90-100, which is the number of states parties that regularly participate at the Meetings of Experts and States Parties. A regular exchange of information between this majority of states parties would be a useful guide in determining the robustness of the mechanism and a helpful number to aim towards.

A second strategy, which has to date received less attention but should be of equal importance to the aim of universalization, is the development of a common political and technical approach to content revision. There are a number of ways to move forward on this. One suggestion has been to convene a small group of like-minded states parties and key NGOs to prepare ideas and find common understandings. Such a group could be constituted by representatives from Missions in Geneva and supplemented by experts from capitals during the Meetings of Experts and States Parties. If the group was to meet on a regular basis it could additionally involve on an ad hoc basis representatives from states parties with a range of different views, providing a broader field for sounding out ideas and gathering information. In parallel to developing a common political approach, a comprehensive analysis of the content revisions required should be carried out, possibly through a multilateral meeting of experts outside of the BWC intersessional process.

Without completing this kind of technical analysis before the Seventh Review Conference, it will be difficult for states parties to reach agreement on any immediate changes in 2011. Other suggestions for moving forward have included compiling all civil society recommendations and states parties' proposals on CBMs to provide a cross-reference of the proposals and suggestions made to date; encouraging states parties who might object to any revisions to clarify their concerns early, for instance through Working Papers to the 2009 and 2010 Meetings of Experts and States Parties; and preparing an analysis or set of reflections on how CBMs have evolved since they were first initiated, including what the political disagreements and technical suggestions have been to date. The more views and ideas that can be exchanged on potential revisions over the coming two years, the higher the likelihood that the Seventh Review Conference will be in a position to take effective action on CBMs.

Notes

[1] Kathryn McLaughlin, "Bringing Biologists on Board: Report from the 2008 Meeting of BWC Experts", Disarmament Diplomacy 89 (Winter 2008).

[2] The event, entitled "Preparing the Ground for the CBM Content Debate: What Information Builds Confidence" was held on Tuesday 2 December 2008 at the Palais des Nations. Richard Lennane, Head of the BWC Implementation Support Unit, provided an overview of the role of the ISU in strengthening CBMs. Filippa Lentzos explored whether, in practice, the information supplied on CBM returns enhances transparency and builds the necessary degree of confidence between states parties. Reto Wollenmann, of the Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the Conference on Disarmament, took a longer-term perspective on CBMs and outlined some of the political work ahead. The event was chaired by David Atwood, Director of the Quaker UN Office in Geneva and Head of its Disarmament and Peace Programme.

[3] Building on the Tuesday side event, this event was held on Thursday 4 December 2008 and was entitled "Universalization of Confidence-Building Measures in the Biological Weapons". Opening remarks were provided by Sophie Moal-Makame of the Permament Mission of France to the Conference on Disarmament and by Christiane Agboton Johnson, Deputy Director of UNIDIR. Presentations were given by Ngoc Phuong Huynh of the BWC Implementation Support Unit, Filippa Lentzos of the London School of Economics, and Angela Woodward of the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre. A summary of the debate following the presentations was provided by Elisande Nexon of the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique. The event had simultaneous interpretation in French and English.

[4] Council Joint Action 2008/858/CFSP of 10 November 2008 in support of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), in the framework of the implementation of the EU strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.

[5] Taken from the website of the United Nations Office at Geneva on 15 January 2009. See www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/
7BE6CBBEA0477B52C12571860035FD5C?OpenDocument

[6] Taken from the website of the United Nations Office at Geneva on 21 January 2009. See www.unog.ch/unog/website/disarmament.nsf/(httpPages)/
9b7413664d854ea0c12572dd002b29dd?OpenDocument&
ExpandSection=22#_Section22

[7] Filippa Lentzos and Angela Woodward (2007) 'National data collection processes for CBM submissions: Revisiting the Confidence Building Measures (CBM) for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention after twenty years of CBM submissions', final project report of a six-month study funded by the Directorate for Security Policy of the Swiss Federal Department of Defence, available at www.lse.ac.uk/collections/BIOS/biosecurity/biosecurity_outputs.htm

[8] Lentzos and Woodward, 2007.

[9] 2008 Report of the Implementation Support Unit, BWC/MSP/2008/3, plus personal communication with the ISU 21 January 2009. According to agreements, CBMs are meant to be submitted no later than 15 April each year and the information provided should cover the previous calendar year (i.e. forms submitted in 2007 cover the calendar year 2006, forms submitted in 2008 cover 2007). Late submissions are, however, accepted.

[10] Lentzos and Woodward, 2007.

[11] Lentzos and Woodward, 2007.

[12] Filippa Lentzos (2008) 'Preparing the ground for the CBM content debate: A study on the information exchange that builds confidence between States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention', final project report of a six-month study funded by the Political Affairs Secretariat of the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, available at www.lse.ac.uk/collections/BIOS/biosecurity/biosecurity_outputs.htm

[13] Lentzos, 2008.

[14] R A Kagan and J T Scholz, 'The Criminology of the Corporation and Regulatory Enforcement Strategies' in K Hawkins and J M Thomas (eds.), Enforcing Regulation, (Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff, 1984). See also J T Scholz, 'Voluntary Compliance and Regulatory Policy', Law and Policy, Vol.6 (1984), pp 385-404.

[15] Genn, H. (1993) 'Business Responses to the Regulation of Health and Safety in England', Law and Policy, Vol.15(3) (1993), pp 219-33.

[16] B M Hutter, Compliance: Regulation and Environment (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997).

[17] Geis' classic study of the 1961 heavy electrical equipment antitrust cases lends support to this argument [G Geis, 'The Heavy Electrical Equipment Antitrust Cases of 1961', in M B Clinard, and R Quinney, Criminal Behavior Systems: A Typology 3rd Ed, (Cincinnati: Anderson, 1994)]. Presenting the first in-depth view of executives' thoughts and perceptions about their violations, Geis illustrates that the CEOs colluding about price fixing were clearly aware of the illegality and its harmful social consequences. Twenty years later, another prominent case involving the car manufacturer Ford gives further substance to the correlation between competition, production pressure, and violative behaviour. [F T Cullen, W J Maakestad, and G Cavender, Corporate Crime under Attack: The Ford Pinto Case and Beyond, (Cincinnati: Anderson, 1987)]. Here, written documents explicitly show the calculations made by executives of the costs and benefits in a redesign decision that juxtaposed the cost of redesign against the quantified loss of human life in accidents if the redesigns were not done. Even though lives had already been lost, the final decision was to continue production. A number of more recent empirical studies also support the 'amoral calculator' model of the firm, for example: J Braithwaite and T Makkai, 'Testing an Expected Utility Model of Corporate Deterrence', Law and Society Review, Vol.25(1) (1991), pp 7-39; R J Burby and R G Paterson, 'Improving Compliance with State Environmental Regulations', Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol.12 (1993), pp 753-772; W B Gray and J Scholz, 'Does Regulatory Enforcement Work? A Panel Analysis of OSHA Enforcement', Law and Society Review, Vol.27(1) (1993), pp 177-213; E Helland, 'The Enforcement of Pollution Control Laws: Inspections, Violations, and Self-Reporting', The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol.80(1) (1998), pp 141-153; P J May and S Winter, 'Regulatory Enforcement and Compliance: Examining Danish Agro-Environmental Policy', Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol.18 (1999), pp 625-51; S Winter and P J May, 'Motivation for Compliance with Environmental Regulations', Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol.20(4) (2001), pp 675-698.

[18] W B Fisse and J Braithwaite, The Impact of Publicity on Corporate Offenses, (Albany, NY: State University of New York, 1983); I Ayres and J Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).

[19] J F Di Mento, Environmental Law and American Business: Dilemmas of Compliance, (New York: Plenum Press, 1986); S Winter and P J May, 'Motivation for Compliance with Environmental Regulations', Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol.20(4) (2001), pp 675-698.

[20] R A Kagan and J T Scholz, 'The Criminology of the Corporation and Regulatory Enforcement Strategies' in K Hawkins and J M Thomas (eds.), Enforcing Regulation, (Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff, 1984).

[21] E Bardach and R Kagan, Going by the Book: The Problem of Regulatory Unreasonableness, (Philadelphia, Penn: Temple University Press, 1982).

[22] Y Brittan, The Impact of Water Pollution Control on Industry: A Case Study of Fifty Dischargers, (Oxford: Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, 1984); J Braithwaite, To Punish or Persuade: Enforcement of Coal Mine Safety, (Albany: New York Press, 1985).

[23] I Ayres, and J Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).

[24] Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992.

[25] Kagan and Scholz, 1984.

[26] This is an argument introduced by Bardach and Kagan in their discussion of regulatory unreasonableness (1982) and further illustrated by M Levi, Of Rule and Revenue, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988); T R Tyler, Why People Obey the Law, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990); J T Scholz and N Pinney, 'Duty, Fear, and Tax Compliance: The Heuristic Basis of Citizenship Behaviour', American Journal of Political Science, Vol.39 (1995), pp 490-512; S Winter and P J May, 'Motivation for Compliance with Environmental Regulations', Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol.20(4) (2001), pp 675-698; and P J May and R S Wood, 'At the Regulatory Frontlines: Inspectors' Enforcement Styles and Regulatory Compliance', Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Vol.13(2) (2003), pp 117-139.

[27] Kagan and Scholz, 1984.

[28] For empirical studies, see R Cranston, Regulatory Business: Law and Consumer Agencies. (London: Macmillan, 1979); K Hawkins,Environment and Enforcement: Regulation and Social Definition of Pollution, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); B M Hutter, Compliance: Regulation and Environment, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997); B M Hutter, The Reasonable Arm of the Law?: The Law Enforcement Procedures of Environmental Health Officers, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988); and S Winter and P J May, 'Motivation for Compliance with Environmental Regulations', Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, Vol.20(4) (2001), pp 675-698.

[29] C D Stone, Where the Law Ends: The Social Control of Corporate Behaviour, (New York: Harper and Row, 1975).

[30] E Gross, 'Organizational Structure and Organizational Crime' in G Geis and E Stotland (eds.) White-Collar Crime: Theory and Research. Beverly Hills, (CA: Sage Publications, 1980); H Finney and H R Lesieur, 'A Contingency Theory of Organizational Crime' in S B Bacharach and E Lawler (eds.), The Social Psychological Process (Research in the Sociology of Organizations, Vol.3), (Greenwich, CT: Jai Press, 1982); D Vaughan, Controlling Unlawful Organisational Behaviour, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1983).

[31] Lentzos and Woodward, 2007. The forms and explanations are accessible at: www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/
3CFFA8AC4E497426C12572DB00514912/$file/
CBM_Forms_Static_E.pdf or www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/
CEC2E2D361ADFEE7C12572BC0032F058?OpenDocument

[32] "Universalization of Confidence-Building Measures in the Biological Weapons" side event jointly hosted by France and UNIDIR, Thursday 4 December 2008, Palais des Nations.

Dr Filippa Lentzos is a Senior Research Fellow in the BIOS Centre of the London School of Economics. Her research is focused on biological disarmament and on the developing policies and regulatory frameworks around biosecurity and biodefence.

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