Disarmament Documentation
Back to the Index
US Statement & Press Conference at CD, January 24
Statement by John Bolton
Statement by John R. Bolton, US Under Secretary of State for
Arms Control and International Security, to the Conference on
Disarmament, Geneva, January 24.
Permit me to outline to this body, the world's oldest
multilateral arms control negotiating forum, the fundamental
elements of the Bush Administration's security policy. Our timing
is particularly opportune. The September 11 terrorist attacks have
made all too clear the grave threats to civilized nations that come
from terrorists who strike without warning, their state sponsors,
and rogue states that seek weapons of mass destruction. We must
defend our homelands, our forces, and our friends and allies
against these threats. And we must insist on holding accountable
states that violate their non-proliferation commitments.
The fight against terrorism will remain a top international
security priority. As President Bush said: "Our lives, our way of
life, and our every hope for the world depend on a single
commitment: The authors of mass murder must be defeated, and never
allowed to gain or use the weapons of mass destruction." The United
States and its partners in this fight will meet this threat with
every method at our disposal.
Above all, we are acting to end state sponsorship of terror. The
United States believes that with very few exceptions, terrorist
groups have not acquired and cannot acquire weapons of mass
destruction without the support of nation-states. This support
might be technical assistance. It might be funding. Perhaps such
assistance has taken the form of simply turning a blind eye to
terrorist camps within one's borders. But the fact that
governments, which sponsor terrorist groups, also are pursuing
chemical, biological, nuclear, and missile programs is alarming,
and cannot be ignored.
Nations that assist terror are playing a dangerous game. As
President Bush stated to a joint session of the US Congress last
fall: "We will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to
terrorism. Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to
make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From
this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support
terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile
regime."
If the September 11 terrorist attacks taught the United States
nothing else, it taught us not to underestimate the intentions and
capabilities of rogue states and terrorist groups. We will not be
complacent to the threat of any kind of attack on the United
States, especially from weapons of mass destruction, whether
chemical, biological, nuclear, or from missiles.
Chemical Weapons
On chemical weapons, the United States is alarmed by the
continuing spread of dangerous technology to countries pursuing
illegal programs. The United States is a strong proponent of the
Chemical Weapons Convention, which provides several useful tools to
combat chemical warfare programs. The United States has made
effective use of the consultation provision of Article IX of the
Convention to address our questions and compliance concerns. To
date, we have conducted several visits at the invitation of other
States Parties in a cooperative effort to resolve these questions
and compliance concerns. In many cases, this has proven to be
highly successful.
The United States will continue to use such consultation
mechanisms to enhance verification and promote full compliance with
the provisions of the Convention. Although bilateral consultations
are not a prerequisite for launching a challenge inspection, the
United States believes that challenge inspections may in some cases
be the most appropriate mechanism for resolving compliance
concerns.
Some States Parties have sought erroneously to characterize the
challenge inspection process as tantamount to an abuse of political
power. On the contrary, challenge inspections were included as a
fundamental component of the CWC verification regime that benefits
all States Parties, both as a deterrent to would-be violators and
as a fact-finding tool to address compliance concerns. They are a
flexible and indispensable tool that, if viewed realistically and
used judiciously, can be instrumental in achieving the goals of the
Chemical Weapons Convention. I caution those nations that are
violating the Chemical Weapons Convention: You should not be smug
in the assumption that your chemical warfare program will never be
uncovered and exposed to the international community.
Biological Weapons
On biological weapons, the United States made its position
crystal clear at the Fifth Review Conference of the Biological
Weapons Convention late last year: we will not condone violation of
the BWC. We flatly oppose flawed diplomatic arrangements that
purport to strengthen the BWC but actually increase the specter of
biological warfare by not effectively confronting the serious
problem of BWC noncompliance. It is for this reason that the United
States rejected the draft protocol to the Biological Weapons
Convention and the continuance of the BWC Ad Hoc Group and its
mandate, and offered an alternate way ahead.
Regarding the BWC protocol, the United States was urged to go
along with this proposal because it was "flawed, but better than
nothing." After an exhaustive evaluation within the US Government,
we decided that the protocol was actually counterproductive. New
approaches and new ways of thinking are needed to prevent the
proliferation of biological weapons.
The United States presented a number of new proposals to do just
this, including tightened national export controls, fully
implementing the BWC by nationally criminalizing activity that
violates it, intensified non-proliferation activities, increased
domestic preparedness and controls, enhanced biodefense and
counter-bioterrorism capabilities, and innovative measures against
disease outbreaks. Many, if not all of these measures can begin to
be implemented now. We look forward to discussing and refining them
with all of you and hope that you will join us in endorsing and
beginning to implement them as we prepare for the resumption of the
BWC Review Conference next November.
Nuclear Weapons
On nuclear weapons, the United States recently completed a
Nuclear Posture Review, the basic conclusions of which have
recently been made public. Fundamental to this review is the
assumption that the United States and Russia are no longer
adversaries, and, therefore, that such Cold War notions as mutual
assured destruction are no longer appropriate as the defining
characteristic of our strategic relationship. Accordingly,
President Bush has announced that the United States will reduce its
strategic nuclear force to a total of between 1,700 and 2,200
operationally deployed strategic warheads over the next ten years.
President Putin has made a similarly bold and historic decision
with respect to Russian strategic nuclear forces.
Given the new relationship between Moscow and Washington, the
specter of nuclear war between the United States and the Russian
Federation is now a comfortingly remote possibility. More likely is
the possibility of the use of nuclear or radiological weapons by
rogue states or terrorist groups. We are also currently faced with
dangerously-high tensions in south Asia between India and Pakistan,
both of which have nuclear explosive devices.
The proliferation of nuclear materials and technology is a
serious threat to international security. The International Atomic
Energy Agency's nuclear inspection system must be reinforced, as we
press others to adopt strengthened IAEA safeguards designed to
detect clandestine nuclear activities. The United States continues
to emphasize the importance of universal adherence to, as well as
full compliance with and implementation of, the NPT and
comprehensive safeguards. Countries such as North Korea and Iraq
must cease their violations of the NPT and allow the IAEA to do its
work. Further, I caution those who think that they can pursue
nuclear weapons without detection: the United States and its allies
will prove you wrong.
And let me reiterate US policy on nuclear weapons proliferation:
the United States regards the proliferation of nuclear weapons
technology as a direct threat to international security, and will
treat it accordingly. The same holds true for nations that traffic
in deadly chemical and biological weapons technology, and missile
systems.
Missiles
Almost every state that actively sponsors terror is known to be
seeking weapons of mass destruction and the missiles to deliver
them at longer and longer ranges. Their hope is to blackmail the
civilized world into abandoning the war on terror. They want the
United States and others to forsake their friends and allies and
security commitments around the world. September 11 reinforced our
resolve to build a limited missile defense shield to defend our
nation, friends, forces and interests against missile attacks from
rogue states and terrorist organizations who wish to destroy
civilized society.
It is an undeniable fact that the United States simply has no
defense against a missile attack on our homeland. While we do have
defenses against shorter-range missiles, we have none against even
a single missile launched against our cities. We must fill this
void in our defenses. As a result, we announced last month our
decision to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. This
was an important decision for the Bush Administration and was made
in close consultations with Moscow. Although our Russian friends
did not agree with our withdrawal decision, the world is aware of
the close and growing relationship between our two nations. Our new
strategic relationship is much broader than the ABM Treaty, as
evidenced by the announcement by both the United States and Russia
that we will reduce our offensive nuclear arsenals to the lowest
levels in decades.
We are also concerned about the spread of missile technology
that may not threaten the United States at this time, but poses
serious threats to our friends and allies, as well as to deployed
US forces. Too many nations are remiss in not controlling their
involvement in the proliferation of missile technology. We are
aware of a long list of missile proliferation activities by
enterprises from at least a dozen nations. Most of these
transactions are serious, and could result in US sanctions, as has
been done several times over the past year. The United States calls
on all countries to control missile-related transfers and ensure
that private companies operating within their borders cease illegal
missile transactions.
President Bush has made clear the imperative of restructuring
deterrence and defense capabilities to formulate a comprehensive
strategy to enhance our security. This strategy must include
strengthening non-proliferation measures (prevention), more robust
counter-proliferation capabilities (protection), and a new concept
of deterrence, relying more on missile defense and less on
offensive nuclear forces.
In this context, the security and well being of the United
States and its allies depend on the ability to operate in space.
America is committed to the exploration and use of outer space by
all nations for peaceful purposes for the benefit of humanity -
purposes that allow defense and intelligence-related activities in
pursuit of national security goals. We remain firmly committed to
the Outer Space Treaty, and we believe that the current
international regime regulating the use of space meets all our
purposes. We see no need for new agreements.
Future of the Conference on Disarmament
This point leads me to touch briefly on the future of this body,
the Conference on Disarmament. If it remains deadlocked in
futility, it will continue to lose credibility and the attention of
the world. To be productive and contribute to international
security, the CD must change the way it does business. It must
focus on new threats, such as efforts by terrorist groups to
acquire weapons of mass destruction. It must squarely face the
serious problem of violations of weapons of mass destruction
non-proliferation regimes and treaties. Finally, in order to
perform a useful function, the CD must put aside irreconcilable
differences and work on issues that are ready for negotiation, such
as a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. ...
I have one personal favor to ask the distinguished delegates in
this room. It has become fashionable to characterize my country as
"unilateralist" and against all arms control agreements.
Nonetheless, our commitment to multilateral regimes to promote
non-proliferation and international security never has been as
strong as it is today, through numerous arms control treaties and
non-proliferation arrangements, including the NPT, CFE, CWC, BWC,
LTBT, PNET, and the TTBT, as well as to non-proliferation regimes
like the Zangger Committee, the NSG, MTCR, the Wassenaar
Arrangement and the Australia Group. In fact, trying to
characterize our policy as "unilateralist" or "multilateralist" is
a futile exercise. Our policy is, quite simply, pro-American, as
you would expect.
The main emphasis of the Bush Administration's arms control
policy is the determination to enforce existing treaties, and to
seek treaties and arrangements that meet today's threats to peace
and stability, not yesterday's. Fundamental to the Bush
Administration's policy is the commitment to honor our arms control
agreements, and to insist that other nations live up to them as
well. Now is the time for the CD to build on its achievements to
forge additional restraints against the spread of weapons of mass
destruction. ...
Source: Text - Bolton Calls for Stronger Curbs on
Weapons of Mass Destruction, US State Department (Washington
File), January 24.
Press Conference by John Bolton
Press Conference by John Bolton, Geneva, January 24.
Question: If I could ask your view on CTBT, which you
didn't make any reference to today. Do you feel that CTBT is still
viable in the current context of the world? Does the US have any
plans at all - two years, three years, five years from now - to
resume testing?
John Bolton: As President Bush said during the 2000
Presidential election campaign, he opposes the CTBT and we have no
plans to seek Senate action on it as part of the nuclear posture
review the Department of Defense recently concluded that there was
a decision to try and upgrade our testing infrastructure so as to
make it possible to test in a relatively earlier time if a decision
were made. This has been widely misunderstood. I'd appreciate the
opportunity to correct it. We are going to continue to follow the
moratorium on testing that President Bush announced. This is simply
one way of being able to reduce the level of operational nuclear
warheads with some feeling of assurance that if the strategic
circumstances in the world change dramatically and a decision were
made sometime down the road we'd be in a better position in terms
of our testing and research infrastructure than we are now. We
continue to review the safety and reliability of the current stock
of warheads. That's something that's very high priority for the
Department of Defense and the Department of Energy, to be sure that
the deterrent remains safe and reliable for ourselves and our
allies. But, as I say, we have no plans to seek Senate action on
the Treaty.
Question: Could you elaborate more on what you said in
your statement on the Iraqi case concerning violations of NPT?
John Bolton: I think it's very clear in the three years
since Iraq has completely excluded the UN Weapons Inspectors that
they've been making efforts with respect to a number of weapons of
mass destruction including attempting to acquire a capability in
nuclear weapons. That's one obvious violation of their NPT
commitments. That's one of the reasons why we have tried for so
long to get the UN Inspectors back into Iraq. The head of UNMOVIC,
Hans Blix, the former head of IAEA, was just in Washington to meet
with Secretary Powell and others, including myself. The problem
with Iraq and its resistance to resolution 687 and its
unwillingness to comply with its international obligations, remains
a very serious issue for the US and I think for everyone.
Question: On biological weapons, I'd like to come back to
the argument that you considered the BWC protocol flawed and
counterproductive but then the US will present a number of new
proposals which will focus on national export controls, nationally
criminalizing activity and things like that. How much more
productive could that be if you leave it to the nations concerned
including the rogue states relying on their good will to do all
this, especially since you said in a recent speech in Washington,
if I am not mistaken, that this disarmament conference is like a
get together of the police and the Mafia trying to discuss a safer
world.
John Bolton: I think I said "to discuss their shared
interest in law enforcement" actually, something like that. The
measures that you referred to that I elaborated in the speech have
already been presented. We began to consult with our friends and
allies on them last summer in the run up to the BWC RevCon in
November and I might say that we thought that they enjoyed very
widespread support and hoped that had the RevCon come to a
conclusion it would have endorsed them. I don't think that they
alone solve the fundamental problem of non-compliance with the BWC,
which is one of the reasons that we felt that the draft protocol
that had been under negotiation was counterproductive. I think it
diverted people's attention from what the real issue was. The real
issue is that while the overwhelming majority of states are in
compliance with the BWC, there are a number that simply have lied
about the commitments that they have undertaken. I think it is one
of our priorities to insist on compliance with international
obligations that nations have undertaken and by focusing on the
issue of non-compliance you can more precisely see just exactly
where the problem is. And looking at the states that are in
violation of the BWC and are seeking other forms of weapons of mass
destruction, it is striking to see the coincidence between that
list of nations and the list of nations that are states sponsors of
terrorism in the more conventional sense. So I think we have a
fairly discrete group of countries that are both pursuing weapons
of mass destruction and have been aiding international terrorism
and I think that as part of the global campaign against terrorism,
as President Bush has made clear, we are going to be addressing
that in the months and years ahead.
Question: You've made reference to Iraq and North Korea
but no reference to Iran. What's the reason for that? You say that
the US insists on holding accountable states that violate the
non-proliferation commitments. What sort of accountability
structure do you have in mind?
John Bolton: This is like déjà vu all over
again: why did you name those two countries and not several others,
just as we had this discussion at the time of the Biological
Weapons Convention Review Conference. The cases of Iraq and North
Korea I think are particularly important now because they are the
subject of not just the NPT Treaty Commitments, but other
International commitments, the Agreed Framework in the case of
North Korea and the series of the UN resolutions in the case of
Iraq, which are intended to bring ultimately both those countries
in compliance. They're countries that are both subjected to
additional enforcement mechanisms, if you will, in addition simply
to their underlying commitments under the NPT. There is no doubt
that there are other countries that are also in violation of the
NPT. But for the purpose of today's conference I wanted to stress
those two because of the particular circumstances that I just
mentioned. All I can say, in terms of naming other ones, stay
tuned, I'm sure their time will come.
Question: And the accountability structure?
John Bolton: What we are trying to do is make clear that
if you focus on non-compliance with existing treaty obligations,
there ought to be ways, whether through our own action, through
actions with like-minded governments, or coalitions of the willing,
to make it clear to violators of the various arms control
agreements that we are not simply going to allow the behavior to
continue. Now I don't mean to indicate that there are specific
plans in mind, but what I do mean to say is that the time in which
countries could sign an international agreement like the Biological
Weapons Convention and lie about their performance under it, and
get away with it, hopefully is over.
Question: Two specific questions. First your comments on
CTBT. With the CTBT being dead and with the US now going slower,
completely silent on this, will FMCT negotiations have any teeth?
Would parties to the CD take FMCT talks seriously when the US is no
longer interested in CTBT. Second question: what do you mean by
civilized nations?
John Bolton: I think that the merits of an FMCT treaty
stand on their on. I don't think they are linked to CTBT, and I
think as I indicated in the statement, it's one of the objectives
of [the new US] Ambassador Javits and our delegation here to try
and break through the gridlock that the CD's been in for the past
six or seven years, and see in particular if it's possible to make
progress on CTBT. It does indicate to us that one of the reasons
that we are, as I think we all are, concerned about the situation
on the subcontinent, is that we don't have a strategic framework, a
policy framework, for dealing with the question of India and
Pakistan's nuclear capabilities post-1998. The CTBT and the NPT
obviously didn't do anything to slow it down since neither state
was a party to the NPT. But it is a matter of high priority for the
United States. Secretary Powell has been to the region twice most
recently, and then a couple months ago as well. These are issues
that we will undoubtedly being focusing on. With respect with your
second question on the definition of civilized states, I will
simply leave it for today's purposes as saying that all those
states that are not engaged in sponsoring, aiding or harboring
terrorists, and the implication, as President Bush has said
repeatedly, is even states that have been supporters or harborers
of terrorists in the past can change their behavior. That's part of
what global campaign is about not simply the multifaceted step
financial, law enforcement, intelligence sharing, military,
political and others, but helping to convince states that their
long term best interest lies in abjuring terrorism and the pursuit
of weapons of mass destruction entirely.
Question: In the plenary just now both Iraq and North
Korea responded to your statements and both countries said that
delegations from the International Atomic Energy Agency had visited
their country recently and did not seem to have any problems. And
North Korea accused the United States of not leaving up to the
agreement that it signed with North Korea in 1994 and not building
the two large reactors and saying that because of problems between
the Congress and the administration deliveries of heavy oil that
were promised had been delayed causing difficulties. Could you
respond to those questions?
John Bolton: Let me do North Korea first. The fact of the
matter is that North Korea has been in violation of its NPT
obligations ever since it signed the agreed framework. It has not,
to this day, permitted the IAEA sufficient access for the IAEA even
to make a baseline determination of what materials and technology
North Korea has. Let alone the kind of verification and analysis
that the IAEA needs to be able to do to determine how much fissile
material the North has. So, it is just a fantasy to say that North
Korea has been cooperating with the IAEA. The United States has
been in compliance with the agreed framework to the extent we can
be, dealing with the regime like the one in Pyongyang. We are going
to continue to try and work with Japan and South Korea to bring the
North Koreans into compliance with their obligations to what they
committed to in 1994. Time is running out and I think they are
beginning to understand that. And as far as Iraq goes, why anybody
takes what they say seriously I'm not sure I understand. If they
are so confident about what they said here today, they ought to let
the UN weapon inspectors in and allow them and IAEA to have full
access countrywide, no game preserves, no sealed off areas, as they
have for the past several years.
Question: If I could follow up, you said time is running
out on the 1994 framework agreement, could you elaborate on that?
The North Koreans, if I recall correctly, are saying that it's the
US, Japan and South Korea that are not doing what was agreed to in
terms of providing the light water reactor.
John Bolton: The agreement in Article 4 very specifically
says that before the key elements to the reactors are delivered,
North Korea has to come in full compliance with the NPT and their
IAEA safeguards agreement. If you look at the time involved with
how much is required to construct the reactors and to bring them
fully into operation, and lay it next to the amount of time that
IAEA will need to do the kind of professional job that they will do
to verify whether in fact North Korea has made a complete baseline
declaration and they have been able to do all their analyses, in
order for those to come together, IAEA and its inspectors and the
work it needs to do, needs to begin moving at a very rapid pace in
the very near future. If that bubble of IAEA activity doesn't start
in time, then the bubble underneath it of finishing the light water
reactors won't be finished in time. But it would be clear after
seven or eight years of not really facing that kind of time
pressure, that if North Korea does not comply with the requirements
of the IAEA, that it will be unambiguously North Korea in
noncompliance. If they comply, then we will comply as well. ...
Question: Can you throw some light where the US stands on
anti-satellite weapons? Your statement doesn't indicate anything
about it.
John Bolton: My statement did say: we support the Outer
Space Treaty and we have been concerned for quite sometime with
threats that might be posed to our communications infrastructure
and the satellite networks that we have in space. ... But as I said
in my prepared remarks, we don't see any need for further
agreements with respect to space at this point.
Source: Transcript - Bolton Says US Will Not Resume
Nuclear Testing, US State Department (Washington File), January
24.
Russian Reaction to John Bolton Statement
'In Connection with the Speech of US Under Secretary of State
John R. Bolton,' Russian Foreign Ministry Statement, Document
148-28-01-2002, January 28.
Moscow has taken note of the speech of US Under Secretary of
State John R. Bolton, which he made at the Conference on
Disarmament in Geneva setting forth the main elements of the policy
of the administration of George W. Bush in the area of
international security and disarmament.
Russia shares the understanding of the need for the maximum
concentration of the international community's efforts on the fight
against international terrorism and on counteraction against new
threats and challenges. Likewise one cannot but agree with the US
proposals for the building-up of efforts to strengthen the
internationally recognized non-proliferation standards and regimes,
and to prevent the slightest possibility of weapons of mass
destruction being turned into an instrument of blackmail and
terror.
Yet Moscow is convinced that the most important aspect of the
consolidation of strategic stability and international security
under today's conditions must be the preservation and strengthening
of the existing arms control and non-proliferation treaties and
agreements.
At the same time a whole series of US approaches to disarmament
problems - and they found again their reflection in the Bolton
speech - objectively complicate the situation, and undermine the
international legal system in the disarmament field. It is the
United States' decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty of 1972,
which Russia considers erroneous. It is the unwillingness of
Washington to ratify the START II Treaty, and the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, its rejection of the continuation of work
on the verification mechanism under the Convention on the
Prohibition of Biological Weapons. In spite of the support by the
overwhelming majority of countries for the start of the negotiation
process on averting an arms race in outer space at the Conference
on Disarmament, in fact the US alone does not see any need for
this.
Russia regards the Conference on Disarmament as a unique
international negotiation forum for the elaboration of universal
disarmament agreements. In the conditions of globalization we see
no way of dealing with international problems except on the basis
of extensive cooperation among states. We once again declare our
readiness for the search of mutually acceptable solutions as to the
commencement of the substantive work of the Conference in the
spirit of the compromise proposals already made by the Russian side
on the program of work.
© 2002 The Acronym Institute.
|
