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Speech by US Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham, February 8

'The Future of Nuclear Non-Proliferation', speech by US Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham, World Affairs Council Luncheon, Los Angeles, February 8; US Energy Department transcript, News Release PR-02-022, February 8.

By overseeing our nation's nuclear weapons capability and stockpile, as well as many of the nation's non-proliferation efforts abroad, the Department of Energy performs essential national security missions. It's the latter of these topics - nuclear non-proliferation - that I would like to address today. Our nuclear non-proliferation programs are about preventing, detecting, and reversing the spread of weapons of mass destruction, while improving nuclear security worldwide. A large part of our non-proliferation effort focuses on securing nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union. I don't believe I have any higher priority as Secretary than to significantly improve the reach and effectiveness of our programs in this area.

That means making major progress toward ensuring that Russian weapons and nuclear material are protected from theft; that Russian plutonium production is ended, that excess Russian nuclear material is converted to reactor fuel rather than weapons; that the United States continues to lead international efforts to control proliferation, and that still more advanced technological tools are developed to detect and prevent proliferation and terrorism. By my lights, if we can continue to make real progress on this agenda, then my tenure as Secretary will have been a success, no matter what else I accomplish.

Let me begin by discussing a bit of the history of our nation's non-proliferation activities. I hope that doing so will supply some context when I discuss the new directions on which we are embarking.

The death of the Soviet Union a decade ago didn't just end the Cold War and break up an empire. It left over 40,000 nuclear weapons as orphans, along with a vast quantity of unprotected nuclear materials. It also left thousands of scientists and engineers from the former Soviet nuclear weapons complex faced with declining - or disappearing - paychecks. Complicating this grave situation was the fact that some of these weapons and materials were in places that were no longer part of Russia. And even those weapons and materials that could be found in the new Russia were no longer well secured; in the economic and political chaos that followed the collapse of communism, this new nation lacked the means to protect them effectively.

The United States recognized the importance of dealing with this challenge. Under the leadership of my former Senate colleagues Sam Nunn, Richard Lugar, and Pete Domenici, we established the Cooperative Threat Reduction program and its counterpart at the Department of Energy. Since then, working with Russia's new leaders, the United States has safeguarded warheads, assisted in dismantling strategic weapons, and taken a number of other important steps to prevent Russian weapons and materials from posing new threats to us and to our allies.

We have not undertaken these programs out of charity, but because they are clearly in our national security interest. The theft of only a very small quantity of high-enriched Uranium or Plutonium, the deadly ingredients needed to fashion a nuclear device, would be enough for a crude but potentially devastating nuclear weapon. That's why extra dedication and vigilance and determination are required to see that these materials don't fall into the wrong hands.

The situation has shifted somewhat since we embarked on this course a decade ago. Other factors have arisen to create a new sort of vulnerability today. The threats to our safety and security have worsened. For instance, there are simply more people interested in acquiring deadly materials, be they rogue states like Iraq, or terrorists like Osama bin Laden. We know of almost 200 documented attempts to acquire illicit nuclear materials over this period - and that's just the known cases. So, as the United States takes its first steps into the 21st Century, we are facing a situation we think is, frankly, more harrowing than it was a decade ago.

Some credit must go to the previous Administration for shining a light on some of these issues. Just ten days before President Bush assumed the Oval Office, a bipartisan task force led by former Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker and former White House Counsel Lloyd Cutler delivered a report - put together after nearly a year of study - assessing DOE's non-proliferation programs in Russia. Among the most critical things facing the new Bush Administration was this conclusion from the Baker-Cutler report:

"The most urgent unmet national security threat to the United States today is the danger that weapons of mass destruction or weapons-usable material in Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile nation states and used against American troops abroad or citizens at home. This threat is a clear and present danger to the international community as well as to American lives and liberties."

For that reason, and because of concerns of his own, the President immediately launched a comprehensive review of our non-proliferation programs, particularly emphasizing those with Russia. We wanted to compare their effectiveness and applicability today versus when they were developed. Working with National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, and Secretary of State Colin Powell, we undertook an exhaustive evaluation to see what was working, where everything stood, and what needed to be reconfigured. This was the first systematic, disciplined non-proliferation policy review in a decade.

We were nearing the end of this review when something occurred to put an enormous exclamation point on the work we were doing. I am referring, of course, to September 11. In the days afterward, when it was revealed that behind the attacks was a network of terrorists, international purveyors of horror and destruction, dedicated to killing Americans simply for being Americans, there was one matter on everyone's mind: What if they had nuclear weapons?

There was little question that these terrorists would use nuclear weapons if they could acquire them. A movement that glories in wholesale slaughter could have no greater ambition than procuring nuclear weapons for use against innocent Americans and our allies.

At a time when much of the world was paralyzed by the horror of what had happened, this Administration was quick to respond. President Bush sent me to Vienna on September 17 to represent America at a meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the international body that serves as the global focal point for nuclear cooperation. Much of its work is dedicated to non-proliferation. At the top of our agenda that day was what we could do to help prevent a nuclear 9-11.

In my remarks to the IAEA, I made clear that the United States fully supported a more robust physical and export controls over nuclear materials, greater accountability, and a greater acceptance of responsibility to ensure nuclear materials are used, stored and disposed of safely. I also made clear that we expected all nations to do their part. Because after September 11, there are no excuses left.

In the weeks and months that followed, one development in particular arose that gives me optimism that our efforts would succeed. And that is the even closer ties between our nation and the Russian Federation forged by President Bush and President Putin. It was obvious to the world that these leaders developed a deep bond after 9-11, particularly during their summit in Crawford, Texas. This friendship between our countries' leaders heralds a positive new friendship for our nations.

In a joint statement, the two signified that a new international framework must hold for the 21st century, one of strategic partnership. "Our countries are embarked on a new relationship," they said: "The United States and Russia have overcome the legacy of the Cold War. Neither country regards the other as an enemy or threat. .... We affirm our determination to meet the threats to peace in the 21st Century. Among these threats are terrorism ... [and] proliferation of weapons of mass destruction." They had special words to say about non-proliferation matters: "Both sides agree that urgent attention must continue to be given to improving the physical protection and accounting of nuclear materials of all possessor states, and preventing illicit nuclear trafficking."

Shortly thereafter, I was sent to Russia by President Bush to work on expanding and accelerating the cooperation efforts cemented earlier by the two presidents. My partner in this effort is Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Alexander Rumyantsev. Our relationship embodies the new spirit of cooperation of which our presidents spoke so eloquently. In Moscow, Minister Rumyantsev and I announced an agreement for an expanded and accelerated US-Russian effort to strengthen the protection of nuclear material. As a result of this agreement we expect to improve by years the time when Russian nuclear materials are protected by comprehensive security features. We also agreed to work together to enhance the international nuclear weapons non-proliferation regime and to improve measures on nuclear materials' physical protection. The Minister and I are personally engaged in supervising this new agreement on a day-to-day basis, in order to ensure that bureaucratic obstacles and any residual Cold War suspicions are overcome quickly.

While in Moscow I also met with the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy, Admiral Vladimir Kuroyedov. The United States has been working for years with the Russian Navy to improve the security of their nuclear warheads; Admiral Kuroyedov and I discussed how to accelerate this work as well. If one good thing can come out of the tragedy of September 11, it's that our nation is now working more closely with Moscow on issues of national security - ours as well as theirs - than we have done at any time in the post-Soviet era.

On my way back to the United States, I once more stopped in Vienna to brief the IAEA on these recent developments for international cooperation. I pledged on behalf of the United States that we would contribute financial support to further IAEA's efforts. And I called for the international community to revise and strengthen the Convention for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, which we view as an urgent matter.

Subsequently, our Administration finalized our internal reviews of non-proliferation programs with Russia. I'm pleased today to initiate for the first time a public discussion of the results of that review.

Accelerating our efforts to secure nuclear materials; re-orienting technical research and development; reworking our nuclear safety programs to have a global reach - these are just some of the steps we're taking as a result of our reviews. I'd like to discuss each briefly.

I can't over-emphasize the importance of our research and development initiatives to staying steps ahead of those who would harm us, or our friends and allies. Detecting anthrax and other biological agents in hours, not days; deploying a biological detection capability at the Salt Lake City Olympics; applying new detection technologies to chemical and biological agents - these activities are at the heart of our mission.

We're accelerating our Material Protection, Control and Accounting program, a unique initiative that provides " low-tech, high payoff" solutions to the problem of under-secured nuclear materials in Russia. This is a program that is already a success story, with security upgrades completed or underway on 600 metric tons of weapons-usable material; hundreds of trucks and railcars in Russia made more secure through

hardening and other measures; and material consolidated at fewer locations, making it less vulnerable to sabotage or terrorist attacks. This is truly where the rubber meets the road, and the results speak for themselves. We are now planning to complete that program by 2008 - two years ahead of schedule. We're working with Russia to strengthen its borders, for example by installing radiation detection equipment at transit and border sites throughout Russia, to better prevent smuggling of sensitive materials outside of that country. And we're working to consolidate sensitive materials at fewer sites throughout Russia, thereby reducing its vulnerability to theft or sabotage. And by employing these scientists for peaceful, viably commercial purposes, we dramatically reduce the talent pool available to those states that would employ these individuals for their own evil ends.

And, finally, let me note one of the most important decisions we have made with respect to our relationship with Russia. After considerable study, we have reaffirmed plans to dispose of 34 metric tons of Russian surplus weapons grade plutonium (as well as 34 tons of American plutonium) by turning the material into mixed oxide fuel - or MOX fuel - for use in nuclear reactors. Some challenged this program because of the cost of US disposal. We've cut the US costs by revising our plans. Compared to the program we inherited, we will save almost two billion dollars and advance the program's completion by three years.

Russia has been unwilling to proceed with its own disposal without a firm US commitment to comparable reduction. Now we have that commitment, reaffirmed at the highest level of our government and fully funded in our new budget. We are now working with Russia to improve the efficiency of the Russian program and are working with our allies to ensure adequate international support. As a result of these efforts, Russia will eliminate enough plutonium to make over 4,200 nuclear weapons.

I don't want to give the idea that our programs are only about Russia, however. DOE's initiatives have a worldwide reach. We're securing materials in Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Uzbekestan. We're working closely with the IAEA, as I mentioned. And I'm pleased with the progress we're making. An example of our progress can be found in our announcement last week that the government of Kazakhstan and the Department of Energy have entered into a new agreement on a project at Kazakhstan's Ulba Metallurgical Plant to recover low-enriched uranium for use in civil power reactors. This project will benefit not only Kazakhstan, but US industry as well.

All this adds up to a series of initiatives that have enormous value on their own, but taken together form a cohesive and effective response to today's pressing threats. It's an effort with which I'm extremely proud to be associated.

In hearing me lay out such an ambitious new plan of action, you might ask if the proof is in the pudding. By " pudding," I mean our budget. I'm happy to tell you that the President's budget is totally consistent with this expanded, accelerated, comprehensive approach.

We requested almost $1.2 billion in FY 2003 for non-proliferation and related activities, the highest amount at which these programs have ever been funded and one-third higher than the last budget of the previous administration. Within that total amount, we are asking for $800 million to support our non-proliferation programs with Russia, an increase of $115 million - 17 percent above the Fiscal Year 2002 appropriated level. In addition, we reversed the past decline in research and development, allocating over a quarter of a billion dollars to technology for countering proliferation and terrorism.

All this follows on the heels of a significant FY '02 supplemental - over $220 million - for research and development, materials security, and other key programs. It's for no small reason that I am confident that the Department can meet the ambitious agenda I laid out at the beginning of my talk.

This is a budget that reflects the President's total commitment to do what it takes to make our country secure, and is fully consistent with the President's Homeland Security initiatives. I'm glad that DOE will be able to continue to do its part, and to do so in such an effective, fully supported fashion.

Earlier I said my mission in this office was to effectively advance, maintain, and if possible expand the effectiveness of the nuclear non-proliferation program. I strongly believe we are well on our way to achieving our goals. I believe there is a growing consensus in Congress that will ensure the support necessary to achieve success. And I believe, in Russia, we have an equally committed partner.

The nature of the war on terrorism is such that it is often difficult to pinpoint success or highlight good news. In the arena of nuclear non-proliferation, we have much work to do and huge challenges before us. But through the leadership of President Bush, the support of Congress, and the cooperation of Russia, we are making progress that can be justly described as good news. ...

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